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ABSTRACT	
NATION	BRAND,	NATIONAL	PRESTIGE,	AND	THE	SOCIAL	IMAGINARIES	OF	THE	
ADVANCED	NATION	IN	SOUTH	KOREA	
	
FEBRUARY	2021	
	
JUNG-YUP	LEE,	B.A.,	SEOUL	NATIONAL	UNIVERSITY,	SOUTH	KOREA	
	
M.A.,	SEOUL	NATIONAL	UNIVERSITY,	SOUTH	KOREA		
	
Ph.D.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS	AMHERST	
	
Directed	by:	Professor	Henry	Geddes	
	
The	dissertation	focused	on	how	the	discourses	and	institutions	of	nation	
branding	and	public	diplomacy	reshaped	the	social	imaginary	of	the	nation.	
Following	the	trajectory	of	the	nation	branding	discourse	in	South	Korea	in	the	first	
fifteen	years	of	the	21st	century,	I	examined	different	moments	of	the	re-imagining	
of	the	nation	by	multiple	agents	with	regard	to	nation	branding	and	public	
diplomacy.		
Firstly,	I	examined	how	the	news	media	played	a	crucial	mediating	role	in	
importing	and	disseminating	the	globally	emerging	discourse	of	nation	branding	in	
collaboration	with	private	and	public	think	tanks	in	the	early	and	mid	2000s.	
Secondly,	I	examined	how	the	South	Korean	government	instituted	the	media-
promoted	public	agenda	of	nation	branding	as	a	highly	visible	official	public	policy	
by	setting	up	the	Presidential	Council	for	Nation	Branding	in	2009.	Lastly,	I	
examined	how	the	public	diplomacy	efforts	by	non-state	agencies	and	their	critiques	
from	the	online	subculture	and	the	media	and	publicity	experts.			
To	complete	this	research,	I	collected	and	analyzed	data	from	news	media	
reports,	policy-related	documents	by	governmental	agencies,	and	internet	blogs,	
	 vii 
online	forums,	and	OP/ED	columns.	I	adopted	the	political	economy	perspective	to	
analyze	the	economic	and	political	interests;	the	narrative	analysis	of	the	news	
media	discourse;	the	political-economy	and	image	analysis	of	the	public	service	
advertisement;	and	the	discursive	analysis	of	the	public	controversies	on	online	
forums	and	news	media.			
I	discovered	that	the	discursive	practices	of	nation	branding	and	public	
diplomacy	conducted	by	different	agencies	converged	into	the	idea	of	“national	
prestige”	and	the	post-developmental	reimagining	of	the	advanced	nation	in	terms	
of	culture	and	civility.	However,	the	different	agencies	reimagined	the	advanced	
nation	in	varied	ways:	in	the	news	media	discourse,	it	was	imagined	as	a	business-
friendly	and	“lawful	and	orderly”	nation;	in	the	public	policy	discourse,	it	was	
imagined	as	a	neoliberal	“brand	nation,”;	in	the	online	subculture	discourse,	it	was	
imagined	negatively	as	an	opposite	of	the	current	status;	and	in	the	experts’	
discourse,	it	was	imagined	as	a	culturally	sophisticated,	globally	accepted	nation.		
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CHAPTER	1		
INTRODUCTION	
	
IMF	crisis,	World	Cup,	Sewol	ferry	disaster	and	presidential	impeachment.	
These	are	historical	events	which	epitomized	the	drastic	social	transformation	in	
South	Korea	for	the	last	two	decades.	As	a	native	South	Korean,	I	have	personally	
experienced	and	observed	the	historical	turmoil.	The	experiences	and	observations	
of	these	events	contributed	to	the	initial	formation	and	continued	development	of	
the	main	idea	of	the	dissertation	research.	Let	me	begin	this	dissertation	with	a	few	
snapshots	of	these	historical	events	and	reflect	on	how	they	informed	this	
dissertation	on	the	discourses	and	institutions	of	nation	branding,	national	prestige,	
and	the	advanced	nation	for	the	last	two	decades.		
Scene	#1:	In	December	1997,	in	the	midst	of	global	financial	meltdown,	South	
Korea	had	no	choice	but	to	accept	the	reform	program	proposed	by	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	in	exchange	for	a	bailout.	The	financial	crisis,	
usually	called	“IMF	wigi”	(literally	meaning	the	“IMF	crisis”)	in	South	Korea,	
practically	put	an	end	to	an	era	of	rapid	national	economic	growth	and	the	state-led	
development	in	South	Korea.	IMF	wigi	in	fact	opened	up	the	era	of	the	
neoliberalization	of	the	whole	society,	characterized	by	rapid	liberalization,	market	
opening,	financialization,	privatization,	labor	flexibility,	widening	income	and	asset	
gap,	intensifying	competition,	the	highest	suicidal	rate	among	OECD	countries,	and	
the	lowest	birth	rate	in	the	world.	IMF	wigi	happened	partly	due	to	the	segyehwa	
initiative	introduced	in	1993-4	by	the	Kim	Young-sam	government.	Segyehwa,	
literally	meaning	“advancing	into	the	world,”	was	regarded	as	the	“next	step	of	
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Korean	development”	(K.-Y.	Shin,	2000,	p.	431)	and	taken	as	an	expression	of	the	
“national	pride	of	successful	economic	growth”	(p.	430).	However,	with	IMF	wigi,	it	
turned	into	its	opposite.	The	oppositional	party	and	the	news	media	called	the	
bailout	a	“national	disgrace,”	invoking	“the	1910	national	disgrace”	(Kyŏngsul	
kukch’i)	in	which	Korea	was	forcibly	annexed	to	Japan	and	lost	its	state	sovereignty.	
This	description	of	“disgrace”	and	the	sense	that	the	country	collapsed	were	so	
widely	accepted	and	circulated	as	a	taken-for-granted	expression	that	the	National	
Archives	of	Korea	put	the	title	on	the	article	about	the	currency	crisis,	“The	day	of	
national	economic	disgrace	with	55-billion-dollar	debt”	(Nam).		
Scene	#2:	Approximately	four	and	a	half	years	later,	in	June	2002,	South	
Korea	co-hosted	the	2002	World	Cup	soccer	games	with	Japan.	The	South	Korean	
team	unexpectedly	kept	winning	and	ended	up	taking	the	4th	place.	The	news	media	
lauded	the	achievement	of	the	national	team	as	well	as	the	orderly	cheering	by	the	
crowd	in	the	street	as	the	case	for	enhancing	the	international	image	and	the	nation	
brand	of	the	country.	The	news	media	praised	how	the	achievement	in	sports	could	
generate	economic	effects	by	helping	the	growth	of	exports	and	GDP,	boosting	the	
consumer	sentiment,	restoring	national	confidence	among	the	people,	and	
enhancing	the	national	brand	image	(Y.-s.	Sin,	2002).	The	street	cheering	featured	
the	chant	of	“Taehanminguk,”1	the	full	official	name	of	South	Korea.	It	was	by	this	
moment	that	it	began	to	be	used	on	sports	broadcasting	and	in	many	other	
	
1	“Taehanminguk	대한민국”	is	the	official	name	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	
(South	Korea),	literally	meaning	the	“great	people’s	nation	of	Han.”	
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occasions.	This	was	the	moment	when	the	state	was	approved	by	the	majority	of	
publics	as	an	object	of	national	and	personal	pride.		
Scene	#3:	Nearly	twelve	years	later,	in	the	morning	of	April	16,	2014,	a	
coastal	ferry	named	Sewol	flipped	and	sank	while	carrying	more	than	500	
passengers	to	Cheju	island.	The	drowning	of	more	than	304	passengers	in	the	
sinking	ferry,	mostly	high	school	students	on	a	school	trip,	was	broadcast	
nationwide	on	live	television.	National	audiences	painfully	watched	the	scene	on	
television	in	which	the	authorities	were	not	able	to	provide	any	proper	efforts	of	
rescuing.	The	disaster	traumatized	publics	and	raised	the	question	about	the	role	of	
the	state	in	protecting	and	saving	the	lives	of	the	people.	Despaired	of	the	
incompetence	and	irresponsibility	of	the	government,	the	families	of	the	victims	and	
protesters	shouted	and	cried,	“Ige	naranya	이게	나라냐?”,	which	means,	“Is	this	a	
nation?”	The	sense	that	the	disaster	exposed	how	South	Korea	lacked	a	properly	
working	“normal	nation”	was	widely	shared.	The	disaster	was	further	linked	to	the	
downfall	of	“national	prestige,”	the	international	status	of	the	country,	so	that	one	
year	later	the	appeal	court	judge	put	the	ferry	captain	in	life	sentence,	blaming	him	
for,	among	others,	driving	“national	prestige”	down	(C.-n.	Cho,	2015).		
Scene	#4:	About	two	and	a	half	years	later,	in	November	and	December	2016,	
the	chant	“Ige	naranya!”	continued	in	the	street,	being	shouted	and	sung	by	millions	
of	people	in	the	street.2	President	Park	Geun-hye	was	blamed	for	defrauding	the	
	
2	Kim	Ho-ch’ŏl,	a	famous	minjung	gayo	(people’s	song)	composer,	adopting	
the	chant,	wrote	a	satire	song,	“Ige	Naranya,	SB 이게	나라냐,	ㅅㅂ(Is	this	a	nation,	
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government	and	abusing	the	power	for	her	secret	associate.	She	was	impeached	in	
the	National	Assembly	in	December	and	finally	removed	from	office	by	the	
determination	in	the	Constitutional	Court	in	March	2017.	As	the	chant	and	the	song	
symbolized,	the	candlelight	demonstration	protested	against	the	incompetent	and	
irresponsible	government	and	the	corrupt	President	and	asked	for	a	properly	
working,	“normal	nation”	(K.-i.	Park,	2017;	T.	a.-k.	Yi,	2012,	p.	28).	The	candlelight	
demonstration	and	the	subsequent	impeachment	stood	out	not	only	because	it	
mobilized	a	historic	number	of	people,	but	because	they	went	on	completely	within	
the	boundary	of	the	constitutional	and	legal	limit	in	an	obsessive	manner.	The	
weekly	protests	were	running	completely	peaceful	without	any	violence.	The	news	
media	frequently	featured	the	scene	in	which	many	participants	voluntarily	
collected	garbage	and	cleaned	up	the	street	at	midnight	after	the	event	of	protest	
(Noh,	2016).	The	non-violent	protest	as	well	as	the	cleaned-up	street	by	voluntary	
citizens	might	epitomize	the	image	of	a	properly	working	“normal	nation”	and	
provide	the	source	of	national	pride	among	South	Koreans.	A	former	human	rights	
lawyer,	Moon	Jae-in	of	the	oppositional	Democratic	Party	was	elected	as	President	
in	May	2017,	proclaiming	to	build	“Naradaun	nara	(a	decent	nation)”	(Moon,	2017,	
p.	15).3	
	
Mofo).”	The	song	was	frequently	played	through	the	PA	speakers	during	the	
demonstration	and	widely	sung	along	by	protesters.		
3	"Naradaun	nara	나라다운	나라"	is	one	of	the	phrases	which	are	used	as	a	
slogan	to	indicate	the	orientation	of	state	management	by	the	Moon	government.	
The	Korean	phrase	could	be	translated	into	English	in	various	ways.	In	the	official	
translation	of	the	presidential	speeches,	it	was	translated	into	"a	decent	nation"	
(Moon,	2017,	p.	15)	and	"a	properly	functioning	country"	(Moon,	2017,	p.	23).	Word	
by	word,	it	can	also	be	translated	into	a	"nation	of	a	nation-worth."	
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Twenty	years	apart,	these	four	snapshots	of	the	historical	events	capture	the	
ups	and	downs	of	the	collective	experiences	and	perceptions	in	contemporary	South	
Korean	society.	Although	they	do	not	necessarily	seem	to	be	closely	connected	at	
first	glance,	they	are	marked	by	common	threads	which	run	through	the	two	
decades.		
First	of	all,	while	these	events	are	different	events	in	nature	—	financial,	
festive,	disastrous,	and	political	—	the	perception	of	them	converged	into	the	idea	of	
the	state	and	the	nation.	While	it	seems	natural	to	think	of	them	at	national	level	
considering	the	size	and	significance	of	these	events,	it	is	striking	that	these	
snapshots	ended	up	being	certain	images	and	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	the	
nation.	Clearly,	the	snapshots	hint	how	all	aspects	of	public	life	is	understood	from	
the	perspective	of	the	state	and	the	nation.		
Secondly,	these	events	are	typically	perceived	and	described	in	affective	
terms	of	the	pride	and	shame	of	the	state	and	the	nation.	It	suggests	that	publics	
have	been	deeply	concerned	about	international	recognition	as	well	as	self-
awareness	of	the	international	status	of	South	Korea.			
Lastly,	while	the	images	and	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	the	nation	
continued	to	be	central	to	the	public	mind	throughout	modern	South	Korea,	the	
snapshots	suggest	that	a	certain	perception	of	the	state	and	the	nation	emerged	
during	this	era	out	of	old	and	fading	images	from	the	earlier	era.	Especially,	a	certain	
aspiration	for	a	more	desirable	state	and	nation	is	a	common	theme.	The	underlying	
demand	and	aspiration	for	a	better	public	life	stands	out	through	the	imaginaries	of	
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a	functioning	normal	state,	an	advanced	country,	a	nation	of	nation-worth,	and	a	
proud	nation.		
Bracketed	by	these	historical	events,	the	dissertation	is	an	attempt	to	make	
sense	of	a	broad	social	transformation	in	South	Korea	by	following	how	the	images	
and	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	the	nation	evolved	with	significant	political	and	
cultural	implications.	For	this	investigation,	the	dissertation	takes	the	discourses	of	
nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	an	advanced	nation	as	keywords	which	
provide	a	potentially	powerful	access	to	the	changes	in	contemporary	cultural	
politics	in	South	Korea.	I	will	examine	how	these	discourses	traversed	different	
institutional	terrains	such	as	the	news	media,	government	policy,	and	public	talks.		
Inspired	by	Charles	Taylor	(1990,	1995,	2002)	and	other	scholars	(Anderson,	
2006,	pp.	22-30;	Crane,	1998,	1999;	Gupta,	2007,	p.	270;	T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998;	
Orgad,	2014;	Wyatt,	2005a,	2005b),	I	use	the	keywords	such	as	national	imaginary	
and	state	imagination	to	refer	to	the	way	in	which	national	publics	make	sense	of	
self	and	the	world	dominantly	in	terms	of	the	state	and	the	nation	through	
discourses	of	nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	the	advanced	nation	
(Aronczyk,	2013;	Kaneva,	2012;	Valaskivi,	2016,	more	discussion	will	follow	in	the	
next	chapter).	To	examine	the	changes	and	continuities	of	national	imaginary	and	
state	imagination,	I	look	at	representations,	narratives,	rhetoric,	and	discourses	in	
the	news	media,	public	policy,	and	public	talks.	I	use	the	term	discourse	in	a	
Foucauldian	sense,	defined	as	a	body	of	specific	knowledge	governed	by	rules	which	
make	certain	ways	of	thinking	make	sense	and	not	others	(Bacchi,	2000;	2009,	more	
discussions	will	follow	later	in	this	chapter).	Nation	branding	and	related	ideas	of	
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national	prestige	and	an	“advanced	nation”	are	discourses	in	this	sense	because	of	
the	ways	they	form	certain	ways	of	thinking	and	imagining	and	generate	knowledge	
and	imaginations	about	the	state	and	the	nation.		
The	English	terms	the	state	and	the	nation	are	already	charged	with	complex	
historical	meanings,	but	they	are	more	complicated	in	South	Korean	historical	
context.	The	term	kukka	국가 or	nara	나라 in	Korean	can	be	translated	into	state,	
usually	referring	to	institutions	and	systems	of	government.	But	it	has	a	wider	
implication	in	South	Korean	context,	encompassing	the	aspect	of	political	
community,	which	is	captured	by	the	English	term	nation	as	an	“imagined	
community”	(Anderson,	1983).	The	distinct	use	of	the	term	국가	in	South	Korea	
might	epitomize	the	central	position	of	the	state	in	the	national	imaginary.	The	
phrase	“the	state	and	the	nation”	frequently	used	in	this	dissertation	is	intended	to	
match	the	Korean	term	국가,	where	the	two	terms	are	closely	bound	together.		
Nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	the	“advanced	nation”	
Nation	branding	is	a	set	of	discursive	and	institutional	practices	that	aim	to	
project	a	positive	image	of	a	country	to	the	outside	world	by	adopting	business	
techniques	of	marketing	and	branding	(Kaneva,	2011a,	p.	118).	It	has	been	avidly	
disseminated	and	widely	circulated	by	transnational	business	marketing/branding	
consultants	and	adopted	by	many	governments	around	the	world.	Indeed,	for	the	
last	two	decades,	nation	branding	has	become	a	public	policy	fad	across	the	globe	
from	advanced	capitalist	countries	like	Japan	and	the	UK	to	developing	and	
transitional	countries	in	Eastern	and	Central	Europe	and	Southeast	Asia.	Thus,	for	
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the	last	twenty	years	or	so,	we	have	seen	nation	branding	slogans	such	as	“Cool	
Britannia,”	“Cool	Japan,”	“100%	Pure	New	Zealand,”	“Amazing	Thailand,”	“Malaysia	
Truly	Asia,”	“Vietnam,	A	Different	Orient,”	“I	feel	Slovenia,”	“Latvia,	the	Land	that	
Sings,”	and	so	on.	These	countries	adopted	nation	branding	as	a	way	to	manage	their	
appearance	with	the	aspiration	to	promote	their	status	in	the	globalizing	world,	
launching	various	nation-branding	campaigns,	adopting	nation	brand	slogans,	and	
setting	up	related	governmental	organizations	(Dinnie,	2008).		
South	Korea,	among	others,	took	nation	branding	seriously.	Jumping	on	the	
bandwagon	of	nation	branding	at	the	time	of	co-hosting	the	2002	Korea-Japan	
World	Cup,	South	Korea	even	set	up	a	high-profile	governmental	institution,	the	
Presidential	Council	for	Nation	Branding	(PCNB)	in	January	2009.	Not	only	being	
instituted	as	the	key	public	policy	agenda,	the	idea	of	nation	branding	became	an	
underlying	reference	point	to	which	the	implementation	of	other	key	public	policies	
was	justified	and	legitimized.	The	instituted	discourse	of	nation	branding	expanded	
to	include	broader	policy	issues	such	as	multiculturalism,	official	development	
assistance	(ODA),	and	public	diplomacy.		Moreover,	it	worked	as	an	extensive	public	
policy	framework,	gluing	together	different	public	policies.	Major	public	policies	by	
the	Lee	Myung-bak	government	(2008-2013)	were	justified	in	the	name	of	
enhancing	the	nation	brand,	such	as	the	global	promotion	of	hansik	(Korean	food),	
“resource	diplomacy,”	the	export	of	nuclear	power	plants,	“green	growth,”	the	“Four	
Major	Rivers	Project,”	and	so	on.	Beyond	the	official	public	policy	discourse,	the	
term	nation	branding,	in	combination	with	the	idea	of	“culture-advanced	country”	
and	a	neologism	“national	prestige,”	became	a	staple	vocabulary	in	the	news	media	
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as	well	as	in	public	discourses	on	a	wide	variety	of	political,	social	and	cultural	
issues	in	South	Korea.	Most	prominently,	the	Korean	Wave,	a	wide	popularity	of	
Korean	popular	culture	and	popular	music	in	East	Asia	and	beyond,	has	been	
increasingly	illuminated	in	terms	of	enhancing	the	nation	brand.	Domestically,	labor	
disputes	and	political	conflicts	have	been	increasingly	contrasted	with	national	
prestige.	In	sum,	the	matters	of	enhancing	the	nation	brand,	national	image,	and	
national	prestige	have	provided	a	dominant	framework	that	encompasses	a	wide	
range	of	national	issues.		
This	dissertation	follows	the	trajectories	of	the	discourses	and	institutions	of	
nation	branding,	“national	prestige,”	and	an	“advanced	country”	in	South	Korea	
since	the	early	2000s.	Imported	by	the	mainstream	news	media	and	public	and	
private	think	tanks,	nation	branding	operated	as	an	externally	oriented	campaign	
for	the	improvement	of	national	image	toward	tourists,	capital	investors,	and	
entrepreneurs.	However,	it	is	notable	that	the	campaign	deployed	in	the	name	of	the	
nation	brand	by	the	news	media	as	well	as	by	the	government	mainly	targeted	
domestic	publics	rather	than	external	audiences.	The	fact	that	neither	logo	nor	
slogan	was	adopted	during	the	apogee	of	the	nation	branding	campaign	under	the	
Lee	government4	might	suggest	the	nation	branding	campaign	was	less	about	the	
outward	projection	of	national	image	per	se.	
	
4	The	nation	brand	slogan	“Dynamic	Korea”	was	devised	for	the	2002	World	
Cup	event,	but	discarded	by	the	Lee	government.	The	tourism	brand	slogan,	“Korea,	
Sparkling”	was	also	abolished.	The	PCNB	assured	that	it	would	devise	a	new	nation	
brand	logo	and	slogan,	but	it	never	realized.	The	new	English-language	nation	brand	
slogan,	“Creative	Korea”	was	introduced	as	late	as	2016.	The	slogan	was	blamed	for	
plagiarizing	the	French	nation	brand	slogan	(Marshall,	2017)	and	became	practically	
	
	 10 
The	transnational	phenomenon	of	nation	branding	drew	attention	from	
critical	media	and	cultural	studies	as	well	as	anthropology	and	international	studies	
(Aronczyk,	2013;	Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015;	Browning,	2015;	Dzenovska,	2005;	
Graan,	2010;	Jansen,	2008;	Kaneva,	2011b;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011;	Valaskivi,	
2013;	Volcic	&	Andrejevic,	2011).	Some	of	these	authors	showed	how	nation	
branding	contributed	to	the	construction	of	specific	national	identities	in	favor	of	
transnational	capital	and	domestic	politicians.	Some	others	also	focused	on	how	
nation	branding	was	in	line	with	the	neoliberal	rationality	of	international	
competitiveness,	aiming	to	produce	flexible,	competitive	subjects.		
However,	the	existing	critical	literature	has	focused	on	the	role	played	by	
transnational	branding	consultants	and	government	officials	in	terms	of	the	agency	
of	nation	branding,	thereby	neglecting	the	role	played	by	the	news	media	and	
publics.	It	was	only	recently	that	critical	media	scholars	paid	attention	to	the	role	
played	by	the	latter	(for	instance,	Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015;	Graan,	2010,	2013).	
Additionally,	most	critical	literature	focused	on	the	“transitional”	countries	in	
Eastern	Europe.	While	nation	branding	and	other	related	discourses	and	practices	
such	as	soft	power	and	public	diplomacy	have	been	in	the	list	of	buzzwords	in	East	
Asia,	most	academic	works	have	come	from	public	administration,	business	
management,	tourism,	and	marketing	with	practical,	technical	and	administrative	
concerns.	Moreover,	while	there	exists	some	critical	works	on	nation	branding	in	
Japan	and	China	(de	Kloet,	Chong,	&	Landsberger,	2011;	Iwabuchi,	2015;	Valaskivi,	
	
obsolete.	Allegedly,	it	was	devised	by	the	company	associated	with	Ch’oe	Sun-sil	
(Choi	Soon-sil),	a	longtime	confidante	of	President	Park	Geun-hye	(H.-m.	Kim,	2017).		
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2013,	2016),	critical	literature	on	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	is	almost	non-
existent.		
In	this	study,	I	aim	to	contribute	to	critical	cultural	and	media	studies	on	
nation	branding,	which	emerged	not	just	as	a	public	policy	framework,	but	as	a	
reference	point	by	which	wider	reforms	of	the	state	and	the	nation	were	envisioned	
from	different	social	and	political	perspectives	and	positions.	Following	the	
discursive	and	institutional	trajectories	of	nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	
the	advanced	nation,	I	am	asking	a	series	of	questions:	Beyond	being	a	technique	of	
publicizing	and	managing	the	name	and	the	image	of	a	nation,	how	did	the	
discourses	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	(hereafter,	NBNP)	offer	a	new	
way	of	imagining	a	nation,	especially	an	advanced	nation?	How	new	was	the	re-
imagining	of	NBNP	in	the	contemporary	context	of	global	neoliberalism?	To	what	
extent	was	it	a	continuation	of	the	imaginary	of	the	state,	the	economy,	and	the	
nation	in	the	historical	context	of	South	Korean	modernity?		
Pursuing	these	questions,	the	primary	purpose	of	this	dissertation	is	to	
contribute	to	the	understanding	of	the	workings	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP,	
especially	in	shaping	and	reshaping	the	collective	social	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	
the	nation.		
Theoretically	informed	by	critical	literature	(introduced	in	the	next	section),	
I	focus	on	two	distinctive	contexts	within	which	the	discourses	of	NBNP	imagined	
and	re-imagined	the	state	and	the	nation.		
On	the	one	hand,	my	purpose	is	to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	the	
workings	of	neoliberalism	vis-a-vis	the	state	and	the	nation.	In	the	contemporary	
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context,	I	aim	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	discourses	of	NBNP	as	part	of	
neoliberal	rationality	provided	a	new	imaginary	of	the	state	and	the	nation.	I	aim	to	
examine	how	the	discourses	of	NBNP	worked	as	an	integral	part	of	the	construction	
of	the	neoliberal	“competition	state”	(Cerny,	1997)	in	South	Korea.		
On	the	other	hand,	in	the	historical	context,	my	purpose	is	to	engage	with	the	
academic	and	intellectual	discussions	and	debates	about	cultural	modernity	in	
South	Korea.	My	focus	here	is	to	examine	the	workings	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP	in	
the	re/shaping	of	the	developmental	imaginary	of	the	state	and	the	nation	in	South	
Korean	modernity.	
Theoretical	and	historical	context		
To	investigate	the	multi-faceted,	internally-oriented	implications	and	effects	
of	NBNP	in	South	Korea	in	a	broader	context,	I	situate	the	present	dissertation	
within	multiple	streams	of	existing	literature.	My	examination	of	the	discursive	and	
institutional	practices	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	addresses	the	academic	
discussions	of	1)	the	imagined	nature	of	the	nation	vis-a-vis	the	state	and	the	
economy,	2)	the	neoliberal	transformation	of	the	state	as	a	competitive	entity	in	the	
globalizing	world,	and	3)	the	changing	nature	of	South	Korea’s	cultural	modernity.		
Imagined	state,	economy,	and	nation		
First,	the	dissertation	conceives	of	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	
of	NBNP	as	offering	new	ways	of	imagining	a	nation	(Aronczyk,	2013;	Kaneva,	2012;	
Valaskivi,	2016),	which	are	predicated	on	specific	social	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	
economy	(Crane,	1998,	1999;	T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998;	Taylor,	2002;	Wyatt,	2005a,	
2005b).	I	rely	on	the	theories	of	the	state	that	explain	its	significance	not	just	in	
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terms	of	how	it	actually	wields	power	and	influence	over	society	and	economy,	but	
also	in	terms	of	how	it	is	conceived,	imagined,	and	idealized,	especially	with	regard	
to	the	economy.		
The	state	is	not	a	self-evident	entity,	a	taken-for-granted	center	of	power,	or	
an	institutional	actor,	but	an	effect	of	discursive	and	material	practices	(Cameron	&	
Palan,	2004;	Dean,	2010;	Ferguson	&	Gupta,	2002;	Foucault,	Burchell,	Gordon,	&	
Miller,	1991;	Gupta,	1995;	T.	B.	Hansen	&	Stepputat,	2001;	Lemke,	2001,	2002,	
2007;	T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998,	2006;	Rose,	1999,	p.	35;	Rose	&	Miller,	1992;	Sharma	
&	Gupta,	2006;	Steinmetz,	1999).	Referencing	this	body	of	literature,	I	examine	the	
discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	nation	branding	in	the	context	of	the	
discourses	on	the	state	which	have	informed	the	state	imaginations	in	modern	
South	Korea.		
The	dominant	imaginary	of	the	state	has	been	constructed	in	relation	to	the	
national	economy	in	the	modern	history	of	South	Korea.	Especially	in	the	
geopolitical	context	of	the	Cold	War,	the	discourses	of	modernization	and	
development	shaped	a	specific	form	of	the	state,	called	the	“developmental	state,”	
whose	historical	role	was	defined	as	“development”	in	relation	to	the	national	
economy.	In	the	context	of	neoliberal	globalization,	political	discourses	on	the	state	
have	exploded	and	variously	reshaped	the	relation	between	the	state	and	the	
economy	in	domestic	and	transnational	settings.	Quite	a	lot	of	academic	books	and	
articles	have	been	written	on	the	developmental	state	and	the	neoliberal	transition	
of	the	state	in	South	Korea.	However,		most	works	were	on	the	institutional	aspects	
from	the	political	economy	perspectives	(for	instance,	Chang,	Fine,	&	Weiss,	2012;	
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Chi,	2007;	Lim	&	Jang,	2006;	Pirie,	2012;	Woo-Cumings,	1999),	with	rare	works	on	
the	cultural	constructions	and	the	imaginations	of	the	state	(Among	the	exceptions,	
Kwon,	2014).		
I	regard	nation	branding	as	one	of	the	latest	forms	of	state	imagination,	
which	is	flexibly	connected	with	and	translated	into	different	state	discourses	on	
national	image,	national	prestige,	soft	power,	the	advanced	country,	the	“normal	
nation”	and	so	on.	It	offers	new	ways	of	imagining	the	nation	by	putting	a	new	
emphasis	on	the	articulation	between	the	state	and	economy.		
The	rise	of	the	neoliberal	competition	state	
Secondly,	I	situate	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	nation	
branding	in	the	contemporary	context	of	neoliberal	globalization	in	South	Korea.	
Many	critical	scholars	agree	that	South	Korea	has	turned	into	a	neoliberal	society,	
especially	since	the	Asian	financial	crisis	in	the	late	1990s	(for	instance,	from	the	
field	of	political	economy,	C.-j.	Ch’oe,	2006;	Chang	et	al.,	2012;	Chi,	2007;	H.-Y.	Cho,	
Surendra,	&	Cho,	2013;	Lim	&	Jang,	2006).		
For	the	last	few	decades,	a	new	political	rationality	called	neoliberalism	
emerged	to	readjust	the	state-economy	relations	and	"reengineering	the	state"	
(Hilgers,	2012),	especially	by	reconstituting	the	changing	conditions	called	
globalization.	Neoliberalism,	defined	as	the	extension	of	the	principles	of	market	
competition	beyond	the	economy	into	the	whole	society	(Brown,	2005,	pp.	39-40),	
has	constituted	a	dominant	governing	rationality	in	South	Korea	(for	instance,	Jun,	
2012;	H.-m.	Kim	et	al.,	2010;	J.	Song,	2010).	In	the	neoliberal	domination,	
commercializing	logics	overwhelm	almost	every	aspect	of	personal,	social,	political	
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and	cultural	life	beyond	the	business	world.	The	logic	of	the	brand	stands	as	a	
dominant	discourse	and	technique	in	this	commercialization	of	society,	extending	
its	application	to	the	state	and	the	nation.		
It	is	in	this	context	in	which	NBNP	emerged	as	a	set	of	discourses	and	
techniques	of	imagining	and	constructing	the	state	as	a	competitive	market	entity	
and	as	a	location	manager	for	transnational	capital.	It	envisions	a	new	globalizing	
economy	and	world	order,	redefining	national	identity	and	shaping	new	citizenship	
in	a	neoliberal	manner.	The	discourses	of	nation	branding	illustrate	a	concrete	way	
in	which	the	neoliberal	transformation	of	the	South	Korean	state	and	the	economy	
has	unfolded.	The	dissertation	explores	how	nation	branding	has	worked	as	part	of	
neoliberal	rationality,	constructing	a	cultural	version	of	the	neoliberal	“competition	
state”	(Cerny,	1997,	2010;	Fougner,	2006,	2008)	in	South	Korea.	Across	the	news	
media	discourses	and	public	policies,	I	examine	how	the	dominant	practices	of	
nation	branding	re-imagined	the	state	as	a	neoliberal	commercial	entity	in	the	
global	market	of	competing	images	of	nations	in	the	name	of	the	nation	brand,	
national	image,	and	national	prestige.		
South	Korea’s	cultural	modernity		
Lastly,	I	situate	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	NBNP	in	a	wider	
historical	context	of	cultural	modernity	of	South	Korea.	In	other	words,	in	order	to	
understand	the	effect	of	the	neoliberal	competition	state,	we	need	to	examine	the	
continuity	and	the	change	of	the	social	imaginary	of	the	state	and	the	nation	in	the	
historical	specificity	of	South	Korean	modernity.		
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In	this	dissertation,	I	attend	to	how	South	Korean	modernity	has	formed	with	
the	state	and	the	economy	at	the	center	of	national	imaginaries	in	the	discourses	
and	programs	of	modernization	and	development.	This	“developmental	modernity”	
seems	to	constitute	a	dominant	social	imaginary	in	South	Korea	even	after	the	
official	demolition	of	the	developmental	state	in	the	late	1990s.	Additionally,	we	
need	to	consider	the	Western-oriented	nature	of	South	Korean	modernity,	in	which	
the	West	has	become	the	normative	standard	of	modernization	and	development	
through	sped-up	imitations	and	adaptations.	Notably,	within	the	Western	
orientation	of	South	Korean	modernity,	cultural	and	social	aspects,	along	with	
political	and	economic	aspects,	have	gotten	increasingly	emphasized	in	the	official	
and	public	discourses	of	NBNP.		
South	Korea’s	take	on	nation	branding	shows	how	it	constituted	a	neoliberal	
“competition	state”	(Cerny,	1997)	not	just	in	terms	of	economy	and	technology	but	
also	in	terms	of	culture	and	civility.	It	is	usually	regarded	that	nation	branding	
represents	public	policies	that	aimed	to	enhance	national	image	and	reputation.	At	a	
deeper	level,	however,	it	articulates	popular	expectation,	desire,	needs	and	
imagination:	a	popular	aspiration	for	the	status	of	an	advanced	country,	a	popular	
demand	for	a	cultural	status	that	matches	the	economic	level	of	the	country,	a	
popular	desire	by	the	middle	class	for	a	nation	with	a	higher	standard	of	living	that	
is	equivalent	to	the	“global	standard”	of	Western	advanced	countries.	It	is	notable	
that	emphases	are	increasingly	put	on	social	and	cultural	aspects	such	as	civility,	
manners,	public	behaviors,	“global	citizenship,”	and	so	on,	the	reference	of	which	
comes	from	the	comparison	between	the	idealized	West	and	South	Korea.		
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I	attend	to	the	translation	of	the	term	nation	brand	into	national	prestige	
(국격 kukkyŏk)	as	the	manifestation	of	the	Western-oriented	nature	of	NBNP.	In	the	
late	2000s,	the	technical	discourse	of	nation	branding	was	transformed	into	the	
discourse	of	national	prestige,	implying	the	dignity	and	class	of	a	nation.	This	term	
took	a	conservative	implication,	based	on	a	state-centered	cultural	and	civilizational	
imagination.	While	it	was	frequently	associated	with	developmental	discourses	of	
“the	first-rate,	advanced	nation,”	it	also	illustrated	the	reflexivity	on	the	economy-
centric	developmentalism,	imagining	a	“normal	country”	with	a	higher	cultural	and	
civilized	status.	A	dominant	state	imagination	of	a	“culturally	advanced	country”	was	
developed	in	this	vein	with	a	growing	attention	to	traditional	as	well	as	modern	
popular	culture	in	regard	to	the	international	status	of	the	nation.	Most	notably,	the	
development	of	South	Korean	popular	culture	and	popular	music,	the	Korean	Wave	
and	K-pop,	illustrates	how	culture	is	converted	into	resources	for	nation	branding.	
In	this	sense,	the	political	discourses	of	NBNP	provide	a	new	imagination	of	the	state	
and	the	nation,	an	imagination	that	hinges	upon	Western	modernity	as	the	norm.		
In	this	context,	the	idea	of	a	“culture-advanced	country”	(munhwa	sŏnjinguk	
문화선진국)	has	emerged	as	a	vision	of	modernity	in	South	Korea.	Now	it	is	culture	
that	is	regarded	as	an	indicator	of	modernity	and	civilization,	and	being	advanced	as	
a	nation	and	in	the	international	ranks	of	advanced	countries.	The	discourses	of	
NBNP	emerged	in	the	early	2000s	along	with	the	vision	of	a	culture-advanced	
country.	It	is	in	terms	of	NBNP	that	a	culture-advanced	country	as	a	truly	advanced,	
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modern	country	is	specifically	presented	and	imagined	beyond	the	status	of	an	
economically-advanced	country.		
Against	this	theoretical	and	historical	backdrop,	the	dissertation	begins	by	
following	the	discourses	of	nation	branding,	which	were	propagated	by	
transnational	business	consultants	and	embraced	by	national	policy	makers	around	
the	world.	The	dissertation	takes	the	case	of	South	Korea	and	focuses	on	how	
globally-circulating	discourses	of	nation	branding	was	adapted	in	the	local	context.	
In	the	examination	of	the	localization,	the	dissertation	highlights	the	processes	of	
local	adaptations	and	transformation	of	nation	branding.	It	focuses	on	how	the	
discourses	and	institutions	of	nation	branding	became	connected	with	and	
converted	into	various	existing	and	emerging	discourses	such	as	national	prestige	
and	the	advanced	nation	among	others.	It	also	emphasizes	how	they	were	driven	by	
various	institutional	actors	such	as	transnational	and	domestic	think	tanks,	the	
national	news	media,	and	domestic	politicians	and	policy	makers,	and	publics.	In	
this	way,	this	dissertation	aims	to	understand	the	processes	of	transformation	and	
conversion	of	discourses	and	institutions	of	nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	
the	advanced	nation	in	a	specific	historical	and	contemporary-political	context.		
Research	design	
Social	imaginaries	and	state	imaginations	rely	on	rhetorical	narratives	and	
symbolic	representations	(Orgad,	2014,	p.	41).	Thus,	in	the	methodological	
consideration,	the	study	of	social	imaginaries	and	state	imaginations	can	be	carried	
out	through	the	examination	of	rhetorics	and	discourses.	In	the	examination	of	the	
social	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	the	nation	in	South	Korean	modernity,	I	take	the	
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public	discourses	of	nation	branding,	national	prestige	(NBNP)	as	the	main	focus	of	
the	investigation.	In	this	section,	I	discuss	how	to	examine	NBNP	as	discourses,	and	
identify	the	data	to	collect	and	examine.		
By	discourse,	I	refer	to	“socially	produced	forms	of	knowledge	that	set	limits	
upon	what	it	is	possible	to	think,	write	or	speak	about	a	‘given	social	object	or	
practice’”	(McHoul	&	Grace,	1993	cited	in	Bacchi,	2009,	p.	35)	(more	discussion	will	
follow	later	in	this	chapter).	Discourse	includes	not	just	to	public	policy	discourses	
produced	by	the	government,	but	wider	discourses	disseminated	by	the	news	media	
as	well	as	circulated	among	publics.	In	this	study,	I	follow	the	trajectories	of	the	
discourses	of	NBNP,	focusing	on	three	critical	moments	created	in	their	discursive	
circulation.	First,	I	look	at	how	NBNP	emerged	as	the	news	media	discourses	in	the	
early-mid	2000s.	Then,	I	examine	how	it	was	established	as	official	policy	discourses	
in	the	late	2000s.	Finally,	I	examine	how	public	discourses	of	NBNP,	facilitated	by	
the	media	and	public	policy	discourses,	circulated	among	publics	in	various	forms.	
Data		
For	the	study	of	NBNP	in	South	Korea,	I	focus	on	three	distinctive	moments	
of	the	circulation	of	the	discourses	with	distinctive	agencies	in	distinctive	
institutional	settings.		
The	first	moment	is	the	emergence	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP	in	the	early-
mid	2000s,	in	which	the	news	media	played	a	crucial	role.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	
financial	crisis	in	November	1997,	South	Korea	tried	to	recover	from	the	economic	
collapse	and	regain	confidence.	The	2002	FIFA	World	Cup	Korea/Japan	turned	out	
to	be	a	crucial	moment	to	announce	the	recovery.	By	that	time,	the	talks	of	nation	
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branding	emerged	as	a	major	public	discourse	in	South	Korea,	greatly	promoted	by	
the	news	media.		
The	second	moment	is	the	institutionalization	of	NBNP	in	2009	and	its	
spread	as	a	public	policy	discourse	from	the	late	2000s	to	the	early	2010s.	The	
conservative	Lee	Myung-bak	government,	which	declared	a	“business-friendly”	
administration,	established	the	PCNB	as	the	official	governmental	public	policy	
agency	for	nation	branding.	It	concentrated	public	relations	and	promotion	
activities	around	the	time	of	hosting	the	G20	(or	Group	of	Twenty)	event	in	2010,	a	
meeting	among	the	governments	and	central	bank	governors	from	19	countries	and	
the	European	Union.	The	PCNB	heavily	publicized	the	hosting	of	the	prestigious	
international	forum	as	an	enhancement	of	the	nation	brand.		
The	last	moment	is	the	proliferation	of	the	NBNP	discourses	among	publics	
in	the	early-mid	2010s,	when	non-governmental	organizations	got	engaged	in	
various	campaigns	for	the	“promotion	of	Korea.”	Especially,	their	activities	of	buying	
ad	spaces	on	billboards	in	Manhattan	and	prestigious	US	newspapers	drew	great	
attention	from	the	news	media	and	publics.	These	campaigns	helped	raise	the	
awareness	of	nation	branding	and	public	diplomacy	among	publics	as	well	as	stirred	
controversies	about	how	to	enhance	nation	image	and	national	prestige.		
These	three	distinctive	moments	are	roughly	in	chronological	order.	
However,	my	purpose	is	to	illustrate	the	multifaceted	and	overlapping	nature	of	the	
discourses	in	circulation	with	distinctive	agencies	in	distinctive	institutional	
settings,	not	to	suggest	a	definite	periodization	or	a	linear	development	of	the	
discourses	of	NBNP.	According	to	the	characteristics	of	these	moments,	I	used	
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multiple	sets	of	data	which	show	the	multidimensional,	dynamic	nature	of	the	
discourses	of	NBNP.		
The	first	batch	of	the	data	was	obtained	from	the	news	media	archives.	For	
the	collection	of	the	news	media	data,	I	used	Kinds	(www.kinds.or.kr),	a	public	news	
archive,	funded	and	run	by	the	Korea	Press	Foundation.	I	also	used	the	Naver	News	
(news.naver.com),	a	commercial	news	archive	as	a	supplementary	tool	for	
additional	data.		
I	used	the	Kinds	archive	to	search	seven	national	newspapers	(Han’gyŏre,	
Kyŏnghyang	Sinmun,	Hanguk	Ilbo,	Segye	Ilbo,	Munhwa	Ilbo,	Seoul	Sinmun,	and	
Kungmin	Ilbo),	three	economic	newspapers	(Hanguk	Kyŏngje,	Seoul	Kyŏngje,	and	
Maeil	Kyŏngje).	I	used	the	Naver	News	Archive	to	search	Tong’a	Ilbo,	three	weekly	
news	magazines	(Han’gyŏre	21,	Sisa-in,	and	Sisa	Journal),	and	two	online	news	
(Pŭresian	and	Ohmynews).	Additionally,	for	the	two	major	nationwide	newspapers	
that	do	not	provide	their	data	to	external	archives,	I	visited	their	individual	websites	
(www.joins.com	for	Chung’ang	Ilbo	and	www.chosun.com	for	Chosŏn	Ilbo)	and	used	
their	own	search	tool.	In	this	way,	I	covered	all	ten	major	nation-wide	newspaper-
based	news	media.		
These	newspaper-based,	national	news	media	continued	to	be	the	major	
source	of	news	consumption	for	citizens	through	the	Internet	news	aggregators	
such	as	Naver	News,	which	has	practically	monopolized	the	circulation	of	news	in	
South	Korea.	Most	news	came	to	be	circulated	and	consumed	through	these	news	
aggregators,	rather	than	on	the	individual	web	sites	by	the	news	media	themselves	
(W.-g.	Kim,	Kim,	&	Kim,	2013;	S.-m.	Yi,	2007).		
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I	did	not	include	in	the	analysis	news	reports	from	broadcasting	–	that	is,	
KBS,	MBC,	and	SBS,	three	national	television	stations,	and	YTN,	a	cable	television	
dedicated	to	news.	The	national	television	news	programs	were	widely	watched	and	
remained	influential	during	the	period	of	the	research,	although	both	television	and	
newspapers	were	quickly	losing	their	audiences	(W.-g.	Kim	et	al.,	2013;	C.-h.	Yi,	
2012).	However,	television	news	programs	were	typically	limited	to	short	straight	
news	reports,	lacking	in-depth	analysis	and	op-eds.	Moreover,	television	news	
programs	were	mobilized	simply	for	the	promotion	of	governmental	policy,	while	
some	newspapers	were	actively	and	strategically	engaged	in	setting	political	and	
policy	agenda.	Thus,	newspapers	seemed	more	adequate	in	this	specific	
examination	of	the	role	played	by	the	news	media	in	terms	of	institutional	and	
discursive	shaping	of	governmental	policy	and	public	agenda.				
From	the	news	media	archives,	I	searched	news	report	data	from	2000	to	
2016.	Major	newspapers	and	magazines	began	to	publish	reports	and	opinions	
related	to	NBNP	since	the	early	2000s,	and	the	amount	and	depth	of	news	media	
articles	enormously	increased	in	the	late	2000s,	especially	around	the	launch	of	the	
PCNB	in	2009	and	the	hosting	of	the	G20	summit	in	2010.		
For	the	search,	I	used	keywords	such	as	“nation	brand	국가	브랜드,	“national	
prestige	국격,”	and	“culture-advanced	country	문화선진국,”	Each	search	showed	a	
large	number	of	results:	8924,	9081,	and	1136	respectively	(including	438	
overlapping	articles).	Due	to	the	large	quantity	of	articles,	I	actually	examined	
articles	with	the	three	keywords	in	the	title	(876,	701,	and	41	articles	for	each	
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keyword	with	a	small	number	of	duplicates).	The	yearly	breakdown	of	the	number	
of	articles,	which	contain	with	the	three	keywords	in	the	title,	from	seven	national	
newspapers	and	three	economic	newspapers,	shows	the	general	trend.	Out	of	these	
1,500+	articles,	I	found	about	half	of	them	were	relevant	to	my	research	as	many	
articles	which	contained	those	keywords	were	not	substantively	meaningful.	For	
instance,	many	articles	on	“국가 브랜드”	were	not	about	“nation	branding”	or	
“nation	brand,”	but	“national	brand.”	“Nation	brand”	and	“national	brand”	are	
distinct	jargons	in	marketing	and	branding	as	the	latter	concerns	corporate	brands	
(Thus,	Hyundai,	LG	and	Samsung	are	South	Korea	national	brands,	and	Sony,	Honda	
and	Toyota	are	Japanese	national	brands).	They	are	written	in	distinct	words	in	
English,	but	they	share	the	same	phrases	in	Korean.	Many	other	articles	were	also	
short	straight	reports,	and	still	others	were	duplicate	articles	supplied	by	the	same	
sources	from	the	government	and	other	private	and	public	institutions	(for	instance,	
Anholt’s	and	SERI’s	annual	Nation	Branding	Index	were	widely	reported	by	most	
newspapers	and	magazines,	but	they	were	almost	identical	as	they	were	copied	
from	newswire	articles	and	the	press	release).	In	this	way,	I	ended	up	reading	6-700	
articles	with	the	keywords	in	the	title	at	least	once.		
Reading	the	articles,	I	was	able	to	get	the	sense	of	the	general	trend	of	how	
nation	branding,	national	prestige,	and	advanced	nation	were	covered	in	the	news	
media.	My	use	of	news	media	materials	is	twofold.	On	the	one	hand,	they	were	
useful	in	the	political	economy	analysis	for	grasping	the	institutional	influence	on	
NBNP,	that	is,	to	identify	individual	and	organizational	actors	who	had	a	stake	in	
and	how	they	were	engaged	in	the	shaping	of	the	public	policy	of	NBNP.	Most	of	all,	
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news	media	articles	gave	a	lead	to	a	broader	examination	of	public	and	private	
actors	such	as	Simon	Anholt,	Philip	Kotler,	Guy	Sorman,	the	Institute	for	Industrial	
Policy	Studies	(IPS),	Hyundai	Research	Institute	(HRI),	Samsung	Economic	Research	
Institute	(SERI),	and	so	on.	The	articles	also	were	helpful	to	identify	the	role	of	the	
news	media	organizations	themselves	in	the	promotion	of	NBNP	through	organizing	
conferences	and	launching	media	campaigns	in	cooperation	with	the	government	
agencies	and	corporations.			
On	the	other	hand,	for	a	closer	analysis	of	the	discourses	revealed	in	news	
media	articles,	I	took	a	closer	reading	of	op-ed	pieces,	special	reports,	and	feature	
and	series	articles.	The	series	articles	from	several	media-led	campaigns	for	NBNP	
were	helpful	to	grasp	their	perspectives	and	orientations.	In	the	analysis	of	how	the	
news	media	problematized	NBNP	and	presented	a	solution	to	the	presumed	
problems,	I	focused	on	how	the	news	media	constructed	the	narratives	of	the	past,	
the	present,	and	the	future	of	South	Korea.	The	following	is	the	list	of	major	news	
media	campaigns	related	to	nation	branding,	which	I	focused	on	for	the	analysis	of	
the	news	media	narrative	of	NBNP:		
1997	The	age	of	global	standards	(Tong’a	Ilbo)	
1998-2002	Global	etiquette	campaign	(Chosŏn	Ilbo)		
2002	Let’s	find	a	new	vision	(Han’gyŏre)	
2002	Upgrade	Korea	(Chung’ang	Ilbo)	
2005	Soft	power,	soft	Korea	(Chung’ang	Ilbo)		
2005	UP	Korea	(Tong’a	Ilbo)		
2005	Upgrade	the	prestige	(Chung’ang	Ilbo)	
2007	Put	new	energy	to	the	Brand	Korea	(Han’gyŏre)	
2007	Enhance	national	prestige:	Image	Up	Korea	(Han’guk	Ilbo)	
2007	Toward	soft	power	Korea	(Seoul	Kyŏngje)	
2008	Enhance	national	prestige	(Maeil	Kyŏngje)	
2008	Let’s	enhance	national	prestige	(Seoul	Kyŏngje)		
2010	National	prestige	campaign	(Tong’a	Ilbo)	
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The	second	batch	of	the	data	is	from	materials	produced	by	various	
governmental	agencies	in	relation	to	NBNP.	First,	I	gathered	and	examined	all	
official	documents	publicly	available	from	the	PCNB.	Included	are	official	
documents,	press	releases,	websites,	minutes	of	the	meetings,	white	papers,	and	
policy	reports	produced	by	the	institution.	I	also	obtained	relevant	documents	from	
other	related	institutions	by	using	keyword	search	from	each	document	archive:	the	
Ministry	of	Culture,	Sports	and	Tourism	(MCST),	the	Korean	Culture	and	
Information	Service	(KOCIS),	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	(MOFAT),	
Korea	Food	Foundation	(KFF),	and	the	Korea	Creative	Content	Agency	(KOCCA).	I	
gathered	the	data	from	their	individual	websites	as	well	as	the	Nation	Archives	of	
Korea	(www.archives.go.kr),	which	put	together	and	archived	past	governmental	
documents.	They	were	supplemented	by	interviews	of	and	writings	by	
governmental	officials	(published	as	newspaper	op-ed	pieces,	columns,	and	books	
and	pamphlets).		
These	materials	were	used	to	understand	general	operations	of	the	
institutions	and	to	figure	out	the	institutional	settings	and	procedures	in	which	the	
public	policy	discourses	of	NBNP	are	produced	to	have	effect.		
Besides,	I	analyzed	the	public	campaign	advertising	materials	produced	in	
association	with	the	PCNB.	As	the	PCNB	concentrated	on	public	relations	and	
worked	closely	with	the	private	corporations,	these	public	campaign	ads	were	
produced	by	private	corporations	in	collaboration	with	the	PCNB.	I	pay	attention	to	
them	because	they	greatly	illustrate	the	institutional	nature	and	the	discursive	
features	of	the	nation	branding	campaign.	For	the	analysis	of	the	ad	narrative,	I	used	
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the	“global	etiquette”	campaign	ad,	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea,”	produced	by	the	LG	Group	
and	aired	in	2010.	The	ad	series,	featuring	visual	representations	of	Korea	and	the	
West,	illustrate	how	the	neoliberal	version	of	nation	branding	reshaped	national	
imaginaries.	
The	last	batch	of	the	data	is	collected	from	multiple	sources	because	the	
focus	here	is	to	follow	the	trajectories	of	discourses	in	circulation	among	publics.	
Informed	by	anthropologists	(Appadurai,	1986;	Marcus,	1995),	I	conducted	a	multi-
sited	research	following	the	circulation	and	the	movement	of	a	specific	discourse.	To	
examine	the	circulation	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP	among	publics,	I	focused	on	the	
campaign	for	the	“promotion	of	Korea”	or	the	“Korea	publicity”	by	non-
governmental	actors,	which	was	widely	promoted	by	the	media	(including	the	news	
media),	and	celebrities,	and	publics.	The	campaign	drew	not	only	a	big	and	mostly	
favorable	attention	from	the	media,	but	engendered	controversies	among	publics.	
The	scuffles	around	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	illustrates	the	nature	of	how	the	
state	and	the	nation	got	re-imagined	among	publics.	The	promotion	of	Korea	is	a	
relevant	research	object	because	it	constituted	an	intersection	between	the	official	
public	policy	by	the	government,	the	civilian	campaign	for	the	“promotion	of	Korea”	
by	the	non-governmental	actors,	a	wide	attention	by	the	news	media,	and	responses	
and	debates	among	publics.		
To	examine	the	NGO	activities	for	the	promotion	of	Korea,	I	followed	a	
celebrity	individual,	Sŏ	Kyŏng-dŏk	(a.k.a.	Kyung-duk	Seo),	and	an	NGO,	Volunteer	
Agency	Network	of	Korea	(Vank)	because	they	were	the	most	active	and	well-
known	activist	groups	in	the	field	of	the	promotion	of	Korea.	For	data	gathering,	I	
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used	their	websites	(in	the	case	of	Vank),	as	well	as	the	media	coverage	and	
interviews	because	their	activities	heavily	relied	on	media	publicity	(in	the	case	of	
Mr.	Seo).			
Lastly,	for	examining	public	controversies	over	the	promotion	of	Korea,	
which	were	produced	and	circulated	among	publics,	I	gathered	data	from	online	
modes	of	public	engagement	with	public	affairs.	Various	online	services	provided	
platforms	for	the	participation	in	and	engagement	with	public	issues.	A	good	
example	is	the	candlelit	protest	against	the	decision	by	the	Lee	Myung-bak	
government	for	the	import	of	US	beef	in	Seoul	in	2008.	The	massive	demonstration	
was,	especially	among	teenagers	and	youths,	facilitated	by	various	digital	platforms	
such	as	text	messaging,	online	forums	(such	as	Daum	Agora),	and	webcasting	(J.	
Kang,	2017;	K.-M.	Kim	&	Park,	2011;	K.	Lee,	2017;	S.	Yun	&	Chang,	2011).		
Out	of	these	various	online	platforms,	I	used	blog	postings	and	online	
subculture	communities	for	analysis.	The	reasons	I	used	blogs	are	several.	First,	the	
blog	platform	gained	a	significant	popularity	in	the	late	2000s	and	the	early-mid	
2010s,	although	it	was	not	the	most	popular.	The	platform	was	competitively	
promoted	by	large	and	small	online	services	in	South	Korea.	While	the	examination	
of	all	aspects	of	all	online	participation	is	beyond	the	purpose	and	scope	of	this	
research,	blogs	provided	an	efficient	way	of	gathering	data	suitable	to	the	
exploratory	nature	of	this	research.	Second,	blogs	are	an	open	platform,	freely	
accessible	by	publics,	in	contrast	with	closed	platforms	such	as	Cyworld	(which	was	
extremely	popular	around	the	turn	of	the	century	in	South	Korea,	but	in	quick	
decline	afterwards).		Besides,	due	to	its	openness,	it	was	more	efficient	for	browsing	
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and	searching	with	search	engines	(W.-g.	Kim,	Yi,	&	Yi,	2010).	Third,	as	blogs	are	
suitable	for	a	personal	and	individual	communication,	despite	the	extent	to	which	
they	are	interactive	and	networked,	they	have	a	better	chance	to	give	a	picture	of	
individual	perspectives	on	a	particular	issue	in	a	more	coherent	way.	Thus,	it	is	
more	convenient	to	identify	individual	perspectives	and	personal	voices	better	than	
other	platforms	such	as	internet	forums.	Lastly,	blogs	were	often	used	not	just	to	
show	what	the	bloggers	thought	but	also	to	show	(off)	what	they	actually	did	in	
relation	to	direct	action	and	active	participation	in	a	more	vivid	manner.	Thus,	blog	
postings	were	helpful	to	look	into	how	bloggers,	actively	participating	part	of	
publics,	were	engaged	in	the	public	campaign	for	the	promotion	of	Korea	and	
Korean	food.					
To	collect	blog	postings	which	made	participation	in	or	comment	on	the	
promotion	of	Korean	food	in	the	early-mid	2010s,	I	used	Google	search	as	well	as	
native	search	engines	built	in	three	major	blog	services,	Tistory	(tistory.com),	Naver	
Blog	(blog.naver.com),	and	Egloos	(egloos.com).	These	blog	communities	were	the	
largest	in	South	Korea	and	hosted	so	called	“power	bloggers”	who	were	opinion	
leaders	in	the	“blogosphere”	(W.-g.	Kim	et	al.,	2010).	I	used	keywords	for	themes	
(“nation	brand,”	“national	prestige,”	“advanced	nation,”	and	so	on),	crossed	with	
related	specific	topics	(“hansik,”	“Times	Square,”	“Tokto,”	and	so	on),	and	examined	
top	search	results.	The	blog	postings,	which	were	collected,	read,	and	used	as	
illustrative	examples	in	this	research,	were	not	necessarily	by	power	bloggers.	But	
they	were	rather	neatly	and	articulately	presented	and	written	by	more	or	less	
“active”	participants	(for	instance,	who	personally	visited	the	Times	Square	in	New	
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York)	than	by	average	or	“passive”	bloggers	(for	instance,	who	used	the	blog	
platform	for	clipping	news	and	blog	postings)	(W.-g.	Kim	et	al.,	2010).	
The	online	communities	I	examined	for	the	analysis	of	the	criticism	of	
excessive	nationalism	are	DC	Inside	(디시	인사이드,	dcinside.com)	and	Ilbe	(일베,	
ilbe.com),	two	of	the	largest	online	communities.5	They	are	equivalent	to	the	
English-language	imageboard	4chan	(www.4chan.org),	a	home	for	online	subculture	
communities,	famous	for	spreading	prominent	internet	memes	("4chan,"	n.d.).	
These	online	communities	are	vastly	diverse	and	flexible	and	cannot	be	lumped	
together	as	a	homogenous	group,	but	a	basic	characterization	might	be	necessary	
for	the	discussion.		
DC	Inside	was	established	in	1999	as	a	forum	for	digital	camera	and	
photography	and	evolved	into	one	of	the	largest	online	community	websites	with	
numerous	sub-communities.	These	sub-communities	host	discussions	and	
exchanges	about	specific	topics	on	their	own	imageboards	(called	“galleries”).	DC	
Inside	became	famous	for	generating	and	circulating	jokes,	buzzwords,	neologisms,	
and	internet	memes.	The	main	user	base	is	known	to	be	those	in	their	20-30s,	the	
majority	of	which	is	male.	The	political	orientation	is	hard	to	tell	in	a	uniform	way	
because	different	sub-communities	show	different	and	changing	orientations,	but	
using	parody,	satire,	and	cynicism,	they	usually	show	rebellious	and	defiant	attitude	
	
5	According	to	one	online	poll	(C.-g.	Hŏ,	2013),	most	popular	online	
communities	among	office	workers	include	Oyu	(Onŭlŭi	Yumŏ,	that	is,	Today’s	
Humor,	25.7	percent),	Ilbe	(20	percent),	DC	Inside	(17.3	percent),	Ppomppu	(16.6	
percent),	and	Kliang	(Clien,	9.5	percent).	I	chose	DC	Inside	and	Ilbe	among	others	
because	their	archives	of	the	early-mid	2010s	are	conveniently	available	for	
keyword	search.	
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toward	the	social	establishment	whether	it	is	left	of	right,	liberal	or	conservative	
("DC	Inside,"	n.d.).		
Ilbe	(short	for	일간베스트	저장소	Ilgan	Besŭtŭ	Chŏjangso,	which	means	
“Daily	Best	Storage”)	began	as	a	spin-off	site	of	DC	Inside	in	2010	against	the	
moderation	policy	of	DC	Inside.	Initially,	it	worked	as	“storage”	of	the	“best”	threads	
of	DC	Inside	before	they	were	removed	by	the	moderators	from	DC	Inside	for	
violating	the	moderation	policy	of	DC	Inside.	Later,	it	evolved	into	an	online	
community	on	its	own,	separate	from	and	independent	of	DC	Inside.	It	became	
notorious	for	its	populist,	far-right-oriented	subculture.	It	drew	enormous	negative	
media	and	public	attention	with	its	misogyny,	hate	speech,	antisocial	behaviors,	
cyber	vandalism,	and	hostility	toward	ideas	such	as	democracy.	Cynicism,	parody,	
and	satire	also	thrive	in	Ilbe	community,	usually	targeting	leftists	(in	South	Korean	
political	context,	mostly	liberals)	and	attacking	the	socially	weak	(such	as	women,	
disabled	people,	etc.).	Ilbe	is	known	as	a	still	more	male-dominated	community	than	
DC	Inside	with	the	user	base	being	younger	("Ilbe	Storehouse,"	n.d.).	
I	searched	the	archives	by	using	keywords	such	as	“Sŏ	Kyŏngdŏk,”	“Tokto,”	
and	“pibimpap.”	I	found	414	postings	from	DC	Inside	(2008-2016)	and	99	postings	
from	Ilbe	(2010-2016).	Not	all	postings	are	relevant	to	the	keywords.	After	gleaning	
the	titles	and	snippets	of	the	postings,	I	finally	read	carefully	several	dozen	postings	
and	their	comments	and	used	them	for	analysis.	
Additionally,	in	the	examination	of	online	subcultures,	I	referred	to	
Namuwiki,	the	biggest	subculture-based	Wiki	site	in	South	Korea.	Namuwiki	in	no	
sense	abides	by	the	principles	of	neutrality	and	objectivity	of	Wikipedia.	Rather,	it	is	
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a	subculture	itself,	pursuing	playfulness,	satire,	and	pun	in	the	online	community	
("Namuwiki,"	n.d.).	However,	as	still	a	wiki	platform,	Namuwiki	is	especially	strong	
and	rich	in	the	description	and	archiving	of	popular	cultures	and	subcultures	in	
South	Korea.6	
It	should	be	noted	that	these	internet-based	subcultures	do	not	fit	in	with	
traditional	political	divisions	between	left	and	right,	conservative	and	liberal	
(progressive),	and	so	on.	While	they	drew	attention	from	the	media	and	the	public	
due	to	its	antisocial	behaviors	such	as	misogyny	and	hate	speech,	they	are	also	
characterized	by	the	pursuit	of	playful	defiance	against	the	presumed	established	
power	and	vested	interests	perceived	by	the	subculture	communities	in	their	own	
ways.	They	are	engrossed	in	generating	and	circulating	internet	memes,	buzzwords,	
puns	and	jokes,	many	of	which	have	made	a	good	point	about	critical	issues	in	South	
Korean	society	and	have	been	widely	circulated	in	mainstream	media	and	among	
wider	publics.	
Discourse	analysis	
This	study	adopts	and	attempts	to	contribute	to	the	analysis	of	public	
discourse	by	examining	NBNP	as	discourses.	Informed	by	a	Foucauldian	notion,	
discourse	refers	to	“socially	produced	forms	of	knowledge	that	set	limits	upon	what	
it	is	possible	to	think,	write	or	speak	about	a	‘given	social	object	or	practice’”	
(McHoul	&	Grace,	1993	cited	in	Bacchi,	2009,	p.	35).	In	this	sense,	discourse	has	a	
power	to	construct	reality	by	defining	problems,	and	producing	subjects	and	space	
	
6	Namuwiki	launched	in	2015,	but	has	roots	in	Rigveda	Wiki	(Enha	Wiki)	
which	started	in	2007.	
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through	constructing	knowledge,	especially	in	the	forms	of	abstract	concepts	and	
categories	(Bacchi,	2000,	p.	48).	The	analysis	of	discourse	begins	with	analyzing	
those	binaries,	key	concepts,	and	categories	embedded	in	rhetorics	and	discourses,	
and	explicating	the	presuppositions,	assumptions,	or	“conceptual	logics”	(Bacchi,	
2009,	pp.	5-7)	that	underpin	the	discursive	formation.	In	this	vein,	this	study	
investigates	how	the	discourses	of	NBNP	in	South	Korea	have	produced	certain	
knowledges	and	imaginations	about	the	state	and	the	nation	since	the	early	2000s.	
In	methodological	terms,	the	analysis	of	discourse	in	this	study	attends	to	a	few	
points:	discourse	in	discursive	chains,	discourse	in	institution,	and	discourse	in	
contestation.		
First,	this	study	analyzes	the	discourse	of	NBNP	not	in	isolation,	but	in	the	
chains	of	other	discourses	(Hall,	1985,	p.	104).	As	Stuart	Hall	points	out,	discourses	
are	not	closed	systems.	Rather,	“a	discourse	draws	on	elements	in	other	discourses,	
binding	them	into	its	own	network	of	meanings”	(Hall,	1992,	p.	292).	The	discursive	
rise	of	nation	branding	needs	to	be	examined	in	the	context	of	the	re-imaginings	of	
the	state	and	the	nation	in	South	Korea.	I	especially	attended	to	how	the	nation	
branding	discourse	was	translated	into	the	national	prestige	discourse,	and	how	
they	were	deployed	in	association	with	other	related	and	competing	discourses	such	
as	soft	power,	public	diplomacy,	and	culture-advanced	country,	which	variously	
informed	the	re-imaginings	of	the	state	and	the	nation	in	South	Korea	in	the	early	
21st	century.		
Secondly,	this	study	attends	to	the	political	economy	of	discourse,	that	is,	it	
examines	discourse	as	a	process	in	institutions	(Fischer,	2003,	p.	76;	Hall,	1992,	p.	
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292).	While	appreciating	the	constitutive	power	of	discourse,	I	also	attend	to	“the	
conditions	of	exercise,	functioning,	of	institutionalization	of	scientific	discourses”	
(Foucault,	1991,	cited	in	Bacchi,	2009,	p.	37).	The	material	effect	of	the	discourse	
should	be	considered	in	relation	to	the	“nondiscursive	domains	of	institutions,	
political	events	and	economic	processes”	(Bernauer,	cited	in	Bacchi,	2009,	p.	37).	
Moreover,	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	are	not	confined	to	the	
apparatuses	of	the	state,	but	also	made	in	the	area	of	civil	society	—	the	media,	
political	parties,	NGOs,	interest	groups,	think	tanks,	academics,	business	interests,	
lobbyists,	and	so	on	—	as	of	the	formal	institutions	of	the	state”	(Jenkins,	2007,	p.	
26).	In	this	vein,	I	followed	the	circulation	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP	in	different	
institutional	settings,	focusing	on	three	critical	forms	of	discourse:	the	news	media	
discourse,	public	policy	discourse,	and	discourse	among	publics.	By	following	the	
trajectories	of	discourses	within	and	across	these	institutional	contexts,	I	
highlighted	the	changes	and	continuities,	uncertainty	and	complexity	in	the	process.		
Lastly,	in	this	study,	I	examined	discourses	as	the	site	of	contestation,	rather	
than	of	the	unidirectional	imposition	of	power.	The	discourse	analysis	might	suggest	
one-way	operation	of	power	in	which	discourses	are	used	by	those	who	hold	power	
upon	those	who	lack	power.	However,	it	is	necessary	to	theorize	the	possibilities	for	
the	challenges	to	dominant	discourses	(Bacchi,	2000,	pp.	51-54).	In	this	vein,	rather	
than	scientific	and	neutral,	discourse	is	implicated	not	just	in	the	legitimacy	and	
authority,	but	the	contestation	and	challenge	of	state	power.	Related	to	the	second	
point	above,	the	wider	area	of	civil	society	is	the	site	of	contestation	where	tensions	
and	contradictions	are	revealed,	and	the	possibilities	of	challenge,	resistance,	and	
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discursive	reshaping	arise	(Bacchi,	2009,	p.	37).	The	discourses	of	NBNP,	which	
were	disseminated	by	the	news	media	and	think	tanks,	and	instituted	as	public	
policy	by	the	government,	created	a	discursive	space	for	publics	in	which	dominant	
discourses	were	negotiated	and	challenged	(Warner,	2002).	Following	Warner’s	
(2002)	discussion,	“publics”	are	a	reflexive	social	form	constituted	through	
discourse	and	the	circulation	of	texts	and	are	used	in	plural	to	emphasize	the	
divergent	formations	vis-à-vis	discourses.			
Contributions	of	the	study		
This	study	will	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	the	global	phenomenon	of	
nation	branding,	theoretically	and	empirically,	in	at	least	three	primary	aspects.		
First,	this	study	will	contribute	to	an	expanding	body	of	literature	on	nation	
branding	and	other	related	discourses	and	institutions	in	critical	media	and	cultural	
studies.	The	critical	attention	to	nation	branding	as	a	media-	and	communication-
related	phenomenon	is	increasing,	but	still	falls	short	compared	to	its	prominence	in	
the	administrative	and	promotional	studies.	Beyond	the	practical	and	technical	
concerns	in	marketing	and	publicity,	the	discourses	and	institutions	of	NBNP	need	
to	be	regarded	and	examined	as	part	of	a	larger	body	of	representations	and	
discourses,	and	examined	as	situated	in	a	social,	national,	and	global	context.	Critical	
media	and	cultural	studies	provide	frameworks	and	tools	to	deal	with	the	
phenomenon	of	NBNP	as	discursive	power	to	imbue	collective	imagination.	
Furthermore,	discourse	analysis	and	representation	studies	provide	effective	
methods	to	analyze	NBNP	as	social	practices	which	offer	a	way	of	imagining	and	re-
imagining	the	self,	the	state,	the	nation,	and	the	world.	Firmly	rooted	in	critical	
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media	and	cultural	studies,	this	study	will	expand	knowledge	of	the	emerging	social	
practices	of	NBNP.	In	particular,	incorporating	a	thoughtful	consideration	of	
institutional	and	historical	context,	this	study	will	contribute	to	the	deepening	of	
discourse	analysis	and	representation	studies.			
Secondly,	this	study	will	contribute	to	the	understanding	of	the	global	spread	
of	neoliberalism,	especially	in	relation	to	the	state	and	the	nation.	Rather	than	a	
totalizing	force,	neoliberalism	needs	to	be	examined	as	particularly	situated	
practices	and	institutions	at	global	as	well	as	local	levels.	In	this	understanding,	the	
study	focuses	on	the	centrality	of	the	state	and	the	nation	and	highlights	the	way	in	
which	the	discourses	of	NBNP	mediated	the	process	of	global	neoliberalization.	This	
study	examines	neoliberalism	as	discursive	and	institutional	practices	which	offer	
new	ways	of	re-imagining	the	state	and	the	nation	as	competitive	entities	in	the	
globalizing	world.		
Lastly,	by	situating	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	NBNP	in	a	
specific	local	context	of	South	Korea,	this	study	will	contribute	to	a	better	
understanding	of	the	changes	in	Korean	society	in	the	early	years	in	the	21st	
century,	and	contribute	to	the	field	of	Korean	studies.	I	characterize	these	years	as	
the	times	when	the	people	raised	a	fundamental	question	about	what	the	state	and	
the	nation	are	and	should	be,	and	the	discourses	of	NBNP	offered	not	just	a	
dominant	way	to	redefine	the	state	and	the	nation	in	neoliberal	rationality,	but	
opened	up	a	discursive	space	around	which	different	imaginations	and	reflections	
could	be	evoked	about	the	role	of	the	state,	the	identity	of	the	nation,	and	the	nature	
of	modernity.	This	study	will	offer	a	glimpse	into	the	extent	to	which	South	Korea	is	
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being	transformed	into	a	neoliberal	society	and	to	which	the	neoliberalization	is	
facilitated	by	and	predicated	on	a	developmental	imaginary	of	state-centered,	
economy-obsessed,	Western-oriented	modernity.	
Outline	of	chapters	
The	dissertation	is	organized	in	the	following	manner.		
In	Chapter	1,	I	introduced	the	dissertation,	laying	out	a	relevant	context	and	
identifying	the	methods	adopted	in	the	study.		
In	Chapter	2,	I	provide	the	relevant	body	of	literature	on	which	this	study	is	
built	on:	the	imagined	nature	of	the	state	and	the	nation,	the	rise	of	a	competition	
state	in	the	global	neoliberalization,	and	the	global	phenomenon	of	nation	branding.		
Chapter	3	locates	the	study	in	the	historical	and	contemporary	context	in	
South	Korea.	In	this	chapter,	I	put	the	discourses	of	nation	branding	and	national	
prestige	(NBNP)	in	a	broader	historical	context	of	national	imaginaries	of	the	
modern	state,	economy,	and	nation,	focusing	on	the	continuity	and	transition	
between	developmentalism	and	neoliberalism	in	South	Korea.	I	explore	the	social	
imaginaries	of	modernization	and	development	as	an	economy-centric	discursive	
framework	for	the	developmental	state.	The	post-developmental	transformation	of	
the	state	is	discussed	as	the	discursive	construction	of	neoliberal	competition	state,	
centered	on	the	transnational	and	techno-economic	imaginations	of	globalization	
and	knowledge	economy.	 	
The	following	three	research	chapters	describe	how	the	discursive	and	
institutional	practices	of	NBNP	played	out	in	South	Korea.	I	examine	the	shifting	
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institutional	deployment	of	the	discourses	of	NBNP,	focusing	on	the	agencies	of	the	
news	media	(Chapter	4),	the	government	(Chapter	5),	and	publics	(Chapter	6).		
In	Chapter	4,	I	focus	on	the	agency	of	the	major	national	news	media	in	
importing	and	disseminating	the	idea	of	nation	branding	along	with	domestic	public	
and	private	think	tanks.	I	also	attend	to	how	the	narratives	by	the	news	media	
contributed	to	a	specific	re-imagination	of	the	state	and	the	nation.	The	examination	
of	the	news	media	highlights	the	institutional	and	discursive	formation	of	NBNP	
beyond	the	official	institution	of	government	public	policy,	and	better	illustrates	the	
wider	discursive	terrain	in	which	multiple	stakeholders	were	involved,	often	in	
contested	ways,	in	the	neoliberal	re-imagination	of	the	South	Korean	state	and	
nation.		
In	Chapter	5,	I	examine	how	nation	branding	policy	emerged	under	the	Lee	
government,	focusing	on	the	policy	activities	by	the	Presidential	Council	for	Nation	
Branding.	The	Council	(PCNB)	took	the	responsibility	for	coordinating	public	
policies	across	different	governmental	departments	and	agencies	and	implementing	
various	publicity-oriented	activities	in	regard	to	nation	branding.	In	coordinating	
and	implementing	the	public	policy	for	nation	branding,	the	Council	emphasized	the	
key	principle:	the	cooperation	between	government	and	business	on	the	one	hand,	
and	between	government	and	citizens	on	the	other.	I	will	focus	on	how	this	principle	
actually	played	out	in	the	deployment	of	the	public	policies	for	nation	branding.		
In	chapter	6,	I	examine	how	the	official	discourses	and	practices	of	NBNP	
have	opened	up	a	discursive	space	for	publics.	Focusing	on	the	debates	and	
controversies	around	the	campaign	for	the	“promotion	of	Korea”	by	the	non-
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governmental	bodies	and	individuals,	I	examine	how	different	social	actors	
articulate	and	imagine	different	ideas	of	an	“advanced	nation”	and	cultural	
modernity.		
In	the	conclusion	chapter,	I	summarize	the	findings	in	the	study,	and	reflect	
on	the	implications.	I	also	discuss	the	limitations	and	gaps	left	by	this	study	and	the	
directions	for	future	research.	
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CHAPTER	2		
LITERATURE	REVIEW		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	review	literature	relevant	to	understand	the	phenomenon	of	
nation	branding	as	discursive	and	institutional	practices.	While	the	study	is	
grounded	on	the	traditions	of	critical	media	and	cultural	studies	in	terms	of	
methods	and	theories,	it	is	also	greatly	informed	by	academic	discussions	and	
theories	from	broader	academic	fields	and	disciplines	such	as	anthropology,	
political	science,	international	studies,	globalization	studies,	development	studies,	
and	sociology.		
Theoretically,	I	situate	the	phenomenon	of	nation	branding	at	the	
intersection	of	the	renewed	imaginaries	of	the	state	and	the	nation,	and	the	
neoliberalization	in	the	global	context.	My	point	of	entry	to	a	critical	study	of	nation	
branding	is	the	academic	discussions	about	the	imagined	nature	of	the	state.	
Through	the	literature,	I	explore	the	extent	to	which	the	idea	of	the	state	is	central	
to	the	way	in	which	the	self,	the	nation,	and	the	world	are	imagined.	Then,	I	review	
literature	on	the	state	vis-a-vis	global	neoliberalism.	I	focus	on	how	the	ideas	of	
“global	governmentality”	and	the	“competition	state”	can	shed	light	on	the	
neoliberalization	of	the	state	toward	the	rationality	of	international	
competitiveness.	Built	on	these	discussions,	in	the	last	section,	I	review	relevant	
literature	on	nation	branding	as	a	set	of	discourses,	practices	and	techniques	from	
critical	media	and	cultural	studies	and	anthropology.	
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The	imagined	state,	economy	and	nation	
First,	the	dissertation	conceives	of	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	
of	nation	branding	as	offering	new	ways	of	imagining	a	nation	(Aronczyk,	2013;	
Kaneva,	2012;	Valaskivi,	2016),	which	is	predicated	on	specific	social	imaginaries	of	
the	state	and	the	economy	(Crane,	1998,	1999;	T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998;	Taylor,	
2002;	Wyatt,	2005a,	2005b).		
Since	the	path-breaking	work	by	Benedict	Anderson,	The	Imagined	
Communities	(1983/1991/2006),	the	intellectual	tradition	has	developed	to	
illuminate	the	modern	emergence	of	enormous	abstract	structures	and	entities	like	
the	nation,	the	economy,	and	the	state	in	terms	of	the	collective	working	of	shared	
ideas,	representations,	symbols,	and	imaginations.		
Anderson	defines	the	nation	as	a	community,	collectively	imagined	among	
members	who	do	not	know	each	other,	but	share	a	sense	of	“a	deep,	horizontal	
comradeship”	(Anderson,	2006,	p.	7).	He	explains	the	emergence	of	this	“fraternity”	
in	a	larger	context	of	the	rise	of	what	he	calls	“vernacular	print	capitalism”	
(Anderson,	2006,	p.	76).	With	the	introduction	of	new	print	media	such	as	
newspapers	and	novels,	people	began	to	share	the	sense	of	living	in	the	same	
temporality	(Anderson,	2006,	pp.	22-30;	Gupta,	2007,	p.	270).	
Charles	Taylor,	inspired	by	Anderson,	expands	the	idea	of	imaginary.	The	
idea	of	“social	imaginary”	describes	“the	ways	in	which	people	imagine	their	social	
existence,	how	they	fit	together	with	others,	how	things	go	on	between	them	and	
their	fellows,	the	expectations	that	are	normally	met,	and	the	deeper	normative	
notions	and	images	that	underlie	these	expectations”	(Taylor,	2002,	p.	106).		
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He	explains	that	the	formation	of	Western	modernity	depended	on	the	
historical	emergence	of	new	social	imaginaries	which	grew	out	of	the	perceived	
relations	of	reciprocity	among	equal	individuals:	those	of	the	market	economy,	the	
public	sphere,	and	the	self-governing	people.	The	concept	of	social	imaginaries	helps	
to	understand	the	cultural	and	moral	grounds	of	modernity	which	buttress	the	
working	of	apparent	grand	structures	and	institutions	as	well	as	constitute	the	
formation	of	communities	and	collective	identities	(González-Vélez,	2002,	p.	349).	In	
a	similar	vein,	the	imagination	as	a	“social	practice,”	“a	form	of	work,”	and	“a	social	
fact”	constitutes	broader	conditions	for	ways	of	modern	lives,	especially	in	the	
increasingly	globalizing	world	(Appadurai,	1996,	p.	31).	More	specifically	to	nation	
branding,	Valaskivi	shows	how	a	certain	circulation	of	the	transnational	idea	of	
nation	branding	in	the	context	of	Japan	formulated	and	reproduced	a	particular	
social	imaginary	of	a	nation	among	globally	competing	nations	(Valaskivi,	2013,	
2016;	Valaskivi	&	Sumiala,	2013).		
The	idea	of	social	imaginary	helps	understand	the	cultural	formations	of	the	
large	institutions	and	structures	such	as	the	state	and	the	economy,	the	formations	
in	which	nation	branding	plays	an	important	part	in	the	contemporary	context.	
Many	authors	further	scrutinized	how	the	institutional	entities	such	as	the	state	and	
the	economy	are	constructed	through	cultural	and	imaginative	works.	Most	notably,	
the	idea	of	social	imaginary	helps	to	understand	how	the	state	actually	wields	
discursive	and	institutional	power	by	highlighting	how	it	was	imagined,	
rationalized,	and	idealized,	especially	with	regard	to	the	economy.	In	his	discussion,	
Taylor	(2002)	implies	that	the	social	imaginaries	of	the	state	(as	the	citizen	state)	
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and	the	economy	(as	the	market	economy)	constitute	crucial	components	of	the	
nation	building	in	Western	modernity.		
In	the	Western	tradition	of	media	and	cultural	studies	that	has	mainly	
grappled	with	the	issues	of	power	and	rule	from	a	cultural	perspective,	the	state	has	
curiously	been	a	relatively	neglected	theme.	The	state	has	usually	been	discussed	as	
a	powerful	actor	in	culture	and	media	policies,	as	an	ideological	institution	for	
capitalist	reproduction	(which	is,	what	Althusser	called,	the	“ideological	state	
apparatuses”	(ISAs)),	or	as	a	powerful	entity	vis-a-vis	the	media	and	cultural	
industries.	In	other	words,	the	state	has	been	conceived	of	as	a	definite	institutional	
entity,	clearly	demarcated	from	non-state	domains	such	as	civil	society	and	the	
economy.	The	state	was	conceived	of	as	a	center	of	power,	but,	in	many	discussions,	
reduced	to	a	certain	person	and	group	in	power	or	to	the	bureaucracy.	Ironically,	
critical	media	and	cultural	studies	has	engaged	in	the	examinations	of	many	taken-
for-granted	entities	as	cultural	and	discursive	constructions,	but	the	state	has	not	
been	under	the	same	scrutiny	in	terms	of	culture,	discourse,	representation,	and	
imagination	(compare	this	situation	with	the	case	of	the	"nation"). 		
The	dissertation	is	predicated	on	the	discussion	which	regards	the	state	not	
as	a	self-evident	entity,	a	taken-for-granted	center	of	power,	or	an	institutional	
actor,	but	as	an	effect	of	discursive	and	material	practices.		
The	state	is	a	central	concept	when	critical	scholars,	especially	with	
postcolonial	perspectives,	conceptualize	the	question	of	modern	power	and	how	it	
works	in	capitalism.	Anthropologists	and	sociologists,	influenced	by	Foucauldian	
thought	about	knowledge/power	and	governmentality,	have	developed	a	
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decentered	concept	of	the	state	(Dean,	2010;	Foucault	et	al.,	1991;	Lemke,	2001,	
2002;	Rose	&	Miller,	1992).	They	raised	such	questions	as	how	and	why	the	state	
emerges	as	central	and	how	state	centrality	is	produced	and	reproduced,	and	paid	
attention	to	the	cultural	process	of	symbolic	and	discursive	production	as	well	as	
the	technical	process	of	institutions,	techniques,	procedures	and	tactics.	It	is	through	
these	processes	that	the	state	effect	is	produced	(Cameron	&	Palan,	2004;	Ferguson	
&	Gupta,	2002;	Gupta,	1995;	T.	B.	Hansen	&	Stepputat,	2001;	T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998,	
2006;	Rose,	1999,	p.	35;	Sharma	&	Gupta,	2006;	Steinmetz,	1999).		Mitchell	(1999,	
2002)	locates	the	state	in	relation	to	modern	forms	of	power.	Following	Foucault,	he	
conceptualizes	microphysical	power	not	as	held	by	state	apparatuses	and	imposed	
upon	the	governed,	but	as	dispersed	throughout	society	in	the	forms	of	modern	
disciplinary	techniques	which	produce	individuals	as	subjects	by	setting	the	
possibilities	and	limits	of	thoughts	and	conducts	at	minute	levels	of	social	life.	At	a	
macro	level,	the	governmental	form	of	modern	power	works	on	population	as	a	new	
object	of	management	by	statistical	knowledge	and	political	technologies.	While	
governmental	power	is	not	reducible	to	the	state,	it	is	at	this	macro	level	that	power	
is	structured,	codified	and	“institutionally	crystallized”	in	the	formation	of	the	state	
(Foucalut,	quoted	in	Jessop,	2006,	p.	37).	Moreover,	the	structural	appearance	of	the	
state	as	objective,	neutral,	abstract,	and	external	to	its	object	is	the	real	source	of	
power	and	order	by	maintaining	and	reproducing	the	division	between	the	state	
and	non-state	(Lemke,	2007).	As	Mitchell	(1991)	explains:		
The	state	should	be	addressed	as	an	effect	of	detailed	processes	of	spatial	
organization,	temporal	arrangement,	functional	specification,	and	
supervision	and	surveillance,	which	create	the	appearance	of	a	world	
fundamentally	divided	into	state	and	society.	The	essence	of	modern	politics	
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is	not	policies	formed	on	one	side	of	this	division	being	applied	to	or	shaped	
by	the	other,	but	the	producing	and	reproducing	of	this	line	of	difference	(p.	
95).		
	
Many	authors	also	illuminated	the	institutional	entities	of	the	state	and	the	
economy	in	terms	of	discursive	construction	and	imagination.		Especially,	many	
have	paid	attention	to	the	relation	between	the	state	and	the	economy	in	the	
examination	of	the	appearance	of	the	state	as	the	authoritative	center.	Foucault's	
concept	of	"government"	provided	a	useful	theoretical	idea	in	this	aspect.	
Government	refers	to	"the	‘conduct	of	conduct,’	a	more	or	less	calculated	and	
rational	set	of	ways	of	shaping	conduct	and	of	securing	rule	through	a	multiplicity	of	
authorities	and	agencies	in	and	outside	of	the	state	and	at	a	variety	of	spatial	levels"	
(Watts,	2003,	p.	9).	The	concept	of	government	allows	us	to	understand	how	the	
object	of	the	economy	is	constructed	through	representations,	discourse,	and	
knowledge,	as	well	as	through	procedure	and	techniques	and	how	the	state	emerged	
as	a	legitimate	authority	to	accumulate	the	knowledge	and	procedure	of	the	
economy	(T.	Mitchell,	1991,	1998,	2006). 		
Mitchell	(2006)	argues	that	"the	economy"	was	invented	out	of	the	post-war	
regime	of	expertise	as	a	real	domain	separated	from	the	state	and	society,	as	a	"self-
contained	totality"	of	production,	distribution,	and	consumption	within	a	given	
territory	(pp.	182-183).	The	reimagining	of	the	economy	as	a	natural	object	to	be	
managed,	adjusted,	and	intervened	by	the	state	was	part	of	the	realignment	of	
government.	It	is	in	this	context	which	the	post-war	national	economies	and	nation-
states	were	reimagined.	The	"national	economy"	was	reimagined	as	geographically-
based	bounded	entity,	and	then	became	the	basis	for	the	reimagining	of	the	state	as	
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the	nation-state	(Dean,	2010,	p.	28;	T.	B.	Hansen	&	Stepputat,	2001,	p.	7;	Sharma	&	
Gupta,	2006,	p.	7).	In	other	words,	modern	nation-states	are	not	just	imagined	
communities	based	on	shared	territory,	language	and	public	sphere	(Anderson,	
1983);	they	are	discursive	and	technical	effects	of	the	construction	of	the	abstract	
entity	of	the	national	economy.		
We	can	identify	further	implications	of	the	reimagining	of	the	national	
economy	and	nation-state	with	regard	to	the	examination	of	nation	branding	in	the	
present.	First	of	all,	from	a	geo-political	perspective,	nation-states	are	effects	of	
transnational	discursive	and	technical	practices	(Rose	&	Miller,	1992,	p.	178),	and	
the	geo-political	order	is	reimagined	as	a	relation	among	comparable,	but	hierarchic	
nation-states	and	national	economies.	In	this	order,	Western	liberal	democratic	
states	are	normalized	as	"fully	developed"	and	"ideal"	forms	of	advanced	states.	In	
turn,	non-Western	states	are	put	into	the	international	hierarchy	in	which	"Western	
state	become	the	norm	against	which	other	states	are	judged"	(Sharma	&	Gupta,	
2006,	p.	10).			
Then,	we	can	consider	"development"	from	the	perspective	of	transnational	
government	(Watts,	2003,	p.	12).	The	developmental	discourse	problematized	
"poverty"	as	a	problem,	and	circulated	a	universal	logic	that	provided	an	
explanation	and	solution	based	on	statistical	representations	and	expert	knowledge	
(Sharma	&	Gupta,	2006,	pp.	20-21).	Thus,	transnational	developmental	discourse	
produced	the	effect	of	the	"developmentalist	Third	World	state,"	for	which	national	
development	emerged	as	the	primary	mandate	for	the	state	to	accomplish	(Sharma	
&	Gupta,	2006,	pp.	20-21).			
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More	broadly,	the	modern	state	was	"no	longer	defined	in	terms	of	an	
historical	mission	but	legitimated	itself	with	reference	to	economic	growth"	(Lemke,	
2001,	p.	196).	In	other	words,	development	of	the	national	economy,	mainly	
presented	in	terms	of	economic	growth,	became	naturalized	as	a	given	sublime	task	
of	the	nation-state	(T.	Mitchell,	1998,	pp.	91-92).		
Relatedly	in	terms	of	the	economic	formation	of	the	nation,	some	scholars	
presented	the	idea	of	the	“imagined	economy”	(Crane,	1998,	1999)	or	“economic	
imaginary”	(Wyatt,	2005a,	2005b).	Crane	examines	the	economic	representations	in	
China	and	emphasizes	that	they	are	constitutive	of	the	formation	of	national	
identity.	National	economic	narratives	of	suffering,	accomplishment,	and	social	
cohesion	provided	an	“imagined	economy”	(Crane,	1999,	p.	216),	a	shared	sense	of	
economic	destiny.	He	emphasizes	that	this	sense	of	economic	national	identity	
enables	a	specific	global	economic	integration	which	aggravates	social	inequality.	In	
a	similar	vein,	Wyatt	illustrates	how	a	specific	“economic	imaginary”	of	“emerging	
power”	(Wyatt,	2005a,	p.	467)	enabled	the	uneven	and	unequal	incorporation	of	the	
Indian	economy	into	the	global	economy.		
Throughout	the	modern	history	of	Korea,	the	state	has	emerged	in	varying	
forms	in	different	historical	moments:	as	“absence”	during	the	Japanese	occupation,	
as	an	overwhelmingly	violent	force	(massacres	and	tortures	by	military	
dictatorship),	as	a	leader	toward	modernization	through	economic	development	
and	industrialization,	or	as	an	institutional	entity	that	(failed	to)	provide(d)	safety	
and	protection	for	the	people's	lives	in	times	of	disasters	(the	Sewol	ferry	
disaster).	These	varying	emergences	and	presences	of	the	state	in	modern	history	
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have	been	central	in	shaping	the	normative	basis	of	social	imaginaries.	The	state	
imaginations	in	turn	have	been	central	in	the	collective	understanding	of	the	nation	
and	the	communal	lives,	and	the	individual	perception	of	the	self	and	others	
whether	it	is	imagined	as	an	enormous	violence,	an	agent	of	modernization,	the	
provider	of	protection	and	rescue,	or	lately,	as	a	nation	brand.		
It	is	noted	that	the	dominant	imaginary	of	the	state	has	been	constructed	in	
relation	to	the	national	economy	in	the	modern	history	of	South	Korea.	Especially	in	
the	geopolitical	context	of	the	Cold	War,	the	discourses	of	modernization	and	
development	shaped	a	specific	form	of	the	state,	called	the	“developmental	state,”	
whose	historical	role	was	defined	as	“development”	in	relation	to	the	national	
economy.	In	the	context	of	neoliberal	globalization,	political	discourses	on	the	state	
have	exploded	and	variously	reshaped	the	relation	between	the	state	and	the	
economy	in	domestic	and	transnational	settings.	Quite	a	lot	of	academic	articles	and	
books	have	been	written	on	the	developmental	state	and	the	neoliberal	transition	of	
the	state	in	South	Korea.	However,		most	works	were	on	the	institutional	aspects	
from	the	political	economy	perspectives	(for	instance,	Chang	et	al.,	2012;	Chi,	2007;	
Lim	&	Jang,	2006;	Pirie,	2012;	Woo-Cumings,	1999),	with	rare	works	on	the	cultural	
constructions	and	the	imaginations	of	the	state	(Kwon,	2014).	
I	regard	nation	branding	as	one	of	the	latest	forms	of	state	imagination,	
which	is	flexibly	connected	with	and	translated	into	different	state	discourses	such	
as	national	image,	national	prestige,	soft	power,	the	advanced	country,	the	normal	
nation	and	so	on.	It	offers	new	ways	of	imagining	the	state	and	the	nation	by	putting	
a	new	emphasis	on	the	connection	between	the	state,	the	nation,	and	the	economy.	
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Neoliberal	transformation	of	the	state	into	a	competitive	entity	in	the	
globalizing	world	
Second,	I	situate	the	discourse	and	practice	of	nation	branding	in	the	
contemporary	context	of	neoliberalization	in	South	Korea.	For	the	last	few	decades,	
a	new	political	rationality	called	neoliberalism	emerged	to	attempt	at	readjusting	
the	state-economy	relations	and	"reengineering	the	state"	(Hilgers,	2012),	especially	
by	reconstituting	the	changing	conditions	called	globalization.			
Neoliberalism	is	usually	understood	as	a	"retreat	of	the	state,"	exemplified	by	
a	series	of	public	policy	initiatives	toward	the	privatization	of	public	assets	and	
national	enterprises,	the	deregulation	of	private	business	activities,	the	reduction	of	
public	services	and	welfare,	and	the	extension	of	market	principles.		Rather	than	a	
coherent	and	orderly	implementation	of	ideological	public	policies,	we	can	
understand	neoliberalism	as	entailing	a	wider	change	beyond	the	realm	of	public	
policies	(Larner,	2000,	p.	12).	In	this	regard,	neoliberalism	is	an	emerging	form	of	
governmental	rationality,	aiming	to	establish	market	competition	as	the	primary	
principle	for	organizing	the	whole	society	and	requiring	the	state	and	individuals	to	
be	reorganized	as	enterprises	to	meet	the	normative	imperatives	of	
competitiveness,	commercial	rationale	and	risk	calculation	(Hilgers,	2012,	p.	358).			
In	these	terms,	the	neoliberal	state	is	an	entity	that	proliferates	the	market	
norms	and	the	principle	of	competition	beyond	the	market	(Brown,	2005,	pp.	39-
40).	We	can	conceptualize	the	nature	of	neoliberal	state	with	varying	foci.	Here,	I	
will	focus	on	the	discussions	on	the	neoliberal	state	and	global	governmentality,	
which	might	be	helpful	in	the	examination	of	nation	branding.				
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Some	critical	scholars	mainly	from	international	studies	have	developed	the	
perspective	called	"global	governmentality"	that	focuses	on	the	transnational	
regime	of	states	(Brown,	2005;	Fougner,	2006,	2008;	H.	K.	Hansen	&	Mühlen-
Schulte,	2012;	Larner,	2000;	Larner	&	Le	Hern,	2004;	Larner	&	Le	Heron,	2002;	
Larner	&	Walters,	2004a,	2004b;	Löwenheim,	2008;	Mühlen-Schulte,	2012).	The	
"global	governmentality"	perspective	expands	the	analytic	scope	from	the	national	
to	the	global,	developing	concepts	such	as	"global	economy"	and	"global	
governance."	Moreover,	in	association	with	the	"governmentality"	analysis,	they	
have	paid	attention	to	concrete	aspects	of	technique,	institutions,	procedures,	and	
tactics,	as	well	as	aspects	of	knowledge,	discourse,	and	representations	(Larner	&	
Walters,	2004a,	pp.	2-5).			
These	international	studies	scholars	widely	attend	to	neoliberal	calculative	
techniques	such	as	benchmarking,	global	standards,	indicators,	and	indices,	which	
are	produced	by	transnational	governance	organizations	(UNDP,	OECD,	IMF,	World	
Bank,	etc.)	as	well	as	private	institutions	(WEF,	IMD,	etc.).	Just	as	national	statistics	
constructed	the	national	economy,	these	calculative,	comparative,	quantitative	
techniques	materialize	global	imaginaries.	It	is	within	these	global	imaginaries	that	
national	economies	are	rendered	comparable,	and	the	global	economic	space	is	
made	imaginable	as	a	space	for	global	comparison	and	competition	(Larner	&	
Walters,	2004a,	pp.	212-215).			
From	the	perspective	of	global	governmentality,	Fougner	(2006,	2008)	
focuses	on	state	form,	and	especially	develops	the	idea	of	the	"competition	
state."		Philip	Cerny's	idea	of	the	“competition	state"	(Cerny,	1997,	2010)	highlights	
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shifting	state	forms	in	accordance	with	the	changing	political	rationality	of	the	
globalizing,	neoliberal	economy.	He	argues	that	nation-states,	which	put	emphasis	
on	civic	association	and	social	cohesion,	are	replaced	by	competition	states	which	
operate	on	quasi-enterprise	association.	The	neoliberal	competition	state	does	not	
retreat,	but	expands	its	intervention	and	regulation	for	openness	and	marketization	
toward	transnational	competitiveness	(Cerny,	1997,	p.	251).	While,	at	a	global	level,	
the	neoliberal	competition	state	is	bound	by	the	rules	and	regulations	disseminated	
through	transnational	agents	and	institutions,	it	still	operates	strongly	at	a	national	
level	as	a	promoter	of	market	competition	by	exposing	national	enterprises	and	
citizens	to	the	pressures	of	international	competition	(Cerny,	2010,	p.	5).			
From	the	perspective	of	the	global	neoliberal	rationality	of	government,	
Fougner	(2006,	2008)	focuses	on	how	calculative,	comparative	techniques	such	as	
benchmarking	are	disciplinary	in	reconstructing	the	nation-state	as	a	market-
competitive	subject	of	the	competition	state.		He	examines	how	international	
competitiveness	has	been	constructed	as	a	governmental	problem	in	which	the	state	
is	framed	as	a	competitive	entity	(p.	165).	With	regards	to	international	
competitiveness,	the	state	is	constructed	in	two	different	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	
international	competitiveness	designates	“aggressiveness,”	the	capacities	of	
"national"	enterprises	to	compete	against	foreign	ones.	In	this	term	of	
aggressiveness,	the	task	of	the	state	is	to	enhance	the	capacity	of	the	enterprises.	On	
the	other	hand,	international	competitiveness	implies	“attractiveness,”	which	is	
employed	with	reference	to	what	"remain	spatially	immobile	–	such	as	the	majority	
of	the	workforce,	citizens,	the	people,	society,	and	so	on."	In	this	term	of	
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attractiveness,	the	tasks	of	the	states	are	framed	"as	good	landlords"	from	the	
perspective	of	"globally	footloose	firms	and	capital"	(p.	174).	He	concludes	that	
especially	from	the	second	notion	of	international	competitiveness	states	are	
increasingly	constructed	"as	flexible	and	manipulable	market	actors"	(p.	177).			
In	a	similar	vein,	many	commentators	also	point	out	how	various	country	
indices,	global	competitiveness	reports	(such	as	those	by	IMD	and	WEF)	and	
sovereign	credit	ratings	(such	as	those	by	Standard	&	Poor's,	Moody's	and	Fitch)	
work	as	normalizing	techniques	with	which	the	legitimacy	and	normalcy	of	the	
especially	Third	World	states	are	constructed	(Buduru	&	Pal,	2010,	p.	460;	Fougner,	
2008,	p.	303;	Larner	&	Le	Hern,	2004;	Löwenheim,	2008,	p.	256).				
The	global	governmentality	perspective	helps	us	to	understand	the	
transformation	of	the	state	beyond	the	national	frame.	It	conceptualizes	the	
problems	of	rule	and	power	at	a	global	level,	and	shows	how	at	that	level	the	state	is	
constructed	as	a	manipulable,	flexible,	and	competitive	subject	through	the	
discursive	and	technical	means.	The	perspective	is	potentially	advantageous	in	
grasping	the	transnational	inequality	and	asymmetry	in	power	between	the	
Western	and	the	Third	World	countries.			
However,	this	perspective	has	at	least	two	shortcomings.	First,	it	is	rigidly	
fixed	on	the	division	between	the	global	and	the	national/local,	and	tends	to	assume	
the	simple	dichotomy	between	the	West	and	the	rest.	Second,	the	state	is	
conceptualized	as	a	monolithic	entity,	blinding	not	just	domestic	but	also	translocal	
dynamics.	It	seems	the	perspective	uses	an	inflexible	application	of	the	Foucauldian	
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notion	of	governmentality,	so	that	the	governable	subject	is	fixed	to	the	level	of	the	
individual	state.		
Scholars	mostly	from	anthropology	provide	a	more	productive	way	to	
theorize	neoliberalism	and	the	state	from	a	governmentality	perspective.	Aihwa	Ong	
(2006,	2007)	defines	neoliberalism	not	as	culture	or	structure,	but	"mobile	
calculative	techniques"	(2006,	p.	13)	that	realign	spaces	and	subjects	in	accordance	
with	market-driven	calculation	(p.	3).	She	avoids	understanding	globalization	and	
neoliberalism	as	totalizing	logics,	but	instead,	focuses	on	how	the	neoliberal	market	
logic	intersects	with	the	existing	logics	of	sovereignty,	territoriality,	and	citizenship.	
This	modular	understanding	of	neoliberalism	as	"assemblage"	(2007,	p.	3)	enables	
her	to	understand	how	neoliberal	calculation	fragments	sovereign	territories	and	
re-gradates	them	along	transnational,	subnational,	translocal	lines.	Moreover,	it	
breaks	up	the	national	citizenship	and	realigns	the	gradated	subjectivities	of	
citizenship	variously	connected	with	the	capacities	in	global	markets	(pp.	4-5).	She	
adds	that	the	neoliberal	logic	not	only	promotes	market-oriented,	entrepreneurial,	
competitive,	self-improving,	self-branding,	creative,	cosmopolitan,	calculative	
subjects,	but	rearticulates	them	with	patriotism,	nationalism	and	other	
heterogeneous	values.	In	this	way,	she	and	other	anthropologists,	focusing	on	the	
cases	of	governmentality	in	the	Chinese	context,	show	how	government	articulates	
with	sovereignty	in	a	non-Western	context	(Hoffman,	2006a,	2006b;	K.	Mitchell,	
1997;	Ong,	1997,	1999;	Rofel,	2007).		
In	line	with	this	modular	thinking	of	neoliberal	assemblage,	Collier	(2009)	
also	shows	how	neoliberal	government	was	redeployed	to	reinforce	the	state	in	
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Russia	or	the	response	to	neoliberalism	led	the	mobilization	of	social	welfare	
project	in	Brazil.	Ferguson	(2010),	on	the	other	hand,	shows	how	neoliberal	
elements,	as	those	in	the	basic	income	program,	could	work	against	neoliberal	
regime	in	South	Africa.		
In	sum,	these	scholars	provide	sophisticated	understandings	of	neoliberalism	
from	a	perspective	of	governmentality,	avoiding	sweeping	claims	which	treat	
globalization	and	neoliberalism	as	overwhelming	“tsunami,”	as	well	as	avoiding	
empty	contentions	that	repeat	the	validity	and	viability	of	the	nation-state	in	a	
conventional	way.		
There	have	been	quite	a	lot	of	debates	on	whether	South	Korea	has	turned	
into	a	neoliberal	society,	especially	since	the	Asian	financial	crisis	in	the	late	1990s	
(for	instance,	from	the	field	of	political	economy,	C.-j.	Ch’oe,	2006;	Chang	et	al.,	2012;	
Chi,	2007;	H.-Y.	Cho	et	al.,	2013;	Lim	&	Jang,	2006).	But	many	agree	that	
neoliberalism,	defined	as	the	extension	of	the	principles	of	market	competition	
beyond	the	economy	into	the	whole	society,	has	constituted	a	dominant	governing	
rationality	in	South	Korea	(for	instance,	Jun,	2012;	H.-m.	Kim	et	al.,	2010;	J.	Song,	
2010).	In	the	neoliberal	domination,	commercializing	logics	overwhelm	almost	
every	aspect	of	personal,	social,	political	and	cultural	life	beyond	the	business	world.	
The	logic	of	the	brand	stands	as	a	dominant	discourse	and	technique	in	this	
commercialization	of	society,	extending	its	application	to	the	state	and	the	nation.		
It	is	in	this	context	in	which	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	emerged	
as	a	set	of	discourses	and	techniques	of	imagining	and	constructing	the	state	as	a	
competitive	market	entity	and	as	a	location	manager	for	transnational	capital.	It	
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envisions	a	new	globalizing	economy	and	world	order,	redefining	national	identity	
and	shaping	a	new	citizenship	in	a	neoliberal	manner.	The	discourses	of	nation	
branding	illustrate	a	concrete	way	in	which	the	neoliberal	transformation	of	the	
South	Korean	state	and	the	economy	has	unfolded.	The	dissertation	explores	how	
nation	branding	has	worked	as	part	of	neoliberal	rationality,	constructing	a	cultural	
version	of	the	“neoliberal	competition	state”	in	South	Korea.	Across	the	news	media	
discourses	and	public	policies,	I	examine	how	the	dominant	practices	of	nation	
branding	re-imagined	the	nation	as	a	neoliberal	commercial	entity	in	the	global	
market	of	competing	images	of	nations	in	the	name	of	the	nation	brand,	national	
image,	and	national	prestige.	
The	global	phenomena	of	branding	and	nation	branding	
In	this	section,	I	introduce	relevant	discussions	on	nation	branding	as	a	set	of	
discourses,	institutions,	and	techniques	from	critical	perspectives	informed	by	
critical	media	and	cultural	studies	and	anthropology.		For	this	end,	I	start	with	the	
idea	of	branding,	the	business	techniques	out	of	which	nation	branding	was	
developed.	The	basic	assumption	of	nation	branding	is	that	the	techniques	of	
branding	products	and	corporations	are	applicable	to	the	state	and	the	nation.	Then,	
I	review	the	literature	on	nation	branding	by	identifying	four	interrelated	themes:	
political	economy,	international	politics,	cultural	identity,	and	citizenship.		
Branding		
Branding	is	an	advanced	marketing	technique	that	adopts	names,	symbols	
and	design	and	applies	them	to	products	in	order	to	stand	out	among	the	crowd	of	
products	in	the	competitive	market	(Dinnie,	2008,	p.	14).	Branding,	almost	
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universally	accepted	in	the	world	of	business	management,	diverges	from	
traditional	marketing	in	its	emphasis	on	image	and	reputation	which	enable	the	
establishment	of	semiotic	and	emotional	ties	with	consumers.	According	to	van	Ham	
(2001):	
Branding	acquires	its	power	because	the	right	brand	can	surpass	the	actual	
product	as	a	company’s	central	asset.	Smart	firms	pour	most	of	their	money	
into	improving	their	brands,	focusing	more	on	the	values	and	emotions	that	
customers	attach	to	them	than	on	the	quality	of	the	products	themselves	(p.	
2).		
	
In	this	advanced	form,	brands	are	defined	as	“clusters	of	functional	and	
emotional	values	that	promise	a	unique	and	welcome	experience	between	a	buyer	
and	a	seller”	(Chernatony,	quoted	in	Dinnie,	2008,	p.	14).	Business	practitioners	and	
critical	observers	of	branding	alike	attend	to	branding	in	its	aspect	of	producing	
“extra	value”	or	“premium	value”	from	the	intangible	and	the	symbolic.		
Critical	scholars	examine	the	phenomenon	of	brands	and	branding	within	the	
context	of	a	larger	social	transformation	(Arvidsson,	2006;	Banet-Weiser,	2012;	
Holt,	2006).	Attending	to	the	cultural	aspect	of	branding,	the	aspect	in	which	
symbolic	and	affective	practices	are	privileged,	they	view	that	branding	is	
symptomatic	of	the	overarching	social	and	economic	transformation	especially	with	
regard	to	the	development	of	neoliberal	globalization	and	information	and	
communications	technologies.		
In	his	examination	of	the	historical	relations	between	branding	and	
consumer	culture,	Holt	(2006)	argues	that	today’s	branding	transcends	“cultural	
engineering”	of	manipulative	marketing	communications	and	propagandistic	public	
relations.	Branding	began	as	early	as	the	late	19th	century	and	soon	developed	by	
	 56 
American	advertising	agencies,	but	the	contemporary	development	of	branding	is	
indebted	to	the	development	of	sophisticated	marketing	and	consumer	researches	
in	the	late	half	of	the	20th	century.	He	argues	that	“branding	is	a	distinctive	mode	of	
capital	accumulation”	in	that	it	“generates	profits	by	creating	and	then	exploiting	
various	sort	of	social	dependency”	(Holt,	2006,	p.	300).	The	“postmodern	branding	
revolution”	(Jansen,	2008,	p.	125)	consists	in	its	emphasis	on	the	meaningful	and	
affective	nature	through	which	brands	come	to	exist	in	the	social	world	of	
experience.	The	shift	from	producer-centered	to	consumer-centered	perspective,	or	
from	modern	to	postmodern	branding	paradigm	(Holt,	2006)	is	epitomized	by	a	
famous	dictum	in	business	management,	“brands	exist	only	in	the	mind	of	the	
consumer”	(Kotler,	quoted	in	Dinnie,	2008,	p.	15).	
Arvidsson	(2006)	relates	the	rise	of	branding	to	“a	new	economic	logic”	that	
has	been	related	to	various	ideas	such	as	“sign	economy,”	“flexible	accumulation,”	
the	aestheticization	of	the	economy,”	“knowledge	economy,”	“information	
economy,”	“cognitive	capitalism”	or	“informational	capitalism.”	These	concepts	
highlight	the	increasing	valorization	of	information,	knowledge,	design	and	style	in	
the	production	of	value.	Arvidsson	(2007)	asserts	that	brands	“are	paradigmatic	of	
the	new	informational	mode	of	production”	in	which	value	creation	is	based	on	the	
immaterial,	the	intangible	of	affect	and	experience.	Major	textbooks	on	marketing	
and	branding	commonly	emphasize	the	importance	of	“building	strong	brand	
identity”	and	“managing	brand	equity”	by	constructing	long	and	stable	relationship	
with	customers	through	the	symbolic	and	emotional	dimension	of	brands	(for	
instance,	Aaker,	1991).	
	 57 
Indeed,	brands	are	at	the	heart	of	the	financialization	of	the	global	economy.	
The	notion	of	“brand	equity”	epitomizes	the	immaterialization	of	the	global	
economy	accelerated	by	global	reach	of	financial	capital.	Brand	experts	estimate	
that	as	much	as	40	to	60	per	cent	of	a	company’s	worth	comes	out	of	its	brand	
equity	(Jansen,	2008,	p.	125).	Anholt	(2005)	estimates	that	brand	could	be	as	much	
as	one-third	of	the	total	value	of	global	wealth.	According	to	the	measurement	by	
Interbrand,	a	leading	branding	consulting	agency,	the	intangible	assets	of	the	top	
100	global	brands	are	up	to	one	trillion	dollars,	which	is	roughly	equal	to	the	
combined	gross	national	income	of	all	the	63	“low	income”	countries	defined	by	the	
World	Bank.	
Brand	equity,	the	financial	value	of	brand	assets,	suggests	that	the	operation	
of	contemporary	capitalism	is	increasingly	dependent	on	the	intellectual	property	
regime	in	which	the	immaterial,	intangible	value	creation	is	crystalized	in	monetary	
terms.	The	phenomenon	of	brands	and	branding	suggests	that	the	“extra-economic”	
resources	become	the	basis	of	economic	value	creation;	in	the	same	process,	the	
economy	is	increasingly	dependent	on	culture.	In	this	context,	it	is	no	surprise	that	
branding	has	become	so	pervasive	that	it	is	not	limited	to	the	business	area;	“the	
brand	seems	to	have	become	the	natural	model	for	the	organization	of	a	whole	
range	of	different	social	formations”	(Arvidsson,	2007,	p.	9).	
In	South	Korea,	the	term	“brand”	(which	reads	as	“bŭraendŭ	브랜드”	in	South	
Korea)	itself	has	been	used	as	a	loanword	without	matching	original	Korean	word,	
and	has	become	an	everyday	word	in	recent	years.	Indeed,	branding	has	emerged	as	
a	dominating	discourse,	practice	and	technique,	overwhelming	almost	every	aspect	
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of	personal,	social,	political	and	cultural	life	beyond	the	business	world.	The	
publishing	industry	poured	out	numerous	books	on	“self-development”	that	
encouraged	individuals	to	“brand	yourself,”	“maximize	your	value”	and	“sell	your	
brand”	(H.-m.	Kim	et	al.,	2010;	Seo,	2010;	J.	Song,	2010).		
Considering	the	overwhelming	sweep	of	branding,	it	is	no	surprise	that	
places	such	as	cities	and	countries	are	getting	branding	treatment	to	build	powerful	
brand	images	and	brand	identities	in	the	competitive	global	market.	If	the	logic	of	
the	brand	has	become	a	dominant	form	of	the	way	in	which	informational	capitalism	
works,	how	can	this	logic	be	extended	to	the	state	and	the	nation?	
Nation	branding		
Nation	branding	has	grown	rapidly	as	a	field	since	the	late	1990s,	
represented	by	several	books7	and	quasi-academic	journals	such	as	Place	Branding	
and	the	Journal	of	Brand	Management,8	and	as	a	burgeoning	consulting	practice	led	
by	global	marketing	and	branding	consulting	firms.	Growing	out	of	business	
management	of	brands	of	products	and	corporations,	the	idea	and	practice	of	nation	
branding	emerged	in	close	relation	with	those	of	destination	branding,	place	
	
7	Representative	books	include	Brand	new	justice	(2003)	and	Competitive	
identity	(2007)	written	by	Simon	Anholt,	a	British	consultant	who	claims	that	he	
first	coined	the	term,	nation	branding.	The	nation-branding	paradigm	was	inspired	
and	advocated	by	Wally	Olins,	who	has	worked	on	corporate	identity	and	branding	
in	his	book,	Trading	identities	(1999),	and	Peter	van	Ham,	who	came	from	
international	politics.	On	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic,	American	professors	at	
business	schools	also	have	influenced	the	establishment	of	the	paradigm	with	
related	books:	David	Aaker	(Managing	brand	equity,	1991),	who	is	an	expert	on	
corporate	brand	strategy,	and	Philip	Kotler	(Marketing	places,	1993),	who	is	called	
“the	Father	of	Modern	Marketing”	among	his	circle.	
8	The	journal,	Place	Branding	was	launched	in	2004	and	was	renamed	as	
Place	Branding	and	Pubic	Diplomacy	in	2006.	Simon	Anholt	was	the	first	editor	of	
the	journal.	
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branding	and	the	“country-of-origin	effect”	in	the	field	of	tourism	studies	and	
international	marketing	(Kotler	&	Gertner,	2003).	Inspired	by	the	business	practices	
valorizing	symbolic	and	cultural	branding	of	products	and	services,	nation	branding	
emphasizes	the	growing	importance	of	image,	logo,	design,	symbol	and	reputation	
for	countries	just	like	for	goods	and	services.		
Nation	branding	is	not	simply	a	communication	strategy	dealing	with	
symbols	and	logos.	Kaneva	(2011a)	defines	nation	branding	as	broadly	as	“a	
compendium	of	discourses	and	practices	aimed	at	reconstituting	nationhood	
through	marketing	and	branding	paradigms”	(p.	118).	It	encompasses	a	range	of	
discursive	and	institutional	practices	at	the	economic,	political	and	cultural	levels.	
Furthermore,	nation-branding	practitioners	ambitiously	aim	to	establish	the	
paradigm	of	nation	branding	as	a	guiding	principle	for	organizing	the	internal	and	
external	public	policy	for	economic	development,	national	planning	and	governance	
(Anholt,	2007,	p.	23).		
In	the	following	section,	I	examine	the	basic	arguments	of	nation	branding	by	
critically	reviewing	its	core	literature.	Most	literature	on	nation	branding	comes	
from	the	academic	disciplines	of	business	administration	and	international	politics.9	
It	is	not	surprising	that	most	of	them	focus	on	the	promotional	and	functional	
aspects	of	nation	branding	in	which	consultants	and	practitioners	deal	with	the	
	
9	Kaneva’s	almost	complete	survey	(2011a)	shows	that	out	of	186	samples	of	
scholarly	sources	on	nation	branding	from	1997	to	209,	106	pieces	came	from	
marketing	and	business	administration	perspectives	and	66	publications	from	
international	relations	perspectives.	
	 60 
principles	and	techniques	for	the	more	effective	and	efficient	implementation	of	
nation	branding.10		
I	subject	these	perspectives	on	nation	branding	to	critical	examination,	
informed	by	cultural	perspectives.	The	critical	cultural	literature,	coming	from	the	
fields	of	media	and	cultural	studies,	anthropology,	and	international	relations	
among	others,	is	relatively	small	but	growing.11	This	critical	literature	commonly	
regards	the	rise	of	nation	branding	as	a	cultural	practice	sitting	in	the	larger	political	
structural	context	of	neoliberal	globalization.	These	authors	raise	the	questions	
about	the	assumption	underlying	the	dominant	paradigm	of	nation	branding.		
The	review	focuses	on	four	key	aspects	of	nation	branding:	first,	how	it	is	
entrenched	within,	and	helps	construct	a	specific	global	economic	order;	secondly,	
how	it	envisions	a	version	of	international	political	order	by	relating	itself	to	such	
ideas	as	public	diplomacy	and	soft	power;	thirdly,	how	it	uses	culture	as	an	
instrument	for	nation	branding	and	redefines	national	identity	for	economic	effects	
and;	lastly,	how	it	gives	shape	to	a	new	form	of	governance	by	emphasizing	public-
private	partnership	and	citizen	participation.		
The	political	economy	of	nation	branding	
The	basic	argument	of	nation	branding	is	that	countries	are	competing	for	
international	attention	to	survive	the	market	globalization.	Nation	branding	
	
10	For	the	purpose	of	the	review,	I	will	focus	on	the	literature	which	proposes	
core	arguments	of	nation	branding,	especially	publications	by	leading	consultants	
Anholt	(2005,	2007),	Olins	(2002)	and	van	Ham	(2001)	as	well	as	an	introductory	
survey	by	Dinnie	(2008).	
11	Kaneva’s	survey	(2011a)	identifies	only	14	sources,	but	the	literature	has	
been	growing	rapidly	since	then.	At	this	point	of	writing,	I	count	ten	times	as	many	
journal	articles	and	dozen	books.	
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advocates	contend	that	the	fierce	global	competition	for	internal	and	external	
markets	makes	it	inevitable	for	nations	and	places	to	engage	in	the	working	and	
reworking	of	national	image	and	reputation	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	1;	Dinnie,	2008,	p.	
106).	They	argue	that	nations	and	places	are	basically	playing	the	same	game	as	
other	products	and	companies	in	that	they	are	exposed	to	global	market	
competition	for	political	and/or	commercial	attention	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	125;	van	
Ham,	2008,	p.	129).		
Cultural	critics	point	out	that	nation	branding	is	predicated	on	the	neoliberal	
assumption	that	market	globalization	is	an	inevitable	and	natural	process	
(Dzenovska,	2005;	Jansen,	2008;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011).	Anholt	(2005)	asserts:		
I	believe	that	we	have	little	choice	in	the	matter.	Because	[……]	so	much	of	the	
wealth	of	nations	in	the	globalized	economy	devise	from	each	country’s	
ability	to	export	branded	goods,	and	because	so	much	of	the	wealth	to	
survive	and	prosper	now	comes	from	the	“added	value”	of	branded	goods	
and	services,	the	competitivity	of	nations	and	the	branding	of	countries	is	the	
only	way	forward;	it	has	become	an	immutable	law	of	global	capitalism.		
	
Assuming	that	the	capitalist	globalization	is	an	objective,	law-like	movement	
from	which	no	individuals	and	countries	can	be	exempted,	he	valorizes	nation	
branding	as	the	only	way	to	foster	the	necessary	national	competitiveness	and	to	
survive	the	global	competition.		
Based	on	this	assumption	in	which	neoliberal	globalization	is	the	law	and	
competitiveness	is	its	norm,	the	necessity	and	benefits	of	nation	branding	are	
presented	exclusively	in	economic	terms.	In	the	context	of	market	globalization,	
practitioners	argue,	nation	branding	is	a	necessary	strategy	for	nations	to	attract	
tourists,	inward	investment	and	international	talents,	to	boost	exports	(Dinnie,	
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2008,	p.	17).	Temporal	further	enumerates	the	potential	benefits	of	nation	branding	
as	follows:	
-	Increase	currency	stability	
-	Help	restore	international	credibility	and	investor	confidence	
-	Reverse	international	ratings	downgrades	
-	Increase	international	political	influence	
-	Lead	to	export	growth	of	branded	products	and	services	
-	Increase	inbound	tourism	and	investment	
-	Stimulate	stronger	international	partnerships	
-	Enhance	nation	building	(confidence,	pride,	harmony,	ambition,	national	
resolve)	
-	Reverse	negative	thoughts	about	environmental	and	human	rights	issues	
-	Help	diffuse	allegations	of	corruption	and	cronyism	
-	Bring	greater	access	to	global	markets	
-	Lead	to	an	improvement	in	the	ability	to	win	against	regional	and	global	
business	competitors,	and	defend	their	own	markets	(quoted	in	Anholt,	
2005,	p.	141).		
	
The	list	suggests	that	nation	branding	presupposes	a	specific	understanding	
of	globalization,	which	is	constructed	specifically	from	the	perspective	of	financial	
capital.	Nation	branding	assumes	that	countries	are	competing	not	just	for	economic	
gains	but	more	specifically	for	improving	international	financial	credibility	ratings.	
In	this	vein,	nation-branding	practitioners	offer	the	measurement	of	nation	brands	
especially	in	terms	of	their	financial	value.	For	instance,	the	Anholt	Nation	Brands	
Index	(NBI)12	incorporates	the	financial	valuation	of	nation	brands,	which	enables	
“to	put	dollar	value	on	the	reputations	of	the	countries	in	the	NBI,	giving	the	sense	of	
the	real	contribution	of	the	brand	to	the	nation’s	economy”	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	44).	
Measured	with	the	methodology	of	“royalty	relief,”	the	value	of	nation	brand	assets	
well	exceeds	the	amount	of	GDP,	led	by	the	USA’s	18	trillion	dollars	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	
	
12	Later,	it	was	revamped	as	the	Anholt-gfk	Roper	Nation	Brands	Index	in	
partnership	with	GfK	Roper	Public	Affairs	and	Media.	
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45).	The	practice	of	indexing	from	the	financial	perspective	transforms	the	nation-
state	into	“calculative	space,”	which	is	“constituted	by	marketing	data	and	decision	
making	rather	than	conceived	in	terms	of	social	relations	or	governance”	(Jansen,	
2008,	p.	122).		
Cultural	critics	further	point	out	that	nation-branding	consultants	not	only	
naturalize	the	neoliberal	global	economy	by	mythologizing	it	as	natural	and	
inevitable	reality	to	which	nations	should	adjust	(Aronczyk,	2009,	p.	292);	but	they	
are	actively	constituting	part	of	the	constructed	reality	of	financial	globalization,	
operating	as	the	“cultural	circuit	of	capital”	(Thrift,	2005).	Nation	branding	
consultants	normalize	and	constitute	capitalist	globalization	by	disseminating	
specific	managerial	knowledge,	constructing	a	specific	image	of	world	economic	
order,	and	facilitating	the	movement	of	financial	capital	at	a	global	scale.		
In	the	framework	of	nation	branding,	the	role	of	nation-states	is	reduced	to	
the	management	of	image	and	reputation	in	order	to	foster	competitiveness	for	a	
business-friendly	environment	to	attract	free-flowing	global	financial	capital,	
technologies	and	elites	(Kaneva,	2007,	2011a;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011).	As	a	
governing	technology	of	global	neoliberalism,	nation	branding	urges	nation-states	
to	participate	in	the	global	capitalist	game	of	enhancing	the	rank	of	nation	brands	by	
internalizing	neoliberal	norms	of	global	standards. 
Nation	branding	and	international	politics		
Nation	branding	practitioners,	especially	those	who	are	based	in	Europe,	
emphasize	that	the	role	played	by	nation	branding	is	not	limited	to	the	economic	
aspect,	but	encompasses	political	and	diplomatic	aspects	(Anholt,	2007;	Olins,	2002;	
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van	Ham,	2008).	These	practitioners	are	eager	to	show	internal	and	external	
political	benefits	of	nation	branding.	They	attempt	to	link	the	idea	of	nation	
branding	to	such	concepts	as	“public	diplomacy”	and	“soft	power”	(Gilboa,	2008),	
arguing	that	nation	branding	is	basically	interchangeable	with	those	concepts	
developed	from	international	relations	and	international	politics.		
Soft	power,	the	concept	introduced	by	Joseph	Nye,	describes	the	ability	of	a	
nation	to	influence	others	not	by	military	force	and/or	economic	lure	but	by	the	
attractiveness	of	a	nation’s	values,	culture	and	policies	(J.	S.	Nye,	2008,	p.	94).	He	
contends	that	soft	power	has	become	strategically	as	important	as	the	hard	power	
of	military	coercion	and	economic	inducement	with	the	rise	of	information	
communications	technologies	and	the	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	(Gilboa,	2008;	J.	
S.	Nye,	2008).	Nation	branding	consultants	contend	that	nation	branding	is	virtually	
equivalent	to	soft	power	in	that	both	of	them	focus	on	image,	reputation	and	
attraction.	Anholt	writes:		
Soft	power	[……]	is	making	people	want	to	do	what	you	want	them	to	do.	
Nation	branding	is	about	making	people	want	to	pay	attention	to	a	country’s	
achievement,	and	believe	in	its	qualities.	It	is	quintessential	modern	
exemplar	of	soft	power	(2005,	p.	13).		
	
In	this	regard,	Anholt	(2007)	argues	that	nation	branding	is	an	essential	
component	of	the	comprehensive	art	of	statecraft.	In	fact,	he	and	other	practitioners	
are	eager	to	recommend	the	recipes	of	nation	branding	and	nation	image	
management	especially	to	under-developed	countries	as	the	overarching	public	
policy	strategy	for	national	development.	He	argues	that	the	soft	power	strategy	of	
nation	branding	is	the	only	viable	option	for	“transitional”	economies	in	the	former	
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Second	World	and	poorer	countries	of	lower	development,	which	lack	hard	power	
instruments	of	military	forces	and	economic	power	(Anholt,	2005,	p.	13).	
Similar	claims	are	raised	about	public	diplomacy.	Gilboa	(2008)	defines	
public	diplomacy,	“where	state	and	nonstate	actors	use	the	media	and	other	
channels	of	communication	to	influence	public	opinion	in	foreign	societies”	(p.	58).	
From	the	perspective	of	international	relations,	it	is	presented	“as	an	official	policy	
translating	soft	power	resources	into	action”	(p.	61).	While	it	is	observed	that	public	
diplomacy	and	nation	branding	are	distinguished	in	terms	of	their	goals	—	the	
former	aiming	at	foreign	policy	outcomes	and	the	latter	at	commercial	benefits	(p.	
68),	nation	branders	contends	that	they	are	converging	in	that	public	diplomacy	
strategically	adopts	commercial	techniques	and	practices	to	appeal	to	foreign	public	
audiences	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	3;	van	Ham,	2008,	p.	135).		
Nation	branding	is	now	regarded	not	just	as	a	communication	technique	
adopted	by	countries,	but	a	critical	component	of	public	policy	that	directs	the	
overarching	orientation	of	internal	and	external	state	management.	In	this	vein,	the	
idea	of	nation	branding	is	increasingly	linked	with	those	of	public	diplomacy	and	
soft	power.	It	is	contended	that	the	convergence	between	nation	branding	and	soft	
power	or	public	diplomacy	is	inevitable	because	the	role	and	position	of	modern	
nation-states	have	changed	in	the	post-Cold	War	era	in	which	ideologies	receded.	
Nation	branding	posits	a	specific	redefinition	of	the	state	and	politics	in	the	post-
Cold	War	international	order	which	is	determined	by	the	market	logic.	Van	Ham	
(2001)	argues	that	the	nation	brand,	or	the	“brand	state”	in	his	own	term,	implies	“a	
shift	in	political	paradigms,	a	move	from	the	modern	world	of	geopolitics	and	power	
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to	the	postmodern	world	of	images	and	influence”	(p.	4).	He	suggests	that	
“postmodern	power,	where	soft	power	and	public	diplomacy	have	their	place”	(van	
Ham,	2008,	p.	127)	is	suitable	in	the	age	of	globalization	in	which	the	ideological	
confrontation	gave	way	to	market	competition	among	nations.	It	is	advised	that	
“smart	states”	put	their	collective	energy	into	building	an	assertive	international	
images	and	reputations	(van	Ham,	2001,	p.	3).		
Furthermore,	postmodern	international	politics	is	depicted	as	rather	
“peaceful	and	humanistic”	landscape	that	consists	of	individual	freedom	and	
consumer	power	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	125).	It	is	soft	power	and	public	diplomacy	which	
are	the	instruments	of	this	postmodern	international	politics	for	gaining	economic	
competitive	advantage.	And	it	is	in	this	postmodern	conception	of	world	politics	
which	nation	branding	is	celebrated	as	the	only	weapon	that	is	possibly	wielded	by	
the	weak	who	are	transitional,	developing	countries	that	“lie	beneath”	in	the	
hierarchy	of	nations	(Anholt,	2005,	p.	13).		
At	least	two	aspects	of	the	nation-branding’s	take	on	the	international	
politics	can	be	put	into	critiques.	On	the	one	hand,	the	nation-branding	
practitioners’	ambitions	and	motivations.	The	nation-branding	consultants	
repeatedly	emphasize	that	nation	branding	cannot	be	equated	with	logos	and	
slogans,	and	communications	techniques	such	as	PR,	advertising	and	campaigns;	
they	claim	that	it	constitutes	a	core	component	of	public	policy	by	encompassing	the	
agenda	of	international	politics.	By	claiming	the	convergence	between	nation	
branding	and	soft	power	and	public	diplomacy,	the	nation-branding	consultants	
locate	nation-branding	at	the	center	of	public	policy	agendas	as	the	overarching	
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orientation	of	internal	and	external	state	management	—	therefore	their	own	place	
as	consulting	authority	for	the	new	panacea	of	nation	branding	(Kaneva	&	Popescu,	
2011,	p.	192)	especially	over	the	countries	which	are	put	at	the	lower	side	of	
international	hierarchy.		
On	the	other	hand,	by	dismissing	modern	nation-states	and	celebrating	
postmodern	brand	states,	nation	branding	depoliticizes	international	politics.	It	
presents	the	“brand	state”	pursuing	“competitive	identity”	as	a	normative	form	of	
states	in	the	age	of	postmodern	power	(Anholt,	2007;	van	Ham,	2001).	International	
politics	among	brand	states	are	depicted	as	dominated	by	soft	power	and	public	
diplomacy	where	peaceful	competition	and	equal	exchange	among	nations	
characterize	“postmodern	power”	(van	Ham,	2008,	p.	127).	
Nation	branding,	cultural	differences,	national	identity		
Advocates	of	nation	branding,	either	from	economic	or	diplomatic	
perspective,	regard	culture	as	an	essential	component	of	nation	branding	strategies.	
Just	like	branding	in	general,	nation	branding	emphasizes	the	immaterial	dimension	
of	distinctive	culture,	symbols,	logos,	naming	and	design	for	strategic	differentiation	
in	the	competitive	global	market.	Practitioners	of	advanced	modern	branding,	
however,	acknowledge	that	nation	branding	is	not	equivalent	to	symbolic	
manipulation	and	propaganda	which	directly	aim	to	influence	other	countries	
because	nation	brands	“are	not	directly	under	the	marketer’s	control”	(Dinnie,	2008,	
p.	108).	
While	this	poses	problems	to	some	marketers	and	branders	of	nations	due	to	
their	complex	nature	ridden	with	history	and	traditions,	it	provides	to	others	a	rich	
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ground	for	cultural	nation	branding	because	“nation-brands	possess	far	richer	and	
deeper	cultural	resources	than	any	other	type	of	brand”	(Dinnie,	2008,	p.	14).	In	this	
light,	nation	branding	is	essentially	a	cultural	practice	aiming	to	carve	out	the	
culturally	differentiated	space	for	international	economic	and	political	competition.	
In	this	cultural	perspective,	nation	brands	are	broadly	defined	as	“the	unique,	multi-
dimensional	blend	of	elements	that	provide	the	nation	with	culturally	grounded	
differentiation	and	relevance	for	all	of	its	target	audiences”	(Dinnie,	2008,	p.	15).	
Nation	branding	deals	with	culture	in	ways	in	which	cultural	resources	could	
contribute	to	the	enhancement	of	national	competitiveness.	In	this	perspective,	
unique	local	and	national	culture	is	regarded	as	essential	to	the	effective	nation	
branding	campaign.	On	the	one	hand,	culture	in	the	forms	of	either	cultural	heritage	
or	modern	popular	culture	makes	immediate	economic	contribution	to	the	national	
economy	through	tourism	and	cultural	exports.	The	policy	initiatives	for	promoting	
the	creative	industries	such	as	“Cool	Britannia”	and	“Cool	Japan”	represent	the	trend	
in	which	culture	has	entered	the	major	realm	of	public	policy	(Clancy,	2009,	p.	28;	
Jansen,	2008,	p.	122).		
On	the	other	hand,	culture	makes	“intangible”	contribution	to	the	national	
economy	and	international	political	influences	by	enhancing	national	prestige	
(Anholt,	2007,	p.	113).	Anholt	(2007)	argues	that	culture	is	useful	in	constructing	
“competitive	identity”	of	nation	brands	simply	because	it	is	generally	regarded	as	
“not	for	sale.”	Culture,	representing	“a	country’s	true	spirit	and	essence”	could	
mitigate	the	overtly	commercial	tone	of	branding.	For	instance,	while	Japan	has	
been	pejoratively	projected	as	“automata,”	its	graceful	heritage	and	“cool”	modern	
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culture	are	effectively	offsetting	the	stereotypical	image.	As	culture	is	a	truly	unique	
feature	of	its	country,	it	provides	“all-important	quality	of	dignity	which,	arguably,	
commercial	brands	can	do	without,	but	countries	cannot”	(Anholt,	2005,	p.	136).	
In	these	frameworks	of	nation	branding,	culture	is	effectively	redefined	as	an	
essential	instrument	for	nation	branding	from	the	perspective	of	global	
competitiveness.	Culture	is	redefined	as	direct	industrial	resources	for	economic	
development.	The	Anholt-Gfk	Roper	Nation	Brands	Index	features	the	category	of	
“culture	and	heritage”	as	one	of	the	six	criteria	measuring	the	value	of	nation	brands	
(the	other	five	are	exports,	governance,	people,	tourism,	and	investment	and	
immigration).		Culture	is	also	conceived	of	as	having	symbolic	consequences	of	
constructing	national	image	and	reputation	in	the	global	economy	and	politics	by	
enhancing	nation	prestige,	dignity,	quality	and	so	forth	(Anholt,	2005).		
The	redefinition	of	culture	within	the	overarching	policy	orientation	toward	
global	competitiveness	has	implications	to	the	way	in	which	the	question	of	national	
identity	is	raised	in	the	nation-branding	paradigm.	If	culture	is	essential	to	the	
formation	of	national	identity	through	the	shared	cultural	traditions	and	
contemporary	culture	represented	in	the	national	media	(Anderson,	1983;	
Aronczyk,	2007),	the	particular	rendition	of	culture	by	nation	branding	entails	a	
specific	redefinition	of	collective	national	identity.		
Its	practitioners	claim	that	nation	branding	is	the	project	of	representing	the	
essence	of	national	culture	and	reflecting	“something	fundamentally	true	about	the	
place	and	people”	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	75).	Dinnie	(2008)	suggests	that	“nation-brand	
development	is	firmly	rooted	in	the	reality	and	essence	of	the	nation”	(p.	135).	In	
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this	sense,	they	argue	that	nation	brand	and	national	identity	are	“virtually	the	same	
thing”	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	75).		
However,	as	a	concept	developed	in	relation	with	the	international	
marketing	concept	of	“country-of-origin	effect”	(Dinnie,	2008,	pp.	84-103),	the	
genuine	interest	of	nation	branding	is	to	present	national	identity	in	a	tradable	form	
which	can	be	used	as	a	“shortcut”	(Anholt,	2005,	p.	3)	for	an	international	purchase	
or	investment	decision.	In	this	sense,	Anholt	(Anholt,	2007)	argues	that	“nation	
brand	is	national	identity	made	tangible,	robust,	communicable,	and	above	all	
useful”	(p.	75).		
Some	advocates,	arguing	that	the	historical	formation	of	nations	is	not	
different	from	the	contemporary	practice	of	nation	branding,	attempts	to	present	
nation	branding	as	an	extension	of	historical	project	of	nation	building.	Wally	Olins	
(2002),	a	leading	branding	consultant,	goes	further	to	suggest	that	nation	building	
be	the	symbolic	construction	of	nations	through	the	process	of	branding	and	
rebranding.	He	argues	that	the	process	of	historical	nation	building	involved	
recreated	national	myths	and	traditions,	reinvented	representations	and	new	
symbolic	systems	that	projected	the	regime	changes	in	reality.	Giving	examples	of	
France,	Germany,	Spain	and	Zimbabwe,	he	contends	that	the	historical	construction	
of	nations	by	way	of	making	up	consistent	and	coherent	images	and	narratives	is	
what	amounts	to	his	conception	of	contemporary	nation	branding	and	rebranding.		
Adopting	the	constructionist	view	of	nation	building	in	academic	discussions	
(Anderson,	1983;	Gellner,	1983;	Ranger	&	Hobsbawm,	1983)	in	his	own	way,	Olins’s	
take	on	national	identity	reduces	the	historical-political	process	to	a	general	process	
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of	symbolic	makeover.	Van	Ham	(2001)	distinguishes	between	modern	and	
postmodern	national	identities.	Whereas	the	modern	national	identity	was	deep-
rooted	in	the	historical-political	context	and	often	fell	into	antagonistic	nationalism,	
the	postmodern	national	identity	is	“cool	brand”	free	from	the	deep-rootedness.	
This	“new	and	improved”	version	of	national	identity	and	nationalism	is	presented	
as	a	solution	to	the	global	economic	competitiveness:		
In	its	ability	to	combine	diverse	motifs	of	heritage	and	modernization,	
domestic	and	foreign	concerns,	and	economic	and	moral	ideologies,	nation	
branding	is	presented	as	a	“2.0	version	of	nationalism,	as	a	more	progressive	
form	of	patriotism	than	its	chauvinistic	or	antagonistic	counterparts	
(Aronczyk,	2009,	p.	294).		
	
While	some	emphasize	the	“mining”	of	history,	culture,	geography,	and	
national	identity	for	external	display	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	75),	others	equally	focus	on	
the	internal	effects	of	nation	branding.	Van	Ham	(2008)	argues	that	“one	of	the	key	
targets	of	the	branding	process	today	is	internal,”13	and	emphasizes	that	nation	
branding	strategy	provides	a	sense	of	belonging	and	self-confidence.		However,	
internal	national	identity	formation,	conceived	within	the	nation-branding	
framework,	is	less	about	building	political	community	or	sharing	cultural	values	
than	about	sharing	brand	purpose	which	is	similar	to	corporate	identity.		
He	attempts	to	justify	the	practices	of	nation	branding	as	a	legitimate	
instrument	for	elites	to	shape	national	identities	in	the	context	of	global	competition	
for	attention	(Kaneva,	2011a,	p.	121).	From	a	cultural	perspective,	questions	are	
	
13	Comparing	place	branding	and	soft	power,	he	argues	that	the	former	has	
the	aspect	of	the	internal	identity	formation	while	the	latter	lacks	it	(van	Ham,	2008,	
p.	131).	
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raised	about	the	way	in	which	culture	and	national	identity	are	conceived	of	in	the	
nation	branding	paradigm.		
First,	nation	branding	treats	culture	and	national	identity	as	commodity	and	
instrument	for	economic	purposes.	It	treats	them	only	in	terms	of	their	usefulness	to	
the	practices	of	nation	branding	management.	Thus,	it	transforms	culture	and	
national	identity	into	“intellectual	property”	(Jansen,	2008,	p.	136)	according	to	
their	economic	utility	and	commercial	value.	The	logic	of	nation	branding	ignores	
the	internal	value	of	culture	and	makes	national	identity,	transformed	into	
“competitive	identity”	(Anholt,	2007),	subordinated	to	corporate	interest.			
Second,	thus,	nation	branding	presents	national	identity	in	an	ahistorical	and	
depoliticized	way.	In	this	logic,	national	branding	as	“nationalism	2.0”	(Aronczyk,	
2009,	p.	294)	or	“national	identity	lite”	(Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011)	seemingly	
emphasizes	the	historical	process	of	national	identity	formation.	Anholt	(2007)	
contends	that	nation	branding’s	“use	of	its	history,	geography,	and	ethnic	motifs	to	
construct	its	own	image”	is	a	benign	and	peaceful	version	of	nationalism.	In	this	
way,	nation	branding	put	national	identity	in	the	postmodern	play	of	differences	
which	erases	historical	and	political	implications	(Halsall,	2008).	While	it	
reestablishes	the	significance	of	nation-states	and	nation	identity	as	key	agents,	
nation	branding	is	only	interested	in	its	role	in	establishing	a	market	position	within	
the	global	economic	competition	(Aronczyk,	2008b),	which	cannot	be	clearer	than	in	
the	redefinition	of	national	identity	as	“competitive	identity”	(Anholt,	2007).		
Third,	nation	branding	constructs	national	identity	in	practical	concerns;	
thus,	the	narratives	mobilized	in	the	identity	formation	are	highly	selective.	
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Commentators	especially	criticize	that	nation	branding	as	a	strategic	display	of	
national	identity	reorganizes	culture	and	redefines	national	identity	in	an	
externally-directed	fashion	(Kaneva,	2007;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011).	Iordanova	
(2007)	criticizes	the	orientalism	of	nation	branding	where	exotic	stereotypes	are	
reproduced	from	the	Western	gaze.	Moreover,	the	externally-oriented	national	
identity	produces	the	effect	of	ignoring	the	internal	differences	within	the	nation	
(Aronczyk,	2007,	p.	122).		
Finally,	the	way	in	which	nation	branding	redefines	internal	national	identity	
brings	about	normative	effects	on	collective	national	behaviors.	Nation	branding	is	
part	of	a	continuing	nation	building	project	in	the	globalized,	mediatized	
environment,	focusing	on	the	management	of	external	image	and	reputation	and	
enhancing	internal	national	pride	and	social	cohesion.	The	redefinition	of	internal	
national	identity	produces	the	effect	of	regulating	collective	life	of	the	nation	
(Aronczyk,	2008a,	p.	71).	This	normative,	regulative	aspect	of	nation	branding	is	
related	to	theme	of	the	next	section:	the	nation	branding’s	governance	of	everyday	
life	of	individuals	and	citizen.	
Nation	branding,	governance	and	citizenship	
In	addition	to	the	redefinition	of	national	identity,	nation	branding	has	a	
further	cultural	implication	in	terms	of	internal	cultural	politics	which	has	a	
regulatory	and	normative	effect	on	citizenship.	If	culture	not	only	designates	
cultural	artifacts	and	heritage	but	also	shared	customs	and	collective	behaviors,	the	
lives	of	citizens	themselves	are	regarded	as	a	key	source	for	nation	branding.		
	 74 
Practitioners	argue	that	for	the	successful	implementation	of	nation	
branding,	the	“brand	purpose”	should	be	shared	by	“brand	stakeholders.”	The	brand	
purpose	is	defined	as	shared	visions	and	values	of	internal	culture.	The	stakeholders	
of	the	nation	brand	in	this	context	include	not	only	various	governmental	
departments,	but	private	business	sectors	and	citizens	alike	(Anholt,	2007,	pp.	6-
12).	Anholt	(2005)	explains	his	idea	about	the	governance	initiative	of	nation	
branding:		
The	initiative	has	to	be	a	major,	nationwide,	public-private	partnership.	The	
government,	tourist	boards,	airlines,	major	brands	and	corporations	have	to	
agree	on	a	common	branding	strategy	(informed	by	a	profound	
understanding	and	objective	evaluation	of	overseas	markets),	and	stick	to	it	
for	many	years	(p.	130).		
	
Adopting	the	idea	of	“governance,”	a	buzzword	across	the	field	of	public	
administration	(Anholt,	2007,	pp.	15-19),	the	nation-branding	paradigm	emphasizes	
a	public-private	partnership	and	participation	by	“brand	stakeholders”	for	a	long-
term	commitment	to	the	strategic	nation	branding.	The	implications	of	this	
argument	are	that	the	nation	branding	paradigm	advocates	the	reorganization	of	the	
state	public	policy	according	to	corporate	principles.	While	Anhlot	elevates	nation	
branding	as	a	vital	component	for	the	long-term	strategic	plan	for	national	
development	and	indeed	a	new	model	guiding	statecraft	(Anholt,	2007,	pp.	18-22),	
he	suggests	that	the	plan	be	set	up	according	to	principles	which	resemble	
corporate	branding	strategy	which	proved	to	be	superior	in	the	global	competition.	
He	argues	for	the	reorganization	of	the	states	like	private	corporations:		
[T]he	fact	is	that	governments	now	find	themselves	competing	in	ways	that	
they	are	scarcely	prepared	to	deal	with,	and	inhabiting	a	world	of	global	
competition	and	mobile	consumers	where	few	of	their	traditional	
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approaches	really	work.	This	is	a	world	that	companies	know	well,	and	
where	they	have	learned	how	to	survive	and	prosper	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	16).		
	
By	emphasizing	the	government-business	partnership	and	the	participation	
by	brand	stakeholders,	what	nation	branding	aims	is	to	realign	public	policy	to	
corporate	principles	and	put	the	state	functions	to	the	service	of	enterprises.	Anholt	
(2007)	argues	for	setting	up	a	governmental	institution	which	works	according	to	
corporate	principles	in	order	effectively	and	successfully	to	execute	the	nation	
branding	strategy	with	continuity	and	authority.		
Critical	media	and	cultural	studies	scholars	characterize	nation	branding’s	
claim	for	the	public-private	partnership	within	the	larger	context	of	neoliberal	
transformation	of	the	state	governance.		
The	corporate	principle	extends	to	the	regulation	of	citizens’	lives	and	
behaviors.	The	practitioners	contend	that	the	working	of	nation	branding	
presupposes	the	full	engagement	by	national	stakeholders	including	citizens	
(Anholt,	2007,	p.	14).	Anholt	(2007)	emphasizes	that	the	shared	purpose	of	nation	
branding	should	get	unanimous	support	by	the	population	enthusiastic	about	
enhancing	national	image	and	reputation.	The	assumption	of	nation	branding	that	
citizens	should	embody	specific	customs	and	behaviors	is	well	epitomized	in	the	
rhetoric	like	“the	people	are	the	brand”	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	75),	“live	the	brand”	
(Anholt,	2007,	p.	6;	Aronczyk,	2009,	p.	123),	“brand	ambassadors”	(Dinnie,	2008,	p.	
72)	and	so	on.		
	The	emphasis	on	the	participation	by	the	ordinary	citizens	is	frequently	
related	with	the	notion	of	public	diplomacy.	Anholt	(2007)	argues	that	public	
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diplomacy	implies	that	the	“messenger”	of	the	nation	brand	is	a	“substantial	part	of	
population”	which	“is	motivated	and	energized	through	a	benign	national	ambition,	
and	instinctively	seizes	every	opportunity	to	tell	the	world	about	its	country”	(p.	
105).	In	this	rationale,	nation	branding	strategy	urges	citizens	to	internalize	global	
standards	and	meticulously	recommends	that	children	should	be	taught	“how	to	be	
welcoming	to	strangers”	(Anholt,	2007,	p.	108).		
By	emphasizing	cooperation,	participation	and	consensus	for	the	single-
minded	purpose	of	nation	branding,	nation	branding	regards	citizens	as	only	a	
component	of	nation	branding	and	aims	to	constitute	them	as	competitive	market	
subjects.	Critical	media	and	cultural	studies	scholars	point	out	that,	contrary	to	the	
participation	claim,	nation	branding	actually	limits	or	excludes	citizen	participation.	
Widler	(2007)	criticizes	that	the	nation	branding’s	analogy	of	nations	with	
corporations	makes	citizens	as	equivalent	with	employees.	Kaneva	(2007)	shows	
that	the	internal	campaign	for	nation	branding	constructs	citizens	as	consumers	to	
whom	“individual	choice”	and	“practical	everyday	gains”	are	presented.	Volcic	and	
Andrejevic	(2011)	points	out	that	the	nation-branding	rhetoric	of	“co-creation”	
encourages	the	citizen	“to	identify	state	and	economic	imperatives	as	their	own”	and	
puts	the	public	interest	in	the	hand	of	the	private	sector.	
Emerging	research	trends		
While	these	four	themes	constitute	ongoing	streams	underpinning	the	
critical	research	on	nation	branding,	I	can	identify	in	recent	researches	at	least	a	few	
emerging	trends	which	point	out	gaps	in	the	existing	literature	and	propose	new	
research	agenda.			
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First,	some	scholars	point	out	that	the	existing	researches	on	nation	branding	
mostly	focused	on	symbols,	logos,	representations,	and	discourses,	relatively	
neglecting	the	aspects	of	material	and	institutional	practices	(Kaneva,	2016).	This	
point	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	the	material	and	institutional	aspects	were	
completely	ignored	in	this	stream	of	research,	but	the	focus	was	relatively	narrow	
and	limited.	In	other	words,	the	study	of	nation	branding	and	other	related	practices	
should	pay	more	attention	to	the	complexity	of	institutional	and	material	process	in	
combination	with	symbolic,	discursive,	and	representational	aspects.		
Secondly,	while	the	media	have	been	the	natural	focus	in	many	critical	
researches	on	nation	branding,	it	was	treated	in	a	rather	simple	way	as	an	outlet	of	
symbols,	discourses,	and	representations.	Scholars	suggest	that	the	multiple	aspects	
of	the	media	should	be	more	examined,	including	technological	and	organizational	
aspects	(Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015).	There	emerged	an	increasing	attention	to	the	
agency	of	the	international	and	domestic	media	in	terms	of	financial,	material,	and	
technological	as	well	as	symbolic	circulation	(Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015;	Kaneva,	
2016).		
Third,	while	the	existing	literature	paid	attention	to	the	transnational	nature	
of	nation	branding,	especially	focusing	on	the	activities	of	transnational	brand	
consultants	(Aronczyk,	2008a;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011),	the	domestic	aspects	and	
effects	were	analyzed	in	a	rather	simplistic	way.	The	domestic	process	of	nation	
branding	was	treated	as	a	black	box,	neglecting	internal	complexity	and	dynamics.	
For	instance,	the	domestic	analysis	usually	focused	more	on	the	static	aspect	of	the	
government	and	the	official	public	policy	process,	than	on	the	dynamic	involvement	
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by	the	domestic	media,	the	domestic	consultants	and	think	tanks,	the	NGOs,	and	
publics.		
Fourth,	the	existing	critical	literature	gives	the	impression	that	the	business	
of	nation	branding	has	been	implemented	and	imposed	to	build	a	certain	national	
identity	or	to	foster	a	certain	citizenship	in	a	rather	successful	manner.	Yet,	recent	
researches	focus	more	on	the	complex,	fragmented,	and	contradictory	nature	of	
nation	branding	campaigns.	In	this	vein,	recent	researches	have	focused	on	the	
agencies	of	publics	and	non-governmental	organizations	in	the	process	of	nation	
branding	and	public	diplomacy	(Graan,	2010,	2013;	Jordan,	2013).		
Last,	the	critical	literature	on	nation	branding	is	characterized	by	the	uneven	
geographical	distribution	of	research.	The	majority	of	critical	literature	focused	on	
the	“post-Communist”	countries	in	Eastern	Europe	(Poland,	Latvia,	Slovenia,	
Ukraine,	Romania,	Estonia,	Macedonia,	Bulgaria,	and	so	on).14.	Recently,	critical	
literature	has	been	greatly	expanded	in	geographic	scope,	and	examined	nation	
branding	in	the	context	of	Western	Europe	(Angell	&	Mordhorst,	2013;	Christensen,	
2013),	Central	Asia	(Marat,	2009),	and	Middle	East	(Al-Ghazzi	&	Kraidy,	2013).	
Besides,	critical	works	on	nation	branding	in	East	Asia	are	increasing	as	the	
discourses	and	practices	of	nation	branding	have	gained	prominence	among	the	
public	policy	and	marketing	circle	in	East	Asia	over	the	last	decade.		
These	works	in	the	East	Asian	context	are	characterized	by	at	least	several	
traits	as	follows.	First,	these	works	mostly	concentrate	on	the	discursive	and	
institutional	practices	in	China	and	Japan	as	these	two	countries	are	the	most	
	
14	This	trend	is	represented	by	a	recent	anthology,	edited	by	Kaneva	(2012).	
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powerful	international	players	(de	Kloet	et	al.,	2011;	Iwabuchi,	2015;	Valaskivi,	
2013,	2016).		
Secondly,	public	diplomacy	and	soft	power	are	as	prominently	examined	as	
nation	branding	as	these	terms	are	the	major	concerns	in	the	public	policy	circles	in	
Japan	and	China	(Chua,	2012;	Cull,	2008;	Heng,	2010;	J.	Nye	&	Kim,	2013;	N.	
Otmazgin,	2016;	N.	K.	Otmazgin,	2012;	N.	K.	Otmazgin	&	Ben-Ari,	2012;	J.	Wang,	
2011).		
Thirdly,	many	works	embed	these	practices	of	nation	branding	in	the	context	
of	international	politics	and	historical	conflicts	in	East	Asia.	They	can	go	back	to	
Japanese	imperialism	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	but	are	still	thorny	
issues,	surfacing	in	the	forms	of	territorial	disputes,	the	conflicts	around	history	
textbooks,	the	“comfort	women”	of	the	Japanese	imperial	forces	(Callahan,	2006;	
Gries,	2005).	Besides,	they	are	embedded	in	the	contemporary	nationalist	tensions	
in	East	Asia,	especially	among	Taiwan,	China,	South	Korea,	and	Japan	(J.	Lee,	2018;	
S.-Y.	Sung,	2010;	Yang,	2008).		
Lastly,	the	critical	research	on	nation	branding	in	East	Asia	is	increasingly	
connected	with	the	stream	of	the	study	of	the	circulation	of	popular	culture	in	the	
region	such	as	J-pop,	K-pop,	Japanese	dramas	and	anime	series,	and	Korean	dramas.	
(Huang,	2011;	Iwabuchi,	2002,	2012;	S.-Y.	L.	Sung,	2015).		
These	emerging	trends	as	well	as	the	ongoing	themes	in	the	research	of	
nation	branding	and	other	related	practices	greatly	inform	the	present	dissertation.	
Especially,	the	following	themes	provide	a	starting	point	for	my	development	of	the	
research:	the	incorporation	of	historical	and	institutional	aspects	to	the	analysis	of	
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nation	branding	and	national	prestige,	the	focus	on	the	institutional	role	played	by	
the	media	in	the	establishing	a	national	agenda,	and	the	participation	and	
involvement	by	the	NGOs	and	publics	in	the	process	of	nation	branding	and	public	
diplomacy.	
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CHAPTER	3		
THE	NATIONAL	IMAGINARIES	IN	SOUTH	KOREA’S	MODERNITY:	FROM	
DEVELOPMENT	TO	COMPETITIVENESS		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	provide	the	historical	context	of	the	rise	of	the	discourses	
and	institutions	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige.	Especially,	I	attend	to	how	
the	social	imaginaries	of	national	development	and	modernization	informed	
modernity	in	South	Korea.	In	this	discussion,	I	identify	the	defining	characteristics	of	
South	Korean	modernity	as	state-centered,	economy-centered,	and	Western-
oriented.		
In	the	following	section,	I	draw	on	literature	on	Western	modernity,	its	
dominant	forms	and	its	critiques.	Then	I	discuss	how	the	ideas	of	modernization	and	
development	were	established	as	the	defining	discourses	and	programs	in	South	
Korea	during	the	Cold	War	era.	Next,	focusing	on	the	historical	formation	of	the	
developmental	state,	I	especially	examine	how	the	state	and	the	economy	have	
taken	the	center	in	the	social	imaginaries	of	national	development	and	
modernization.		
Next,	I	examine	the	post-developmental	transition	to	neoliberalism	and	the	
rise	of	the	competition	state	in	South	Korea.	In	this	examination,	I	consider	how	the	
neoliberalization	of	the	state	and	the	economy	continued	as	well	as	changed	the	
national	imaginaries	of	development	in	the	context	of	the	globalizing	economy.	I	
especially	focus	on	a	series	of	state	discourses	which	constructed	the	neoliberal	
competition	state	toward	the	rationality	of	international	competitiveness.		
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In	the	last	section,	examining	how	the	imaginary	West	continued	to	offer	the	
normative	standard	and	the	universal	model	for	South	Korea,	I	confirm	the	
Western-oriented	nature	of	South	Korean	modernity.		
The	discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	nation	branding	and	national	
prestige	emerged	against	this	backdrop	of	continuing	as	well	as	changing	
characteristics	of	modernity	in	South	Korea:	the	state-centered,	economy-obsessed,	
and	Western-oriented	characteristics.			
Modernity		
Modernity,	from	a	dominant	point	of	view,	refers	to	the	ensemble	of	
institutions,	practices,	norms	and	experiences	which	are	distinctive	from	the	
tradition.	Charles	Taylor	distinguishes	two	approaches	to	modernity:	acultural	and	
cultural	(Taylor,	1995,	p.	24).	The	acultural	theory,	which	is	the	dominant	
understanding,	conceives	of	modernity	in	such	terms	as	the	rise	of	reason,	the	
progress	of	history,	and	the	advancement	of	science	and	technology.	Philosophically	
built	on	the	ideas	of	Reason	and	Enlightenment,	the	acultural	theory	explains	the	
social	transformation	in	terms	of	the	rise	of	individualism,	industrialization	and	
mobility,	the	building	of	nation-states,	the	spread	of	liberal	democracy,	and	market	
economy	(Luke,	1990,	p.	212).	
As	Taylor	points	out,	this	acultural	understanding	of	modernity	presupposes	
the	“Enlightenment	package,”	that	is,	“one	single	universally	applicable	operation”	
to	be	unpacked	in	a	uniform	pattern	of	progress	of	science,	technology,	and	
industrialization	(Taylor,	1995,	p.	28).	In	this	acultural	understanding	of	the	
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universal	path	to	modernity,	any	and	every	culture	and	society	is	assumed	to	have	
to	go	through	more	or	less	the	same	transformations	(Taylor,	1995,	pp.	24-25).		
Many	scholars	have	criticized	this	dominant	view	of	modernity,	especially	its	
linear	formulation	of	temporality	as	Eurocentrism,	privileging	the	particular	
experience	of	Europe	or	the	West	and	imposing	it	on	non-Europe	or	the	non-West.	
Historically,	it	was	through	colonial	rule	that	modernity	spread	from	the	West	to	the	
rest	of	the	world.	In	this	historical	process,	thus,	the	dominant	form	of	modernity	
from	the	West	established	itself	as	the	universal	standard	and	norm	which	the	non-
Western	world	should	follow.		
Dipesh	Chakrabarty	(2000)	characterizes	the	epistemology	of	Eurocentric	
modernity	as	“historicism,”	which	presupposes	global	historical	time	in	the	
structure	of	“first	in	Europe,	then	elsewhere”	(p.	7).	Thus,	historicism:		
posited	historical	time	as	a	measure	of	the	cultural	distance	(at	least	in	
institutional	development)	that	was	assumed	to	exist	between	the	West	and	
the	non-West.	In	the	colonies,	it	legitimated	the	idea	of	civilization.	In	Europe	
itself,	it	made	possible	completely	internalist	histories	of	Europe	in	which	
Europe	was	described	as	the	site	of	the	first	occurrence	of	capitalism,	
modernity,	or	Enlightenment	(p.	7).		
	
Timothy	Mitchell	(2000)	also	calls	into	question	the	dominant	narrative	of	
modernity	by	criticizing	its	temporal	logic.	He	points	out	that	it	understands	history	
as	having	“only	one	unfolding	time,	the	history	of	the	West,	in	reference	to	which	all	
other	histories	must	establish	their	significance	and	receive	their	meaning”	(p.	7).	
He	emphasizes	that	the	temporality	of	modernity	as	the	uniform	and	singular	
history	of	the	West	reorganizes	dispersed	geographies	into	the	various	stages	of	
Europe’s	past	(pp.	8-9).	In	this	modern	temporality,	the	past,	laid	out	within	the	
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space	of	the	present	and	co-present	in	the	homogenous	space	of	now,	is	none	other	
than	the	non-West	colonies.	In	this	definition	of	modernity	as	the	“spatialization	of	
time,”	he	suggests	that	we	can	understand	“the	West	as	the	product	of	modernity”	or	
modernity	as	being	produced	as	the	West,	rather	than	modernity	as	the	product	of	
the	West	(p.	15).		
In	this	way,	the	idea	of	modernity	provides	legitimacy	for	the	superiority	and	
dominance	of	the	West	over	the	non-West.	In	this	sense,	Walter	Mignolo	(2011),	
following	Anibal	Quijano,	points	out	that	“coloniality”	(pp.	2-3)	is	the	underlying	
logic	of	modernity	and	Western	civilization.	Escobar	(1995)	emphasizes	that	the	
colonial	discursive	regime	perpetuates	“the	hegemonic	idea	of	the	West’s	
superiority”	through	the	constructions	of	the	“colonial/Third	World	subject”	(pp.	8-
9)	as	the	object	of	knowledge	and	the	exercise	of	power.			
In	a	similar	vein,	Taylor	(1995)	criticizes	the	acultural	understanding	of	
modernity,	especially	its	inability	to	deal	with	modernity	in	the	non-Western	
context.	According	to	him,	modernity	cannot	be	explained	directly	in	terms	of	
technological	rationality,	but	in	terms	of	the	changes	in	background	understanding,	
habitus,	or	“social	imaginary”	(p.	30).	In	this	dimension	of	culture,	a	new	option	and	
possibility	for	change	can	emerge	beyond	the	existing	horizon.	In	this	sense,	
Western	modernity	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	universal,	linear	advance	of	
individualism,	science	and	technology,	instrumental	reason,	progress	and	
enlightenment	and	so	on,	and	that	it	should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	a	larger	
change	in	moral	order	and	social	imaginary.	He	relativizes	Western	modernity	by	
bringing	up	as	an	example	the	rise	of	the	public	sphere	as	a	new	repertoire	beyond	
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the	existing	social	imaginary.	It	was	the	changes	in	the	understanding	of	secular	
time	and	the	sense	of	contemporaneous	that	enabled	the	emergence	of	the	public	
sphere	(p.	30).		
The	strength	of	this	cultural	understanding	of	modernity	is	that	it	allows	us	
to	consider	multiple	paths	to	modernity	or	"multiple	modernities"	(Gaonkar,	2002,	
p.	12),	which	are	not	reduced	to	the	universal	narrative	of	historical	time.	Different	
cultures	depend	on	different	social	imaginaries.	Thus,	for	instance,	the	cultural	
forms	such	as	the	public	sphere	are,	when	introduced	in	non-Western	contexts,	
“reconfigured	both	in	meaning	and	function	when	placed	within	a	social	imaginary	
calibrated	by	an	image	of	a	moral	order	different	from	that	of	the	West”	(p.	12).		
In	sum,	Taylor’s	approach	relativizes	Western	modernity	by	identifying	its	
specificities,	and	provides	a	new	frame	for	understanding	non-Western	modernities.	
The	latter	should	not	be	evaluated	in	terms	of	satisfying/not	satisfying	the	criteria	
derived	from	Western	experiences;	rather	the	task	is	to	understand	how	non-
Western	cultural	forms	are	reconfigured	in	their	own	cultural	context.	
Modernization	and	development		
To	examine	the	contemporary	formation	of	modernity	in	South	Korea	in	view	
of	the	discussion	on	the	cultural	theory	of	modernity,	it	would	be	fair	to	start	with	
the	discourse	and	the	program	of	development	and	modernization.		
In	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	in	mainstream	social	sciences	in	
the	United	States,	the	Euro-centric	idea	of	modernity	was	reformulated	into	the	
scientific	theory	and	the	policy	program	of	modernization	and	development.	The	US	
mainstream	social	scientists,	supported	by	the	US	government,	led	the	
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dissemination	of	the	discourse	and	the	program	of	modernization	and	development	
throughout	the	anti-communist,	liberalist	bloc	in	the	Cold	War	context	(Escobar,	
1992,	p.	24;	Leys,	2005;	Luke,	1990,	pp.	212-213).		
The	discourses	and	institutions	of	modernization	and	development	
continued	the	dichotomy	between	the	modern	and	the	traditional,	based	on	which	
various	aspects	of	non-Western	societies	are	evaluated	as	to	whether	meeting	the	
criteria	of	modernity	or	not	(Dirlik,	2002,	p.	35).	In	that	way,	the	program	of	
modernization	and	development	was	modeled	after	the	historical	experience	of	the	
Western	societies	and	imposed	on	non-Western	societies.		
Moreover,	the	formulation	of	modernization	and	development	is	important	
in	the	sense	that	it	was	an	explicit	complex	of	“knowledge-power”	between	the	
academia	and	the	government	in	the	United	States	and	was	more	or	less	
systematically	experimented	and	implemented	in	the	so	called	Third	World	
countries.	Instead	of	emphasizing	the	European	ideas	such	as	enlightenment,	
civilization,	and	progress,	as	Timothy	Luke	(1990)	points	out,	the	discourse	of	
modernization	and	development	put	forward	such	notions	as	development,	
economic	growth,	technological	innovation,	self-determination,	democracy	and	so	
on,	which	were	in	a	more	neutral	and	scientific	appearance,	yet	embodying	“the	
cultural	assumptions,	political	premises,	and	economic	values	of	the	United	States”	
(p.	213)	or	“American	myths”	(p.	213).	In	the	formulation	of	modernization	and	
development,	non-Western	societies	are	diagnosed	as	being	in	different	stages	of	
development	in	terms	of	aggregate	economic	growth,	extensive	industrialization,	
democratization,	and	so	on.	The	statistical	indicators	are	devised	to	measure	the	
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stages	in	development	and	to	engineer	the	programs	for	the	“takeoff”	(p.	217).	
However,	as	Escobar	(1995)	emphasizes,	development	is	never	severed	from	the	
colonial	discourse	in	the	sense	that	it	is	“regimes	of	discourse	and	representations”	
and	“apparatus	for	producing	knowledge	about,	and	the	exercise	of	power	over,	the	
Third	World”	(pp.	9-10).		
Under	the	anti-communist	regime	in	the	post-war	era,	it	was	the	program	of	
modernization	and	development	that	defined	the	nature	of	modernity	in	South	
Korea.	Like	many	postcolonial	societies,	modernization	and	development	epitomize	
the	politics,	economy	and	society	in	the	post-liberation	South	Korea,	especially	since	
the	1960s	when	General	Park	Chung-hee	seized	the	power	in	a	military	coup.	The	
socio-economic	program	was	received	and	deployed	in	a	wholesale	way,	greatly	
shaping	modernity	in	South	Korea.	In	the	modern	history	of	South	Korea,	
development	and	modernization	have	provided	a	template	by	which	state	public	
policies	were	legitimated,	and	economic	activities	and	socio-cultural	lives	were	
predicated	on.			
Modernization	and	development	can	be	understood	as	a	social	imaginary	(cf.	
Watts,	2006,	p.	48).	In	the	following	discussion,	I	characterize	the	social	imaginary	
of	development	and	modernization	in	South	Korea	as	state-centered	and	economy-
centered:	the	state,	standing	above	society,	led	the	development	and	modernization,	
and	the	economy	became	the	most	significant	object	of	development	and	
modernization.	I	also	characterize	the	social	imaginary	of	development	and	
modernization	rested	on	a	certain	image	of	the	world	in	which	the	state	strived	to	
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“catch	up”	with	advanced	countries	by	harnessing	the	growth	of	the	national	
economy.	
The	developmental	state		
There	are	many	theories	that	try	to	explain	development	and	modernization	
in	South	Korea	and	East	Asia	in	general	in	the	late	20th	century.	Critical	intellectuals	
in	South	Korea	in	the	1980s,	who	were	influenced	by	the	world-system	theory	
and/or	dependency	theory,	emphasized	the	outer	limit	of	(under)development	
imposed	by	the	imperialist	center	on	the	peripheral	economy	of	South	Korea.	But	
they	were	faced	with	an	explanatory	conundrum	when	South	Korean	economy	
seemed	to	break	through	the	supposed	outer	limit.	Liberalists,	on	the	other	hand,	
explain	it	as	a	natural	process	of	the	evolutionary	expansion	of	capitalist	market	
principle.	For	instance,	Daniel	Chirot	(2005),	a	truthful	advocate	of	the	original	form	
of	modernization	theory,	explains	that	South	Korea	has	successfully	implemented	
modernization	because	it	followed	the	capitalist	path	to	modernity	pioneered	by	the	
West.	However,	this	liberalist	view	is	also	in	contradiction	with	historical	reality,	
especially	about	the	authoritarian	state	and	state-led	economic	development.	The	
South	Korean	economy	was	not	developed	according	to	the	liberalist	principle	of	
free-market	and	free-enterprise	in	a	straightforward	way,	but	in	a	mercantilist	
fashion	led	by	the	“plan-rational”	state	(Cumings,	1999,	p.	64;	Pieterse,	2010,	p.	23).		
The	prominence	of	the	state	is	central	to	the	understanding	of	modernity	in	
East	Asia	and	South	Korea.	The	state	played	a	major	role	in	development	and	
modernization,	which	constituted	dominant	social	imaginaries	among	South	
Koreans	since	the	1960s,	as	in	other	post-colonial	states.	In	modern	South	Korea,	
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the	state	is	“capable	of	setting	the	direction	of	social	and	economic	changes	and	
molding	the	behavior	of	individuals	and	groups	in	society”	and	“therefore	the	most	
critical	variable	explaining	virtually	all	major	aspects	of	historical	change	in	Korea”	
(H.	Koo,	1993,	p.	11).	In	this	sense,	the	process	of	development	and	modernization	is	
largely	conterminous	with	state	formation	(K.	J.	Kim,	2007,	p.	69).		
The	concept	of	the	“developmental	state”	emphasizes	the	role	played	by	the	
state	in	economic	development	and	modernization	in	East	Asia	(Woo-Cumings,	
1999).	In	this	aspect,	modernity	in	East	Asia	can	be	understood	as	a	“state	project”	
(Ong,	1997,	p.	172),	driven	toward	the	national	goal	of	techno-economic	
modernization	by	the	nationalist	state	elite.	The	South	Korean	state	under	military	
dictatorship	has	been	widely	analyzed	as	a	prominent	case	of	the	“developmental	
state”	(Amsden,	1989;	Evans,	1995;	Woo-Cumings,	1999).	The	concept	highlights	
how	the	state	took	the	leading	role	over	the	course	of	rapid	economic	growth	and	
industrialization	among	East	Asian	capitalism	(especially,	Japan,	Korea	and	Taiwan).	
The	developmental	state	with	a	high	level	of	capacity	and	autonomy	did	“get	the	
price	wrong”	(Amsden,	1989),	“govern	the	market”	(Wade,	1990),	or	play	a	
“transformative	role”	(Evans,	1995,	p.	6)	in	the	state-led	economic	growth	and	
development.		
State-centeredness,	central	to	South	Korean	modernity,	takes	root	in	the	
continuum	of	a	long-term	historical	imaginary	in	South	Korea.	It	is	debatable	how	
far	we	can	go	back	to	find	the	root	of	state-centrism.	Some	go	back	to	Confucian	
bureaucracy	in	the	Chosŏn	Dynasty	(Woodside,	2009).	In	fact,	it	is	suggested	that	
throughout	the	history	of	Korea,	the	state	have	been	central	to	the	“politics	of	
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vortex”	in	which	every	automized	individual	in	homogenous	society	was	pulled	
upward	toward	a	highly	concentrated	political	center	(Henderson	(1968),	quoted	in	
K.	J.	Kim,	2007).	At	least,	the	centrality	of	the	state	in	South	Korea	could	go	back	to	
the	Japanese	colonial	state	in	Korea,	the	Government-General	of	Korea	(1910-1945)	
or	the	US	Army	Military	Government	(1945-1948),	both	of	which	were	highly	
concentrated,	bureaucratic,	and	repressive.15	In	any	case,	the	dominant	topological	
imagery	is	that	the	state	stood	above	society,	with	overwhelming	military	and	police	
force,	well-equipped	bureaucracy,	and	institutional	apparatuses.			
In	the	1960s,	the	developmental	state	was	established	by	modeling	after	the	
colonial	regime	of	war-time	mobilization.	The	developmental	state	has	been	
explained	by	borrowing	theoretical	terms	such	as	the	”overdeveloped	state”	(C.-j.	
Ch’oe,	2002,	p.	45)	or	imagined	as	“standing	above	civil	society”	(Ferguson	&	Gupta,	
2002,	p.	985).	Within	the	historical	context	of	state-centered	social	imaginary,	the	
developmental	state	led	the	way	to	rapid	economic	growth.	It	led	other	parts	of	
society	toward	developmental	mobilization,	disciplining	and	regulating	population	
with	coercive	measures,	as	well	as	controlled	finance	and	distributing	monopoly	
and	competition	among	big	capital.	The	developmental	state	played	a	central	role	in	
the	formation	of	the	large	capital-led,	export-oriented	national	economy,	which	was	
constructed	as	the	object	of	state	intervention	(Jessop	&	Sum,	2006b,	p.	169).		
	
15	Or	it	can	go	back	to	Manchukuo	(1932-1945),	a	puppet	state	by	Japanese	
Empire	in	Northeast	China	and	Inner	Mongolia,	which	experimented	a	militarist	
state-driven,	speed-oriented	mobilization	for	modernization,	which	in	turn	inspired	
President	Park	Chung-hee	for	the	bulldozer-like	drive	toward	modernization	(cf.	
Duara,	2004;	Eckert,	2016;	S.-c.	Han,	2016).	
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The	imagery	of	the	state	standing	above	society	was	reinforced	in	the	
geopolitical	environment	of	the	Cold	War,	which	shaped	and	limited	the	national	
imaginary.	The	Cold	War	discourses	of	national	security	and	regime	competition	
against	North	Korea	led	to	greater	concentration	of	force	and	power	on	the	state.	
The	“security	state”	or	“garrison	state”	(Em,	2016,	p.	52)	imposed	violence	on	the	
population	on	the	everyday	basis	and	organized	it	as	in	a	military-style	mobilization.	
It	was	in	this	environment	that	the	South	Korean	“developmental	state”	emerged	as	
a	way	of	national	survival	and	winning	over	North	Korea	in	the	regime	competition	
(Cumings,	1987;	Pempel,	1999).	The	export-driven	“catch-up”	strategy,	which	the	
South	Korean	developmental	state	adopted	for	of	“late	industrialization”	(Amsden,	
1989),	was	made	possible	within	the	hierarchic	international	division	of	labor.	In	
this	setting,	the	US	provided	military	and	economic	aids	and	opened	the	domestic	
market	to	industrializing	countries	with	a	strategic	consideration	in	the	Cold	War	
environment.		
State-centrism	lies	closely	related	with	other	enduring	features	such	as	
authoritarianism,	familism,	collectivism	and	nepotism	that	were	historically	formed	
as	well	as	central	to	explaining	“social	psychology”	(H.-g.	Song,	2003)	or	“cultural	
codes”	(S.-b.	Chŏng,	2007)	of	South	Koreans	during	the	rapid	growth	era.	In	this	
broader	sense,	state-centeredness	in	South	Korea’s	modernity	not	just	concerns	
institutions,	but	refers	to	the	central	position	of	the	state	in	thinking	and	behaving	in	
everyday	life	and	in	the	social	imaginary	among	Koreans.	Song	(2003)	points	out,	
“In	Korea,	it	is	commonplace	to	think	that	nothing	can	be	done	without	the	state,”	
	 92 
and	“the	state	stands	central	to	every	standard	of	judgement	and	pattern	of	
behavior”	(pp.	145,	my	own	translation).	
Development	of	the	national	economy		
Coupled	with	state-centeredness,	what	characterizes	the	formation	of	South	
Korean	modernity	is	economy-centeredness.	In	fact,	the	developmental	state	
established	itself	through	the	state-centered	building,	development	and	growth	of	
the	national	economy.	In	that	sense,	state-centeredness	and	economy-centeredness	
cannot	be	separated	in	modern	social	imaginary	in	South	Korea.		
In	terms	of	the	social	imaginary	of	modernity	in	South	Korea,	economy-
centeredness	can	be	examined	in	various	aspects.	First	of	all,	economy-centeredness	
is	apparent	in	the	sense	that	development	meant	and	was	reduced	to	economic	
development	(K.	J.	Kim,	2007,	p.	25),	or	more	precisely	economic	growth	(Lie,	1998).	
Accordingly,	all	socio-economic	institutions	and	programs	were	concentrated	and	
mobilized	for	the	development	and	growth	of	the	national	economy.	Yi	Sang-rok	
(2011)	investigates	how	the	idea	of	economy	rose	to	top	priority	in	the	1960s.	He	
shows	how	polyphonic	popular	desires	and	needs	were	rendered	into	the	
“monotone	of	ex-backward	modernization”	(p.	129),	and	modern	productive	
subjects	were	produced	through	disciplinary	discourses	and	apparatuses.	Ko	Wŏn	
(2006)	also	shows	how	Saemaŭl	Undong	(New	Village	Campaign)	in	the	early	1970s	
morally	encouraged	farmers	into	modern	national	subjects	toward	the	“revolution	
of	modernization”	(p.	181).	In	this	sense,	modernity	of	South	Korea	meant	a	
capitalist	state	project	for	the	building	of	national	economy	(cf.	Dirlik,	2002,	pp.	35-
36;	Ong,	1997,	p.	172).		
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Hwang	Pyŏng-ju	(2008)	shows	how	the	emergence	of	the	notion	of	
“economic	development”	in	social	imaginaries	in	the	1960s	was	possible	by	
problematizing	poverty.	Based	on	the	dichotomy	between	modern/premodern,	
advancement/backwardness,	and	civilized/uncivilized,	the	discourse	of	“ex-
backward	modernization”	reconstituted	backwardness	exclusively	as	the	problem	
of	economic	poverty.	Backwardness	was	constructed	as	an	evident	matter	of	fact	
through	the	comparison	techniques	such	as	GNP	and	the	narratives	of	the	West	such	
as	travelers’	diaries	and	American	popular	culture.	Through	this	problematization	of	
poverty,	the	idea	of	economic	growth	and	development	of	the	national	economy	
emerged	as	the	most	prominent	concern,	and	in	turn	the	state	emerged	to	lead	the	
way	to	development	and	modernization.			
In	this	state	project	of	the	building	of	the	national	economy,	the	
developmental	state	established	itself	in	a	special	relation	with	the	large	industrial	
capital	sector	of	conglomerates	through	the	export-oriented	drive.	The	state	
controlled	the	conglomerates	not	just	by	way	of	distributing	the	finance	but	by	way	
of	using	violent	measures.	In	the	process,	large	conglomerates	(chaebŏls)	grew	very	
rapidly	and	pursued	a	favored	relation	with	the	government	by	providing	secret	
political	money.	For	this	chaebŏl-oriented	economic	growth,	the	state	created	a	
specific	sociopolitical	condition	in	which	the	military	regime	violently	repressed	
labor	in	the	name	of	national	development,	but	in	effect,	in	favor	of	chaebŏls.	Kim	
Tŏk-Yŏng	(2014)	argues	that	the	reduction	of	development	solely	to	economic	
growth	and,	in	turn,	solely	to	the	growth	of	chaebŏls,	characterize	the	“reduced	
modernity”	in	South	Korea.		
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At	the	socio-political	level,	the	developmental	state	mobilized	the	population	
and	repressed	labor	in	the	name	of	“national	survival”	and	“national	security”	in	the	
context	of	the	post-Korean	War	regime	competition	against	the	Communist	North	
Korea.	The	paternalist	state	discourse	such	as	the	“modernization	of	the	Fatherland”	
articulated	collective	desire	for	survival	and	development.		
In	the	capitalist	state	project	of	development,	modernity	was	deemed	a	socio-
economic	reform	for	material	improvement	of	standard	of	living	(Chirot,	2005).	On	
the	one	hand,	the	developmental	regime	was	repressive	in	the	sense	that	different	
ideas	from	state	ideology	for	developmental	mobilization	were	not	allowed	and	
suppressed	with	violent	measures	in	the	name	of	national	security	against	
communists.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	it	was	also	hegemonic	in	the	sense	that	it	
was	based	on	popular	desire	for	the	escape	from	poverty	and	the	raise	of	standard	
of	living.	This	hegemonic	project	of	modernity	for	development	and	modernization	
depended	on	the	expectation	of	a	“good	life,”	which	was	imagined	on	the	basis	of	
techno-economic	rationality.	Mahbubani	(2013)	comments	on	modernity,	defined	in	
Singaporean	context,	but	also	relevant	in	other	East	Asian	countries:		
Modernization	means	that	you	want	to	have	a	comfortable,	middle-class	
existence	with	all	the	amenities	and	attributes	that	go	along	with	it	—	clean	
water,	indoor	plumbing,	electricity,	telecommunications,	infrastructure,	
personal	safety,	rule	of	law,	stable	politics	and	a	good	education	system	
(2013).		
	
In	the	modern	social	imaginary	of	South	Koreans,	it	was	impossible	to	
separate	the	improvement	of	economic	life	with	the	growth	of	the	national	
economy.	The	developmental	state	established	its	role	in	the	“embedded	autonomy”	
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with	society	as	“fostering	economic	transformation	and	guaranteeing	minimal	level	
of	welfare”	(Evans,	1995,	p.	5).		
Mignolo	(2011)	points	out	that	this	developmental	promise	of	a	good	
material	life	could	not	reach	beyond	the	middle	class	due	to	the	colonial	restriction	
and	the	lack	of	necessary	relation	between	the	improvement	of	material	life	and	
modernity.	Dirlik	(2002)	also	indicates	that	“the	power	of	developmentalism	lies	in	
its	ever-receding	promise	that	the	good	life	is	right	around	the	corner,”	but	that	
promise	of	modernity	is	“not	likely	for	the	majority”	(p.	43).	While	the	promise	of	
developmentalism	is	not	sustainable,	it	is	also	true	that	its	promise	of	“a	good	life”	
has	worked	quite	effectively	as	long	as	it	has	been	carried	out	on	a	relatively	equal	
ground	in	South	Korea	until	the	mid	1990s.	The	developmental	legacy	does	not	lie	in	
the	state	institutions	themselves,	but	might	remain	in	the	way	in	which	the	
population	imagined	and	aspired	their	good	lives	mostly	in	developmental	terms	of	
standards	of	living.		
Economy-centeredness	is	the	dominant	trait	of	South	Korea’s	modernity.	It	is	
not	only	the	product	of	development	and	modernization	since	the	1960s	and	has	
affected	how	the	population	imagined	their	own	lives	and	the	world	around	them;	it	
has	also	formed	the	basis	of	the	enduring	social	imaginary	among	South	Koreans	
and	shaped	the	basis	of	the	state	project	of	development	and	facilitated	it.	Chŏng	Su-
bok	(2007),	for	instance,	regards	“secular	materialism”	as	one	of	the	“fundamental	
cultural	codes”	among	Koreans,	which	regards	material	wealth	“of	this	world”	as	
forming	basis	of	a	good	life	(pp.	110-115).	Or,	social	Darwinist	idea	of	taking	
extreme	competition	for	survival	for	granted	has	been	around	at	least	for	a	century	
	 96 
in	Korea	since	the	late	nineteen	century	(Tikhonov,	2010).	In	fact,	the	economy-
centeredness	has	been	so	dominant	that	it	was	almost	impossible	to	think	a	good	
life	imagined	outside	the	developmental	limit.	Arguably,	alternative	voices,	which	
fundamentally	problematized	economic	growth	and	development,	have	been	hardly	
influential	even	among	the	intellectuals,	the	political	left,	the	civil	movement,	and	
the	trade	union.	The	status	of	a	developed	and	advanced	country,	defined	in	terms	
of	economic	growth,	has	been	an	obsession	among	the	intellectuals	for	decades.	It	
was	only	recently	that	alternative	voices	emerged	gained	in	a	substantive	way	
(which	is	at	least	partly	examined	and	discussed	in	Chapter	6).			
Like	state-centrism,	economic-centrism	in	Korea	might	go	back	to	different	
historical	eras,	but	it	needs	here	to	note	that	it	constituted	the	core	of	
developmental	modernity,	predicated	upon	material,	secular,	economic	orientations	
which	have	defined	the	social	imaginaries	among	South	Koreans.	
Post-developmental	transition	to	neoliberalization			
In	this	section,	I	follow	the	way	in	which	a	series	of	state	discourses	shaped	
the	post-developmental	transformation	of	the	state	and	the	economy	since	the	early	
1990s.	I	have	two	points	to	emphasize	in	this	discussion.	On	the	one	hand,	these	
grand	state	discourses,	with	the	normative	imperative	of	“international	
competitiveness”	as	a	dominant	discursive	frame,	facilitated	the	neoliberal	
transformation	of	the	state	and	the	economy.	The	neoliberal	normative	imperative	
of	international	competitiveness	dominated	political	discourses	and	public	policies,	
facilitating	the	transformation	of	the	developmental	state	into	the	neoliberal	
competition	state,	a	competitive	entity	in	the	global	economy.		
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On	the	other	hand,	these	top-down	state	visions	and	discourses	were	
predicated	on,	as	well	as	continued	and	reinforced	by,	the	state-centered	and	
economy-centered	nature	of	collective	national	imaginary	in	South	Korea.	The	
neoliberal	rationality	of	international	competitiveness	put	a	new	layer	on,	rather	
than	replaced,	the	developmental	rationality.	The	ideas	of	competition	and	survival	
have	been	central	to	collective	national	imaginary	of	development.	Moreover,	
neoliberalization	was	driven	by	the	state	in	the	language	of	national	interest	and	
national	survival.	The	continued	state-centered	and	economy-centered	nature	of	
collective	national	imaginary	characterizes	the	process	of	neoliberalization	in	South	
Korea.		
Neoliberal	competition	state	
The	transformation	of	the	South	Korean	society	can	be	understood	as	a	rapid	
transition	from	a	developmental	regime	to	a	neoliberal	one.	By	the	late	1980s,	the	
developmental	state	became	ineffective	and	unsustainable	due	to	great	domestic	
and	international	structural	changes	(H.-y.	Cho,	2000).	First,	the	collapse	of	the	
Soviet	and	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	heralded	a	new	phase	of	geopolitics.	In	this	
changing	geopolitical	environment,	the	United	States	put	pressure	on	South	Korea	
to	open	market	for	goods	and	service.	Second,	the	June	Uprising	and	the	subsequent	
Great	Labor	Action	in	the	summer	of	1987	made	it	unsustainable	to	repress	labor	to	
maintain	low-wage	policy	in	favor	of	export-led	economic	growth.	Last,	large	South	
Korean	conglomerates	began	to	grow	into	major	global	capital	and	demanded	
neoliberal	deregulation	and	market	liberalization	(H.-y.	Cho,	2000;	Jessop	&	Sum,	
2006a).	The	transformation	geared	toward	double	movement	toward	liberation:	the	
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one	from	the	authoritarian	political	repression	and	the	other	from	the	state’s	tight	
grip	of	the	business	into	a	neoliberal	“advocacy	of	free	enterprise”	(Harvey,	2005,	p.	
37).	
The	South	Korean	national	economy,	until	then	firmly	nationally	bounded	
relatively	closed	except	for	exportation,	began	to	be	reconstructed	within	this	
changing	international	and	domestic	setting.	The	techno-economic	master	
narratives	of	globalization	and	the	knowledge-based	economy	(KBE)	provided	a	
sweeping	discursive	frame	to	reconstruct	the	national	economy	and	reposition	the	
South	Korean	state,	emphasizing	the	normative	imperative	of	international	
competitiveness	(Jessop,	2002,	p.	133).	It	was	in	this	context	that	successive	South	
Korean	governments	from	the	early	1990s	to	the	mid	2000s	presented	and	
promulgated	a	series	of	top-down	grand	state	visions	and	strategies	with	slogans	
such	as	“New	Korea,”	“segyehwa,”	“Rebuilding	Korea,”	“Knowledge-based	Nation	
(KBN),”	“Northeast	Asian	financial	hub	country,”	and	so	on.	These	series	of	top-
down	state	visions	constructed	and	re-imagined	the	South	Korean	economy	and	
state	in	the	emerging	space	of	globalizing	economy.		
The	Kim	Young-sam	government	(February	1993-February	1998),	the	first	
civilian	government	in	South	Korea,	proclaimed	the	grand	state	vision	of	segyehwa,	
literally	meaning	“world-ization”	(Armstrong,	2007,	p.	4).	It	marked	the	beginning	of	
South	Korea’s	aggressive	take	on	globalization	beyond	the	developmental	strategy	
of	“catching-up.”	The	state	vision	of	segyehwa	defined	the	global	economic	
conditions	as	“limitless	competition”	(Y.-s.	Kim,	1994),	which	in	turn	demanded	the	
bounded	national	economy	to	be	liberated	and	exposed	to	international	
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competition.	In	this	discursive	frame,	the	South	Korean	state	repositioned	itself	as	
the	facilitator	to	foster	international	competitiveness	of	the	national	economy.	The	
narratives	of	information	technology	and	the	“new	economy”	were	also	emphasized	
as	a	way	for	restructuring	the	national	economy	to	a	higher	level.	The	neoliberal	
policy	measures	such	market	opening,	financial	liberalization,	deregulation	and	
labor	flexibility	were	widely	introduced	in	the	name	of	meeting	the	global	standard.		
The	segyehwa	drive	toward	international	competitiveness	was	legitimized	as	
an	imperative	to	survive,	to	continue	economic	growth	and	to	become	a	“top-tier	
advanced	nation	(illyu	seonjin	gukga)”	in	the	world	(Y.-s.	Kim,	1995b).	The	Kim	
Young-sam	government	pursued	the	membership	of	the	OECD	(Organization	for	
Economic	Co-operation	and	Development)	and	the	10,000	dollar	mark	of	GNP	per	
capita	as	the	symbolic	evidence	of	South	Korea’s	“top-tier	advanced”	status.16	
As	the	progress	of	political	democracy	and	the	confidence	in	economic	
growth	created	national	optimism,	the	segyehwa	discourse	aimed	to	orient	“all	
aspects	of	national	life”	toward	globalization	(G.-W.	Shin,	2006,	p.	212).	It	urged	
Korean	people	to	be	“a	Korean	in	the	world”	and	to	live	up	to	the	“global	standard”	
by	paying	attention	to	world	affairs,	looking	for	travel	abroad,	and	engaging	in	
computer	skills	and	intensive	English	learning	(Y.-c.	ŏ.	Kim,	1999,	p.	30).	
	
16	In	fact,	the	pursuit	of	the	OECD	membership	and	the	mark	of	10,000	dollar	
of	GNP-per-capita	contributed	to	the	financial	crisis	in	1997.	The	Kim	Young-sam	
government	hastened	to	abolish	the	Economic	Planning	Board,	the	headquarter	of	
developmental	planning,	in	order	to	facilitate	the	gaining	the	OECD	membership	
within	his	presidential	term.	The	government	also	tried	to	maintain	the	exchange	
rate	at	a	higher	level	to	adjust	the	10,000	dollar	mark.	
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The	financial	meltdown	in	November	of	1997	made	a	deep	impact	to	every	
corner	of	the	Korean	society.	The	financial	crisis	and	the	intervention	by	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	overdetermined	the	conservative-neoliberal	
transformation	ventured	in	the	mid	1990s.	The	crisis	constituted	a	critical	
conjuncture	in	which	the	existing	ideas	of	the	nation-state	and	the	national	economy	
were	put	into	serious	question	and	a	fundamental	transformation	of	the	Korean	
economy	and	society	was	demanded.	The	IMF	intervention	marked	a	turning	point	
where	the	drive	toward	neoliberalization	was	unidirectionally	pushed	as	social	
resistances	against	neoliberal	reform,	especially	by	labor,	were	effectively	muted.		
The	Kim	Dae-jung	government	(February	1998-February	2003),	newly	
elected	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	launched	the	“Rebuilding	Korea”	campaign	
(제 2 의	건국운동)17	and	drove	a	nationwide	reform	of	the	state,	economy	and	
society.	Kim	Dae-jung,	known	to	be	an	advocate	for	fair	market	competition,	tried	to	
balance	economic	growth	and	the	provision	of	“productive	welfare.”	He	declared	the	
“parallel	development	of	democracy	and	the	market	economy”	as	the	governing	
principle	(D.-j.	Kim,	1998,	p.	13).	However,	demanded	by	the	IMF	as	a	condition	for	
the	relief	bailout	loan	as	well	as	by	neoliberal	bureaucracy	and	the	domestic	big	
business	sector,	the	actual	policy	orientations	and	implementations	were	geared	
toward	the	neoliberal	direction,	in	favor	of	establishing	market	principle.	In	fact,	the	
extensive	neoliberal	reform	programs,	so	called	the	“IMF	plus	package,”	were	
inserted	by	the	neoliberal	force	in	Korea	rather	than	one-sidedly	imposed	upon	by	
	
17	Literally,	it	can	be	translated	into	English	as	the	“Second	Nation-Building	
Movement.”		
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the	IMF	and	the	US	government,	the	package	which	included	the	complete	opening	
of	financial	market	to	foreign	investors,	the	accelerated	liberalization	of	the	trade	of	
goods	and	services,	the	privatization	of	public	enterprises,	and	the	labor	market	
reform	by	introducing	flexible	layoffs	and	labor	dispatching	(Chi,	2007,	p.	8).	In	
other	words,	the	radical	neoliberal	reform	was	chosen	and	aggressively	sought	after	
rather	than	simply	imposed	on	(C.-j.	Ch’oe,	2006,	p.	138).		
The	post-crisis	reform	towards	neoliberalization	was	driven	in	the	name	of	
establishing	global	standards	and	enhancing	international	competitiveness,	which	
were	deemed	essential	to	overcome	the	crisis	and	to	accomplish	the	ultimate	goal	of	
getting	into	the	rank	of	“world’s	first	rate	nation”	(C.	Sŏ	&	Kim,	2013,	pp.	168-170).		
As	a	way	of	enhancing	international	competitiveness,	the	Kim	Dae-jung	
government	pushed	technology-related	policy,	including	IT	policy	and	cultural	
policy	for	the	post-crisis	economic	boost	for	the	next	developmental	step	of	the	
national	economy.	The	Kim	government	declared	the	vision	of	the	“knowledge-
based	nation”	as	a	state	program	for	“Rebuilding	Korea.”	Kim	presented	it	as	
“transforming	the	industrial	nation	which	is	based	on	materials	into	the	knowledge-
based	nation	which	is	based	on	creative	knowledge	and	information”	(D.-j.	Kim,	
1998,	p.	422).	It	was	a	statist	version	modified	from	the	“knowledge-based	
economy,”	the	vision	of	which	was	recommended	as	a	new	engine	for	economic	
growth	and	transformation	by	various	transnational	organizations	including	the	
World	Bank,	the	UNESCO	and	the	OECD	(S.-t.	Hong,	1999,	p.	33;	P.-j.	Kim,	2007,	p.	
266).	
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The	subsequent	liberal	Roh	Mu-hyun	government	(February	2003-February	
2008)	brought	the	project	of	the	“Northeast	Asian	economic	hub	country”	into	the	
central	state	reform	agenda.	The	Roh	government	defined	the	international	reality	
of	South	Korean	economy	as	a	“nutcracker	situation”	between	superpowers	and	
proposed	the	project	as	a	future	economic	growth	engine.	While	the	state	project	of	
the	Northeast	Asian	economic	hub	country	caught	up	with	the	geo-economic	trend	
of	the	regional	integration	of	the	national	economy	and	put	in	mind	the	geo-political	
issue	of	North-South	Korean	relations,	it	implied	the	deepening	of	the	full-scale	
market-oriented	reform	and	financial	liberation	of	the	South	Korean	society	and	
economy	(K.-K.	Lee,	2004;	Woo-Cumings,	2003).	In	the	same	vein,	the	Roh	
government	also	pushed	the	Korea-US	Free	Trade	Agreement,	among	others,	under	
the	pretext	of	enhancing	international	competitive	capacity	of	South	Korea	by	
exposing	financial	and	service	sectors	to	advanced	competitors	and	securing	the	US	
market	for	industrial	products	such	as	automobiles	and	mobile	phones	(C.	Sŏ	&	Kim,	
2013,	pp.	171-172).		
The	subsequent	conservative	Lee	Myung-bak	government	(February	2008-
January	2013)	drove	the	full-scale	neoliberalization	without	reserve.	With	the	
catchphrase	of	“Global	Korea,”	the	“corporate	state”	of	the	Lee	government	took	
aggressive,	pro-business	moves	in	the	name	of	achieving	the	status	of	an	“first-rate	
advanced	country”	(Kalinowski	&	Cho,	2012,	p.	246;	T.-c.	u.	Kim,	2010,	p.	263).	The	
public	policies	discourses	under	the	Lee	government,	which	set	the	backdrop	for	the	
discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	
(NBNP),	will	be	closely	examined	in	the	subsequent	chapters.		
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Continuity	and	change		
Through	the	examination	of	the	state	discourses	and	visions	from	the	early	
1990s	to	the	2000s,	we	can	identify	several	points	that	could	give	insight	to	the	
discussion	of	NBNP	in	the	following	chapters.	I	highlight	these	points	especially	
focusing	on	the	historical	continuity	and	change	in	terms	of	social	imaginaries	of	the	
state	and	the	economy.		
First	of	all,	the	grand	state	visions	and	the	policy	frameworks	from	“New	
Korea”	to	the	“Global	Korea”	declared	by	the	consecutive	governments	commonly	
showed	neoliberal	orientation.	To	different	degrees,	they	drove	the	neoliberal	
policies	such	as	market	opening,	financial	liberalization,	privatization	of	public	
goods,	labor	flexibility,	and	deregulation	of	business.	These	policies	transformed	
South	Korean	society	into	a	neoliberal	one	in	quite	a	short	period.	The	whole	
societal	area	was	reorganized	toward	a	“corporate	society”	(T.-c.	u.	Kim,	2010),	
dominated	by	the	principle	of	market	competition.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	
that	the	“developmental	legacy”	was	cleared	away	and	“fair”	principle	of	market	
competition	was	established	in	South	Korea.	Rather,	the	neoliberal	principle	of	
market	and	competition	was	superimposed	on	the	existing	customs	and	practices	
such	as	bureaucratic	inefficiency	and	corruption,	cronyism,	excessive	governmental	
regulation,	collusive	links	between	politics	and	business	and	so	on.	This	
combination	resulted	in	an	unprecedented	gap	between	the	rich	and	the	poor,	
widening	rent-seeking	practices	among	the	rich,	and	precarious	life	conditions	for	
the	poor.		
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Second,	it	was	the	post-developmental	state	that	led	the	process	of	the	rapid	
neoliberal	transformation,	accelerating	the	incorporation	of	South	Korea	into	the	
global	financial	order.	The	“neoliberal	competition	state”	repositioned	itself	as	an	
agency	to	drive	the	neoliberal	reform	of	the	whole	society	(K.-i.	Yi,	2008).	In	fact,	the	
rapid	neoliberal	transition	was	enabled	by	the	powerful,	often	top-down	and	
authoritarian,	initiatives	by	the	state	with	developmental	legacy.	We	can	identify	the	
continuity	from	the	developmental,	strategic	competition	state	to	the	neoliberal	
competition	state	(Cerny,	1997).	The	South	Korean	developmental	state	was	already	
closely	tied	to	the	world	capitalist	regime	with	the	outward	export-oriented	project	
of	economic	development.	Without	any	alternative	political	forces,	it	is	not	allowed	
to	imagine	the	South	Korean	state	breaking	from	“path	dependency”	(K.-i.	Yi,	2008,	
p.	38).		
While	the	developmental	state	itself	was	dissolved	in	the	1990s	and	
transformed	into	the	state	orienting	toward	market	integration	into	global	economy,	
the	state	remains	central	to	social	imaginary	in	South	Korea.	Political	scientist	Ch’oe	
Chang-jip	(2006)	emphasizes	the	continuity	of	the	state	form	during	the	liberal	
transition:		
It	seems	that	democratization	in	Korea	did	not	bring	about	a	change	in	the	
perception	or	attitude	of	the	Korean	people	as	well	as	the	structure	and	the	
operation	of	the	state.	In	other	words,	a	high	degree	of	continuity	has	been	
maintained	in	relation	to	the	nature	of	the	state.	The	notion	that	there	is	little	
change	in	the	perception	and	attitude	among	the	citizens	means	that	even	
after	the	democratization,	strong	state-centered	attitudes	and	values	and	
statism-nationalism	still	remains	the	dominant	ideals.	The	result	is	that	the	
state	that	exercises	widespread	influence	over	society	through	its	well-
developed	bureaucratic	administration	system	remains	under	democracy	
(my	own	translation	pp.	99-100).		
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Third,	we	can	also	understand	the	rapid	neoliberal	transformation	in	terms	
of	the	effectiveness	of	the	normative	principle	of	international	competitiveness,	
which	emerged	as	a	dominant	discursive	framework.	The	neoliberal	discourse	of	
international	competitiveness	dominated	political	discourse	and	state	public	policy,	
constructing	the	state	as	a	competitive	entity	within	the	neoliberal	global	order.	
While	the	“aggressive”	version	of	international	competitiveness	continued	
throughout	the	grand	state	visions,	the	“attractive”	one	gradually	developed	
alongside,	facilitating	the	imagining	of	the	state	as	a	competitive	entity,	as	the	
manager	of	territorial	assets	of	national	economy	for	the	global	economy.	While	
supporting	export-led	economic	growth	represents	the	international	
competitiveness	in	the	former	take,	successful	attraction	of	transnational	capital	
investment	represents	the	priority	of	the	state.		
Fourth,	the	imagery	of	the	economy	became	more	central	not	just	to	the	
function	of	the	state	but	also	to	all	aspects	of	life.	In	that	sense,	economy-centrism	
became	more	dominant	feature	of	social	imaginary	in	neoliberal	South	Korea.	
National	security	became	less	significant	as	a	national	task	as	the	developmental	
difference	between	North	and	South	became	too	wide	to	compare;	instead,	national	
economic	growth	was	reinforced	as	the	supreme	national	task	especially	in	the	
context	of	globalizing	world	economy.	In	relation	to	collective	economic	life,	it	is	
notable	that	the	neoliberal	transition	toward	international	competitiveness	was	
driven	in	the	languages	of	the	nation	such	as	national	interest,	national	survival,	
enhancing	national	capacity,	national	reform,	reinforcing	national	competitiveness,	
and	so	on.	In	this	discursive	frame	of	geography,	the	global	economy	was	imagined	
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from	the	national	economic	perspective.	For	instance,	segyehwa	was	imagined	as	the	
advance	of	Korean	firms	and	Koreans	into	the	world,	and	the	FTAs	were	promoted	
in	the	geographical	imagination	of	the	“expansion	of	economic	territories”	of	the	
nation	(C.	Sŏ	&	Kim,	2013,	p.	174).	We	can	identify	the	continuity	from	the	
developmental	discourse	in	the	sense	that	the	neoliberal	emphasis	on	international	
competitiveness	was	imagined	with	the	imagery	of	national	economy	at	the	center.	
Further,	the	imagination	of	the	prospect	of	South	Korea	as	a	“first-rate,	advanced	
country”	has	underlay	the	series	of	grand	state	visions.	The	status	of	an	advanced	
country	has	been	idealized	and	imagined	as	an	ultimate	collective	goal	of	the	nation.		
Fifth,	the	goal	of	becoming	an	advanced	country	has	been	predicated	on	
technological	discourses	such	as	information	and	knowledge	economy.	In	the	state	
discourses,	technological	advancement	in	ICT,	automobile,	and	so	on	dominated	the	
imagination	of	the	present	and	future	nation.	Technological	advancement	was	
regarded	as	crucial	for	a	techno-economic	leap	forward	beyond	the	developmental	
catching-up.	The	growth	and	expansion	of	national	economy	became	dominated	by	
techno-economic	imagination,	predicated	on	the	techno-centric	idea	of	linear	
development	and	progress.		
Last,	the	imagination	of	a	technologically	advanced,	international	competitive	
country	is	bound	by	the	Western-oriented	modernity.	The	normative	imperative	of	
international	competitiveness	urged	the	acceptance	of	global	norms	and	standards,	
which	were	in	practice	set	on	the	basis	of	the	Western	criteria.	The	Western	
perspective	in	effect	dominates	the	assessment	of	international	competitiveness	and	
national	capacities.	
	 107 
Post-developmental	social	imaginaries	in	Western-oriented	modernity	
In	the	discussion	of	this	section	so	far,	I	examined	how	South	Korean	
modernity	has	formed	with	the	state	and	the	economy	at	the	center	of	the	social	
imaginaries	in	the	discourse	and	program	of	modernization	and	development.	This	
“developmental	modernity”	seems	to	constitute	a	dominant	social	imaginary	in	
South	Korea	even	after	the	official	demolition	of	the	developmental	state	in	the	late	
1990s.	Thus,	any	post-developmental	social	imaginary	is	necessarily	engaged	with	
developmental	modernity.		
State-centrism	and	economic-centrism,	which	are	crucial	to	developmental	
modernity,	are	still	central	to	social	imaginary	among	South	Koreans.	They	are	also	
key	elements	in	the	questions	and	debates	about	the	current	status	and	future	
direction	of	South	Korean	modernity	in	the	twenty-first	century.	To	put	it	in	a	
simplified	way,	we	can	identify	two	contrasting	positions	concerning	South	Korean	
modernity.		
The	first	one	affirms	the	modern	development	of	South	Korea	especially	in	
terms	of	its	economic	accomplishment.	From	this	position,	modern	Korea	in	the	
second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	has	marched	successfully	toward	the	universal	
progress	of	human	civilization,	characterized	by	market	capitalism,	democratic	
institutions,	and	individualism	(Y.-h.	Yi,	2007).	This	position,	represented	by	the	
South	Korean	“New	Right,”18	diagnoses	that	South	Korea	successfully	achieved	
industrialization	as	well	as	democratization	(with	the	emphasis	on	the	former),	and	
	
18	In	the	mid	2000s,	they	emerged	as	a	powerful	voice	in	the	public	sphere,	
shaping	conservative	public	agenda	for	the	Lee	Myung-bak	government.	
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proposes	that	the	next	task	is	“advancedness”	(sŏnjinhwa	선진화,	which	literally	
means	being/making	advanced)	(S.-i.	Pak,	2006),	the	last	stage	of	the	universal	
model	of	modernity.	They	contend	that	the	urgent	task	for	South	Korea	is	to	widely	
reform	political	systems	and	institutions,	and	social	and	cultural	customs,	which	
were	deemed	“backward”	and	not	in	sync	with	the	advanced	business	world,	and	
thus,	standing	in	the	way	to	economic	growth	and	sŏnjinhwa.	In	sum,	this	position	
continues	the	developmental	narrative	of	economic	growth	with	“ever-receding”	
promise	of	improvement.	This	position	represents	the	politics	of	the	so-called	
“industrialization	generation”	who	went	through	rapid	economic	growth	in	the	
1960s	to	1980s.		
The	second	position	regards	South	Korean	modernity	as	“distorted”	and	
falling	short	of	the	universal	standard.	This	position	acknowledges	past	economic	
growth	but	criticizes	state-centrism	and	economic-centrism	and	the	consequential	
state-conglomerates	alliance,	which	is	deemed	to	have	made	South	Korea	deviate	
from	the	“normal”	course	of	modernity	and	stand	in	the	way	to	sŏnjinhwa	and	“true”	
modernity.	State-centrism	and	collectivism	have	organized	the	whole	life	around	the	
state,	and	deterred	individualism	and	social	differentiation,	the	organizing	
principles	of	modernity	(T.-y.	Kim,	2016,	p.	15).	Economy-centrism	has	reduced	
modernization	to	economic	growth,	and	the	whole	life	to	abstract	economic	indices	
(T.-y.	Kim,	2016,	pp.	138-144),	resulting	in	South	Korea’s	“reduced	modernity”	(T.-y.	
Kim,	2014).	To	achieve	the	status	of	true	modernity,	this	position	contends,	South	
Korea	needs	to	improve	in	terms	of	“universal	values”	such	as	individualism,	human	
rights,	equality,	democracy,	environment	and	ecology,	and	so	on	(T.-y.	Kim,	2016,	p.	
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211).	This	position	is	widely	shared	by	the	“democratization	generation,”	younger	
than	the	“industrialization	generation,”	who	observed	and	experienced	the	widening	
of	democracy	and	individual	freedom	since	the	1990s.		
In	real	politics,	these	two	positions	are	in	stark	antagonism	to	each	other,	
especially	on	the	historical	and	current	issues	such	as	the	authoritarian	regime	and	
the	big	capital	(chaebŏl)	system.	It	is	obvious	that	while	the	first	position	is	
business-oriented,	the	second	prioritizes	welfare,	equality,	and	democracy.	Despite	
this	obvious	antagonism,	we	can	identify	a	convergence	between	them	concerning	
the	past,	present,	and	future	of	South	Korea.	First,	both	acknowledge	South	Korea’s	
remarkable	economic	development	in	the	past.	Second,	they	evaluate	the	current	
status	of	South	Korea	as	falling	short	of	the	desired	level	of	modernity.	Last,	most	
importantly,	both	positions	aspire	to	South	Korea’s	attaining	of	an	“advanced”	status	
in	terms	of	“universal”	values	of	modernity	although	they	appreciate	different	
aspects	of	the	universal.	More	generally,	both	positions	implicitly	and	explicitly	
imagine	the	West	as	the	universal	model	of	modernity.		
At	this	point,	one	is	reminded	how	the	discourse	and	program	of	
modernization	and	development	were	predicated	on	the	Western	ideal.	Thus,	in	
addition	to	state-centeredness	and	economy-centeredness,	we	need	to	consider	the	
Western-oriented	nature	of	South	Korean	modernity.	The	idea	of	“compressed	
modernization”	(Chang,	1999),	which	describes	the	historical	formation	of	
modernity	in	South	Korea,	epitomizes	not	just	the	speed	at	which	it	achieved	
economic	development,	but	the	way	in	which	it	attempted	to	“catch	up”	“advanced”	
or	“developed”	Western	countries.	Further,	it	implies	that	the	West	has	become	the	
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normative	standard	of	modernization	and	development	for	South	Korea	through	
sped-up	imitations	and	adaptations.	
Notably,	in	the	Western	orientation	of	South	Korean	modernity,	cultural	and	
social	aspects,	rather	than	political	and	economic	aspects,	have	gotten	increasingly	
prominent	across	different	positions.	Although	the	two	positions	emphasize	
different	social	and	cultural	aspects,	they	commonly	emphasize	such	social	and	
cultural	aspects	as	civility,	manners,	public	behaviors,	“global	citizenship,”	and	so	
on,	the	reference	of	which	usually	comes	from	the	comparison	between	the	
idealized	West	and	South	Korea.	In	this	context,	the	idea	of	a	“culture-advanced	
country”	(munhwa	sŏnjinguk	문화선진국)	has	emerged	as	a	vision	of	modernity	in	
South	Korea.	Now	it	is	culture	that	is	regarded	as	an	indicator	of	modernity	and	
civilization	and	being	advanced	as	a	nation	and	in	the	international	rank	of	
advanced	countries.			
It	is	in	this	context	of	the	rise	of	the	vision	of	a	“culture-advanced	nation”	in	
which	the	discursive	and	institutional	practices	of	NBNP	emerged	in	the	early	
2000s.	It	is	in	terms	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige	that	a	culture-
advanced	country	as	a	truly	advanced,	modern	country	is	specifically	presented	and	
imagined	beyond	the	status	of	an	economically-advanced	country.		
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CHAPTER	4		
THE	NEWS	MEDIA	AND	THE	RISE	OF	THE	DISCOURSES	OF	NATION	BRANDING	
AND	NATIONAL	PRESTIGE		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	examine	how	nation	branding	has	emerged	as	a	dominant	
political	discourse	in	South	Korea	during	the	first	decade	of	the	2000s.	In	the	midst	
of	the	rising	concern	about	the	international	status	and	national	image	among	the	
news	media	and	political	elites,	nation	branding	became	an	essential	part	of	the	
major	political	vision	for	state	management.	The	Lee	Myung-bak	government	(2008-
2012)	set	up	the	Presidential	Council	for	Nation	Branding	(PCNB)	in	January	2009	
and	instituted	the	idea	of	nation	branding	as	the	key	public	policy	agenda.	Indeed,	
the	idea	of	nation	branding	became	a	discursive	framework,	in	reference	to	which	
the	implementation	of	other	key	public	policies	was	justified	and	legitimized.	
Beyond	the	official	public	policy	discourse,	the	talks	of	nation	branding,	in	
combination	with	a	neologism	“national	prestige,”	became	a	staple	vocabulary	in	the	
news	media	as	well	as	in	the	popular	political	discussion	on	a	wide	variety	of	
political,	social	and	cultural	issues	in	South	Korea.		
The	emergence	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	into	the	policy	
discourse	did	not	happen	within	a	vacuum.	In	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	rise	of	
nation	branding	and	national	prestige	(NBNP)	in	a	larger	discursive	and	
institutional	context	in	which	the	imperative	of	political,	economic,	social	and	
cultural	reforms	have	been	increasingly	cast	in	light	of	enhancing	the	nation	brand	
and	national	prestige.	In	the	course,	the	emerging	discourses	of	NBNP	imbued	a	new	
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way	of	imagining	the	state	and	the	nation	from	a	business	standpoint	as	a	
competitive	entity	in	the	global	economy.		
I	especially	attend	to	the	institutional	and	discursive	role	played	by	the	
mainstream	national	news	media,	along	with	domestic	public	and	private	think	
tanks,	in	importing	and	disseminating	the	idea	of	nation	branding	since	the	early	
2000s.	The	examination	of	the	news	media	highlights	the	discursive	and	
institutional	formation	of	NBNP	prior	to	the	official	institution	of	government	public	
policy	in	the	late	2000s,	and	better	illustrates	the	wider	discursive	and	institutional	
terrain	in	which	multiple	actors	were	involved,	often	in	contesting	ways,	in	the	
reconfiguration	of	the	state	and	the	nation	in	South	Korea.		
My	focus	on	the	role	played	by	the	domestic	news	media	addresses	the	
ongoing	academic	discussions	and	debates	in	terms	of	the	agencies	of	nation	
branding.		
First,	the	existing	critical	literature	has	greatly	focused	on	the	agency	of	
transnational	branding	consultants	in	the	proliferation	of	the	discourses	and	
techniques	of	nation	branding.	(Aronczyk,	2008b;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011).	For	
instance,	the	idea	of	the	“transnational	promotional	class”	highlights	the	role	played	
by	diverse	transnational	experts	and	professionals	in	marketing,	branding,	and	
advertising	whose	profit-seeking	interests	have	been	driving	the	boom	of	nation	
branding	around	the	world	(Aronczyk,	2013,	p.	38).	While	the	presence	of	
transnational	consultants	has	been	apparent	in	the	practices	of	nation	branding,	the	
agencies	of	diverse	domestic	actors,	including	the	news	media,	have	played	a	critical	
role	in	disseminating	and	establishing	the	discourses	and	institutions	of	nation	
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branding	in	South	Korea.	The	chapter	aims	to	keep	track	of	the	domestic	actors,	
especially	the	news	media,	which	played	a	critical	role	as	agencies	of	nation	
branding	and	to	examine	the	domestic	dynamics	of	the	political	economy	and	the	
cultural	politics	of	nation	branding.		
Second,	I	especially	focus	on	the	distinctive	role	played	by	the	news	media	as	
a	crucial	actor	for	the	promotion	of	nation	branding	in	discursive	as	well	as	
institutional	terms.	While	the	media	has	been	the	natural	focus	in	many	critical	
researches	on	nation	branding,	it	was	treated	in	a	rather	simple	way	as	an	outlet	of	
symbols,	discourses,	and	representations.	It	was	only	recently	that	the	critical	
literature	has	taken	notice	of	the	multiple	aspects	of	the	role	played	by	the	media	
(Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015;	Kaneva,	2016).	This	literature	suggests	that	the	agency	of	
the	media	should	be	addressed	in	terms	of	financial,	material,	and	technological	as	
well	as	symbolic	circulation.		
Situated	in	the	academic	context,	this	chapter	examines	the	agency	of	the	
news	media	in	establishing	nation	branding	in	two	distinctive	aspects.		
First,	I	examine	how	the	idea	of	nation	branding	was	imported	and	
domesticated	in	the	early	2000s,	by	keeping	track	of	diverse	actors	and	their	
institutional	and	discursive	practices.	With	the	rising	concern	about	the	
international	status	and	image	of	the	nation,	the	news	media	introduced	and	
mediated	the	idea	of	nation	branding	among	political	and	business	elites.	They	set	
nation	branding	at	the	center	of	public	policy	agenda,	relying	on	the	authority	of	
Western	experts	and	working	with	domestic	think	tanks	and	governmental	
agencies.	The	idea	of	nation	branding	grew	out	of	a	marketing	concept	into	a	
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political	discourse	on	the	state	with	larger	implications	along	with	related	terms	
such	as	soft	power,	public	diplomacy,	the	attractive	nation,	and	the	advanced	
country.	The	news	media	especially	contributed	to	the	political	visibility	of	the	idea	
of	nation	branding	as	they	translated	it	into	“nation	prestige.”		
Here,	the	use	of	the	term	“agenda	setting”	is	rather	descriptive	than	analytic	
although	the	examination	of	the	role	played	by	the	news	media	in	the	institutional	
and	discursive	formation	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	is	partly	informed	
by	the	theory	of	agenda	setting	in	mass	media	(those	of	agenda	building	and	policy	
agenda	setting	for	that	matter,	Rogers	&	Dearing,	1988).	Agenda	setting	theory	
refers	to	“the	creation	of	public	awareness	and	concern	of	salient	issues	by	the	news	
media”	(Kleinnijenhuis	&	Rietberg,	1995).	In	the	sense	that	the	theory	emphasizes	
how	the	media	shapes	the	perceptions	on	public	issues,	this	chapter	shares	the	core	
assumptions	underlying	agenda	setting	theory	of	agenda.		
However,	it	does	not	aim	to	apply	agenda	setting	theory,	that	is	to	test	the	
media	effects	by	examining	the	correlation	between	the	salience	of	agenda	in	the	
news	media	reports	and	the	perceptions	among	publics	or	voters	(agenda	setting	
theory)	or	among	public	policy	makers	(policy	agenda	setting	theory).	Rather,	this	
chapter	attempts	to	explore	a	wider	formation	in	a	historical	context,	focusing	on	
the	agency	of	the	news	media	in	institutional,	political	economic	and	discursive	
terms.	Thus,	this	chapter	focuses	on	how	the	news	media	institutions	mediated	
various	actors	such	as	transnational	consultants,	governmental	and	private	research	
institutes,	and	politicians	and	facilitated	the	circulation	of	emerging	discourses	of	
nation	branding	and	national	prestige	among	elites.		
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Second,	following	the	examination	of	the	institutional	role	by	the	news	
media,	I	analyze	how	the	media	discourses	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	
form	a	particular	social	imaginary	of	the	state,	the	economy,	and	the	nation.	I	
especially	attend	to	the	historicized	form	of	narratives	of	the	past,	the	present,	and	
the	future	of	the	nation	(C.-i.	Kang	&	Sŭng-hyŏn,	2011;	Wyatt,	2005a,	2005b).	The	
news	media	narratives	problematized	the	nation	brand	deficit	in	economic	terms,	
and	presented	the	state-wide	reform	for	enhancing	the	nation	brand	and	national	
prestige	as	a	solution	to	continuing	economic	growth.	While	evoking	collective	
discontent	and	anxiety	about	the	weak	international	status,	the	news	media	
discourses	brought	up	as	nation	branding	resources	the	national	pride	in	the	rapid	
economic	growth	and	the	transnational	popularity	of	Korean	popular	culture.	I	
examine	how	the	historicized	narratives	of	the	nation	directed	toward	a	particular	
re-imagination	of	the	nation	as	standing	at	the	threshold	of	entering	the	ranks	of	
first-class,	“advanced”	countries,	competing	on	the	world	stage.		
Based	on	the	examinations	of	the	process	and	narratives	of	nation	branding,	
the	chapter	concludes	with	the	discussions	of	the	nature	and	implications	of	the	
news	media’s	drive	for	NBNP.	The	campaigns	attempted	not	just	to	align	the	state	as	
a	neoliberal	manager	of	the	national	economy,	but	to	mobilize	the	national	citizen	as	
responsible	for	enhancing	the	nation	brand.	The	news	media	campaigns	for	NBNP,	
setting	the	ultimate	national	goal	of	entering	the	rank	of	the	advanced	countries,	
constantly	evoked	the	international	framework	of	comparison	and	imposed	the	
Western	measures	of	global	standards	on	the	behavior	of	citizens	in	terms	of	culture	
and	civility.	
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Before	entering	the	main	subject,	it	is	necessary	to	situate	the	South	Korean	
news	media	within	the	historical	context.	The	South	Korean	news	media	became	
liberated	from	the	tight	control	by	the	state	after	the	1987	Great	Democratic	
Struggle.	Since	the	1990s,	the	direct	involvement	in	the	news	media	has	been	greatly	
reduced;	conversely,	the	major	news	media	has	increased	their	influence	on	the	
political	process	and	the	formation	of	public	opinion.	In	particular,	the	three	major	
conservative	newspapers	(Chosŏn	Ilbo,	Chung’ang	Ilbo,	and	Tong’a	Ilbo	—	
collectively	called	“Cho-Chung-Tong”)	have	increasingly	exercised	great	power.	
Despite	the	increasing	influence	of	broadcasting	media,19	the	three	conservative	
newspapers	have	exercised	excessive	political	power.	Compared	to	“Cho-Chung-
Tong,”	the	influence	of	liberal-progressive	newspapers	—	Hangyŏre,	Kyŏnghyang	
Sinmun,	and	others	—	has	been	minuscule.		
The	power	of	“Cho-Chung-Tong”	comes	from	their	close	networks	and	
relations	with	large	conglomerates	(chaebŏls)	and	the	conservative	political	party.	
Chung’ang	Ilbo	used	to	be	an	affiliation	of	the	Samsung	Group,	the	largest	
conglomerate,	and	became	formally	separated	by	clearing	the	equity	relationship	in	
1999.	However,	it	is	no	denying	their	close	relationship,	tied	through	marriage	(C.	
Kim,	2016).	Chosŏn	Ilbo	and	Tong’a	Ilbo,	family-owned	newspaper	companies,	
formally	independent	from	the	state	and	large	capital,	have	been	strengthening	their	
	
19	For	the	news	broadcasting	media,	major	players	had	been	two	major	
public	broadcasters	(KBS	and	MBC),	one	commercial	broadcaster	(SBS,	established	
in	1990),	and	one	cable	news	broadcaster	(YTN,	established	in	1995).	Four	general	
programming	broadcasters	newly	opened	in	2011,	which	were	licensed	to	the	three	
conservative	newspapers	(“Cho-Chung-Tong”)	and	one	economic	newspaper	(Maeil	
Kyŏngje).		
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ties	with	conservative	politicians	and	chaebŏls	through	marriage	and	human	
networking	(Y.-i.	Kim,	2005).	“Cho-Chung-Tong”	have	shared	conservative	political	
interests	as	many	of	their	senior	journalists	entered	politics	through	the	
conservative	parties	(M.-J.	Park,	Kim,	&	Sohn,	2000,	p.	101).	Economic	newspapers	
have	either	been	owned	by	the	chaebol	coalition	(in	case	of	Han’guk	Kyŏngje)	or	
have	exclusively	defended	the	interests	of	large	corporations.	In	this	regard,	the	
conservative	news	media	have	been	the	actual	player	in	the	political	power	process.	
They	were	in	fierce	conflict	with	the	liberal	governments	(the	Kim	and	Roh	
governments)	and	put	efforts	to	support	the	conservative	presidential	candidate	in	
the	presidential	election	in	December	2007.	The	conservative	news	media	are	
considered	to	have	played	a	crucial	role	of	“making”	conservative	presidents	(M.-J.	
Park	et	al.,	2000,	p.	101)	in	the	next	two	elections.	
From	a	broader	historical	perspective,	the	news	media	have	played	an	
important	role	in	the	imagination	and	the	formation	of	the	nation-state	through	
deploying	public	campaigns	for	enlightenment	and	education.	Going	back	to	the	
early	20th	century,	Taehan	Maeil	Sinbo	(1904)	participated	in	the	Patriotic	
Enlightenment	Movement	by	organizing	the	National	Debt	Redemption	Movement	
(C.-m.	Kang,	2019;	M.-g.	Kang,	2013).	After	the	liberation,	the	public	enlightenment	
campaigns	for	development	and	modernization	continued	to	be	considered	part	of	
the	inherent	role	of	the	media.	An	exemplary	case	is	the	Gold	Collection	Movement	
led	by	KBS	in	January-March	1998	in	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	crisis	("The	IMF	
Economic	Crisis	and	Gold	Collection	Movement,"	2017).	In	this	historical	context,	it	
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is	a	common	practice	for	the	news	media	to	take	lead	in	the	public	campaign	to	
enlighten	and	mobilize	publics.		
	
South	Korea’s	struggle	for	international	recognition	
Throughout	modern	history,	South	Koreans	have	been	conscious	about	
gaining	international	recognition.	However,	gaining	international	recognition	has	
been	a	long	shot	for	South	Korea,	which	remained	occupied	by	Japan	for	the	first	
half	of	the	twentieth	century	and	best	known	for	a	long	time	for	the	Korean	War	in	
the	early	1950s.		
It	was	only	recently	that	South	Korea	started	to	carry	out	effective	policy	
actions	in	terms	of	international	recognition.	Until	the	1980s,	South	Korea	had	been	
a	relatively	unknown,	closed,	and	isolated	country	from	the	world,	except	for	its	
high	level	of	dependence	for	economic	growth	on	international	trade	with	the	US	
(export)	and	Japan	(import).	South	Korea	had	been	known	to	the	world	for	its	
negative	images	associated	with	the	Korean	War,	the	division	of	the	nation,	the	
image	of	poverty,	and	the	military	dictatorship.		
The	Olympic	Games	in	Seoul	in	the	summer	of	1988	marked	a	crucial	turning	
point	at	which	South	Korea	asserted	its	international	presence	as	a	newly	
industrializing	and	democratizing	country.	The	Olympics	indeed	marked	a	“coming	
out	party”	(Bridges,	2008;	Manheim,	1990)	for	South	Korea	in	which	it	took	a	
chance	on	the	enhancement	of	its	international	status.	Subsequently	after	the	
Olympics,	South	Korea	(the	Republic	of	Korea)	was	admitted	to	the	United	Nations	
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simultaneously	with	North	Korea	(the	Democratic	People’s	Republic	of	Korea)	in	
1991,	and	established	diplomatic	relations	with	the	Soviet	and	China.		
The	news	media	emphasized	the	Olympics	not	just	as	a	celebration	of	
economic	accomplishment	and	democratization,	but	an	international	breakthrough	
in	terms	of	national	image.	One	newspaper	column	valued	the	successful	hosting	of	
the	Olympics	in	diplomatic	terms	in	which	South	Korea	dusted	off	the	image	of	an	
“unstable,	divided	country”	and	“war-torn,	poor	country”	(S.-h.	Hong,	1999).	
Another	newspaper	article	summarized	the	economic	benefits	of	the	Seoul	Olympic	
Games	such	as	rising	investment,	employment,	tourism	and	so	on,	and	emphasized	
its	long-term	effect	of	producing	the	image	of	a	“capable	country”	(Paek,	1996).	
The	public	concern	about	the	international	image	and	status	of	the	country	
increased	throughout	the	1990s.	The	official	state	visions	such	as	the	“New	Korea”	
and	segeyhwa	(Korea’s	take	on	globalization),	declared	by	the	Kim	Young-sam	
government	in	1993-1994,	were	predicated	on	the	national	awareness	and	
aspiration	for	the	nation’s	presence	on	the	international	stage.	Since	the	mid	1990s,	
improving	“national	image”	(kukka	imiji	국가이미지)	began	to	be	put	on	the	list	of	
public	policy	agenda	and	regarded	as	a	crucial	part	in	enhancing	national	
competitiveness	to	the	level	of	the	“advanced,	first-class	country”	which	since	has	
become	an	underlying	priority	for	the	public	policy	in	South	Korea.		
Indebted	to	the	economic	boom	for	a	decade,	South	Korea	gained	a	
membership	in	the	Organization	of	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD)	
in	1996,	which	was	widely	known	in	South	Korea	as	a	“club	among	world’s	most	
advanced	countries”	(Ŭ.-s.	Kim,	1996).	This	development	was	widely	regarded	as	
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South	Korea’s	entering	the	rank	of	“advanced,	first-class	countries”	in	the	world,	and	
an	optimistic	and	euphoric	mood	dominated	South	Korea.		
However,	a	hurried	market	opening	and	liberalization	which	the	government	
aggressively	drove	with	the	purpose	of	gaining	the	OECD	membership	led	to	a	
disastrous	financial	crisis.	The	Asian	financial	crisis	in	1997-1998	was	perceived	as	
a	“national	disgrace”	that	ruined	national	confidence	and	pride	built	on	past	
economic	development	(I.-s.	Kim,	1997).	Indeed,	Koreans	regarded	the	bailout	by	
the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	as	the	loss	of	economic	sovereignty,	
equivalent	to	“Kyŏngsul	Kukch’i”	(1910	national	disgrace)	in	1910	when	Korea	lost	
its	sovereignty	to	Japan.		
The	subsequent	Kim	Dae-jung	government	called	for	harnessing	the	drive	for	
enhancing	national	competitiveness	to	overcome	the	national	crisis	and	regain	
international	status.	The	2002	FIFA	World	Cup,	co-hosted	by	South	Korea	and	Japan,	
was	regarded	as	a	chance	to	enhance	the	international	status	and	national	image	of	
the	country	just	as	the	1988	Olympic	Games	were	presumed	to	have	done.	The	
successful	co-hosting	of	the	event	and	especially	the	showing	of	South	Koreans’	
passionate	street	cheering	were	regarded	as	giving	a	positive	impression	to	the	
world	that	South	Korea	was	a	young,	dynamic,	and	successful	country	(cf.	Jeon	&	
Yoon,	2004;	Joo,	2006;	H.	Lee	&	Cho,	2009).		
Besides	the	co-hosting	of	the	World	Cup,	in	the	early	2000s,	there	emerged	a	
couple	of	stories	of	global	breakthrough	achieved	by	South	Korea:	the	international	
market	success	of	the	export	of	South	Korea-originated	high-value	products	such	as	
Hyundai	vehicles	and	Samsung	mobile	phones	and	the	growing	popularity	of	South	
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Korean	popular	culture	throughout	East	Asia,	the	so	called	“Korean	Wave.”	Put	
together,	these	moments	were	constructed	as	contributing	to	gaining	global	status	
and	competitiveness	of	South	Korea.	In	the	following,	I	will	show	how	the	news	
media	called	for	a	heightened	drive	for	enhancing	national	image	and	the	national	
brand	of	South	Korea.	
The	rise	of	nation	branding	
Nation	branding	as	a	Western-originated	idea		
In	this	historical	context,	the	idea	of	nation	branding	emerged	as	a	major	
political	discourse	and	a	public	policy	agenda	since	the	early	2000s.	The	South	
Korean	news	media	brought	up	the	issue	of	nation	branding	by	referring	to	globally	
circulating	knowledge	and	expertise.	The	first	talk	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	
came	with	the	names	of	Western	experts.	These	Western	experts	played	a	crucial	
role	in	getting	the	idea	of	nation	branding	introduced	both	in	public	discourse	and	in	
the	actual	process	of	public	policy	in	South	Korea.		
In	2001-2002,	a	few	news	media	introduced	Peter	van	Ham’s	article,	“The	
rise	of	the	brand	state,”	published	in	Foreign	Affairs,	and	brought	attention	to	the	
issues	of	nation	branding	and	national	image.	Han’guk	Ilbo,	a	national	newspaper,	in	
two	editorial	pieces,	paid	attention	to	the	significance	of	national	image	and	symbols	
and	their	political	management	(S.-j.	Kim,	2001;	S.-h.	Yi,	2001).	A	newly	established	
internet	news	press,	Pŭresian	(Pressian),	published	an	abridged	translation	of	van	
Ham’s	article,	and	emphasized	the	nation	brand	as	crucial	on	the	way	to	the	rank	of	
the	advanced	countries	(S.-s.	Yi,	2002).		
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In	the	same	year,	Maeil	Kyŏngje	(Maeil	Business	Newspaper)	invited	Philip	
Kotler	to	South	Korea,	widely	praised	as	the	“father	of	marketing”	in	the	business	
management	circle.	Marketing	consultant	and	professor	of	the	Kellogg	School	of	
Management	at	Northwestern	University,	Kotler	preached	cutting-edge	business	
techniques	such	as	customer	relationship	management	(CRM)	and	the	importance	
of	branding	elements	such	as	names,	logos	and	slogans.	Although	his	speech	did	not	
necessarily	focus	on	nation	branding,	the	newspaper	highlighted	the	part	of	his	
speech	in	which	he	mentioned	the	importance	of	building	Korea-originated	global	
brands	(C.-h.	Kim,	2001).		
Another	Western	figure	central	to	the	promotion	of	the	idea	of	nation	
branding	was	Guy	Sorman.	Having	passed	as	an	expert	on	Korea,	this	French	
intellectual	has	published	books,	written	columns	on	South	Korea,	and	frequently	
visited	South	Korea	since	the	early	1990s.	Invited	to	an	international	symposium	
held	by	the	Federation	of	Korean	Industries	(FKI)	in	2000,	which	represented	the	
big	business	interest	in	South	Korea,	he	emphasized	the	utility	of	culture	for	
enhancing	the	brand	of	Korean	exports.	In	his	speech,	he	urged	the	South	Korean	
government	and	business	to	build	a	strong	national	cultural	image	to	secure	
international	competitiveness	in	the	world	market	(C.-k.	Yun,	2000).		
Arguably,	the	most	significant	figure	was	Simon	Anholt,	who	influenced	the	
development	of	nation	branding	in	the	transnational	circuit	as	well	as	in	South	
Korea.	British	brand	consultant	and	author	of	Brand	New	Justice	(2003),	Anholt	was	
credited	for	the	coinage	of	the	term	nation	branding.	He	caught	instant	attention	in	
South	Korea	with	the	first	publication	of	Nation	Brands	Index	(NBI)	in	2005.	
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Presented	as	a	way	to	measure	and	rank	the	image	and	reputation	of	countries,	
Anholt’s	NBI	was	widely	reported	across	the	news	media,	which	made	a	fuss	about	
the	low	rank	and	weak	“nation	brand	power”	of	South	Korea	(ninth	out	of	eleven	
countries	in	the	first	quarter	report,	and	twentieth	out	of	twenty-five	in	the	second	
quarter	report)	(Kong,	2005;	O,	2005).		
The	publications	presented	a	full-fledged	idea	of	nation	branding	in	the	form	
of	index	and	ranking,	measured	by	“scientific”	data	collection	and	analysis.	These	
publications	were	notable	by	their	emphasis	not	just	on	the	importance	of	national	
image,	but	their	assumption	that	the	nation	brand	and	nation	image	were	
measurable	by	Western	expert	knowledge	and	the	implications	that	they	were	
manageable	by	policy	intervention.		
These	Western	figures	frequently	visited	South	Korea	as	evangelists	
advocating	for	the	need	for	nation	branding.	Some	of	them,	as	well	as	branding	
consulting	firms	such	as	Interbrand,	got	involved	in	the	public	policy	process	related	
to	nation	branding	and	beyond.20	
Thus,	we	can	understand	the	development	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	
as	the	process	in	which	the	news	media	mobilized	the	authority	of	Western	
transnational	brand	consultants	in	scientific	and	rationalized	knowledge	and	
expertise	on	nation	branding.	The	news	media’s	attention	to	Anholt’s	NBI	could	
illuminate	their	utilization	of	Western	authority	in	promoting	nation	branding.	In	
fact,	a	similar	nation	branding	report,	with	similar	“scientific”	methods	and	ranked	
	
20	Commissioned	by	the	Korea	Tourism	Organization,	Simon	Anholt	devised	a	
tourism	brand	campaign,	“Sparkling	Korea”	in	2006,	which	turned	out	to	be	a	huge	
failure.	
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representation,	was	published	by	a	domestic	institution	as	early	as	2002,	but	did	not	
attract	as	much	attention	by	the	media	as	Anholt’s	NBI.	 
Domestic	think	tanks	and	nation	branding		
While	the	Western	experts	propagated	the	idea	of	nation	branding,	it	was	
multiple	domestic	agents	which	actively	promoted	it	in	South	Korea,	including	
public	policy	think	tanks	and	the	news	media.	These	agencies	actively	imported	and	
successfully	domesticated	the	Western-originated	idea	of	nation	branding.	
One	of	the	first	domestic	agencies	to	promote	nation	branding	was	the	
Institute	for	Industrial	Policy	Studies	(IPS).	As	a	public	policy	think	tank	affiliated	
with	the	Ministry	of	Commerce,	Industry	and	Energy	(MoCIE)	(reorganized	to	the	
Ministry	of	Knowledge	Economy	(MKE)	in	2008),	it	had	been	working	to	develop	the	
idea	of	the	international	competitiveness	of	the	nation	and	business.	Since	1999,	it	
has	published	“The	National	Competitiveness	Report,”	based	on	a	worldwide	survey.	
It	was	advertised	as	comprehensive	and	prestigious	as	the	IMD’s	and	the	WEF’s	
reports	on	international	competitiveness.	Since	2002,	the	IPS	has	extended	its	
research	to	cover	nation	branding	by	publishing	its	calculation	of	the	“national	
brand	value	(NBV).”	This	calculation	expanded	the	previous	“national	
competitiveness”	by	taking	into	consideration	additional	intangible	factors	such	as	
“national	image”	and	“national	brand	strategy.”	Based	on	this	calculation,	the	IPS	
reported	that	South	Korea	ranked	ninth	among	sixteen	countries	surveyed.	IPS	
avidly	promoted	the	idea	of	nation	branding	and	their	own	brand	of	nation	branding	
report:	the	IPS	held	the	annual	Korea	Brand	Conference	since	2002	and	Cho	Tong-
sŏng,	the	IPS	director	and	dean	of	the	Business	School	at	Seoul	National	University,	
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contributed	to	various	news	media,	trying	to	propagate	the	idea	of	nation	branding	
and	their	own	calculation	of	NBV	(T.-s.	Cho,	2002a,	2002b;	M.-k.	Chŏng,	2002).		
Subsequently,	a	number	of	private	think	tanks,	university	research	institutes,	
government	agencies,	and	the	national	news	media	worked	together	to	host	a	series	
of	events	and	to	publish	policy	reports	related	to	nation	branding.	For	instance,	the	
Hyundai	Research	Institute	(HRI),	affiliated	with	the	Hyundai	conglomerate,	
published	a	series	of	reports	on	national	image	and	nation	branding	(Hyundai	
Economic	Research	Institute,	2002,	2006),	in	which	the	HRI	especially	argued	for	
the	nation	branding	campaign	driven	by	the	public	rather	than	the	government.	The	
National	Brand	Management	Institute	at	Sungkyunkwan	University,	commissioned	
by	the	Ministry	of	Culture	and	Tourism	(MCT),	published	a	report	on	nation	
branding	in	2003	(“Strategies	for	the	Enhancement	of	the	Nation	Brand	Value	
through	Culture”).	Based	on	a	worldwide	survey,	the	report	measured	the	national	
image	of	South	Korea	in	the	world	and	suggested	culture-inspired	public	policies	
(National	Brand	Management	Institute,	2003).	Korea	Trade-Investment	Promotion	
Agency	(KOTRA),	also	affiliated	with	the	MoCIE,	established	the	Center	for	Nation	
Brand	Management	in	2006.	It	composed	the	“Korea	Brand	Map”	to	locate	the	
Korea’s	brand	image	and	launched	the	campaign	of	“Premium	Korea”	(H.-j.	Yi,	
2007).		
These	agencies	greatly	contributed	to	the	domestication	of	the	idea	of	nation	
branding.	However,	the	influences	of	their	activities	were	limited	as	their	circulation	
was	mostly	limited	to	business	newspapers	and	expert	circles.	A	wider	circulation	of	
the	idea	of	nation	branding	was	indebted	to	NBI	by	Simon	Anholt	rather	than	NBV	
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by	the	IPS,	although	both	claimed	their	production	of	expert	knowledge	through	
neutral	and	scientific	methods.	As	discussed	above,	the	differentiated	influence	
could	be	due	to	the	intellectual	authority	ascribed	to	the	Western	expertise.	
The	news	media	and	the	discourse	of	nation	branding	
Since	2005,	the	idea	of	nation	branding	has	rapidly	proliferated	through	the	
concerted	engagement	by	government	institutions	and	agencies,	the	news	media,	
and	private	think	tanks.	In	the	face	of	impending	presidential	election	in	2007,	the	
news	media	and	think	tanks	attempted	to	increase	their	political	influences	by	
presenting	grand	political	visions	and	“state	management	strategies,”	in	which	
nation	branding	emerged	as	a	crucial	agenda.	The	term	nation	branding	began	to	
earn	a	wider	public	appeal	beyond	the	expert	circle	and	business	newspapers.	
Although	nation	branding	drew	a	certain	interest	from	the	incumbent	government,	
it	was	prepared	as	the	national	agenda	for	the	next	government,	which	was	
expected	to	be	conservative,	by	the	conservative	news	media	and	think	tanks.	
The	national	mainstream	news	media	actively	promoted	the	discourse	of	
nation	branding,	set	forth	by	Western	experts	and	domestic	think	tanks.	The	news	
media	widely	reported	the	nation	branding	publication	by	Simon	Anholt	and	
supported	the	promotion	of	nation	branding	with	op-eds.	The	nation	branding	
promotion	by	the	news	media	far	exceeded	the	conventional	media	activities	such	
as	publishing	news	reports	and	op-ed	columns.	The	mainstream	national	news	
media	across	the	political	spectrum	published	a	long-term	series	of	reports	and	
analyses	related	to	nation	branding.	Many	of	them	launched	nation	branding-related	
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public	campaigns,	working	closely	with	government	agencies	and	private	actors	
engaged	in	the	business	of	nation	branding.		
Through	these	all-out	efforts	for	setting	nation	branding	as	a	public	agenda,	
the	news	media	greatly	expanded	and	popularized	the	idea.	Before	examining	the	
narrative	of	nation	branding,	I	attend	to	the	institutional	agency	of	the	news	media	
in	popularizing	the	idea	of	nation	branding.	Nation	branding,	a	rather	technical	
jargon	in	marketing,	enriched	its	meanings	in	relation	to	existing	and	emerging	
political	ideas	on	the	state	and	nation.	In	the	course	of	the	news	media	campaigns	
and	events,	nation	branding	became	variously	associated	with	other	related	ideas	
such	as	the	“attractive	nation”	and	“soft	power,”	translated	into	a	more	intuitive	
neologism,	“national	prestige,”	and	connected	to	a	renewed	image	of	an	“advanced	
nation.”	
Attractiveness	and	soft	power	
With	the	rising	concern	about	the	international	image	and	status	of	the	
nation,	the	news	media	and	think	tanks	suggested	various	concepts	to	articulate	the	
public	concern.		
Most	notably,	the	Samsung	Economic	Research	Institute	(SERI)	published	a	
public	policy	report,	“Attractive	Korea:	Strategy	for	Entering	the	Rank	of	10	Most	
Advanced	Countries	by	2015”	(Samsung	Economic	Research	Institute,	2005a).	The	
SERI,	affiliated	with	the	largest	conglomerate	in	South	Korea,	Samsung	Group,	has	
been	the	most	influential	private	think	tank.	The	SERI	played	a	major	part	in	the	
institutional	establishment	of	nation	branding	at	the	governmental	level,	when	it	
was	involved	in	the	launch	of	PCNB	in	January	2009	under	the	Lee	Myung-bak	
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government.	Especially,	the	SERI	took	the	responsibility	of	devising	a	new	nation	
brand	index,	aiming	to	replace	the	NBI	by	Anholt.		
The	2005	report	continued	the	SERI’s	ongoing	efforts	to	articulate	the	grand	
state	vision	and	state	management	strategies,	emphasizing	international	
competitiveness	from	a	business-centered	perspective.21	The	report	continued	to	
emphasize	innovation	and	knowledge,	human	capital,	market	environment	and	
openness	to	“upgrade	the	system.”	The	report	simply	adopted	the	term	of	
“attractiveness”	to	replace	the	former	slogan	for	the	state	vision,	“GNP	per	capita	of	
twenty	thousand	dollars,”	and	repackaged	the	market-friendly	plan	for	state	
management	oriented	toward	international	competitiveness.	The	notion	of	
“attractiveness”	that	the	report	suggested	originated	from	the	business	idiom	as	in	
“investment	attractiveness”	or	“competitiveness	to	attract	foreign	direct	
investment”	(Samsung	Economic	Research	Institute,	2003);	thus,	it	focused	less	on	
the	issue	of	national	image	than	capital	investment.	Regardless,	the	idea	of	
“attractive	Korea”	became	a	buzzword	within	the	public	policy	circle	and	widely	
circulated	by	the	news	media	(Son,	2006).		
	
21	Since	the	late	1990s,	SERI	has	published	a	series	of	comprehensive	public	
policy	reports	on	the	matters	of	“state	management,”	including	“State	Strategy	and	
Reform	Agenda	in	the	21st	Century”	(1998),	“Realities	and	Policy	Methods	of	
National	Competitiveness”	(2002),	“Agenda	for	State	Affairs	and	State	Management”	
(2003),	and	“The	Road	to	Twenty	Thousand	Dollars	of	GNP	per	Capita”	(2004).	
These	massive	and	comprehensive	policy	reports	contributed	to	placing	the	concept	
of	“national	competitiveness”	at	the	center	of	the	state	vision	and	put	forward	
keywords	such	as	“business-friendly	country,”	“growth	engine,”	“innovative	
capacities,”	“selection	and	focus,”	“competition	and	openness”	and	so	forth,	which	
were	widely	adopted	as	the	guiding	vocabularies	of	public	policy	under	the	Kim	
Dae-jung	and	Roh	Mu-hyun	governments.	
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While	the	SERI	introduced	the	idea	of	“attractiveness”	into	the	discourse	of	
state	management	from	the	perspective	of	transnational	capital,	approximately	at	
the	same	time,	the	same	term	was	also	developed	from	another	direction,	more	in	
relation	to	the	ideas	of	“soft	power,”	national	image	and	nation	branding.		
Tong’a	Ilbo,	a	major	national	news	media,	promoted	the	idea	of	“attractive	
nation”	in	association	with	the	term,	soft	power.	The	21st	century	Peace	Foundation,	
affiliated	with	Tong’a	Ilbo,	held	a	conference	on	June	2,	2005,	titled,	“Attractive	
Nation:	Future	Strategy	for	Soft	Power.”	At	the	closed-door	conference,	about	two	
dozen	university	professors	(majority	of	whom	came	from	political	science	at	Seoul	
National	University),	private	institute	researchers,	journalists,	government	officials	
and	one	business	man22	participated	in	the	discussion	on	state	strategy	for	
enhancing	the	international	status	of	Korea.	The	idea	of	“attractive	nation”	or	
“attractive	state”	was	developed	by	the	professors	at	the	SNU	who	combined	their	
own	idea	of	the	“network	knowledge	state”	and	Joseph	Nye’s	idea	of	“soft	power”	
(S.-b.	Kim	&	Ha,	2006).	The	conference	especially	focused	on	the	contribution	by	the	
Korean	Wave	and	the	IT	development	to	the	enhancement	of	South	Korea’s	
international	“attractiveness”	(21segi	P’yŏnghwa	Porŏm,	2005).	Compared	to	the	
SERI’s	proposition	of	“Attractive	Korea,”	which	was	embedded	in	the	interest	of	
	
22	The	sole	businessperson	who	was	invited	to	the	conference	was	Kim	Yŏng-
min,	president	of	SM	Entertainment,	a	leading	company	of	the	Korean	Wave.	
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transnational	financial	capital,	the	idea	of	“attractive	nation”	brought	to	the	fore	the	
cultural	appeal	in	the	enhancement	of	the	international	status	of	South	Korea.23	
The	term	soft	power	earned	a	wider	circulation	than	the	related	term	
attractiveness.	The	term,	soft	power,	was	used	to	conjure	up	the	“soft”	side	of	the	
state,	especially	the	cultural	aspect,	as	opposed	to	the	“hard”	side,	that	is,	military	
and	economic	capacities	of	the	state.	The	term	was	used	in	a	simple	and	casual	way	
in	which	the	term	“soft”	was	immediately	associated	with	culture.	In	2005,	the	
SERI’s	report,	“The	Road	to	Soft	Power”	(Samsung	Economic	Research	Institute,	
2005b)	emphasized	“soft	industries”	including	cultural,	fashion,	advertising,	and	
design	industries	as	leading	economic	growth	in	the	21st	century.	It	argued	that	
South	Korea	had	potential	to	lead	the	trend,	based	on	the	specific	combination	of	the	
presumed	collective	sensibilities	such	as	chŏng	(정;	affection)	and	sinparam	
(신바람;	excitement),	traditional	culture	(“culture	archetypes”),	and	advanced	
information	technologies	and	infrastructure.		
An	article	from	Han’guk	Ilbo,	sponsored	by	SK	Corporation,	regarded	cultural	
value	as	the	resource	of	soft	power,	and	emphasized	that	“cool”	popular	cultural	
products	could	create	a	positive	and	friendly	nation	brand,	which	in	turn	could	
contribute	to	making	Japanese	soft	power	("Looking	back	at	Japan	3:	Soft	Power	
Powerhouse	Japan,"	2004).	In	2007,	in	a	series,	“Toward	Soft	Power	Korea,”	Seoul	
	
23	The	Korean	word	for	attractiveness	could	be	either	yuin	(유인; lure	or	
draw)	or	maeryŏk	(매력; charm	or	appeal).	Only	the	latter	has	a	strong	affective	
connotation,	meaning	the	“power	to	pull	people’s	mind	and	heart.”	Both	“attractive	
Korea”	and	“attractive	nation”	used	the	term	maeryŏk	for	attractiveness	instead	of	
yuin,	emphasizing	the	affective	aspect	of	the	term.	
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Kyŏngje	also	emphasized	collective	sensibilities,	knowledge,	culture,	and	creativity	
as	resources	of	soft	power,	and	suggested	a	set	of	wide	social	reform	for	an	
advanced	nation	(H.-u.	Ch’oe,	2007).	It	is	noticeable	that	the	soft	power	discourse	
focused	on	the	reform	of	the	domestic	system,	rather	than	external	projection	of	
national	image	and	power.		
The	attention	to	the	ideas	of	attractiveness	and	soft	power	illustrates	a	
widening	concern	about	the	international	status	and	image	of	the	nation.	The	terms	
were	frequently	associated	with	the	nation	brand	and	invoked	the	necessity	of	
nation	branding,	especially	from	a	cultural	term.	 
National	prestige	and	the	advanced	nation	
The	idea	of	nation	branding	expanded	its	implication	in	association	with	such	
ideas	as	soft	power	and	attractiveness,	but	it	was	in	association	with	the	idea	of	
national	prestige	that	it	was	widely	disseminated.	Since	2005,	the	term,	national	
prestige	or	kukkyŏk	국격,	was	frequently	used	side	by	side	with,	or	in	place	of,	the	
term	nation	branding.	The	news	media	effectively	translated	the	business	marketing	
jargon	of	nation	branding	and	national	image	into	a	tongue-in-cheek	neologism	in	
Korean	language,	kukkyŏk.	The	translation	into	kukkyŏk	or	national	prestige	marked	
a	significant	discursive	moment	for	the	development	of	nation	branding.	It	was	not	a	
simple	linguistic	translation,	but	a	crucial	discursive	expansion	with	wider	
implications.		
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The	term,	kukkyŏk,	means	the	prestige,	dignity,	class,	or	grace	of	a	nation-
state.24	While	the	term	was	a	neologism	that	was	rarely	used	in	Korean	until	the	mid	
2000s,	the	meaning	of	the	term	was	intuitive	for	Korean	speakers	as	it	was	easily	
associated	with	the	term	inkyŏk	(인격;	the	class	or	character	of	a	person,	or	
personality).	The	term	kukkyŏk	was	easily	understood	as	the	abbreviation	of	kukka	
ŭi	p’umkyŏk	국가의	품격,	literally	the	prestige,	dignity,	or	grace	of	a	nation-state.25	
In	2007,	Han’guk	Ilbo,	a	national	newspaper,	featured	a	series	of	special	
articles	and	launched	campaigns	for	national	prestige	and	nation	branding,	“Image-
Up	Korea:	let’s	raise	national	prestige.”	The	series,	composed	of	over	thirty	articles,	
raised	a	wide	range	of	issues	related	to	national	image.	The	series	introduced	the	
efforts	to	enhance	national	prestige	by	advanced	countries	and	made	a	
comprehensive	suggestion	for	national	reform.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	campaign	
was	launched	in	collaboration	with,	and	sponsored	by,	the	Korean	Foundation	and	
the	SERI.		
	
24	Kukkyŏk	has	conventionally	been	translated	into	“national	prestige”	in	
English.	
25	The	term	kukkyŏk	had	not	been	used	frequently,	but	there	exited	
noticeable	precedents.	Kim	Chin-hyŏn,	former	editor-in-chief	of	Tong’a	Ilbo	
newspaper	and	then	the	Minister	of	Science	and	Technology,	used	this	term	in	his	
book,	Where	is	Korea	headed:	The	second	independence	movement	for	national	
prestige,	national	power,	and	advancedness	(1993).	Maeil	Kyŏngje	also	adopted	the	
term	when	it	launched	the	year-long	campaign	for	“Vision	Korea:	Practicing	the	21st	
century”	in	1997.	It	declared	that	the	campaign	aimed	to	“build	a	new	dignity	of	the	
state	[kukkyŏk]	by	changing	everything	from	government,	politics,	institutions,	and	
business	to	every	individual	of	the	population”	("Vision	Korea,	Practice	the	21st	
Century,"	1997).	The	wider	use	of	the	term	might	be	related	to	and	influenced	by	the	
book,	The	Dignity	of	the	Nation	國家の品格,	a	huge	bestseller	in	Japan.	The	book	was	
written	by	a	Japanese	conservative	writer,	Fujiwara	Masahiko	藤原正彦	in	2005	and	
translated	into	Korean	in	the	next	year.	
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The	series	focused	on	the	problems	regarding	the	poor	national	image	that	
were	presumed	to	undermine	the	international	competitiveness	of	South	Korea.	The	
series	attributed	it	not	just	to	the	ineffective	use	of	public	relations	by	the	
government,	but	widely	to	the	institutions,	customs	and	behaviors	of	the	whole	
nation,	including	corruption,	poor	institutional	system,	pervasive	street	
demonstration	and	labor	strikes,	lack	of	ethnic	tolerance,	and	the	overseas	
behaviors	of	“ugly	Koreans”	(Y.-s.	Yi,	2007).	The	series	then	paid	a	visit	to	seven	
countries	—	Japan,	the	US,	the	UK,	Germany,	China,	Russia,	and	Hungary	—	and	
introduced	the	efforts	to	enhance	national	image	by	each	government.	The	series	
concluded	with	a	set	of	comprehensive	suggestions	for	enhancing	national	image,	
such	as	“setting	up	the	institutional	system	for	the	management	of	the	national	
brand	and	image,”	“becoming	global	citizen,”	“reviving	the	dynamism,”	“eliminating	
the	image	of	instability,”	“promoting	the	Korean	Wave	content,”	“strengthening	the	
image	of	digital	power,”	and	“promoting	tourism.”	
Similar	campaigns	for	national	prestige	followed,	at	the	time	of	the	
institutional	launch	of	nation	branding	(“Enhance	National	Prestige”	series	by	Maeil	
Kyŏngje	in	2008,	and	“Let’s	Enhance	National	Prestige”	series	by	Seoul	Kyŏngje,	
2008),	and	at	the	time	of	hosting	the	international	event	of	G20	summit	in	Seoul	in	
2010	(“National	Prestige	Campaign”	by	Tong’a	Ilbo,	2010).		
These	campaigns	illustrate	how	the	term	national	prestige	became	central	to	
the	news	media’s	efforts	to	build	the	public	agenda	of	nation	branding.	In	the	
process,	the	news	media	widened	the	nation	branding	agenda,	encompassing	
government	reform,	social	control,	and	especially	the	moral	qualities	of	citizens	
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within	the	framework	of	the	dominant	economic	discourse	of	international	
competitiveness.	
With	the	rise	of	the	discourse	of	national	prestige,	the	image	of	the	advanced	
nation	took	widened	implications.	Becoming	an	advanced	nation	had	been	an	
ultimate	national	goal	at	least	since	the	state	project	of	segyehwa	in	the	mid	1990s,	
but	national	prestige	was	imagined	as	a	necessary	condition	for	realizing	the	goal	of	
becoming	an	“a,	first-class”	nation.	In	the	context	of	the	campaigns	for	national	
prestige,	the	advanced,	first-class	nation	was	imagined	not	just	as	a	country	
developed	in	economic	terms	of	GNP	per	capita	or	trade	values.	It	was	also	imagined	
as	advanced	with	in	wider	terms	including	governance	and	civility,	specifically	
defined	in	narrow	terms	of	business	interest.26	
In	2007-2008,	the	political	agenda	and	policy	recommendations	of	nation	
branding	by	the	news	media	took	a	concrete	shape,	encompassing	wide	domestic	
reform	plans	and	international	public	relations.	The	official	public	agenda	of	nation	
branding	by	the	PCNB	in	2009	took	up	most	of	the	political	agenda	promoted	by	the	
news	media.	Some	propagators	of	the	agenda	of	nation	branding	in	the	news	media	
went	straight	into	the	government.	Indeed,	the	news	media’s	promotion	of	nation	
branding	was	part	of	their	ongoing	attempt	to	increase	political	influence	and	shape	
state	management.		
The	discussion	so	far	focused	on	the	institutional	agency	of	the	news	media	
in	the	rearrangement	of	political	discourses	and	the	establishment	of	the	discourses	
	
26	This	aspect	of	actual	public	policy	will	be	examined	in	detail	in	the	next	
chapter.	
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of	NBNP	as	the	central	political	agenda.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	further	
examine	the	narrative	of	the	media	discourses	of	NBNP	and	identify	their	wider	
political	implications.	
The	narrative	of	the	news	media’s	nation	branding	campaign	
In	this	section,	I	examine	how	the	news	media’s	campaign	for	NBNP	
constituted	a	specific	narrative	of	the	state	and	the	nation.	The	news	media’s	
narrative	centered	on	the	notion	of	global	competitiveness	of	the	nation,	predicated	
on	a	specific	economic	metanarrative	of	globalization.	Existing	literature	shows	how	
economic	narratives	contribute	to	the	imagination	of	the	nation	state	(Cameron	&	
Palan,	2004;	Crane,	1999;	Deshpande,	1993;	Wyatt,	2005a,	2005b).	In	this	analysis,	I	
focus	on	how	the	discursive	construction	of	national	competitiveness	was	
predicated	on	a	particular	economic	narrative	about	the	past,	present,	and	future	of	
the	nation-state	of	South	Korea.		
The	news	media	discourse	on	NBNP	glorified	rapid	industrialization	and	
economic	development	out	of	poverty	as	a	source	of	national	pride.	Fussing	about	
the	low	international	ranks	in	the	nation	brand	and	image,	the	news	media	
discourse	ascribed	the	present	economic	crisis	not	to	the	business	sector,	but	to	the	
government,	political	parties,	labor,	and	the	citizen.	The	news	media	urged	the	
whole	nation	to	make	efforts	to	create	a	business-friendly	climate	in	order	to	
enhance	the	national	brand	and	national	prestige.	The	news	media	portrayed	the	
business	as	leading	the	road	to	the	ultimate	national	goal	of	becoming	an	advanced	
nation.	The	IT	industry	and	the	cultural	industry	were	highlighted	as	enhancing	the	
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nation	brand	and	national	prestige	and	envisioning	the	future	of	technologically-	
and	culturally-	advanced	South	Korea,	as	is	analyzed	in	the	following	section.		
The	news	media’s	nation	branding	campaign	illustrates	how	the	discourses	
of	NBNP	contributed	to	constructing	the	nation	as	a	neoliberal	competitive	entity.	
The	news	media	problematized	the	poor	international	image	of	South	Korea	in	
economic	terms,	presented	a	specific	neoliberal	solution	to	address	the	problem,	
and	regulated	the	population	as	resources	for	the	goal	of	achieving	the	status	of	the	
“culture-advanced	country”	by	enhancing	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige.	
The	past	glory:	the	miracle	of	rapid	economic	growth	
The	media	discourses	of	NBNP	shed	light	on	the	past	of	South	Korea	in	a	
particular	way.	The	history	of	modern	South	Korea	was	portrayed	as	a	self-made	
success	story	of	overcoming	the	extreme	poverty	from	the	wreckage	of	war	and	
achieving	the	“unprecedented”	rapid	economic	growth,	often	called	the	“Miracle	of	
Han	River.”	This	particular	story	exclusively	focused	on	the	rapid	economic	success,	
while	relatively	disregarding	the	dark	side	of	extremely	rapid	economic	growth	and	
the	political	achievement	of	a	democratic	regime.	The	rhetoric	such	as	
“unprecedented”	or	“miracle”	evoked	the	economic	development	as	the	source	of	
national	pride,	especially	when	the	“New	Right”	claimed	to	celebrate	the	60th	
anniversary	of	the	“state	foundation”	(e.g.	K.-y.	Chŏng,	2008;	"Korea	to	be	a	new	
starting	point	for	60	years,"	2008;	Y.-o.	Yu,	2008).	For	instance,	a	renowned	
economics	professor,	Chŏng	Kap-yŏng,	clearly	linked	the	economic	success	and	
national	pride	in	his	column,	“The	hero	of	a	successful	history”:	
Let's	open	the	world	map.	Except	for	a	few	countries	belonging	to	the	OECD,	
how	many	countries	are	more	affluent	than	we	are?	If	you	look	for	a	country	
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that	has	achieved	democratization	as	well	as	the	economy,	it	gets	smaller.	If	
you	are	looking	for	a	country	that	has	succeeded	in	industrialization	and	
democratization	in	the	least	developed	countries	since	the	1960s,	Korea	is	
the	only	one.		
Koreans	should	not	just	be	enthusiastic	about	the	Olympic	gold	medal,	but	be	
proud	of	our	60	years	of	history!	There	are	so	many	reasons	we	should	
straddle	our	shoulders	on	the	world	stage.	In	a	recent	Tong’a	Ilbo	survey,	
only	64.9%	of	Koreans	rated	"Korean	history	as	proud."	Positive	appraisals	
are	up	10	percentage	points	higher	than	five	months	ago,	and	it	is	fortunate	
that	72.9%	of	the	younger	generation	are	proud	of	it.	But	how	can	we	build	
confidence	in	the	future	if	we	disregard	ourselves	and	evaluate	our	past	
history	negatively	(K.-y.	Chŏng,	2008).		
	
In	the	media	discourses	which	glorified	the	past,	certain	historic	figures	were	
illuminated	in	terms	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige.	For	instance,	in	the	
campaign	article,	Seoul	Kyŏngje	featured	a	survey	in	which	Park	Chung-hee	(who	
seized	power	through	a	military	coup	and	ruled	South	Korea	from	1961	to	1979),	
Chŏng	Chu-yŏng	(Chung	Ju-yung,	the	founder	of	Hyundai	Group),	and	Yi	Pyŏng-ch’ŏl	
(Lee	Byung-chul,	the	founder	of	Samsung	Group)	were	chosen	as	the	top	
contributors	to	the	enhancement	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige	(C.	Son,	
2008).	These	figures	had	been	celebrated	as	the	protagonists	who	led	
industrialization	and	achieved	the	economic	miracle,	but,	in	the	article,	they	were	
retrospectively	related	to	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige.	It	illustrates	how	
the	news	media	related	the	past	glory	of	rapid	economic	development	with	the	
nation	brand	and	national	prestige	from	the	economic,	business-centered	
perspective.		
The	glorifying	of	the	past	economic	success	in	the	nation	branding	campaign	
needs	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	rise	of	the	“New	Right”	in	the	2000s.	The	
New	Right	emerged	as	a	political	and	intellectual	project	for	the	conservatives	to	
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regain	political	power	from	the	“leftist”	governments	(the	Kim	Dae-jung	and	Roh	
Mu-hyun	governments)	and	to	establish	a	conservative	government.	They	started	a	
movement	against	the	so-called	“self-depreciating”	view	of	history	and	for	the	
positive	rewriting	of	the	history	of	the	proud	state	foundation.	Assuming	the	
teleological	view	of	history,	the	New	Right	appraised	the	successful	industrialization	
of	the	“Taehan	min’guk”	(대한민국;	Great	Nation	of	Korea)27	as	the	triumph	of	the	
capitalist	market	economy	(Y.-h.	Yi,	2007).	The	nation	branding	campaigns	partly	
shared	the	New	Right’s	view	of	history,	predicating	on	a	particular	national	
imaginary	which	centered	on	the	nation’s	past	economic	success. 
The	present	crisis:	Problems,	responsibilities	and	solutions		
Political	scientists	Kang	Chŏng-in	and	Chŏng	Sŭng-hyŏn	(2011)	characterize	
the	languages	in	modern	Korean	politics	as	those	of	national	decay,	solution	and	
reform,	and	the	future	imagery	of	a	developed	country.	The	news	media	discourse	of	
nation	branding	used	similar	languages:	problems	and	crisis,	responsibilities	and	
solution,	and	the	future	of	a	“truly”	advanced	country.		
The	news	media	diagnosed	the	present	status	of	South	Korea	as	a	crisis,	
failing	to	inherit	the	glorified	success	of	industrialization	and	to	proceed	to	the	road	
to	“sŏnjinhwa”	(becoming	advanced).	It	is	notable	that	the	news	media’s	definition	of	
the	crisis	depicted	the	current	status	of	Korea	through	various	numerical	
	
27	“대한민국”	is	the	official	title	of	South	Korea.	It	can	translate	into	the	Great	
Nation	of	Democratic	Korea.	This	title	had	not	been	used	beyond	official	
governmental	occasions	until	the	1990s.	But	since	the	early	2000s,	especially	during	
and	after	the	2002	World	Cup,	the	title	Taehan	min’guk	became	a	vernacular	
vocabulary,	especially	in	the	media	discourse,	in	South	Korea.	 
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representations	of	the	national	economy.	The	news	media	articles	frequently	cited	
indexes	such	as	GDP,	export	volume,	and	trade	value	as	shorthand	for	the	
international	status	and	economic	achievement.	These	figures	indicated	that	South	
Korea	ranked	13th	in	terms	of	GDP	and	the	11th	in	terms	of	trade	volume	mostly	in	
the	first	decade	of	the	2000s.	
In	contrast	to	the	international	economic	status	as	one	of	the	largest	
economies	in	the	world,	according	to	the	diagnosis	by	the	news	media,	South	Korea	
was	suffering	a	poorer	international	recognition	than	it	deserved.	The	poor	marks	in	
international	rankings	and	indexes	related	to	national	competitiveness	and	nation	
branding	were	regarded	as	an	epitome	of	the	present	crisis	that	plagued	South	
Korea.		
Especially,	the	NBI	reports	by	Simon	Anholt	triggered	the	sense	of	crisis,	in	
which	South	Korea	marked	at	25th	in	2006	and	32nd	in	2007	in	terms	of	the	nation	
brand,	falling	behind	China,	Russia,	Hungary,	Brazil,	and	Argentina	(H.-u.	Ch’oe,	
2007;	K.-s.	Ch’oe,	2006;	"Korea	brand	falls	short	of	its	economic	power;	the	problem	
is	national	prestige,"	2008).	The	report	shocked	the	political	elites	and	the	public,	
who	believed	to	have	achieved	a	spectacular	economic	growth	and	successfully	
overcome	the	recent	economic	crisis	in	the	late	1990s. ⁠28	
	
28	In	fact,	the	seemingly	lower	rank	of	the	South	Korean	nation	brand	than	its	
size	of	the	national	economy	might	not	be	something	to	fuss	about,	considering	that	
it	would	not	be	surprising	if	Western	countries	with	smaller	economies	(such	as	
Denmark,	Sweden,	the	Netherlands,	Finland,	Australia,	New	Zealand,	and	so	on)	
marked	a	higher	score	by	the	measure	of	international	image,	recognition,	and	
reputation.	Yet	the	news	media	rarely	raised	this	point.	
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The	Korea	discount	
The	concern	about	international	recognition	was	apparent	in	such	terms	as	
the	“Korean	discount.”	Initially	designating	the	under-valuation	of	the	Korean	stock	
market,	the	term	epitomized	the	way	in	which	the	problem	of	the	nation	brand	
deficit	was	conceived	of	from	the	economy-	and	business-centered	viewpoint.	It	was	
explained	that	the	products	originating	from	South	Korea	did	not	get	the	right	price	
due	to	the	poor	national	image	and	recognition.	Due	to	the	Korean	discount,	for	
instance,	Samsung	cell	phones	and	Hyundai	automobiles	were	sold	at	a	lower	price	
than	their	similar	quality	competitors.	Kyŏnghyang	Sinmun	cited	the	IPS’s	survey,	
“Nation	brand	map”	and	reported:		
When	asked	how	much	they	are	willing	to	pay	for	a	same	product	or	service,	
the	respondents	answered	that	they	were	willing	to	pay	155	dollars	for	
German	ones,	148.7	dollars	for	Japanese	ones,	and	148.6	dollars	for	
American	ones	compared	to	100	dollars	for	Korean	one	(B.-y.	Chŏn,	2007).	
	
The	news	media	frequently	brought	up	a	famous	anecdote:	Samsung	was	
frequently	misrecognized	as	a	Japanese	company,	which	was	actually	not	bad	for	
selling	the	products	because	of	the	high	nation	brand	value	ascribed	in	Japanese	
electronic	products:		
That	is	why	even	global	enterprises	such	as	Samsung	and	LG	do	not	display	
the	nation	brand,	that	is	“Made	in	Korea,”	when	advertising	their	products	
overseas.	It	is	understandable	because	it	is	in	the	way	of	their	exports	(S.-w.	
Kim,	2005).		
		
This	anecdote	suggests	that	the	South	Korean	business,	especially	large	
export-oriented	conglomerates,	had	a	high	stake	in	the	promotion	of	the	nation	
brand.	
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The	term	Korean	discount	represented	the	perceived	gap	between	the	
nationally	based	but	transnationally	growing	business	and	other	parts	of	the	society.	
Accordingly,	the	problems	of	the	Korean	discount	and	the	deficit	of	the	nation	brand	
were	ascribed	not	to	the	business,	but	to	other	parts	of	the	society:	the	inefficient	
government,	backward	political	parties,	violent	and	militant	labor	unions,	and	
uncivilized	citizens.	29	The	latter	was	deemed	to	undermine	the	deserved	value	
created	by	the	business	and	thus	weaken	national	competitiveness	and	undermine	
the	nation	brand	value,	and	ultimately	get	in	the	way	to	the	rank	of	advanced	
nations.	Accordingly,	the	government	and	other	parts	of	society	should	learn	from	
business:		
The	government	is	to	blame	for	the	[low]	nation	brand	that	contributed	to	
the	“Korea	discount.”	We	cannot	help	but	to	think	that	the	lack	of	
international	public	relations	led	to	the	failure	to	favorably	appeal	to	the	
people	around	the	world.	Although	the	status	of	our	nation	has	improved	
through	the	events	such	as	1988	Olympic	Games,	2002	World	Cup,	and	Pusan	
APEC,	it	is	reported	that	the	foreigners,	especially	businesspeople,	are	
reminded	of	negative	terms	such	as	“North	Korea	nuclear	threat”	and	
“hardline	labor	unions”	when	they	think	of	Korea.	These	negative	images	
have	crucially	weakened	the	nation	brand.	It	is	urgent	to	turn	it	into	positive	
images.	The	government,	at	least,	should	not	be	an	impediment	to	the	
corporate	business	activities.	It	should	devise	strategies	to	enhance	the	
nation	brand	to	a	premium	brand.	It	is	a	good	way	to	benchmark	corporate	
brand	strategies	adopted	by	national	enterprises	with	world	top	100	brand	
names	(S.-w.	Kim,	2005).	
	
	
29	The	blaming	of	the	government,	politics,	and	labor	resonates	with	the	
famous	statement	made	by	Lee	Kun-hee,	chairman	of	Samsung	Group,	in	1995,	who	
graded	Korean	politics	as	fourth	class,	its	government	as	third	class,	and	its	business	
as	second	class.	The	news	media	repeatedly	reminded	his	statement.	For	instance,	
see	two	op-ed	columns	in	Maeil Kyŏngje	and	Kyŏnghyang	Sinmun,	which	are	
regarded	as	representing	pro-business	conservatives	and	progressive	liberals	
respectively	("Lee	Kun-hee's	aggressive	deregulation	appeal,"	2007;	C.-s.	Pak,	2006).	
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The	news	media	blamed	the	inefficiency	of	the	government	and	the	excessive	
economic	regulation	by	the	government	not	just	for	hampering	the	business	
freedom	of	the	nationally	based	business,	but	for	turning	away	foreign	capital	
investment.	The	physical	violence	in	the	National	Assembly	was	to	blame	for	
degrading	national	prestige	by	being	the	object	of	international	ridicule	of	the	
backwardness	of	South	Korea.	The	street	demonstrations	and	militant	labor	
struggles	were	also	to	blame	for	driving	away	foreign	capital	investment	by	
reinforcing	the	anti-business	image	of	South	Korea	("Advanced	Korea	in	the	21st	
century	is	difficult	to	acheive	with	20th	century	country	image,"	2008;	H.-j.	Cho,	
2005;	T.-k.	Cho,	2009).		
The	news	media	also	problematized	behaviors	of	citizens	as	lacking	"civil	
consciousness”	and	blamed	them	for	undermining	the	nation	brand	and	national	
prestige.	The	PCNB	and	the	SERI	published	that	South	Korea	ranked	at	18th	in	terms	
of	the	nation	brand,	but	at	27th	in	terms	of	“citizenship”	among	30	OECD	countries.	
The	news	media	widely	reported	the	publication,	specifically	blaming	the	lack	of	
civility	for	undermining	the	nation	brand.	In	this	vein,	Maeil	Kyŏngje	launched	a	
campaign	for	“G20	global	citizenship,”	asking	to	“raise	civil	consciousness	if	we	want	
to	be	treated	in	the	world”	(H.-h.	Chŏng,	2009).		
The	news	media	launched	campaigns	that	urged	ordinary	citizens	to	follow	
public	etiquette	and	keep	public	order	in	the	name	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	
prestige,	including	keeping	traffic	signals,	treating	fellow	citizens	kindly,	showing	
generosity	to	foreigners,	and	so	on	("To	enhance	the	quality	of	Korean	power,"	
2008).		
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The	news	media	especially	pointed	fingers	at	behaviors	of	“ugly	Koreans.”	
The	Korean	tourists	in	Southeast	Asia	were	accused	of	the	behaviors	such	as	
excessive	drinking	at	the	airport,	underage	prostitution,	disregarding	locals,	and	so	
on.	Lacking	“global	citizenship,”	these	behaviors	were	blamed	for	making	the	nation	
“shameful”	and	detrimental	to	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige	("We	Need	to	
Take	Action	on	Ugly	Overseas	Tourism,"	2007).	The	news	media	even	pointed	out	
the	labor	exploitation	and	maltreatment	of	immigrant	workers	as	the	problems	of	
the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige	("Foreign	labor	exploitation	is	a	matter	of	
national	prestige,"	2012;	S.-r.	Son,	2008). 
The	nationwide	reform	and	social	capital		
In	this	way,	the	news	media	raised	concerns	about	the	nation	brand	and	
national	prestige	in	wider	terms	of	politics,	government,	labor	dispute,	and	the	
citizen’s	behavior.	In	this	context,	it	is	notable	that	the	news	media	often	brought	up	
the	notions	of	social	capital	and	social	trust	as	a	key	to	the	nationwide	reform	
toward	the	status	of	an	advanced	country.		
	The	low	marks	of	nation	brand	value	and	national	prestige	were	explained	in	
terms	of	lacking	social	capital	and	social	trust.	The	comprehensive	concept	of	social	
capital	was	used	variously	to	encompass	the	perception	of	governmental	and	
corporate	corruption,	the	degree	of	trust	toward	the	government	and	among	
citizens,	and	the	social	community	networks	of	citizens.	As	a	kind	of	“capital,”	like	
human	capital	and	material	capital,	social	capital	is	conceived	of	as	contributing	to	
productivity	and	economic	growth.	The	idea	of	social	capital	has	been	actively	
promoted	by	the	World	Bank	as	a	new	developmental	panacea	for	solving	various	
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problems	such	as	economic	growth,	poverty,	crime,	environmental	issues,	and	so	on	
(Fine,	1999;	C.-y.	Kim,	2008).		
The	news	media	discourse	actively	utilized	the	notion	of	social	capital	in	
association	with	NBNP.	The	notions	of	social	capital	and	social	trust	operated	as	the	
mediating	concepts	for	the	abstract	ideas	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	prestige,	
providing	concrete	imagery	for	national	reform	agenda.	The	news	media	promoted	
the	idea	of	social	capital	in	conservative	terms	of	maintaining	and	reinforcing	law	
and	order.	For	instance,	working	with	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	Maeil	Kyŏngje	
launched	a	campaign	for	“establishing	law	and	order”	in	the	name	of	“enhancing	
national	prestige	of	Korean	power”	(P.-d.	Chŏn,	2008;	"To	enhance	the	quality	of	
Korean	power,"	2008).	In	the	campaign,	the	newspaper	blamed	“the	trend	of	
ignoring	law”	as	well	as	labor	struggle	not	just	for	being	“illegal”	but	for	
undermining	social	trust	and	further	national	prestige.		
The	news	media	mobilized	social	capital	and	social	trust	for	disciplining	and	
conservatively	controlling	civic	life.	The	NBNP	campaigns,	centered	on	social	capital	
and	social	trust,	oriented	toward	conservative	social	control,	especially	the	control	
of	political	opponents	and	labor,	and	social	regulation	of	the	mundane	civic	norms.	
The	campaigns	ignored	the	historical	formation	of	Korean	modernity.	The	national	
problems	of	the	nation	brand	deficit	and	the	ugly	Koreans	phenomenon	were	not	
discussed	and	analyzed	in	depth	within	a	historical	understanding,	but	presented	in	
fragmented	and	caricatured	ways.	It	illustrates	the	nature	of	nation	branding	
campaigns	that	aimed	to	control,	regulate,	and	mobilize	the	population,	rather	than	
to	facilitate	deliberative	discussions	on	these	social	issues.	
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The	future	of	a	“truly”	advanced	country	
The	political	discourses	of	NBNP	constructed	a	particular	future	imagery	of	
South	Korea	as	a	member	of	the	(imaginary)	“advanced	countries’	club.”		
Since	the	1960s,	the	future	imagery	of	becoming	an	advanced	country	has	
been	a	major	part	of	the	dominant	political	discourse	of	development	in	South	Korea	
(C.-t.	Kim,	2014,	p.	172)	in	the	sense	that	modernization	has	been	conceived	as	
becoming	a	developed,	advanced,	industrial	country	(Hwang,	2008,	p.	256).	The	
vision	of	becoming	an	“advanced,	first-class	country”	has	continued	to	be	the	
ultimate	goal	set	by	political	elites	since	the	declaration	of	the	“New	Korea”	in	the	
early	1990s.	Notably,	since	the	1990s,	the	imagery	of	becoming	an	advanced	country	
was	reinforced	as	the	advance	of	the	nation	implied	the	international	
competitiveness	of	the	nation	in	the	world	stage.		
The	image	of	an	advanced	country	has	been	represented	mainly	in	economic	
terms,	especially	in	terms	of	national	income.	The	national	income	index	was	used	
to	signify	the	advanced	status	of	South	Korea.	The	Kim	Young-sam	government	set	
the	goals	of	increasing	GNP	per	capita	to	10,000	dollars	and	obtaining	the	
membership	of	the	OECD	as	the	signposts	of	becoming	an	advanced	country	(both	
were	achieved	in	1996	at	the	expense	of	the	financial	crisis	in	the	next	year).	In	
2003,	the	Roh	government	also	set	up	the	goal	of	GNP	per	capita	of	20,000	dollars	as	
a	state	agenda	(as	suggested	to	the	government	by	the	SERI)	("Roh	asks	to	renovate	
the	country	to	open	up	the	era	of	20	thousand	dollars,"	2003).		
The	government	and	the	news	media	perceived	that	the	elusive	goal	of	
becoming	an	advanced	country	was	near	at	hand	in	economic	terms,	considering	the	
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size	and	volume	of	the	South	Korean	economy.	Especially,	particular	future-oriented	
industries	were	conceived	of	as	providing	a	concrete	shape	to	the	future	image	of	
advanced	South	Korea.	For	instance,	technology-oriented	industries	such	as	the	IT	
industry	(represented	by	Samsung	Electronics)	were	regarded	not	just	as	the	future	
engine	for	continued	economic	growth,30	but	also	as	envisaging	the	desirable	future	
of	advanced	economic	development.	The	world-leading	IT	industries,	reinforced	by	
the	futuristic	image,	provided	not	just	a	source	of	national	pride,	but	a	national	
sense	of	being	competitive	and	taking	the	lead	in	the	world.		
The	cultural	industries,	leading	the	Korean	Wave,	also	emerged	as	
envisioning	the	competitive	and	advanced	Korea	in	economic	terms.	The	Korean	
Wave	was	cast	on	in	terms	of	its	economic	effects.	In	2004,	Segye	Ilbo	cited	the	study	
by	the	HERI	and	reported	the	tangible	and	intangible	effects	of	the	“Yonsama”	
phenomenon	was	estimated	to	generate	as	large	as	3	trillion	won31	in	Korea	and	
Japan.	In	2005,	Yonhap	News	cited	the	study	by	the	IPS	and	reported	that	the	overall	
economic	effects	of	the	Korean	Wave	all	over	East	Asia	(including	Japan,	China,	
Taiwan,	and	Hong	Kong)	was	estimated	as	high	as	4.5	trillion	won	(Hong,	2005).	
Aside	from	the	point	that	the	calculation	of	the	figures	was	on	a	vague	and	
exaggerated	ground,	and	the	measurement	was	widely	inconsistent	across	the	
	
30	Since	the	1960s,	science	and	technologies	have	been	emphasized	as	
essential	to	reach	the	advanced	level	of	economic	development	(Hwang,	2008;	K.-b.	
Kim,	2008).	The	strong	emphasis	on	science	and	technologies	can	be	found	in	the	
slogan,	“being	late	in	the	industrialization,	let’s	take	the	lead	in	the	way	to	
informatization”	under	the	Kim	Young-sam	government,	and	the	state	vision	of	
“knowledge-based	nation”	under	the	Kim	Dae-jung	government.	
31	Since	the	financial	crisis	in	1997,	the	rate	between	the	Korean	won	and	the	
US	dollar	exchange	rate	has	been	fluctuated	between	1,000-1,200	won	per	dollar.		
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reports,	the	nation	branding	discourse	cast	on	the	events	and	phenomena	
exclusively	from	the	economic	and	monetary	terms.	The	monetary	calculation	of	the	
nation	brand	had	effects	on	the	conversion	of	“intangible”	and	not	necessarily	
economic	phenomena	into	calculable	economic	entities.	
These	industries	were	conceived	of	as	going	beyond	the	developmental	
strategy	of	“catching	up”	and	leading	the	way	to	“world	class”	Korea.	Products	such	
as	mobile	phones	and	the	popular	culture	projected	the	prestigious	nation	brand	
(“Korean	premium”).	In	this	context,	national	prestige	and	prestigious	nation	brand	
was	equated	with	the	market	premium	value	(high	value	added)	created	by	
prestigious	national	brands.		
Further	and	more	importantly,	the	Korean	Wave	was	cast	in	the	cultural	
terms	beyond	the	economic	terms	of	future	growth	engine.	The	Korean	Wave	was	
celebrated	as	the	first	historical	instance	for	Korean	culture	to	spread	widely	in	the	
world.	With	the	development	of	the	Korean	wave,	the	state	vision	was	frequently	
presented	as	entering	the	rank	of	“munhwa	sŏnjin’guk”	(문화선진국;	culture-
advanced	countries).	The	news	media	emphasized	the	Korean	Wave	as	a	road	to	
becoming	a	“truly”	advanced	country.	The	advancement	of	the	nation	was	
increasingly	conceived	of	not	just	in	terms	of	achieving	high	levels	of	economic	and	
technological	development	and	scale,	but	in	terms	of	having	refined	culture.		
In	this	context,	since	the	2000s,	the	imagery	of	an	advanced	nation	has	
expanded	to	include	not	just	economic	status	of	the	nation,	but	comprehensive	
political,	social,	and	cultural	terms.	Nation	brand	index	as	well	as	other	international	
indices	and	rankings	published	by	various	transnational	private	and	public	
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institutions	contributed	to	this	expansion	of	imagery	of	an	advanced	nation.32	These	
international	indexes	and	rankings	provided	a	rationale	for	wider	social	reform	
oriented	toward	the	future	of	a	“truly”	advanced	nation.		
The	image	of	the	culture-advanced	nation	was	also	projected	in	terms	of	civic	
norms	of	public	behaviors	and	manners,	which	were	narrowly	defined	as	abiding	by	
law	and	order.	The	successful	hosting	of	the	2002	World	Cup	football	was	cast	on	in	
terms	of	its	economic	effects,	but	was	highlighted	in	terms	of	projecting	the	image	of	
public	order	to	the	world.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	public	behaviors	of	citizens	
were	projected	as	a	great	improvement	and	achievement,	illuminating	a	bright	
future	of	the	nation	as	a	true	advanced	country.	
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	examined	how	the	news	media	institutionally	and	
discursively	engaged	in	the	promotion	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	as	
the	national	public	agenda,	which	got	elevated	to	the	status	of	the	central	public	
policy	agenda	by	the	next	government.		Since	the	late	1990s,	the	news	media	have	
made	serious	attempts	to	provide	grand	state	agendas,	manifesting	their	own	stake	
in	the	political	process	of	state	management.	As	one	of	the	recent	attempts,	the	
discourses	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	exemplify	how	the	news	media	
played	a	crucial	role	in	the	post-developmental	transition	to	neoliberal	governance	
	
32		They	include	Human	Development	Index	(HDI)	by	United	Nations	
Development	Programme	(UNDP),	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(CPI)	by	
Transparency	International	(TI),	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(GCI)	by	World	
Economic	Forum	(WEF),	World	Competitiveness	Yearbook	(WCY)	by	International	
Institute	for	Management	Development,	among	others.	
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in	South	Korea.	The	process	illustrates	how	the	news	media	actively	mediated	the	
interest	of	big	capital	in	the	promotion	of	the	state	agenda	of	nation	branding.		
As	a	conclusion	of	the	chapter,	I	will	sum	up	and	discuss	the	implications	of	
the	news	media’s	institutional	and	discursive	engagement	in	the	promotion	of	NBNP	
and	discuss	the	social	imaginary	of	the	nation-state	provided	by	the	discourses	of	
NBNP	in	a	wider	context	of	the	social	transformation	of	South	Korea.		
First	of	all,	the	chapter	examined	the	domestication	of	the	transnational	
discourse	and	institution	of	nation	branding	by	domestic	players.	It	was	
transnational	practitioners	in	the	business	of	marketing/branding	consultation	that	
invented	and	disseminated	the	idea	of	nation	branding	since	the	late	1990s.	They	
were	quick	to	introduce	the	idea	and	technique	of	nation	branding	to	national	and	
local	governments	across	the	world.	The	governments	in	Eastern	Europe,	in	
particular,	were	quick	to	adopt	and	apply	nation	branding	as	part	of	their	transition	
to	global	capitalism.	The	existing	critical	studies	of	nation	branding	mostly	
emphasized	the	role	played	by	the	transnational	practitioners.	They	introduced	and	
disseminated	neoliberal	rules	and	market-oriented	norms	through	the	technique	of	
nation	branding	which	rendered	the	nation-state	as	a	market	entity.	By	contrast,	I	
emphasized	the	domestic	dynamics	of	nation	branding	and	identified	multiple	
domestic	players	which	were	involved	in	the	introduction	and	dissemination	of	the	
transnational	idea	of	nation	branding.	The	introduction	of	nation	branding	in	South	
Korea	was	less	of	a	process	in	which	transnational	brand	managers	took	advantage	
of	the	national	government	and	prescribed	a	neoliberal	prescription	of	managing	
the	nation	brand;	it	was	a	process	in	which	domestic	elites	proactively	adopted	and	
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promoted	nation	branding	as	a	state	management	agenda.	The	public	and	private	
think	tanks	and	the	major	news	media	were	quick	to	introduce	the	idea	of	nation	
branding,	to	circulate	among	government	and	business	elites,	and	to	translate	and	
popularize	in	relation	to	a	neologism	of	national	prestige.	The	news	media	played	a	
mediating	role	in	the	institutional	and	discursive	domestication	of	nation	branding	
among	experts,	government,	and	publics	in	favor	of	the	interest	of	capital.		
It	should	also	be	added	that	I	do	not	disregard	the	role	played	by	the	
transnational	branding	experts	all	together,	but	evaluate	their	role	in	South	Korea	
from	a	different	perspective.	Their	involvement	in	the	institutional	process	of	nation	
branding	seemed	limited	in	South	Korea	although	the	transnational	branding	
consultants	landed	some	branding	contracts	with	the	governmental	agencies	and	
local	governments.	Rather,	they	were	more	significant	in	terms	of	their	sheer	
presence	and	status	in	the	discourse	of	nation	branding.	In	the	domestication	of	
nation	branding,	the	international	authority	and	global	status	of	the	discourse	and	
their	transnational	agencies	seemed	crucial	for	the	domestic	players	such	as	the	
news	media	and	the	policy	experts.	The	news	media	summoned	the	Western	media,	
Western	intellectuals,	and	Western	experts	as	the	authoritative	source	of	speaking	
the	language	of	nation	branding.	It	seemed	that	the	intellectual	and	symbolic	
authority	of	the	Western	intellectuals,	experts	and	the	media	were	indispensable	to	
the	domestication	of	nation	branding;	but	they	were	instrumental	and	selectively	
appropriated	by	the	domestic	agency	of	nation	branding.	The	actual	
institutionalization	of	nation	branding	worked	for	the	benefit	of	the	domestic	
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players	—	conservative	politicians,	bureaucrats,	news	journalists,	and	the	capital,	as	
we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter.		
Secondly,	the	news	media’s	promotion	of	nation	branding	predominantly	
operated	in	favor	of	the	interest	of	large	capital	and	for	the	neoliberal	discipline	of	
the	state,	the	nation,	and	the	citizen.	The	news	media	narratives	of	nation	branding	
prioritized	the	building	of	a	business-friendly	environment	to	attract	foreign	
investment	and	tourists	and	to	continue	the	export-led	economic	growth,	favoring	
domestically-based	but	globalized	large	conglomerates.	The	neoliberal	political	
nature	of	the	campaign	is	apparent	in	its	condemnation	of	labor	as	detriment	to	
international	competitiveness	and	its	mobilization	of	the	citizens	in	favor	of	
business.	By	urging	the	government	to	manage	the	whole	nation	in	the	prospect	of	
enhancing	international	competitiveness	and	the	overall	nation	brand	value,	the	
campaigns	constructed	the	state	as	a	neoliberal	manager	of	the	competitive	brand-
state.	The	priority	put	on	the	business	sector	suggests	that	the	discourses	of	NBNP	
were	aligned	with	the	neoliberal	reorganization	of	the	government	and	the	
population.	In	line	with	the	normative	imperative	of	international	competitiveness,	
the	news	media’s	call	for	nation	branding	put	priority	on	attracting	transnational	
capital	and	tourists	and	creating	a	business-friendly	climate.	The	nation	branding	
campaigns,	in	this	sense,	attempted	to	regulate	and	discipline	the	citizens	with	
respect	to	the	neoliberal	globalization	in	the	name	of	a	continued	economic	growth	
of	the	national	economy.		
It	should	be	added	that	the	news	media’s	promotion	of	nation	branding	
spoke	mostly	to	the	incoming	government,	rather	than	to	the	soon-to-be-retired	
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liberal	government.	As	early	as	2005,	the	next	government	was	strongly	expected	to	
be	a	conservative	one	led	by	a	successful	businessman-turned-politician.	It	was	the	
Lee	Myung-bak	government	that	greatly	instituted	and	drove	the	nation	branding	
campaign,	which	will	be	examined	in	the	next	chapter.		
Thirdly,	the	news	media’s	campaign	for	nation	branding	can	be	
contextualized	with	regard	to	the	re-imagination	of	the	post-developmental	state	
and	nation	following	what	seems	the	end	of	the	developmental	era	in	South	Korea.	
The	news	media’s	narrative	of	nation	branding	drove	a	particular	rendering	of	the	
post-developmental	imaginary	of	South	Korea	toward	the	neoliberal	orientation.	
What	is	striking	in	this	aspect	is	that	the	discursive	construction	of	the	neoliberal	
brand-state	is	predicated	on	a	particular	geographic	imagination	of	South	Korea’s	
standing	in	the	global	stage.	The	news	media	discourses	invoked	the	imagery	of	an	
“advanced	nation”	through	the	affective	activation	of	collective	developmental	
sentiments.	It	fed	on	the	national	confidence	on	the	past	achievement	of	rapid	
economic	growth	and	the	national	pride	on	the	present	global	success	of	Korea-
originated	manufactured	products	and	popular	culture.	While	the	developmental	
“catching	up”	mobilization	for	economic	growth	had	fed	on	the	collective	national	
desire	for	“survival,”	the	neoliberal	construction	of	the	competition	state	thrived	on	
the	developmental	desire	for	the	prestigious	status	of	the	“top-tier,	advanced	
country”	standing	in	the	world	stage	not	just	in	terms	of	economy	but	also	culture	
and	civility.		
Additionally,	the	globalized	re-imagination	as	an	advanced	country	put	South	
Korea	in	the	framework	of	perpetual	comparison	with	the	West	as	an	invariable	
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point	of	reference.	The	news	media	discourses	of	NBNP	depended	on	the	invocation	
of	the	Western	authority	and	the	“advanced”	nature	of	the	Western	knowledge	and	
expertise.	Moreover,	the	news	media	campaign	selectively	mobilized	the	aspects	of	
culture	and	citizenship	in	the	name	of	global	standards	from	the	perspective	of	the	
Western	(investors’)	standpoint	and	thus	reinforced	and	perpetuated	the	Western-
centered	perception	of	international	hierarchy.	The	news	media	campaign	for	NBNP	
exposed	the	paradox	of	Korean	modernity	in	which	the	collective	anxiety,	
discontent	and	insecurity	underlie	national	pride	and	confidence.	
The	last	point	I	raise	in	this	chapter	concerns	the	increasing	importance	of	
the	idea	of	culture	with	regard	to	nation	branding	and	national	prestige.	The	news	
media’s	discourses	of	NBNP	obviously	centered	on	the	economy	and	favored	
business,	but	they	entailed	increasing	attention	to	the	idea	of	culture.	The	attention	
to	culture,	especially	in	relation	to	the	imagery	of	an	advanced	nation,	not	only	
assumed	the	developmental	idea	of	West-centered,	staged	progress	from	the	
economy	to	culture,	but	also	was	based	on	the	reflection	on	the	one-sided	emphasis	
on	the	economy.	The	attention	to	culture	was	accelerated	by	the	rising	popularity	of	
the	Korean	Wave	and	K-pop,	Korean	modern	popular	cultural	products	in	Asia	and	
around	the	world.	
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CHAPTER	5		
CONTINGENCIES	OF	THE	PUBLIC	POLICY	OF	NATION	BRANDING	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	examine	how	nation	branding	policy	unfolded	under	the	Lee	
Myung-bak	government,	focusing	on	the	policy	activities	by	the	Presidential	Council	
for	Nation	Branding	(PCNB).	The	Council	took	the	responsibility	for	coordinating	
public	policies	across	different	governmental	departments	and	agencies	and	
implementing	various	publicity-oriented	activities	with	regard	to	nation	branding.	
In	coordinating	and	implementing	the	public	policy	for	nation	branding,	the	Council	
emphasized	the	key	principles:	the	cooperation	between	government	and	business	
on	the	one	hand,	and	the	participation	by	citizens	on	the	other	hand.	The	principles	
of	cooperation	and	participation	sound	positive	and	ideal,	implying	potentially	
democratic	values.	However,	these	policy	statements	cannot	be	taken	literally	
without	questions.	That	is,	what	do	they	really	mean	when	they	are	applied	to	the	
government-led	campaign	for	nation	branding?	What	forms	did	cooperation	and	
participation	take?	How	were	the	values	realized	in	the	actual	deployment	of	the	
public	policy	for	nation	branding?	I	will	examine	the	deployment	of	the	public	
policies	for	nation	branding,	focusing	on	how	these	principles	actually	played	out	
and	what	implications	they	had	in	a	wider	social	and	cultural	context	in	South	
Korea.		
In	the	first	section	of	the	chapter,	I	examine	previous	governmental	efforts	to	
institute	the	concerns	about	the	international	image	of	the	nation	before	the	term	
nation	branding	got	currency.	Throughout	the	first	decade	of	the	2000s,	public	
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policy	toward	national	image	has	developed	until	it	was	shown	in	full	shape	with	the	
establishment	of	the	PCNB	in	2009.		
Then	I	examine	the	major	task	of	the	PCNB	which	put	together	and	
coordinated	related	policies	that	had	been	scattered	across	different	governmental	
departments	and	agencies.	The	PCNB	was	defined	as	the	“control	tower”	of	related	
public	policies	that	were	executed	by	respective	departments	and	agencies.	In	this	
setting,	I	get	a	glimpse	of	a	wide	range	of	public	policies	that	were	related	to	nation	
branding	and	coordinated	by	the	PCNB:	from	international	aid	and	the	promotion	of	
Korean	popular	culture	to	domestic	public	campaigns	for	“multicultural	Korea”	and	
“global	citizenship.”	In	this	examination	of	the	public	policy	for	nation	branding,	I	
will	focus	on	how	the	government-business	relation	on	the	one	hand	and	the	
government-citizen	relation	on	the	other	hand	were	conceived	of	and	arranged	in	
the	public	policy	scheme	for	nation	branding.		
In	addition	to	the	coordination	of	the	related	policies	that	had	been	executed	
by	respective	departments	and	agencies,	The	PCNB	actively	deployed	a	range	of	
promotion	and	publicity	activities,	especially	in	preparations	for	the	upcoming	
international	event	of	G20	Seoul	Summit	in	2010.	In	the	second	part	of	the	chapter,	I	
will	examine	public	campaigns	for	nation	branding	developed	under	the	
commission	of	the	PCNB,	including	the	public	campaign	ads	and	the	public	
participation	campaign.	In	particular,	I	take	a	close	look	at	the	public	service	ad	
campaign	operated	by	the	PCNB	in	tandem	with	the	big	business	companies	on	the	
one	hand,	and	the	citizen	participation	programs	which	utilized	digital	
communications	on	the	other.	In	this	examination,	I	will	make	two	points	of	
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observation.	First,	I	will	focus	on	how	the	nation	branding	campaigns	were	
predicated	upon	a	particular	government-business	relation	in	which	the	
government	mobilized	the	business	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	governmental	
authority	was	utilized	for	business	benefit	on	the	one	hand.	Second,	I	will	focus	on	
how	marketing	and	branding	techniques	of	“participation”	were	utilized	for	the	“co-
creation”	of	the	nation	brand	in	the	post-developmental	mobilization	of	publics.		
In	the	concluding	section,	I	will	discuss	how	the	nation	branding	policy	
constituted	the	re-imagination	of	the	nation	as	a	brand	in	which	the	state	was	
constructed	as	a	quasi-enterprise	entity.	I	argue	that	the	policy	campaign	for	nation	
branding	was	part	of	the	neoliberal	program	of	governance	that	aimed	to	construct	
the	space	of	the	competitive	brand-nation	and	produce	the	subjects	of	brand-
citizens	in	the	context	of	neoliberal	globalization.		
The	institutional	establishment	of	nation	branding	
In	response	to	the	aggressive	promotion	of	the	nation	branding	agenda	by	
the	business	sector	and	the	mainstream	news	media,	which	we	have	examined	in	
the	previous	chapter,	The	Lee	Myung-bak	government	(February	2008-January	
2013)	pushed	the	public	policy	initiative	for	nation	branding.	In	his	speech	on	
August	15,	2008,	President	Lee	declared	that	he	would	“raise	Korea’s	nation	brand	
value	to	the	level	of	advanced	countries	within	his	presidency,”	and	“establish	a	
governmental	organization	to	promote	Korea’s	nation	brand”	(PCNB,	2013a).	
Accordingly,	the	PCNB	was	set	up	in	January	2009	at	the	Ministry	level.	The	
government	announced	that	the	PCNB	was	the	world’s	first	and	the	only	
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governmental	institution	that	was	dedicated	to	the	integrated	task	of	nation	
branding	(C.-i.	Yun,	2010).		
The	public	policy	for	“national	image”			
The	PCNB	was	not	the	first	governmental	institution	devoted	to	the	
promotion	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	image	in	South	Korea.	Even	before	the	
term	“nation	branding”	was	introduced	in	the	early	2000s,	the	government	was	
gradually	concerned	about	the	promotion	of	national	image.		
It	is	fair	to	note	that	the	government	exerted	efforts	to	promote	nation	image	
with	the	hosting	of	the	Seoul	Olympic	Games	in	1988,33	but	it	was	in	the	early	1990s	
that	the	nation	image	promotion	was	taken	seriously	and	systematically	as	part	of	a	
larger	national	reform	when	the	Kim	Young-sam	government	pushed	the	policy	
initiative	for	segyehwa,	Korea’s	take	on	globalization.	For	the	enhancement	of	the	
external	national	image,	the	government	set	up	the	Committee	on	Overseas	Public	
Relations	in	1995.	It	was	acknowledged	that	given	the	rapid	economic	growth	and	
political	democratization,	the	international	recognition	of	Korea	stayed	low	due	to	
unstable	national	security	and	a	series	of	disasters	(such	as	the	collapse	of	Sŏngsu	
Taegyo	bridge,	one	of	the	Han’gang	river	bridges	in	1994,	and	the	collapse	of	
Samp’ung	department	store	building	in	Seoul	in	1995).	The	Committee,	presided	by	
the	Prime	Minister,	was	set	up	to	coordinate	the	work	of	disseminating	information	
	
33	It	should	be	noted	that	the	“politics	of	gaze,”	that	is,	the	implementation	of	
the	promotion	of	national	image	entailed	violence	especially	under	the	military	
regime	facing	the	1988	Olympics.	Preparing	the	event,	the	regime	wiped	out	the	
shack	in	Seoul,	especially,	the	shack	visible	on	the	road	from	the	airport	to	
downtown	Seoul	(H.-n.	Pak,	2016).		
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internationally	and	managing	national	image	among	government	departments	
(Bureau	of	Public	Information,	1995).		
Subsequently	in	1997,	the	Korea	International	Broadcasting	Foundation	
launched	Arirang	TV,	an	English-language	satellite	broadcasting	station,	aiming	at	
fostering	a	good	international	image	of	Korea	through	broadcasting.	It	was	called	a	
“spearhead”	of	Korea’s	globalization	and	expected	to	function	as	“Korea’s	friendly	
face	toward	the	global	neighbors”	(Y.-s.	Kim,	1995a).	Arirang	TV	embarked	on	its	
overseas	broadcasting	to	the	Asia-Pacific	region	in	1999	and	its	worldwide	
broadcasting	to	Europe,	Africa	and	the	Americas	in	2000.	
Despite	the	grand	policy	claim	for	Korea’s	globalization,	the	governmental	
efforts	for	enhancing	national	image	were	regarded	as	insufficient.	One	
governmental	document	pointed	out	that	the	overseas	publicity	functions	were	
uncoordinated	as	they	were	scattered	around	different	governmental	departments	
and	agencies	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Culture	and	Tourism,	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	
Affairs	and	Trade,	and	the	Korea	Foundation	(K.-h.	Chŏng,	1998).	The	major	
shortcoming	was	the	fact	that	the	matter	of	national	image	was	limited	to	overseas	
public	relations.	
The	government’s	efforts	to	improve	national	image	advanced	when	Korea	
co-hosted	with	Japan	one	of	the	biggest	world	events:	the	2002	FIFA	World	Cup.	In	
preparation	for	the	event,	the	government	planned	to	set	up	a	slogan	for	the	World	
Cup	which	symbolized	the	country	in	English	(K.-h.	Yi,	2007a).	In	December	2001,	
with	the	international	event	several	months	ahead,	“Dynamic	Korea”	was	selected	as	
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the	English	slogan	to	publicize	Korea	to	the	world	(K.-h.	Yi,	2007b).34	The	slogan	
was	used	during	and	after	the	event	for	the	promotion	of	national	image.		
In	this	atmosphere,	the	government	attempted	to	institute	a	systematic	pan-
governmental	campaign	for	enhancing	national	image	by	setting	up	the	Council	on	
National	Image	(CNI)	in	July	2002.	The	Council	was	an	intra-governmental	
coordinating	board,	presided	by	the	Prime	Minister	and	composed	of	ten	cabinet	
members.	The	Action	Council	on	National	Image,	which	supported	the	Council,	was	
presided	by	the	Ministry	of	Public	Relations	and	composed	of	ten	Vice-Minister	level	
officials	(K.-h.	Yi,	2007b).		
For	the	next	few	years,	the	Council	proposed	comprehensive	plans	for	
enhancing	national	image.	In	2002,	the	Council	included	wider	diplomatic	and	
economic	concerns	into	the	national	image	agenda.	For	instance,	the	Council	
suggested	to	repair	systems	and	customs	according	to	global	standards	by	enacting	
the	Animal	Protection	Act	and	regulating	“dog	eating,”	arranging	protection	of	
foreign	sex	workers,	tidying	up	utility	polls,	billboards	and	road	signs,	and	the	like	
(P.-s.	Kim,	2002).		
	
34	Korean	Broadcasting	System	(KBS),	the	public	broadcasting	organization,	
conducted	an	online	poll	to	select	the	slogan	on	its	website.	With	6,084	participants	
to	the	poll,	“Dynamic	Korea”	took	the	most	votes	with	24.6	per	cent,	followed	by	
“Fantastic	Korea”	(24.5	per	cent),	“Peaceful	and	Safe	Korea”	(21.4),	“Experience	
Korea”	(17.3),	and	the	“Hub	of	Asia”	(12.2).	Based	on	the	result	of	the	online	poll	as	
well	as	international	and	local	expert	opinion,	the	Blue	House	led	the	deliberation	
on	selecting	the	slogan	for	the	World	Cup.	As	a	result	of	the	deliberation,	“Dynamic	
Korea”	was	selected	as	the	basic	slogan	with	the	“Hub	of	Asia”	as	the	sub	(K.-h.	Yi,	
2007a).	Subsequently,	the	Interbrand,	a	leading	transnational	marketing	and	
branding	consulting	company	that	also	worked	for	the	emblem	for	the	1988	Seoul	
Olympic	Games,	worked	on	the	emblem	for	the	slogan	for	the	World	Cup	Organizing	
Committee	(National	Strategy	Institute,	2006).	
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The	Council	decided	to	expand	Official	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	from	
59	million	dollars	in	2002	to	72	million	dollars	in	2003	and	to	resume	contribution	
to	the	Economic	Development	Cooperation	Fund	(EDCF),	which	had	been	
suspended	due	to	the	financial	crisis	in	1997.	It	also	aimed	to	increase	the	world’s	
first-class	products	from	220	items	to	500	items	by	2005,	and	to	produce	more	
Korean	brands	among	the	world’s	best	100	corporate	brands.		
In	November	2005,	the	Council	planned	to	develop	the	National	Image	Index	
of	Korea	(NIIK),	an	index	to	measure	national	image	for	its	systematic	management.	
The	Council	announced	that	it	would	measure	five	elements	of	nation	image	–	
natural	and	geographical	environment,	politics,	economy,	culture	and	society	–	in	
terms	of	three	criteria	of	human	resource,	system	and	process,	and	content.	The	
measurement	would	reflect	existing	internationally	authoritative	indices	such	as	the	
World	Competitiveness	Yearbook	(WCY)	published	by	the	International	Institute	for	
Management	Development	(IMD),	the	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(GCI)	published	
by	the	World	Economic	Forum	(WEF),	the	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(CPI)	by	
the	Transparency	International	(TI),	sovereign	credit	ratings	evaluated	by	major	
credit	rating	agencies	such	as	Moody’s,	Standard	&	Poor’s	and	Fitch,	which	were	in	
great	circulation	with	transnational	authority	(P.-s.	Pak,	2005).		
The	Council	also	appointed	five	world-famous	Koreans	as	honorary	
ambassadors	in	four	different	fields	–	culture	and	arts	(classical	music	singer	Cho	
Su-mi	and	film	director	Kim	Ki-dŏk),	sports	(professional	golfer	An	Si-hyŏn),	“world-
class	products”	(vice	president	Yun	Jong-yong	of	Samsung	Electronics),	and	science	
and	technology	(professor	Hwang	U-sŏk).	The	meeting	also	decided	to	reinforce	the	
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Action	Council	and	to	install	the	Committee	on	National	Image	Development,	an	
advisory	board	composed	of	civil	experts	on	public	relations	(H.-Y.	Kim,	2005).		
The	development	of	the	official	policy	toward	national	image	suggests	that	
the	plans	were	not	limited	to	the	repair	of	national	image	and	the	establishment	of	
national	slogan;	the	Council	took	charge	of	the	establishment	of	visions	and	
strategies	as	well	as	the	comprehensive	policy	suggestions	in	regard	to	national	
image	issues.	It	shows	that	the	diplomatic	and	international	political	economic	
issues	and	internal	reforms	encompassing	laws,	systems	and	customs	were	viewed	
from	the	perspective	of	the	national	image	enhancement.		
However,	despite	the	great	breadth	and	depth	of	the	plans	written	on	paper,	
the	Council	was	not	able	to	implement	most	of	its	proposed	policies.	Established	in	
an	“on-the-fly”	manner	by	the	time	of	hosting	the	mega	international	event,	the	
Council	fizzled	out	without	consistent	policy	implementation	and	visible	
performance	outcome.	The	Council	was	criticized	as	“mere	nominal”	for	its	
inactivity	and	the	lack	of	action	strategies.	In	fact,	the	Council	meetings	were	held	
only	twice,	in	2002	at	its	launch	and	in	2005	for	the	preparation	of	the	2006	World	
Cup	(T.	Kim,	2006;	N.-h.	Yi,	2004).		
The	lack	of	policy	implementation	despite	a	rather	comprehensive	plan	was	
partly	ascribed	to	the	problem	of	the	organizational	structure	within	the	
government,	where	cooperation	and	coordination	were	hard	to	expect. 
The	establishment	of	the	PCNB	
Against	this	historical	backdrop,	the	Presidential	Council	for	Nation	Branding	
(PCNB)	was	established	with	a	strengthened	status	in	the	governmental	
	 162 
organization.	It	was	set	up	as	a	Presidential	Council	at	the	Ministry	level,	elevated	
from	the	status	of	the	CNI,	which	was	set	up	as	a	Prime	Minister’s	Council.	In	fact,	
the	new	government	strategically	established	or	reorganized	five	Presidential	
Councils,	including	the	PCNB,	which	played	a	central	role	in	propelling	the	core	
policy	agenda	of	the	new	government.35		
The	PCNB	claimed	that	it	was	the	world’s	first	governmental	organization	on	
nation	branding.	It	was	a	dubious	claim	suggesting	Korea’s	obsession	with	the	
“world’s	first,”36	but	it	was	clear	that	it	was	promoted	from	the	previous	
organizations.		
Despite	this	institutional	promotion	from	the	previous	government,	however,	
the	status	of	the	PCNB	was	ambiguous	and	contingent	on	domestic	politics.	The	
character	of	Euh	Yoon-dae	(Ŏ	Yun-dae),	Chairperson	of	the	PCNB,	illustrated	the	
ambiguity.	On	the	one	hand,	he	symbolized	the	elevated	status	of	the	organization;	
he	was	known	as	a	powerful	insider	of	the	new-elected	President,	Lee	Myung-bak.	
He	was	a	professor	in	business	management	and	served	as	president	of	Korea	
University,	which	President	Lee	attended.	The	high-profile	figure	contributed	to	the	
elevation	of	the	status	of	the	organization.	On	the	other	hand,	as	powerful	as	he	was,	
	
35	The	other	four	Councils	were	the	Presidential	Council	on	National	
Competitiveness,	the	Presidential	Council	on	Green	Growth,	the	Presidential	Council	
for	Future	and	Vision,	and	the	Presidential	Committee	on	Regional	Development.	
36	Precedent	examples	are	identified	in	Britain	where	the	Public	Diplomacy	
Strategy	Board	(2002)	and	the	following-up	Public	Diplomacy	Board	(2006)	dealt	
with	the	task	of	nation	branding	in	relation	to	public	diplomacy.	
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he	took	the	position	almost	by	accident,	as	he	was	dropped	from	the	nomination	of	
the	Minister	of	Education	and	Science.37	
A	year	later,	he	was	appointed	as	Chairperson	of	the	PCNB.	The	anecdote	
hints	that	the	PCNB	was	established	as	a	trophy	for	the	powerful	insider	rather	than	
according	to	the	consistent	purpose	for	the	enhancement	of	the	nation	brand.		
In	this	arrangement,	the	agenda	of	nation	branding	was	able	to	carry	more	
weight	than	before.	Set	up	as	a	pan-government,	co-operative	body,	the	PCNB	
claimed	to	assume	the	role	of	“control	tower”	for	nation	branding,	taking	charge	of	
the	coordination	among	related	government	departments	and	between	government	
and	business	(The	Ministry	of	Culture,	2009).		
However,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	role	and	the	status	of	the	Council	
in	a	balanced	way.	The	PCNB	was	misunderstood	as	a	“powerful”	organization	
taking	responsibility	for	nation	branding	policy	that	the	Lee	government	
ambitiously	drove.	In	fact,	however,	the	“control	tower”	role	of	the	PCNB	implied	
that	its	role	was	limited	to	putting	together	and	coordinating	mostly	pre-existing	
governmental	policies	in	relation	to	nation	branding.	Most	policies	put	together	
under	the	name	of	nation	branding	continued	to	have	been	implemented	by	
individual	executive	governmental	bodies.		
As	a	coordinating	body,	the	Council	was	composed	of	16	heads	or	personnel	
of	relevant	governmental	departments	involved	in	nation	branding	and	31	experts	
	
37	He	was	unofficially	nominated	as	the	first	Minister	of	Education	and	
Science	under	the	Lee	government	but	was	dropped	hours	before	the	official	
announcement	due	to	the	suspicion	that	his	wife	speculated	in	real	estate	(H.-u.	No,	
2008).	
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on	nation	branding	from	civil	society	and	academia	(The	Ministry	of	Culture,	
2009).38	The	institutional	arrangement	reflected	the	special	emphasis	on	the	
cooperation	between	government	and	business.	In	addition	to	the	coordinating	role,	
the	Council	carried	on	its	own	projects	for	nation	branding	such	as	holding	public	
forums,	contests	and	campaigns.	For	this	task,	the	Council	was	staffed	with	about	30	
employees	and	was	allocated	a	small	budget	of	8	billion	won.39	Additionally,	the	
Council	asked	eight	large	conglomerates	to	send	their	working-manager-level	
employees	to	the	Council	with	salary	on	their	part.	This	unusual	organizational	
arrangement	symbolized	the	status	of	the	Council	as	a	cooperative	body	between	
government	and	big	business.40	
The	contingent	nature	of	the	PCNB	is	apparent	throughout	its	institutional	
existence.	For	one	thing,	the	PCNB	subsisted	only	under	the	Lee	government	for	four	
years.	For	another,	the	focus	of	the	organization	dramatically	shifted	with	the	
	
38	The	16	Council	members	representing	the	governmental	departments	and	
agencies	included	the	Minister	of	Strategy	and	Finance	(MOSF);	Minister	of	
Education,	Science	and	Technology	(MOEST);	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	
(MOFAT);	Minister	of	Justice	(MOJ);	Minister	of	Public	Administration	and	Security	
(MOPAS);	Minister	of	Culture,	Sports	and	Tourism	(MCST);	Minister	of	Knowledge	
Economy	(MKE);	Minister	of	Land,	Transport	and	Maritime	Affair	(MLTM);	Minister	
of	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office;	Chief	of	the	Korea	Communications	Commission	
(KCC);	Mayor	of	Seoul;	Secretary	to	the	President	for	Executive	Planning	and	
Management;	Secretary	to	the	President	for	Speech	and	Records;	President	of	Korea	
Trade-Investment	Promotion	Agency	(KOTRA);	President	of	Korea	International	
Cooperation	Agency	(KOICA);	and	the	CEO	of	Korea	Tourism	Organization	(KTO).	
39	Eleven	public	servants	were	dispatched	from	the	relevant	governmental	
departments,	and	five	employees	from	the	relevant	governmental	agencies.	The	
Council	independently	recruited	six	employees	specializing	in	promotions	and	
research.	
40	They	were	Kolon,	Asiana	Air,	Korean	Air,	Posco,	SK	Telecom,	Hyundai	
Motors,	LG	Electronics	and	Samsung	Electronics.	Hanhwa	joined	the	next	year	(C.-i.	
Yun,	2010,23).	
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change	of	the	head.	In	the	first	term	(January	2009-July	2011,	Chairperson	Euh),	the	
PCNB	mainly	focused	on	the	preparation	for	the	impending	G20	Seoul	Summit,	
emphasizing	the	government-business	cooperation	and	the	citizen	participation	for	
nation	branding.	In	the	second	term	(July	2011-October	2012),	the	PCNB	focused	on	
the	promotion	and	commodification	of	traditional	Korean	culture.	The	shift	in	focus	
to	traditional	Korean	culture	was	partly	due	to	the	personal	interest	of	the	new	
Chairperson,	Lee	Bae-yong	(Yi	Pae-yong),	who	was	a	professor	in	Korean	history.	 
 
The	policy	activities	for	nation	branding	
In	this	institutional	arrangement,	the	PCNB	set	up	a	set	of	extensive	plans,	
ranging	widely	from	public	diplomacy	to	the	Official	Development	Assistant	(ODA)	
to	the	domestic	campaign	for	global	citizenship.		
The	PCNB	referred	to	the	fact	that	Korea’s	nation	brand	lagged	behind	at	
mere	33rd	according	to	the	Anholt-GfK	Roper	Nation	Brands	Index	(NBI)	of	2008.	It	
is	notable	that	the	diagnosis	of	the	nation	brand	problem	in	terms	of	dichotomy	
between	economic	and	non-economic	aspects.	The	PCNB	diagnosed	that	despite	its	
“hard	edge”	of	economic	size	and	technological	advancement,	Korea’s	international	
status	stayed	at	a	lower	position	due	to	insufficient	activities	and	publicity	on	“soft	
edge.”	The	PCNB	set	the	goal	of	enhancing	Korea’s	ranking	from	33rd	to	15th	by	
2013.		
The	PCNB	put	together	pre-existing	and	new	policies	and	rebranded	them	
into	five	major	policy	focal	areas	under	the	banner	of	nation	branding.	The	five	
areas	were	identified	as:	(1)	“contributing	to	the	international	community,”	(2)	
“promoting	advanced	technology	and	products,”	(3)	“promoting	culture	and	
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tourism,”	(4)	“embracing	multiculture	and	foreigners,”	and	(5)	“cultivating	global	
citizenship”	(Choi	&	Kim,	2014,	p.	354;	PCNB,	2013a).	
In	addition	to	this	coordinating	task,	the	PCNB	also	carried	out	their	own	
roles	of	PR	and	communications	with	regard	to	nation	branding	and	the	role	of	
devising	the	index	and	criteria	for	evaluating	the	nation	brand.	In	fact,	the	publicity	
and	communications	activities	seemed	central	to	the	organization	as	the	substantive	
nation	branding	policies	were	executed	by	the	respective	governmental	
departments	and	agencies.	Considering	the	various	roles	which	the	PCNB	assumed,	
in	practice,	it	operated	as	an	intra-governmental	agency	for	publicity	and	promotion	
in	relation	to	nation	branding.		
Five	areas	of	nation	branding	policy	
In	this	section,	I	give	a	glimpse	at	a	range	of	public	policy	put	together	under	
five	areas	for	nation	branding	policy	and	consider	the	nature	of	the	policy	in	terms	
of	the	relation	between	government,	business,	and	citizens.		
The	first	focal	area	for	nation	branding	policy	emphasized	the	international	
contribution	and	responsibility	and	included	various	international	cooperation	
plans.		
Previous	overseas	volunteer	programs	were	integrated	and	rebranded	as	
“World	Friends	Korea.”41	The	policy	assumed	that	Korea’s	international	volunteer	
services	were	underestimated	in	light	of	reality	that	Korea	was	sending	over	four	
	
41	The	plan	suggested	the	integration	of	government-sponsored	international	
volunteering	activities	to	a	single	brand.	They	were	Korea	Overseas	Volunteers	
(KOV)	Program	by	KOICA	under	MOFAT,	Korea	University	Volunteer	Program	
(KUV)	by	MOEST,	Korea	IT	Volunteer	Program	by	KADO	under	MPAS,	Korea	Techno	
Peace	Corps	(TPC)	Program	by	KICOS	under	KOEST.	
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thousand	volunteers	abroad,	third	largest	number	next	to	the	US	and	Japan.	
However,	due	to	the	lack	of	integrated	brand,	the	contribution	had	not	been	
appreciated.	Accordingly,	modeled	after	Peace	Corps	(US)	and	JICA	(Japan)	(PCNB,	
2009e),	the	existing	volunteering	activities	were	bundled	and	rebranded	as	“World	
Friends	Korea.”42	
Also	emphasized	were	the	expansion	of	developmental	assistance	(ODA)	and	
the	participation	in	international	peacekeeping	operations	(PKO).	Acknowledging	
the	insufficient	contribution	to	the	international	community,	the	policy	suggested	to	
increase	the	ODA	to	the	level	of	OECD	average.		
It	is	striking	that	the	policy	emphasized	the	difference	in	the	ODA	program	
between	Korea	and	other	advanced	countries.	Highlighting	Korea’s	unique	
experience	of	turning	from	an	aid-recipient	to	a	donor	country,	the	policy	proudly	
emphasized	that	Korea	could	pass	on	intangible	know-hows	for	economic	
development	as	well	as	material	aids.	Often	called	the	“economic	Korean	wave,”	the	
policy	included	the	exportation	of	Korean	model	of	economic	development	in	the	
name	of	the	“Knowledge	Sharing	Programs”	(KSP).	The	KSP	was	advertised	as	
offering	comprehensive	consulting	for	economic	development.	Especially,	the	policy	
	
42	The	programs	were	also	expanded	and	diversified:	the	existing	
volunteering	activities,	usually	youth-based,	IT-centered,	were	reorganized,	but	also	
the	WFK	included	“advisers	program”	and	“senior	experts	program,”	which	
recruited	those	with	expert	knowledge	and	experience	within	various	public	and	
corporate	fields.	The	latter	programs	were	explicitly	linked	to	the	international	
development	assistance	programs	as	they	aimed	to	provide	expert	knowledge	of	
public	administration	and	policy	consulting	to	developing	and	underdeveloped	
countries.	The	plan	assumed	that	the	overseas	volunteering	activities	would	
enhance	friendly	and	giving	image	of	Korea	and	potentially	open	the	way	into	the	
respective	overseas	markets	(PCNB,	2009e).	Especially,	current	public	servants	
were	encouraged	to	participate	in	the	programs.	
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promoted	the	exportation	of	the	Saemaŭl	campaign	as	a	successful	model	of	
modernization.43	
The	first	area	of	nation	branding	emphasized	international	cooperation	and	
assistance,	but	we	can	identify	underlying	motives	behind	the	policy.	Underlying	
was	the	self-pride	on	the	past	achievement	of	rapid	economic	development	and	the	
self-confidence	on	the	advanced	level	of	economy	and	technologies,	discussed	in	the	
previous	chapter.	Further	underlying	was	economic	ambition	to	open	up	business	
opportunities	for	Korean	enterprises	in	large-scale	civil	engineering	and	
construction	as	well	as	in	various	other	industries	such	as	information	and	
education.		
For	instance,	with	regard	to	developmental	support	and	consulting,	the	plan	
especially	emphasized	the	merit	of	the	e-learning	system.	Highlighting	the	advanced	
information	technologies	and	the	experience	of	education	information	system,	the	
policy	explicitly	aimed	to	export	the	Korean	e-learning	system	and	further	establish	
it	as	the	global	standard	in	the	global	education	industries	(PCNB,	2009c).		
The	business-centered	approach	to	nation	branding	was	more	explicit	in	the	
second	policy	focal	area,	which	was	branded	as	“advanced	technology	and	design	
Korea.”	It	emphasized	the	overcoming	of	“Korea	discount”	and	the	promotion	of	
Korea-originated	products	and	brands	for	“premium	Korea”	(PCNB,	2013a,	pp.	68-
69).	This	focus	area	basically	featured	various	support	schemes	for	the	Korean	
small-to-medium-sized	business	home	and	abroad	by	putting	up	the	established	
	
43	The	KSP	was	launched	in	2009	with	Vietnam	as	the	first	country	to	get	
developmental	consulting.	
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national	image	of	technological	advancement.	For	instance,	the	plan	included	the	
promotion	of	select	high	quality	products	by	utilizing	the	brand	and	logo,	“Advanced	
Technology	and	Design	Korea”	(AT	&	D	Korea)	(PCNB,	2009a).		
In	the	third	policy	focus	on	culture	and	tourism,	the	PCNB	policy	scheme	
emphasized	the	dissemination	of	Korean	culture	and	the	use	of	cultural	resources	
for	tourism.		
Major	policy	efforts	in	this	focal	area	of	culture	and	tourism	included	the	
dissemination	of	Korean	language	and	Korean	alphabet	(han’gŭl).	The	PCNB	
coordinated	the	reorganization	of	previously-scattered	efforts	for	the	international	
education	of	Korean	language	and	culture	into	the	single	brand	of	Sejong	Hakdang	
(the	King	Sejong	Institute).	It	aimed	to	make	it	as	prominent	as	those	institutions	
such	as	the	British	Council	(UK),	Goethe-Institut	(Germany),	Confucius	Institute	
(China),	or	Alliance-Française	(France).		
In	addition,	the	PCNB	was	directly	involved	in	the	efforts	to	enlist	sŏwŏn	
(private	Confucian	academies	in	the	Chosŏn	Dynasty)	and	Buddhist	temples	as	the	
World	Heritage	sites	of	the	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	
Organization	(UNESCO)	(PCNB,	2013a,	pp.	124-138).		
Especially	in	its	second	term	with	the	historian	Lee	Bae-yong	as	Chairperson	
of	the	Council,	the	PCNB	greatly	focused	on	the	promotion,	branding,	and	
commodification	of	traditional	culture.	This	focus	on	traditional	culture	was	on	
promoting	and	publicizing	the	presumed	excellence	of	Korean	culture,	the	value	of	
which	was	assumed	to	have	not	been	known	to	the	world.	
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The	fourth	and	fifth	focal	areas,	“embracing	multicultural	family	and	
foreigners”	and	“cultivating	global	citizenship,”	were	more	directly	related	with	the	
issues	of	nation	image	and	reputation	than	the	previous	aspects,	and	thus	involved	
various	public	campaigns	targeting	the	domestic	public.	These	campaigns	aimed	to	
educate	and	mobilize	the	domestic	public	toward	the	building	of	internationally-
friendly,	business-favorable	socio-cultural	environment,	especially	in	the	
preparations	of	the	G20	Seoul	Summit.		
Concerning	the	policy	support	for	multicultural	families,	assumed	by	the	
Ministry	of	Gender	Equality	and	Family,	the	PCNB	deployed	public	campaigns	and	
media	publicity	that	aimed	to	educate	the	domestic	public	toward	multicultural	
families.	For	instance,	the	PCNB	helped	to	produce	a	public	service	advertisement	
video	material	featuring	“Rainbow	Singers,”	which	were	composed	of	children	from	
multicultural	families,	helped	to	launch	a	television	program,	“We	are	Koreans”	on	
MBC	(PCNB,	2013a,	p.	166).	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	campaigns	did	not	include	
immigrant	workers	as	the	subject	of	understanding	and	hospitality.		
Concerning	the	policy	for	global	citizenship,	the	PCNB	was	involved	in	the	
launch	of	a	series	of	public	campaigns	urging	the	domestic	public	to	learn	global	
etiquette	and	behave	in	globally	proper	manners.	Most	of	these	campaigns	were	
executed	by	related	government	departments	and	agencies:	MCST,	Korea	Tourism	
Organization	(KTO),	Visit	Korea	Committee,	Korea	Broadcasting	Advertising	Corp.	
(KOBACO)	and	so	on,	but	some	public	service	advertisements	for	global	etiquette	
were	produced	under	the	commission	of	the	PCNB	in	cooperation	with	private	
enterprises	(that	is,	the	private	parties	bore	the	production	cost	and	advertising	
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expenses)	(PCNB,	2013a,	pp.	152-159).	These	campaign	ads	will	be	examined	in	
detail	in	the	next	section.	Before	turning	to	them,	I	would	like	to	add	a	few	
comments	on	the	nature	of	the	public	policy	of	nation	branding.		
First,	the	PCNB	extended	the	framework	of	nation	branding	quite	widely,	
coordinating	a	wide	range	of	public	policies	from	ODA	to	global	citizenship.	It	is	
worth	noting	that	many	of	these	policies	had	been	promoted	by	the	news	media	and	
considered	in	the	policy	framework	under	the	CNI	in	relation	to	nation	image.		
Second,	the	nation	branding	policies	were	planned	and	operated	from	the	
perspective	of	business:	while	the	first	three	aspects	explicitly	and	implicitly	aimed	
to	support	the	domestically-based	business	and	promote	exports,	the	remaining	two	
were	more	or	less	involved	in	attracting	transnational	business	and	capital	by	
providing	a	socio-cultural	climate	that	were	deemed	friendly	to	international	
business	and	capital.		
Last,	the	public	policy	on	nation	branding	was	keen	on	mobilizing	citizen	
volunteers	or	making	especially	the	youth	involved	in	nation	branding.	Overseas	
volunteer	programs,	branded	“World	Friends	Korea,”	naturally	involved	a	lot	of	
citizen	volunteers	of	various	ages.	Additionally,	concerning	the	promotion	of	
traditional	Korean	culture,	the	nation	branding	policy	plan	recruited	and	supported	
the	youth	activities	for	the	conservation	of	UNESCO	world	heritage	sites	(PCNB,	
2013a,	pp.	139-145).	The	PCNB	adopted	various	open	prize	contests,	and	recruited	
citizens	under	various	names	such	as	communicators,	reporters,	and	bloggers	for	
the	promotion	and	publicity	activities	of	the	nation	brand	of	Korea.	The	aspects	of	
the	government-business	relation	and	the	citizen	participation	will	be	further	
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discussed	in	the	examination	of	the	publicity	and	promotion	activities	for	nation	
branding	in	the	next	section.	 
Publicizing	and	communicating	nation	branding	
In	addition	to	substantive	policies	that	were	coordinated	by	the	PCNB	and	
executed	by	the	respective	governmental	departments	and	agencies,	the	PCNB	took	
responsibility	for	publicity	and	communications	in	relation	to	nation	branding.	In	
these	terms,	the	PCNB	covered	various	policy	activities	including	overseas	as	well	as	
domestic,	conventional	as	well	as	unconventional	publicity	activities.		
The	PCNB	policy	report	book,	published	in	2013,	shows	how	much	weight	
was	given	to	these	publicity	and	communications	activities.	The	report	summed	up	
the	outcome	of	their	policy	performance	through	four	years	before	its	termination	
months	later.	In	this	350-page	report	(excluding	appendix),	the	PCNB	spared	almost	
half	of	the	book	to	the	publicity	and	communications	activities	in	great	detail	while	
summing	up	in	70	pages	all	the	substantive	nation	branding	policy	activities	that	
were	executed	by	other	governmental	bodies	(PCNB,	2013a).		
In	this	section,	I	examine	the	actual	policy	activities	of	publicity,	
communications	and	promotion	of	nation	branding	by	the	PCNB.	I	focus	on	three	
activities:	first,	the	development	of	the	nation	brand	index	in	cooperation	with	the	
SERI;	second,	the	PCNB’s	publicity	activities,	exemplified	by	the	public	campaign	ads	
produced	by	LG	Group;	third,	various	“participatory”	publicity	programs,	which	
induced	citizens’	involvement	in	nation	branding,	especially	through	digital	
communications	technologies.	In	this	examination,	I	consider	how	the	PCNB	
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conceived	and	conducted	the	government-business	cooperation	and	the	citizen	
participation.	
SERI-PCNB	NBDO		
The	PCNB	made	the	development	of	the	nation	brand	index	one	of	its	duties.	
In	cooperation	with	the	SERI,	the	PCNB	developed	and	published	the	result	of	the	
nation	brand	index	since	2009	(It	was	discontinued	with	the	abolishment	of	the	
PCNB	with	the	launch	of	Park	Geun-hye	government	in	2013).	Dissatisfied	with	the	
NBI	developed	by	Simon	Anholt,	the	Council	aimed	to	replace	it	with	their	own	
brand	of	nation	brand	index	to	indicate	the	changing	position	of	South	Korea	more	
effectively.		
The	nation	brand	index,	called	the	SERI-PCNB	NBDO	(nation	brand	dual	
octagon),	aimed	to	measure	the	dual	aspects	of	nation	brands	—	substance	and	
image	—	in	eight	categories	—	economy/corporations,	science/technology,	
infrastructure,	policy/institution,	heritage,	modern	culture,	people,	and	celebrities.	
(D.-H.	Lee,	2013;	C.-u.	Yu,	2013,	pp.	82-86).		
The	SERI-PCNB	NBDO	conceptualized	that	the	nation	brand	was	composed	of	
the	dual	aspects	of	“substance”	and	“image.”	The	SERI	argued	that	as	existing	nation	
brand	indexes	such	as	Anholt’s	NBI	(The	Anholt-GfK	Roper	Nation	Brands	Index)	
measured	only	“image”	and	“soft”	aspect	of	nation	brands	through	surveys,	they	
only	reflected	subjective	perception	of	the	nation	brand	and	lacked	objectivity.	Thus,	
the	newly	developed	index	combined	a	“soft,”	“image”	aspect,	and	a	“hard,”	
“substance”	aspect.	For	the	former,	the	index	conducted	a	worldwide	survey	of	
about	13,500	“opinion	leaders”	from	26	countries	(D.-H.	Lee,	2013).	For	the	latter,	it	
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incorporated	extensive	125	“hard”	statistical	data	already	published	by	
organizations	including	international	competitiveness	indices	by	IMD	and	WEF,	
other	statistical	data	from	the	World	Bank,	UNESCO,	and	others.	The	index	also	
divided	the	items	of	measurement	of	nation	brands	into	eight	categories.	The	SERI	
insisted	that	the	“octagon”	of	the	eight	categories	referred	to	David	Aaker’s	brand	
identity	model	and	Machiavelli’s	state	theory,	but	did	not	mention	Simon	Anholt	(T.-
h.	Yi,	2009).	However,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	“octagon”	was	devised	in	reference	
to	the	“hexagon”	in	the	Anholt-Gfk	Roper	Nation	Brands	Index	(the	hexagon	is	
composed	of	the	following	six	elements:	export	brands,	foreign	and	domestic	policy,	
investment	and	immigration,	tourism,	culture	and	heritage,	and	people).		
The	formulation	of	the	SERI-PCNB	NBDO	took	a	neutral	look,	based	on	
technical	expertise,	but	it	illustrates	the	business-oriented	bias	of	nation	branding.	It	
is	notable	that	the	SERI	took	the	lead	in	the	composition	of	the	index.	As	was	
examined	in	Chapter	4,	the	SERI,	as	a	subsidiary	of	Samsung	conglomerate,	
presented	the	grand	state	vision	in	the	direction	of	the	interest	of	big	business.	The	
formulation	of	the	nation	brand	index	is	a	continued	intervention	into	the	state	
strategy	by	the	SERI,	following	reports	such	as	“Attractive	Korea:	Strategy	for	
Entering	the	Rank	of	10	Most	Advanced	Countries	by	2015”	(Samsung	Economic	
Research	Institute,	2005a).	Especially,	the	“substance”	side	of	the	dual	measurement	
in	the	nation	brand	index	points	to	the	continuity	between	the	previous	reports	
which	emphasized	the	“substantive”	aspect	of	international	competitiveness.		
The	SERI-PCNB	index	also	confirmed	the	continued	perception	that	South	
Korea	was	undervalued	in	terms	of	the	nation	brand	(image)	in	comparison	to	its	
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substantive	value.	The	annual	reports	continued	to	identify	non-economic	areas	
such	as	culture,	heritage,	government	and	policy	and	people	as	weak	points	in	
comparison	to	a	higher	mark	by	economy,	corporations,	and	technology.	This	
dichotomy	continued	to	suggest	that	the	nation	brand	problem	came	from	the	non-
economic	sectors,	not	from	economic	sectors.	Thus,	the	index	further	implied	that	
the	nation	branding	policy	was	not	limited	to	campaigns	and	public	relations	of	
national	image,	but	oriented	toward	a	wider	social	reform	from	the	business	point	
of	view,	as	examined	in	Chapter	4.		
The	PCNB	announced	that	during	its	tenure,	South	Korea	achieved	a	gradual,	
but	impressive	improvement	in	terms	of	nation	branding	ranking.	The	SERI	paper	
reported	that	South	Korea	marked	13th	in	terms	of	substance	and	17th	in	terms	of	
image	in	2012,	a	gradual	increase	from	19th	and	20th	in	2009	(D.-H.	Lee,	2013).	South	
Korea’s	position	in	this	ranking	is	significantly	high	marked	in	comparison	to	other	
major	related	indices	(22nd	by	IMD’s,	19th	by	WEF’s,	and	27th	by	NBI’s	index),	which	
the	PCNB	disregarded	as	not	suitable	to	South	Korea.	It	is	interesting	that	the	
Council	report	(PCNB,	2013b)	emphasized	a	different	aspect	of	the	same	data.	The	
report	did	not	mention	the	numeric	ranking	at	all.	Instead,	the	success	of	the	
performance	by	the	PCNB	is	illuminated	in	terms	of	a	different	index:	it	proclaimed	
that	South	Korea	passed	the	mark	of	the	OECD	average	(100)	in	both	terms	of	image	
(101)	and	substance	(103)	of	the	nation	brand	by	2012.	The	report	added	that	the	
figures	indicated	a	significant	improvement	from	2009	(89	to	101	on	image	and	97	
to	103	on	substance).	Moreover,	the	gap	between	the	two	aspects	was	significantly	
narrowed	(8	to	2).		
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The	SERI-PCNB	NBDO	turned	out	to	be	a	convenient	tool	for	the	PCNB.	
Rather	than	depending	on	the	Western	authority	of	well-known	indices,	the	PCNB	
devised	their	own	index	as	a	nation	brand	measurement	at	the	SERI’s	suggestion.	
This	notable	decision	to	replace	the	Western	authority	by	a	Korean	alternative,	
Samsung,	suggests	a	domestically	oriented,	politically-embedded	nature	of	the	
public	policy	for	nation	branding.	The	SERI,	with	the	power	of	Samsung	Group	in	the	
background,	exerted	a	significant	influence	and	authority	among	South	Korean	
elites	but	not	necessarily	outside	South	Korea.	The	invention	of	their	own	index	
suggests	the	domestic-oriented	nature	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	despite	
the	PCNB’s	declaration	that	it	would	raise	the	index	as	an	internationally	recognized	
indicator.	In	fact,	the	SERI	terminated	the	publication	of	the	index	as	the	PCNB	was	
abolished	in	2013.	Moreover,	the	invention	of	its	own	indicator	for	the	nation	brand	
suggests	an	increased	control	over	how	South	Korea	was	represented	in	the	nation	
branding	ranking.	Moreover,	holding	the	indicator	in	hand	also	suggests	control	
over	how	the	PCNB	and	the	South	Korean	government	performed	was	represented.	
Not	necessarily	implying	a	manipulation,	the	SERI	and	the	PCNB	were	able	to	make	
expedient	use	of	the	scientific-	and	neutral-looking	index	in	a	flexible	and	
convenient	way	to	their	own	advantage.	
Public	campaign	ads	on	nation	branding	
In	terms	of	international	publicity,	the	PCNB	aired	spot	commercials	on	
international	media	such	as	CNN,	Euronews,	BBC,	and	so	on,	publicizing	the	
“advanced	technology	and	design	Korea”	(PCNB,	2013a,	p.	299).	The	Council	also	
hosted	the	international	nation	branding	public	event	called	the	“Korea	Week.”	The	
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showcase	public	events	were	aimed	to	facilitate	the	bilateral	international	economic	
cooperation	and	cultural	exchange.44	Also	included	in	the	international	nation	
branding	activities	by	the	PCNB	were	the	hosting	of	annual	nation	branding	
convention	event	since	2011	and	the	setting	up	a	publicity	booth	at	the	2012	Seoul	
Nuclear	Security	Summit.		
However,	the	majority	of	the	PR	activities	by	the	PCNB	targeted	domestic	
citizens,	rather	than	overseas	audiences,	especially	in	the	first	term	when	it	devoted	
its	activities	to	the	preparation	of	the	2010	G20	Seoul	Summit.	In	2009	and	2010,	a	
series	of	public	service	advertisements	were	aired	under	the	commission	of	the	
PCNB.	Notably,	these	public	service	ads	were	commissioned	by	the	PCNB,	but	
actually	produced	by	major	private	conglomerates.45	These	campaign	ads,	produced	
in	Korean	language	and	mostly	aired	on	domestic	media,	suggest	the	domestic	focus	
of	the	nation	branding	campaign.	The	PCNB	boasted	these	ad	series	as	successful	
outcome	of	their	activities	(PCNB,	2013a,	pp.	320-326).		
Among	these	campaigns,	Asiana	Airlines	produced	a	couple	in-flight	public	
campaign	ads.	These	short	animation	ads	aimed	to	educate	Korean	tourists	going	
abroad	on	the	proper	behaviors	on	the	plane	and	in	places	like	museums.	Korean	
Air	followed	by	airing	a	public	service	advertisement	on	global	etiquette	on	the	
three	major	television	networks	(KBS,	MBC,	and	SBS).	This	ad	campaign	also	
	
44	These	events	were	held	in	Viet	Nam	(2009),	Indonesia	(2010),	Kazakhstan	
(2011),	France	(2011),	and	China	(2012).	
45	The	included	Samsung,	Hyundai	Motor	Company,	LG,	CJ,	SK,	Korean	Air,	
Posco,	Asiana	Airlines,	Woori	Bank,	Korea	Development	Bank,	and	KB	Financial	
Group.	The	list	looks	similar	to	that	of	the	companies	that	dispatched	their	
employees	to	the	PCNB.	
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featured	global	etiquette	in	various	situations	(for	instance,	using	“please”	when	
placing	order	in	the	restaurant).	The	ad	ended	with	the	onscreen	message	“You	are	
little	Korea,”	evoking	Korean	tourists	as	representatives	of	the	nation	(Y.-k.	Kim	&	
Chŏn,	2010).		
While	these	airline	companies	were	natural	fit	for	the	public	campaign	for	
global	etiquette,	other	public	campaign	ads	covered	wider	themes	in	relation	to	
nation	branding,	encompassing	the	contribution	to	the	international	community	
(Samsung	Group,	POSCO),	the	celebration	of	the	successful	hosting	of	G20	(Woori	
Bank,	KDB),	the	nation	pride	of	Korea	(DB	Financial	Group,	Hyundai	Motors	Group),	
and	global	etiquette	(LG	Group,	CJ-affiliated	tvN).	These	themes	also	suggest	the	
domestic	nature	of	the	nation	branding	campaign,	mobilizing	nationalistic	pride	and	
aiming	to	educate	domestic	audiences	on	globally-desirable	etiquette.		
Probably,	the	most	successful	was	the	public	campaign	ads	by	LG	Group.	LG	
Group	produced	a	series	of	public	campaign	ads	in	regard	to	nation	branding.	Early	
2010,	the	PCNB	released	a	“global	etiquette”	campaign	ad	in	collaboration	with	the	
LG	conglomerate	Group	(in	this	context,	“collaboration”	meant	that	LG	got	the	ads	
produced	and	covered	the	expenses).	Indebted	to	the	success	of	the	campaign	ad	in	
attracting	public	attention,	LG	Group	continued	to	release	three	additional	campaign	
ads,	focusing	on	“multiculture”	in	2010-2011	(LG	Group	Blog	Administrator,	2012).		
In	the	following	section,	I	analyze	the	“global	etiquette”	campaign	ad	by	LG.	
This	ad	is	interesting	not	just	because	it	was	well	received	by	advertising	experts	as	
well	as	the	general	public,	but	also	it	could	provide	an	interesting	case	that	suggests	
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intertwined	relations	between	the	government	and	the	private	sector	concerning	
nation	branding.		
“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	
This	advertisement	was	aired	to	raise	the	public	awareness	for	“global	
etiquette”	and	the	hospitality	toward	foreign	visitors	with	the	G20	Seoul	Summit	
near	at	hand.	The	event,	a	gathering	of	financial	ministers	and	central	bank	
governors	of	20	major	economies,	was	publicized	on	a	large	scale	by	the	
government	as	“a	crucial	opportunity	to	enhance	Korea’s	nation	brand	and	national	
prestige”	(PCNB,	2009b).	This	ad	was	aired	for	two	months	on	major	television	
networks.		
The	computer-graphic-based	animation	featured	various	Korean	and	
Western	characters	from	famous	Korean	and	Western	masterpiece	paintings.	These	
characters	were	in	contact	with	each	other	in	different	imaginary	situations.	The	40	
second	ad	is	composed	of	five	main	scenes	as	the	following:		
Scene	#1:	The	ad	begins	with	a	bird-eye-view	on	an	old	Chonsŏn	town.	The	
camera	zooms	in	and	cuts	to	a	gentleman	and	a	lady	in	modern	European	
costumes	looking	at	the	map	of	Korea	(Figure	1).	They	are	from	A	Sunday	
Afternoon	on	the	Island	of	La	Grande	Jatte	(1884)	by	Geoges-Pierre	Seurat.	A	
group	of	gentlemen	wearing	Korean	traditional	costumes	and	Confucian	hats	
approach	and	ask,	“May	I	help	you?”	(The	dialog	is	muted	but	is	shown	on	
screen	as	a	caption	in	both	English	and	Korean.	This	applies	also	to	the	other	
following	scenes	of	encounters).	They	are	from	Appreciation	of	Painting	(late	
18th	century)	by	Korean	painter	Kim	Hong-do.	Then	they	look	at	the	map	
together	and	one	of	them	points	the	way	with	his	folding	fan.	The	couple	nod	
with	gratitude	and	go	their	way.		
	
Scene	#2:	The	couple	are	watching	Korean	traditional	wrestling	(Figure	2).	
The	scene	is	from	Ssirŭm	(late	18th	century)	also	by	Kim	Hong-do.	A	boy	
hawker	is	back-stepping	and	bumping	into	a	bearded	man	in	a	postman	
uniform.	The	man	is	from	Portrait	of	the	Postman	Jeseph	Roulin	(1888)	by	
Vincent	Van	Gogh.	The	boy	bows	saying,	“I’m	sorry,”	and	the	postman	
responds	with	a	gesture	of	appreciation.		
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Scene	#3:	Two	young	ladies	are	riding	horses	led	by	a	young	man	and	they	
are	all	in	Korean	traditional	costumes	(Figure	3).	The	scene	is	from	Yŏnso	
Tapch’ŏng	(Youths	go	spring	picnic)	(late	18th	century)	by	Korean	painter	
Sin	Yun-bok.	He	picks	up	a	flute	and	gives	back	to	a	boy	in	a	Western	uniform,	
saying	“Here	you	are.”	The	boy	is	from	The	Fifer	(1866)	by	Édouard	Manet.	
They	bow	to	each	other	in	a	polite	manner.		
	
Scene	#4:	A	gentleman	in	Korean	costume	is	holding	the	door	for	two	women	
in	“ethnic”	costumes	carrying	baggage	with	both	hands	(Figure	4).	He	says,	
“After	you,	ma’am,”	and	they	pass	through	nodding	their	heads	with	
gratitude.	The	man	is	from	Two	Lovers	Under	Moonlight	(late	18th	century)	
by	Sin	Yun-bok,	and	the	women	are	from	Tahitian	Women	on	the	Beach	
(1891)	by	Paul	Gauguin.		
	
Scene	#5:	In	the	transitional	shot,	a	Korean	phrase,	“For	Korea	to	be	loved	by	
the	people	of	the	world”	is	shown,	synchronized	with	the	narration	(Figure	
5).	Then	the	camera	cut	to	two	gentlemen	smiling	with	each	other.	The	one	is	
from	Self-portrait	(late	17th	century)	by	Yun	Tu-sŏ,	and	the	other	is	also	from	
Self-portrait	(1889)	by	Vincent	van	Gogh.	Then	the	camera	cut	to	the	two	
getting	on	a	boat.	The	image	of	getting	on	a	boat	themed	from	Boat-riding	on	
the	River	(late	18th	century)	by	Sin	Yun-bok.	An	onscreen	message	
“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	shows	on	top,	and	the	logos	of	the	PCNB	and	LG	show	
side	by	side	on	the	bottom	(Figure	6).	
	
Throughout	the	ad,	theme	music	plays.	The	main	melody	is	played	by	
gayagŭm,	Korean	zither,	accompanied	by	Western	percussion	and	bass.	From	
scene	#4	to	the	end,	a	female	voice	narrates	over	theme	music,	saying	“Your	
impression	is	Korea’s	impression.	For	Korea	to	be	loved	by	the	people	of	the	
world.	Saranghaeyo,	Korea.	This	campaign	is	brought	by	the	Presidential	
Council	on	Nation	Branding	and	LG.”		
	
	 181 
	
Figure	1:	"May	I	help	you?"	(screenshot	from	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
	
	
Figure	2:	“I’m	sorry”	(screenshot	from	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
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Figure	3:	“Here	you	are”	(screenshot	from	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
	
	
Figure	4:	“After	you,	Ma’am”	(screenshot	from	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
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Figure	5:	“For	Korea	to	be	loved	by	the	people	of	the	world”	(screenshot	from	
“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
	
	
Figure	6:	End	title	(screenshot	from	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	ad)	
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The	ad	is	interesting	in	many	aspects.	First	of	all,	the	ad	is	interesting	in	
terms	of	the	production.	For	Korean	viewers,	the	ad	looked	and	sounded	familiar,	
not	just	because	it	featured	characters	from	the	familiar	Korean	and	Western	
masterpiece	paintings	that	they	learned	from	the	high	school	textbooks,	but	because	
it	modeled	after	a	well-received	ad	series	for	LG	products	that	also	featured	
masterpiece	paintings.		
In	2007-8,	the	LG	Group	launched	a	series	of	ads.	Those	ads	parodied	famous	
Western	and	Korean	masterpiece	paintings	within	which	LG	products	such	as	
television,	air	conditioner,	shampoo,	notebook	computer,	mobile	phone,	and	so	on,	
were	“placed”	in	a	PPL	(product	placement)	style.	The	ad	series	were	successful	and	
highly	praised	within	the	advertising	community	and	regarded	as	contributing	to	
the	premium	image	for	LG	products	and	brands	(Y.-k.	Kim,	Pak,	&	O,	2009).		
The	public	service	ad	for	nation	branding	by	LG	was	developed	on	the	basis	
of	the	themes	and	visual	templates	of	the	LG	brand	advertisements.	HS	Ad,	an	in-
house	ad	agency	for	LG	Group,	which	had	produced	the	LG	corporate	branding	
campaign	ads,	took	charge	of	the	production	of	the	public	campaign	ad	for	nation	
branding.	Thus,	the	seamless	continuity	between	the	corporate	brand	ads	for	LG	and	
the	public	service	ad	for	the	nation	brand	Korea	is	striking	in	terms	of	overall	
themes	and	visual	elements.	The	continuity	is	also	apparent	in	terms	of	sound.	The	
nation	brand	ad	adopted	one	of	the	signature	theme	music	pieces	of	LG	brand	
advertisements.	It	slightly	changed	the	original	mid-tempo	chamber	music	style	
piece	by	adding	Korean	traditional	instruments.	
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Even	the	awkward	phrase	in	the	public	service	ad,	“Saranghaeyo,	Korea”	was	
a	direct	adaptation	from	a	famous	signature	phrase	for	the	LG	brand,	“Saranghaeyo,	
LG.”	The	phrase	“saranghaeyo”	literally	means	“I	love	you,”	but	the	LG	Group	had	
used	the	expression	“saranghaeyo,	LG”	in	their	long-lasting	corporate	branding	
campaign.		
As	a	result	of	all	these	intertextual	and	institutional	continuities,	the	nation	
branding	ad	looked	and	sounded	like	a	typical	LG	corporate	brand	ad.	This	effect	
may	or	may	not	be	intended,	but	reveals	a	specific	relation	interwoven	through	the	
practices	of	nation	branding	between	the	government	and	the	private	conglomerate.		
The	PCNB	claimed	to	be	the	“control	tower”	for	nation	branding,	but	in	fact,	it	
depended	on	private	conglomerates	for	its	human,	financial,	and	creative	resources.	
It	asked	major	conglomerates	to	dispatch	their	marketing	staffs	and	to	produce	
public	service	advertisements	for	the	nation	branding	campaign.	In	this	way,	the	
government	asserted	its	public	authority	without	expanding	the	organization.		
Moreover,	the	nation	brand	and	identity	depended	on,	and	were	seamlessly	
conflated	with,	the	corporate	brand	and	identity.	The	private	conglomerates	
provided	corporate	resources	to	the	governmental	work	with	a	national	cause.	For	
the	production	of	the	public	service	advertisement	discussed	above,	the	LG	
conglomerate	utilized	their	resources	in	a	time-saving	and	cost-efficient	way	
because	they	used	their	in-house	ad	agency	and	utilized	their	own	pre-existing	
creative	templates.	It	was	a	profitable	business	for	LG	because	they	not	just	
inscribed	their	corporate	brand	in	the	nation	brand	but	also	earned	the	reputation	
for	“corporate	social	responsibility”	(CSR)	(Y.-k.	Kim	&	Chŏn,	2010;	Y.-k.	Kim	et	al.,	
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2009;	C.-y.	Yun,	2013).	In	this	way,	the	LG-produced	nation	branding	campaign	ad	
illustrates	an	interwoven	relation	between	the	government	and	business.		
The	ad	is	also	notable	in	terms	of	how	it	represented	South	Korea	and	the	
world	and	educated	citizens	on	global	etiquettes.	It	is	based	on	a	familiar	theme	of	
the	encounter	between	the	West	and	the	East	(Korea)	in	a	witty	way.	The	tradition	
and	culture	of	Korea	seemed	on	a	par	with	those	of	the	West	in	this	face-to-face	
encounter.	The	ad	gently	evoked	the	participation	and	hosting	of	the	G20	Summit	as	
something	for	Korean	citizens	to	be	proud	of.	Thus,	the	appeal	of	the	ad	hinged	on	
how	it	evoked	the	public	of	the	developmental	aspiration	for	the	status	of	an	
advanced	country.				
The	characters	coming	out	of	famous	masterpiece	paintings	interact	with	
each	other	in	polite	manners	following	globally-accepted	etiquette.	They	also	seem	
to	exchange	Korean	greetings	such	as	bowing	for	a	couple	of	times,	but	the	manners	
and	expressions	mostly	follow	the	Western	customs	of	politeness.	Aired	on	Korean	
television	networks,	the	public	service	ad	apparently	aims	to	educate	the	Korean	
public	to	learn	a	global	(Western)	way	of	being	hospitable	and	polite,	especially	in	
preparation	for	the	international	event	of	the	G20	Seoul	Summit.	
It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	the	famous	paintings	originated	in	Western	
Europe	although	the	G20	encompassed	various	countries,	not	just	Western	
European	countries,	but	also	the	BRICs	and	other	mid-to-large	economies	(Turkey,	
Saudi	Arabia,	Mexico,	Argentina,	South	Africa,	and	Indonesia).	The	“world”	
according	to	the	ad	was	configured	exclusively	to	the	West,	tailored	to	the	
developmental	aspiration	of	South	Korea.	Reminding	the	aspiration,	the	ad	
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attempted	to	persuade	the	citizens	to	learn	global	etiquettes	within	the	hierarchic	
imagination	of	South	Korea	and	the	world.			
Digital	media	and	citizen	participation	
The	PCNB	adopted	a	wide	variety	of	promotion	and	publicity	campaigns,	
which	notably	involved	citizen	participation	and	the	use	of	digital	communications.	
Especially,	The	PCNB	utilized	various	online	and	digital	media	platforms	as	a	“cost-
efficient”	method	of	publicity	and	promotion	(C.-i.	Yun,	2010,	pp.	120-121).		
First	of	all,	for	the	publicity	of	Korea’s	positive	image,	the	PCNB	set	up	its	
own	website	(Koreabrand.net),	blogs	(at	Naver.com	and	Daum.net),	and	other	
online	channels	(YouTube,	twitter,	Facebook,	etc.)	in	multiple	languages	(PCNB,	
2013a,	p.	251).		
More	notably,	the	PCNB	recruited	internet	users,	especially	college	students,	
to	produce	online	content	that	promoted	Korea’s	positive	image.	For	instance,	as	
part	of	the	effort	for	“public	diplomacy,”	the	PCNB	operated	“World	Students	in	
Korea”	program	from	2009,	in	which	international	students	residing	in	Korea	were	
selected	to	write	blog	posts	on	their	own	languages	about	various	aspects	of	Korea	
on	their	own	blogs	(PCNB,	2013a,	p.	247).		
Later	in	2010,	the	PCNB	also	launched	the	“Korea	Brand	Bloggers”	program	
in	which	Korean	web	users	(called	as	“Korea	brand	blog	supporters”	and	later	
“Korea	brand	content	reporters”)	were	recruited	to	publicize	Korea’s	various	
aspects	on	their	own	blogs	and/or	contribute	to	the	PCNB	publicity	website	(PCNB,	
2013a,	p.	264).	The	PCNB	provided	the	bloggers	or	reporters	with	a	small	amount	of	
writer’s	fee	as	well	as	an	access	to	various	events	and	camps	to	experience	Korean	
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culture	and	society	such	as	visits	to	industrial	facilities	and	historic	places	(PCNB,	
2009d).		
The	PCNB	also	organized	online	contests	and	events	in	collaboration	with	
major	global	or	domestic	commercial	online	services	such	as	Flickr,	YouTube,	and	
Pandora,	and	encourage	net	users	to	participate	in	nation	branding.	For	instance,	in	
2009,	the	PCNB	launched	the	“Korea	image	making	campaign,”	in	collaboration	with	
Flickr.com,	encouraging	net	users	to	upload	images	and	photos	positively	
representing	Korea.	The	PCNB	argued	that	the	campaign	successfully	changed	the	
search	result	of	the	keyword	“Korea”	on	Flickr,	reducing	North	Korea-related	
images	from	72	percent	to	39	percent	(PCNB,	2009b).		
For	another	example	among	many	others,	the	PCNB	held	a	series	of	“UCC”	
(user-created	content)	contests	on	the	YouTube	channel.	Under	the	broad	theme	of		
“Experience	Korea,”	the	PCNB	asked	domestic	and	international	net	users	to	upload	
their	own	video	clips	on	the	YouTube,	describing	“Digital	Life	in/with	Korea,”	“My	
Korean	Food	Recipe,”	“My	vacation	in	Korea,”	“My	G-20	Agenda,”	“Hangul	in	the	
World,”	and	so	on	(PCNB,	2013a,	p.	274).			
Within	the	marketing	and	business	circle,	such	ideas	as	“consumer	
participation	marketing,”	“customer	participation	marketing”	and	“consumer-
business	collaboration”	emerged	as	a	leading	trend	(Ku	&	Na,	2009).	Especially	the	
rise	of	digital	media	technologies	was	regarded	as	facilitating	the	“participatory”	
trend	of	marketing	in	the	age	of	“marketing	3.0”	(Kotler,	Kartajaya,	&	Setiawan,	
2010).		
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It	is	notable	that	the	PCNB	quickly	picked	up	the	buzzwords	in	the	rising	
marketing	trend,	“participation”	and	“digital,”	in	the	publicity	and	promotion	for	
nation	branding.	The	PCNB	was	able	to	adopt	cutting-edge	marketing	techniques	
(aside	from	how	successful	they	were),	indebted	to	its	organizational	structure	as	a	
government-business	collaborative	body	(C.-i.	Yun,	2010,	p.	127).	Through	these	
marketing	techniques,	the	Council	was	able	to	boast	that	they	induced	citizens’	
voluntary	involvement	and	contribution	to	nation	branding.	In	its	comprehensive	
report	in	2013,	the	PCNB	included	small	details	about	the	digital	participation	of	
citizens	(about	70	pages	out	of	350	page-report)	(PCNB,	2013a).		
In	the	“participation	marketing”	campaign,	the	Council	adopted	business	
marketing	tools	to	mobilize	citizens	for	nation	branding.	The	adoption	of	
participation	marketing	illustrates	the	changing	mode	of	citizen	mobilization	in	
government-led	campaigns	from	the	developmental	mobilization	of	the	past.	
Moreover,	the	PCNB	conducted	citizen	participation	marketing	through	digital	
media	in	a	cost-effective	way	by	passing	the	actual	work	of	promotion	on	to	the	staff	
from	business	and	to	participating	citizens	and	residing	foreigners.				
Branding	mobilizes	affective	attachment	and	emotional	loyalty	of	the	
consumer	(Arvidsson,	2005).	Nation	branding	appropriates	citizen	participation	in	a	
commercial	way	in	the	sense	that	the	nationalist,	patriotic	passion	is	converted	into	
collective	loyalty	to	the	nation	brand.		
The	nation	branding	campaign	through	the	participation	marketing	tools	
depended	on	the	social	conditions	in	which	the	“participants,”	who	were	usually	
college	students	seeking	jobs,	were	situated.	A	number	of	public	institutions	and	
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private	organizations	have	offered	idea	contests	and	prize	contests	that	usually	
involved	digital	media	activities	such	as	blogging	and	video	production.	Many	young	
college	students	in	South	Korea	have	been	eager	to	participate	in	these	contests	to	
add	a	line	on	their	résumé	and	to	increase	their	job	opportunities	(Y.-r.	Kim,	2009;	
Ku	&	Na,	2009,	p.	113).	In	this	context,	the	participation	marketing	tools	were	in	fact	
used	to	exploit	digital,	“free	labor”	of	participants	for	commercial	purpose	in	the	
guise	of	voluntary	and	active	participation	of	the	public	(Arvidsson,	2005). 
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	examined	the	public	policies	for	nation	branding,	focusing	
on	the	policy	activities	by	the	PCNB	and	investigated	the	nature	of	nation	branding	
in	South	Korea.	The	PCNB	took	the	role	of	coordinating	substantive	policies	that	
respective	governmental	departments	and	agencies	executed	and	the	role	of	
communicating	and	publicizing	the	governmental	public	policies	for	nation	
branding.	The	public	policies	for	nation	branding	were	governed	under	the	guidance	
of	the	principles	of	the	government-business	coordination	and	the	participation	of	
the	citizens.	Based	on	the	examination	so	far,	in	the	concluding	section,	I	will	discuss	
a	few	points	about	the	nature	and	implications	of	the	public	policy	for	nation	
branding.		
The	public	policy	for	nation	branding	needs	to	be	understood	in	the	
sociopolitical	context	of	the	advance	of	neoliberalization	and	provides	a	clue	to	
understand	the	post-developmental	contingency	of	neoliberalization	in	South	Korea.	
Neoliberalism,	among	other	dimensions,	could	be	conceptualized	as	a	set	of	
institutions	and	norms	which	put	the	whole	society	to	serve	on	the	imperative	of	
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market	competitiveness	under	the	premise	of	globalization	beyond	one’s	control.	In	
the	mandate	of	neoliberalization,	the	state	is	asked	to	be	revamped	as	a	brand-state	
in	the	global	market.	The	Lee	Myung-bak	government,	led	by	a	former	CEO	for	a	
conglomerate,	openly	advocated	neoliberal	ideology	by	proclaiming	business-
friendly	policies.	He	accelerated	the	process	of	neoliberalization	through	promoting	
outright	deregulation,	liberalization	and	privatization.		
The	PCNB	was	established	as	a	governmental	institution	at	presidential	level,	
symbolizing	a	serious	commitment	by	the	Lee	government	to	nation	branding	and	a	
brand-state,	which	the	business	sector	spearheaded	by	the	news	media	and	think	
tanks	have	demanded	for	years.	The	PCNB	coordinated	to	reorganize	and	straighten	
out	the	existing	public	policy	actions	with	regard	to	nation	branding,	which	were	
taken	care	of	by	various	governmental	departments	and	agencies:	including	
dispatching	volunteers	overseas,	providing	ODA,		promoting	Korean	culture	and	
Korean	studies	overseas,	executing	national	image	ads,	providing	supports	to	
multicultural	families,	educating	Korean	tourists	on	global	etiquettes,	and	so	on.		
These	policy	actions	for	nation	branding	aimed	to	promote	and	support	
Korean	business	overseas	as	well	as	attract	foreign	investment	and	tourists	by	
providing	a	favorable	socio-cultural	climate.	Nation	branding	seems	to	symbolize	
the	transformation	of	the	state	toward	a	neoliberal	governance	that	constructed	the	
business-friendly	space	of	the	competitive	“brand-state”	in	South	Korea.			
Considering	that	the	policy	actions	listed	above	were	in	fact	nothing	
completely	new	and	already	in	operation	by	respective	governmental	departments	
and	agencies,	what	really	changed	with	the	establishment	of	the	PCNB	was	that	they	
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were	rebranded	and	paid	more	attention	than	before.	In	that	sense,	the	main	focus	
of	the	PCNB	was	on	the	publicity	and	promotion	of	governmental	policies	on	nation	
branding	and	of	the	impending	global	event,	the	Seoul	Summit	of	G20	in	2010.	In	
terms	of	the	aspect	of	publicity	and	promotion,	the	PCNB	included	in	their	work	the	
development	of	the	nation	brand	index,	and	the	production	of	public	service	ads	on	
global	etiquettes,	and	the	recruitment	of	college	students,	domestic	and	
international,	for	the	publicity	of	Korea	through	digital	media.		
It	is	notable	that	these	publicity	activities	were	highly	dependent	on	the	
mobilization	of	big	business	such	as	Samsung	(for	the	SERI-PCNB	NBDO	index),	LG	
Group,	and	other	chaebŏls	(for	public	service	ads	and	digital	publicity).	However,	the	
appearance	of	the	mobilization	of	big	business	by	the	government	may	be	at	the	
same	time	the	continued	intervention	by	chaebŏls	into	the	state	management	and	
nation	branding	with	their	own	stake.	The	PCNB	in	effect	worked	as	if	it	was	a	
publicity	or	advertising	agency	run	by	big	business	for	the	government	in	the	name	
of	the	cooperation	between	the	government	and	business.	The	PCNB	highly	
depended	on	big	business	for	financial	and	creative	resources	while	big	business	
pushed	corporate	claims	in	the	nation	branding	campaign.	The	mobilization	of	big	
business	was	not	through	a	forced	pressure	by	the	government,	but	through	the	
sharing	of	interest	in	the	name	of	cooperation.		
The	PCNB’s	publicity	and	promotion	activities	also	reveal	how	they	
attempted	to	mobilize	citizens	for	nation	branding.	In	practice,	the	PCNB	made	its	
efforts	for	the	international	event,	G20,	and	attempted	to	mobilize	and	educate	
citizens	on	global	etiquettes	for	the	event.	It	implies	that	the	nation	branding	
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campaign	was	more	domestically	oriented	than	globally	conscious.	In	the	attempt	to	
mobilize	citizens,	the	PCNB	did	not	adopt	developmental	methods	of	coercion.	It	did	
not	even	use	admonishing	and	didactic	tone	adopted	by	the	nation	branding	
campaign	by	the	news	media.	Rather,	the	participatory	events	centered	on	a	
voluntary	method	of	using	digital	media	and	the	public	campaign	used	advertising-
styled	persuasion.	The	nation	branding	campaign	addressed	individual	citizens	for	
voluntary	participation	in	nation	branding	and	aimed	to	produce	the	subject	of	
“brand-citizens”	with	motivations	for	self-improvement	and	competitive	personal	
branding	in	the	neoliberal	context.		
Underlying	the	construction	of	neoliberal	brand-citizens	was	the	national	
imaginary	of	South	Korea	as	an	advanced	country,	standing	side	by	side	with	the	
Western	developed	countries	in	the	global	stage	in	the	G20	Summit.	In	particular,	
the	public	service	ads,	commissioned	by	the	PCNB	and	produced	by	LG,	projected	
the	aspiration	for	the	status	of	an	advanced	country	by	placing	the	Western	and	
Korean	paintings	side	by	side.	The	campaign	ads	urged	the	citizens	with	the	
aspiration	for	an	advanced	country	to	follow	the	global	standard	and	norm,	
symbolized	in	global	etiquettes.		
The	PCNB’s	public	policy	for	nation	branding,	especially	policy	actions	for	the	
publicity	and	promotion,	illustrates	how	the	productions	of	the	space	of	the	
neoliberal	brand-state	and	the	subject	of	the	neoliberal	brand-citizens	was	
predicated	on	the	post-developmental	imaginary	of	the	nation	as	standing	in	the	
rank	of	the	advanced	countries.		
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CHAPTER	6		
THE	“KOREA	PUBLICITY”	CAMPAIGN	AND	ITS	DISCONTENT	
	
A	print	ad,	placed	on	the	New	York	Times	in	March	12,	2014,	caused	a	little	
scuffle	in	the	public	discursive	space	in	South	Korea.	The	ad	(Figure	7)	featured	
Shin-soo	Choo	(a.k.a.	Ch'u	Sin-su),	a	South	Korea-born	Major	League	Baseball	player.	
Breaking	130-million-dollar	deal	with	the	Texas	Rangers	in	2013,	he	became	a	
celebrity	in	South	Korea	and	in	Texas,	but	not	necessarily	elsewhere.	In	the	ad,	he	is	
not	in	his	usual	baseball	helmet	and	uniform	which	baseball	fans	are	used	to,	but	in	
a	casual	outfit	without	a	baseball	cap.	In	this	way,	it	is	not	likely	that	he	is	
recognized	by	the	majority	(especially,	considering	the	ad	is	on	the	New	York	Times).	
Instead	of	holding	a	baseball	bat,	he	is	grabbing	a	dish	full	of	food	in	his	left	hand	
and	a	pair	of	chopsticks	in	his	right	fingers.	With	a	piece	of	meat	between	the	
chopsticks,	he	seems	to	suggest	that	readers	try	a	certain	kind	of	food.	From	the	
headline	of	the	ad,	"Bulgogi”	with	a	question	mark,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	food	is	
pulgogi	(bulgogi),	a	Korean-style	grilled	dish	made	of	beef	marinated	in	sweet	soy	
sauce.		
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Figure	7:	A	Korean	food	ad	titled	“Bulgogi,”	which	appeared	on	the	New	York	
Times,	March	12,	2014	(Image	from	the	article,	No,	2014).	
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The	next	day,	a	Korean	news	agency	Newsis	favorably	reported	the	
appearance	of	the	ad	(No,	2014).	The	report	relied	almost	exclusively	on	the	press	
release	package	provided	by	Mr.	Seo	Kyoung-duk	(Sŏ	Kyŏng-dŏk)	who	had	this	ad	
run	on	the	New	York	Times.	In	the	report,	which	were	widely	reproduced	across	
mainstream	media	in	South	Korea,	Mr.	Seo	expressed	his	intention:	“Mr.	Choo,	who	
has	a	lot	of	fans	in	the	United	States,	came	out	as	an	advertising	endorser.	With	him,	
I	want	to	introduce	pulgogi	to	New	Yorkers	in	a	more	familiar	way.”	Donating	his	
“talent”	to	the	ad	for	free,	Mr.	Choo	also	commented,	“I	agree	with	the	purpose	of	
publicizing	our	Korean	food	to	the	world.	As	a	Korean,	I	appeared	on	the	ad	to	
provide	support.”	The	news	report	also	featured	three	images	—	the	original	copy	of	
the	ad,	the	image	of	the	page	A8	of	the	New	York	Times	where	the	ad	was	printed,	
and	the	photo	of	the	two	gentlemen.		
For	many	South	Koreans,	the	message	of	the	ad	seemed	obvious.	An	ethnic	
Korean,	who	made	a	great	success	in	the	world’s	best	stage	and	won	respect	as	a	
national	pride	by	many	South	Koreans,	was	promoting	a	favorite	Korean	food	
pulgogi	to	the	people	of	the	world	on	the	world’s	prestigious	newspaper.	Associating	
Koreanness	to	many	“bests”	of	the	world,	this	ad	definitely	aimed	to	make	South	
Koreans	feel	good	about	and	be	proud	of	their	food,	their	country,	and	themselves.	
The	appearance	of	the	ad	itself	on	the	New	York	Times	became	a	news	item	widely	
reported	in	most	news	media	in	South	Korea.		
It	was	a	business	as	usual	for	the	news	media	to	widely	and	favorably	report	
this	kind	of	publicity	stunt	deployed	by	Mr.	Seo	and	others.	This	publicity	had	been	
called	“kukka	hongbo	국가	홍보”	(the	“promotion	of	Korea,”	or	the	“Korea	
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publicity”)46	in	South	Korea,	and	it	could	be	conceived	more	broadly	of	as	part	of	the	
“public	diplomacy”	by	non-government	actors.	The	news	media	had	been	reporting	
Mr.	Seo’s	publicity	stunt	as	a	goodwill	and	patriotic	act	for	years	by	then.		
In	the	next	few	days,	the	situation	changed	sharply	as	critical	remarks	on	the	
ad	spread	on	the	internet.	It	started	with	a	few	pieces	of	news	reports	or	rather,	blog	
postings	by	the	US	news	media.	Luis	Clemens,	editor	for	race	and	identity	of	NPR,	
followed	the	ad	that	he	found	“weird”	and	“disorienting”	(Clemens,	2014).	He	wrote	
that	he	was	not	able	to	understand	why	the	ad	was	advertising	a	generic	Korean	
food	rather	than	a	specific	brand	or	a	restaurant,	and	followed	the	clues	to	make	
sense	of	the	ad.	In	the	process,	he	was	led	to	the	website,	
ForTheNextGeneration.com	only	to	find	English	phrases	written	obviously	by	a	non-
native	speaker	and	a	more	confusing	hotchpotch	of	South	Korea-related	information	
such	as	K-pop,	Korean	food,	history,	territory,	and	the	2018	Pyeongchang	Winter	
Olympic	Games.	He	was	finally	able	to	locate	the	ad	in	the	context	of	a	series	of	ad	
campaigns	that	promoted	Korean	food	and	culture	that	Mr.	Seo	had	been	running	
for	several	years.	He	also	found	that	the	ad	was	sponsored	by	Chicken	Maru,	a	
Korean	fried	chicken	franchise,	which	was	also	a	mystery	to	him.		
The	ad	was	also	spotted	by	Jon	Tayler	of	Sports	Illustrated,	who	got	
interested	in	this	ad	because	it	featured	a	highly	paid	baseball	player.	In	his	online	
report,	he	called	this	ad	“bizarre”	(Tayler,	2014),	suggesting	its	poor	quality	and	
	
46	The	phrase	“kukka	hongbo	국가	홍보”	literally	means	“country-publicity”	
or	“country-promotion.”	In	this	study,	I	translate	it	into	English	as	the	“promotion	of	
Korea”	or	the	“Korea	publicity.”		
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messy	communication.	A	few	days	later,	David	Gianatasio	of	Adweek	found	this	ad	as	
“the	year’s	oddest	celebrity	endorsement”	(Gianatasio,	2014).		
These	cynical	remarks,	in	turn,	drew	serious	attention	in	South	Korea.	These	
articles	were	deemed	as	significant	news	reports	by	the	“influential	news	media	of	
the	United	States”	(McPherson,	2014)	although	they	were	as	casual	as	personal	blog	
postings	by	news	reporters.	Many	news	media	as	well	as	blogs	and	online	
community	forums	discussed	these	articles,	and	they	added	critiques	in	rather	
direct	and	heated	languages	than	those	suggestive	articles.	Some	blogs	and	
community	board	postings	advocated	the	sincerity	and	patriotism	of	Mr.	Seo	despite	
shortcomings	(for	instance,	K’ŭrosŭrod	(2014)	and	Kŏlpidi	(2014)).	Yet	many	
others	joined	the	harsh	criticism	of	his	ad	campaign	for	its	narrow-sighted,	
nationalistic,	self-centered,	and	unprofessional	amateurism.	Examples	are	found	in	
the	discussion	forum	on	reddit.com	("Choo	Shin-soo	bulgogi	advertising.	What	do	
you	think	about	this	ad?,"	2014),	and	the	discussion	that	followed	the	online	news	
article	on	huffingtonpost.kr	(P.	Kang,	2014).		
Notably,	the	criticism	raised	by	the	Western	news	media	reporters	drew	
wider	public	attention	in	South	Korea	even	though	some	domestic	writers	have	
already	raised	similar	criticisms	on	the	issues	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	by	
the	non-state	actors.	Moreover,	the	effects	of	the	criticism	by	the	Western	reporters	
published	in	the	US	media	websites	were	amplified	and	resonated	by	writers	and	
reporters	for	the	domestic	news	media.	Especially,	the	criticism	was	relayed	by	
those	writers	with	broader	transnational	experiences	and	cosmopolitan	
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perspectives	--	an	American	residing	in	Korea,	and	Korean	correspondents	residing	
abroad.		
For	instance,	Joe	McPherson	of	ZenKimchi,	a	Korean	food	blog,	criticized	the	
nationalist	blindness	of	the	ad,	the	Korean	media,	and	the	public.	He	wrote	in	the	
online	edition	of	Chung’ang	Ilbo:		
These	ads	are	confusing	and	ridiculous	to	Americans.	The	main	problem	of	
the	Korea	publicity	by	Seo	and	other	“brand	experts”	is	that	the	target	of	the	
publicity	is	not	foreigners.	They	want	to	say	to	Koreans,	“We're	doing	this.”	
The	Korean	media	would	spotlight	the	Korea-related	ads	in	New	York	Times	
or	Times	Square.	An	idiot	can	have	an	ad	run	on	the	New	York	Times	if	he	has	
money.	This	kind	of	nationalism	does	not	help	the	Korea	publicity.	If	you	are	
a	true	public	relations	expert,	you	need	to	thoroughly	analyze	the	target	and	
the	market	and	calculate	the	investment	effects	and	risks.	One	word	can	
describe	this	kind	of	ad:	embarrassment.	As	a	foreigner	who	loves	Korea,	I	do	
not	understand	why	Korea	continues	to	spend	money	to	make	such	a	
campaign	(McPherson,	2014).		
	
Jane	Han,	New	York	correspondent	of	the	Korea	Times,	an	English-language	
newspaper,	blamed	the	ad	for	making	a	Korean	sports	hero	“laughingstock.”	She	
called	the	ad	a	“PR	catastrophe”	(J.	Han,	2014),	failing	to	understand	the	PR	barrier	
beyond	confined	cultural	customs.	Pak	Chŏng-yŏn,	reporter	of	
Chaeoedongp'osinmun	(the	Overseas	Koreans	Newspaper),	residing	in	Cambodia,	
wrote	in	Ohmynews,	a	leading	online	news	media:		
Mr.	Seo’s	ads	were	made	from	Koreans’	perspectives	and	lacked	the	
consideration	of	foreigners	who	do	not	have	sufficient	understanding	of	
Korean	culture……	The	Korea	publicity,	which	started	from	the	sense	of	
cultural	superiority	and	self-centered	worldview,	can	risk	a	disgraceful	
calling	of	an	underdeveloped	country	and	generate	the	sneer	from	the	
international	society	(C.-y.	Pak,	2014).		
	
The	controversy	around	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	by	Mr.	Seo	suggests	
the	extent	to	which	publics	were	concerned	about	the	international	image	of	South	
	 200 
Korea	seen	from	the	external	perspective	in	line	with	global	standards.		While	the	
news	media,	celebrities,	and	the	public	had	almost	unanimously	supported	the	
Korea	publicity	activities	and	ad	campaigns	by	Mr.	Seo	and	the	like,	there	were	
raised	some	questions	and	critiques	against	Mr.	Seo’s	Korea	publicity	campaign	for	
several	years.	However,	with	the	Choo’s	pulgogi	ad	controversy,	the	perception	of	
the	Korea	publicity	campaign	suddenly	fell	from	“national	pride”	to	a	“disgrace”	(C.-
y.	Pak,	2014)	and	“shame”	(S.-d.	Sin,	2014).	The	controversy	around	this	ad	
campaign	illustrates	that	the	examination	of	the	national	image	promotion	should	
not	be	limited	to	the	governmental	public	policy	nor	to	the	news	media	campaign	
for	nation	branding	which	I	covered	in	the	previous	chapters.		
In	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	public	engagement	with	and	the	debate	around	
the	promotion	of	the	nation	brand	and	national	image.	Especially,	I	focus	on	an	
aspect	of	public	diplomacy,	performed	by	non-state	organizations	and	individuals	in	
the	name	of	the	“promotion	of	Korea”	or	the	“Korea	publicity.”		
First,	I	examine	how	non-state	actors	deployed	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	
the	public	engagement	with	the	nation	image	and	brand	promotion.	The	Korea	
publicity	campaign	emerged	as	nationalistic	responses	to	the	regional	politics	in	
East	Asia	in	the	context	of	increasing	global	exchanges	and	technological	availability.	
Since	the	late	2000s,	in	response	to	governmental	policy	initiatives,	the	campaign	
has	concentrated	on	the	promotion	of	Korean	food.	In	this	discussion,	I	examine	the	
nature	of	the	public	engagement	with	nation	branding	and	how	it	articulated	the	
collective	desire	for	the	international	recognition	of	the	excellence	and	legitimacy	of	
South	Korea	by	the	world.		
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Next,	I	examine	the	public	debate	and	critiques	around	the	Korea	publicity	
campaign.	The	critiques	pointed	out	the	problem	of	the	campaign	in	terms	of	its	
excessive	nationalism	and	the	lack	of	professionalism	and	expertise	in	advertising	
and	public	relations	and	the	mismanagement	of	communication	messages	and	
methods.	They	suggested	that	a	more	effective	publicity	should	focus	more	closely	
on	the	target	audience	of	the	world,	rather	than	asserting	its	own	cultural	legitimacy	
and	supremacy.	The	critiques	further	suggested	that	the	publicity	should	follow	
adequate	universal	cultural	codes	and	professional	protocols	in	line	with	the	global	
standard.		
Lastly,	in	the	concluding	section,	I	discuss	the	Korea	publicity	and	its	
criticism	within	wider	public	discourse	toward	the	advanced	nation.	I	discuss	how	
the	Korea	publicity	campaign	and	its	criticism	were	differently	predicated	on	the	
imagination	of	Korea	as	an	“advanced”	nation,	recognized	and	respected	by	the	
outside	world.	The	Korea	publicity	campaign	imagined	that	being	advanced	should	
be	recognized	by	the	West.	The	critics	were	drawn	to	the	imagination	of	an	
advanced	nation	as	embodying	global	standards	and	proper	business	codes.	
The	non-state	actors	for	the	Korea	publicity		
Since	the	early-mid	2000s,	the	discourses	of	nation	branding	and	national	
prestige	have	become	prevalent	in	South	Korea.	Under	the	Lee	Myung-bak	
government	(2008-2012),	nation	branding	was	instituted	with	the	establishment	of	
the	PCNB,	and	it	became	a	public	policy	priority.	Nation	branding	and	national	
prestige	became	a	discursive	framework	for	public	policy	against	which	other	major	
public	policies	were	legitimized.	Indeed,	side	by	side	with	the	public	policy	drive,	the	
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ideas	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	became	prominent	in	the	public	
discursive	space	as	well.		
In	this	broad	public	policy	setting	for	nation	branding	and	national	prestige,	
NGOs	and	individuals,	independent	of	the	government,	also	exerted	voluntary	public	
diplomacy	efforts.	In	fact,	the	public	diplomacy	by	non-state	actors	or	the	non-
governmental	effort	for	the	Korea	publicity	had	a	longer	history:	the	campaign	for	
providing	(correct)	information	about	(wrongly	known)	Korea	to	the	world	had	
developed	before,	and	independently	from,	the	government	campaigns	for	nation	
branding	by	the	Lee	government.		
The	non-governmental	campaign	for	the	Korea	publicity	emerged	as	
voluntary	individual	and	civic	activism,	triggered	by	the	regional	politics	in	East	
Asia.	Around	the	year	2000,	conflicts	over	historical	and	territorial	issues	
deteriorated	between	Korea	and	Japan	as	the	Japanese	government	attempted	to	
revise	history	textbooks	in	order	to	glorify	the	past	imperialist	Japan,	denied	
apology	and	compensation	over	“comfort	women”	issue,	and	claimed	sovereignty	
over	Tokto	(Dokdo)	islets	(called	Takeshima	in	Japan).	Japan	and	Korea	also	
competed	over	the	name	of	the	sea	between	them	(the	Sea	of	Japan	or	East	Sea)	in	
the	international	stage	(Bong,	2013).	Moreover,	the	Chinese	Academy	of	Social	
Sciences	promoted	the	“Northeast	Project,”	which	included	an	attempt	to	
incorporate	the	ancient	kingdom	of	Koguryŏ	(Goguryo)	in	Northeast	Asia	
exclusively	into	Chinese	history	(Gries,	2005).	The	Korean	government	responded	
to	these	provocations	by	Japan	and	China	on	the	history	and	territories	through	
diplomatic	and	policy	measures,	but	the	nationalist	sentiment	of	anger	and	
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resentment	grew	among	Korean	publics.	It	was	in	this	atmosphere	in	the	early	
2000s	that	voluntary	individuals	and	civic	activists	intervened	in	these	issues.	Most	
notable	among	them	who	engaged	with	the	publicity	activities	were	the	VANK	and	
Mr.	Seo	Kyung-deok.		
The	Voluntary	Agency	Network	of	Korea	(VANK)	was	founded	in	1999	by	Mr.	
Pak	Ki-t’ae	(Park	Ki-tae)	as	an	online-based	collaborative	network	of	volunteers	
(prkorea.com).	The	VANK	claims	to	be	have	up	to	75,000	members,	who	are	called	
volunteer	“cyber-diplomats”	(T.	a.-ŭ.	Song,	2015,	p.	212).	It	has	carried	out	a	
campaign	to	find	out	and	correct	“errors”	in	a	wide	variety	of	Korea-related	
information	in	textbooks,	libraries,	maps,	and	websites	(Wikipedia,	the	World	
Factbook	by	the	CIA	and	so	on)	around	the	world.	For	instance,	they	sent	letters	to	
those	who	were	in	charge	of	those	documents	and	records	and	pressured	to	change	
the	names	“Takeshima”	or	“Liancourt	Rocks”	to	“Tokto”	and	to	change	the	name	of	
the	“Sea	of	Japan”	to	“East	Sea.”	Notably,	a	majority	of	the	VANK	members	were	
composed	of	middle	to	high	school	students,	who	were	eager	to	use	“collective	
intelligence”	to	locate	erroneous	information	on	the	Internet	all	over	the	world	(T.	
a.-ŭ.	Song,	2015).		
Mr.	Seo	earned	considerable	media	and	public	attention	by	conducting	a	
public	service	ad	campaign	on	famous	newspapers	and	billboards.	Most	notably,	he	
had	a	series	of	full-page	opinion	ads	concerning	the	Tokto	issue	placed	in	the	New	
York	Times,	the	Washington	Post,	and	the	Wall	Street	Journal	since	2008.	He	also	had	
a	video-format	advertisement	run	on	the	electronic	billboard	in	Times	Square	on	
March	1,	2010,	the	anniversary	of	the	March	1st	Movement	against	the	Japanese	
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occupation	in	1919	(I.-s.	Kang,	2010).	Financially	sponsored	among	others	by	a	
popular	music	singer,	Kim	Chang-hun,	famous	for	his	generous	donations	for	cause,	
these	ads	affirmed	that	Tokto	belonged	to	South	Korea,	not	Japan	(C.-h.	Kim,	2010).	
These	ads	refuted	Japan’s	territorial	claim	for	Tokto	(“Do	You	Know”	ad	in	2008)(C.	
a.-h.	No,	2008),	blamed	the	“error”	(sic)	of	the	newspaper	for	using	the	name	“Sea	of	
Japan”	instead	of	“East	Sea”	(“Error	in	NYT”	ad	in	2009)	(No,	2009b)	(Figure	8),	and	
promoted	South	Korea	and	Tokto	as	tourist	attractions.	The	2012	Tokto	ad,	
sponsored	by	Gmarket ⁠1	(S.-h.	Pak,	2012),	argued	for	Tokto	being	South	Korean	
territory,	likening	to	Sicily	being	Italian	territory	and	Hawaii	being	American	(Figure	
9).	
 
 
	
Figure	8	"Do	You	Know?"	ad	in	2008	and	"Error	in	NYT"	ad	in	2009	(Images	
from	the	articles,	C.	a.-h.	No,	2008;	No,	2009b,	respectively)	
	 205 
	
	
Figure	9:	"Visit	Dokdo"	ad	in	Times	Square	in	2010	(image	from	I.-s.	Kang,	
2010)	and	"Connect"	ad	on	the	NYT	on	March	1,	2012	(C.-h.	Chŏn,	2012)	
	
Along	with	the	historical	and	territorial	issues	in	Northeast	Asia,	Mr.	Seo	
turned	to	promoting	Korean	food	in	his	ad	campaign	in	the	late	2000s,	by	the	time	
the	South	Korean	government	took	the	promotion	of	Korean	cuisine	as	one	of	the	
major	public	policy	agenda.	Especially,	in	relation	to	the	public	policy	effort	for	
nation	branding,	the	government	launched	the	Korea	Food	Foundation	(KFF)	and	
pushed	the	drive	for	the	global	promotion	of	Korean	cuisine	(한식	세계화	추진	
hansik	segyehwa	ch’ujin).	In	the	context	of	the	rise	of	nation	branding,	the	project	of	
Korean	food	promotion	was	regarded	as	contributing	to	national	economic	wealth	
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and	national	pride.	Thus,	the	project	was	widely	supported	by	the	news	media	and	
drew	attention	from	the	general	public.		
The	governmental	campaign	for	the	promotion	of	Korean	food	received	a	
positive	response	among	publics	as	it	was	regarded	as	enhancing	national	pride	and	
national	image.	It	was	regarded	as	an	apolitical,	national	issue	that	transcended	
partisan	interests.	In	the	public	opinion	survey	by	Korea	Research	in	2009-2010,	92	
percent	of	the	respondents	agreed	on	the	necessity	of	the	global	promotion	of	
hansik	(H.-c.	ŏ.	Yi,	2014).	Around	the	year	2010	when	the	nation	branding	campaign	
was	at	its	height,	it	was	regarded	as	a	great	national	cause	to	spread	good	images	
and	information	of	Korea	across	the	world.	Deeply	embedded	in	the	developmental	
as	well	as	neoliberal	imperatives,	the	best	way	to	deliver	it	passed	as	
commercialization	and	industrialization.		
Mr.	Seo’s	ad	campaign	found	extra	boost	when	he	was	featured	in	the	most	
popular	television	show	in	South	Korea	at	that	time,	Muhandojŏn	(Infinite	Challenge)	
on	Munhwa	Broadcasting	Corporation	(MBC).	The	reality-television-inspired	show	
set	various	challenging	goals	for	the	show	members	to	competitively	but	comically	
accomplish	or	to	work	out	together.	In	2009,	the	show	set	the	goal	of	promoting	
Korean	food	and	received	sponsorship	from	the	MoFAT	and	the	Korean	Food	
Foundation	(Chŏngch'aekkonggam,	2011).	The	show	invited	Mr.	Seo	for	the	
consultation	of	their	tasks.	Over	a	few	episodes,	the	show	followed	how	the	show	
members	along	with	Mr.	Seo	managed	to	conceive	and	produce	a	print	ad	to	
promote	pibimpap.	They	finally	had	the	ad	published	on	the	New	York	Times,	in	A23,	
December	21,	2009.	Titled	“how	about	bibimbap	for	lunch	today?,”	the	ad	featured	a	
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picture	of	pibimbap	garnished	with	egg	and	various	colorful	vegetables.	Then	it	
listed	17	Korean	restaurants	located	in	Koreatown	on	32nd	street	in	Manhattan	
(Figure	10).		
The	next	year,	the	show	members	made	efforts	to	produce	a	video	ad	on	the	
outdoor	billboards	at	Times	Square.	It	incorporated	a	variety	of	Korean	traditional	
and	modern	cultural	elements	(samulnori	performance,	puch'aech'um	dance,	
t’alch’um	dance,	t’aekwondo,	and	a	percussion	performance,	Nanta)	to	give	shape	to	
Korean	food,	pibimpap.	The	30-second	ad	ended	with	the	phrase,	“the	taste	of	
harmony,	bibimbap,”	epitomizing	the	concept	of	the	ad,	and	then	the	phrase	“the	
taste	of	Korea,”	with	the	shot	of	the	show	members	pausing	in	a	funny	gesture	
(Figure	11).	The	ad	was	run	every	30	minutes	until	the	end	of	the	year,	totally	about	
500	times.	This	ad	was	directed	by	Mr.	Ch’a	Ŭn-taek	(Cha	Eun-taek),	one	of	the	most	
prominent	music	video	and	ad	directors	in	South	Korea.	Mr.	Seo	also	participated	in	
the	production	as	a	Korea	publicity	expert.	It	featured	200	dance	major	students,	
exhibiting	various	traditional	Korean	dances	and	performances.47		
	
	
47	The	video	ad	is	available	to	watch	on	the	official	YouTube	channel	of	the	
KFF,	“the	Taste	of	Korea”	(The	Taste	of	Korea,	2010).		
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Figure	10:	"Bibimbap"	ad	on	the	New	York	Times	(Image	from	the	article,	
Hyŏn-jun	Kim,	2010)	
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Figure	11:	Screenshots	of	“Taste	of	harmony,	bibimbap”	ad	(Images	captured	
from	The	Taste	of	Korea,	2010).		
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These	ads	were	almost	unanimously	praised	by	the	news	media	as	well	as	in	
blogs,	online	forums,	and	social	media	for	creatively	showing	the	excellency	and	
diversity	of	Korean	food	and	culture.	For	instance,	a	blogger,	specialized	in	
advertising,	praised	the	colorful	and	dynamic	video	quality	of	the	ad	and	expressed	
a	patriotic	feeling	in	the	blog	posting	titled,	“Extraordinary	creativity”	(Kwanggoin,	
2014).	For	another,	Medius,	an	online	news	media,	published	a	blog-style	article,	
“Why	is	Muhandojŏn’s	pibimpap	ad	great?,”	which	praised	the	artistic	achievement	
and	the	patriotic	implication	of	the	ad:		
The	pibimpap	video	ad,	which	was	created	with	pure	patriotism	and	
enthusiasm,	with	help	by	civil	experts,	genuinely	expresses	a	thirst	and	
affection	for	our	own	thing.	Hundreds	of	participants	played	their	own	roles	
and	put	together	to	express	the	message	of	harmony	hidden	in	pibimpap,	
which	seemed	to	bring	us	back	together	in	the	time	when	we	are	scattered	
like	sand	(Ch’aimi,	2010).		
	
The	popularity	of	and	the	attention	to	the	video	ad	is	illustrated	by	the	fact	
that	many	Koreans	residing	in	or	visiting	the	Manhattan	area	bothered	to	visit	
Times	Square	to	see	this	ad	on	the	electronic	billboard	in	person.	Many	of	them	took	
photos	and	videos	on	their	own	of	the	billboard	running	the	ad,48	and	they	posted	
them	on	their	own	blogs,	community	forums,	and	on	their	YouTube	channel.	
Typically,	they	added	to	the	photos	and	videos	how	they	felt	patriotic	and	proud	of	
their	country	when	they	visited	the	venue.	For	instance,	Hŏ	Su-jin,	a	member	of	
“Young	Hyundai	Global	Reporters,”	a	community	group	of	college	student	interns	
	
48	These	media	cultural	practices	of	making	use	of	digital	technologies	and	
networks	are	called	“chiktchik	직찍”	and	“chikk'aem	직캠”	in	South	Korea,	which	
were	the	abbreviation	of	“chikchŏp	tchigŭn	sajin”	(photo	taken	in	person)	and	
“chikchŏp	tchigŭn	yŏngsang”	(video	taken	in	person)	respectively.	
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managed	by	Hyundai	Motors,	visited	Times	Square	and	wrote	a	blog	posting	of	the	
photos	of	Korea-	and	Hyundai-related	advertisements,	including	the	pibimpap	video	
ad	(S.-j.	Hŏ,	2010).	Rokimsa,	a	power	blogger	writing	its	everyday	life	in	New	York,	
visited	Times	Square,	waited	for	30	minutes	to	watch	the	pibimpap	ad,	and	posted	
photos	of	its	own	taken	with	pride	(Rokimsa,	2010).49		
In	2013,	Mr.	Seo	followed	up	to	have	a	series	of	print	ads	on	Korean	food	
placed	in	the	Wall	Street	Journal	and	the	New	York	Times.	These	ads	promoted	
representative	Korean	cuisines	such	as	makkoli	(makgeolli),	pibimbap	(bibimbap),	
and	kimch’i	(kimchi)	that	were	among	those	items	chosen	for	the	global	promotion	
of	Korean	food	by	the	government.	These	ads	featured	television	and	film	celebrities	
such	as	Song	Il-guk,	Yi	Yŏng-ae,	and	Kim	Yun-jin,	who	were	born	in	South	Korea	but	
more	or	less	gained	international	fame.50	They	willingly	appeared	in	the	ads	free	of	
charge	for	the	cause	(Figure	12).		
	
	
49	On	YouTube,	there	are	many	video	clips	of	the	pibimpap	ad	in	Times	
Square.	They	are	also	taken	and	uploaded	on	their	own	by	Koreans	who	resided	in	
or	visited	New	York	at	the	time	the	video	ad	was	running	on	the	billboard.	For	
instance,	cocoaya777	(https://youtu.be/VmiNLGIs0nA),	mintmochaa	
(https://youtu.be/aHuj1rAGlos),	jy3186	(https://youtu.be/nFlgRjqatas),	Yujin	Bae	
(https://youtu.be/hyBZZO8fVGw)	,	and	so	on.	
50	Song	Il-guk	(a.k.a.	Song	Il-gook	or	Song	Il-kook)	is	a	South	Korean	actor	
who	earned	fame	when	he	played	the	leading	role	in	the	Korean	historical	serial	
drama	Jumong,	televised	on	MBC	in	2006.		
Yi	Yŏng-ae	(a.k.a.	Lee	Young-ae)	is	a	South	Korean	actress	who	emerged	as	
one	of	the	most	famous	Hallyu	(Korean	Wave)	stars	when	she	played	the	leading	
role	in	the	enormously	successful	Korean	historical	serial	drama	Tae	Chang-gǔm	(or	
Dae	Jang	Geum),	televised	on	MBC	in	2003-2004	and	exported	to	gain	popularity	in	
East	Asia	and	Middle	East	afterwards.		
Kim	Yun-jin	(aka	Kim	Yunjin)	is	a	South	Korea-born,	American	actress,	who	
earned	fame	for	her	role	on	the	American	television	series	Lost,	televised	on	NBC	in	
2004-2010.	
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Figure	12:	"Bibimbap"	ad	featuring	Yi	Yŏng-ae,	shown	side	by	side	with	the	
front	page	of	the	New	York	Times	in	2013	(Image	from	the	article	"Yi	Yŏng-ae,	
nyuyokt'aimsŭ	pibimbap	kwanggoe	'chaenŭnggibu'	[Yi	Yŏng-ae,	'Talent	
Donation'	in	New	York	Times	bibimbap	advertisement],"	2013)	
	
Riding	on	the	successful	and	acclaimed	ad	campaign,	Mr.	Seo	brought	the	
Korean	food	ads	to	other	places	around	the	world	such	as	Pataya	(Thailand)	(J.-y.	
Kim,	2013),	Shanghai	(China),	Tashkent	(Uzbek),	Seoul	(South	Korea)	and	so	on	(No,	
2013;	S.-j.	Yu,	2013)	(Figure	13).	The	video	ad	was	also	aired	overseas	via	Arirang	
TV,	an	English-language	broadcasting	run	by	the	South	Korean	government	(Han-ju	
Kim,	2010).		
	
	 213 
	
Figure	13:	Mr.	Seo	pausing	in	front	of	"Bibimbap?"	ad	featuring	Yi	Yŏng-ae	on	
the	billboard	in	Qipulu,	Shanghai,	2013	(Image	from	the	article,	No,	2013)	
	
The	public	support	for	the	Korea	publicity		
The	non-state	actors	such	as	VANK	and	Mr.	Seo	were	widely	supported	and	
praised	by	the	mainstream	media	as	well	as	by	publics.	Through	their	prominent	
activities,	they	also	gained	a	wide	popular	participation	and	sponsorship,	as	well	as	
the	financial	support	by	the	government.	When	the	Lee	government	tried	to	slash	
the	budget	to	support	the	VANK,	it	was	harshly	criticized	by	the	media	and	had	to	
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restore	it.	The	news	media	and	publics	often	contrasted	the	government’s	behavior	
with	the	donation	by	a	popular	singer	Kim	Chang-hun	(a.k.a.	Kim	Jang-hoon),	who	
had	generously	supported	the	VANK	and	Mr.	Seo	(Y.-h.	Ch’oe,	2008).	Mr.	Seo’s	
campaign	ads	for	promoting	Korea	and	Korean	food	gained	wide	media	and	public	
attention	and	found	broad	support	and	praise.	The	pulgogi	ad	featuring	Mr.	Choo	
was	a	follow-up	of	the	series	of	ads	with	Korean	celebrities	endorsing	Korean	food.		
To	understand	the	positive	response	to	and	favorable	support	from	publics	
for	the	campaign,	two	major	conditions	should	be	considered	which	characterize	the	
non-state	activities	for	the	promotion	of	Korea.		
On	the	one	hand,	the	non-governmental	promotion	of	Korea	resorted	to	
nationalist	sentiment,	stimulated	by	regional	conflicts	in	East	Asia	such	as	history	
textbooks,	“comfort	women”	and	territorial	disputes	in	the	2000s.	It	also	reflected	
an	emerging	sense	of	national	pride	and	self-confidence	expressed	in	the	2002	
World	Cup	event.		
The	campaign	itself	often	became	a	focus	of	heated	exchange	in	the	
international	politics	in	the	region.	For	instance,	the	pibimbap	print	ad	in	2009	
became	an	object	of	a	quarrel	with	the	provocation	by	a	Japanese	journalist,	Kuroda	
Katsuhiro.	Having	resided	in	Seoul	over	30	years	working	for	the	right-wing	Sankei	
Shimbun	and	written	many	books	on	Korea	including	Korean	food,	he	caused	a	little	
stir	by	making	a	remark	with	regard	to	the	pibimbap	ad.	In	his	column	for	Sankei	
Shimbun	on	December	26,	2009,	the	far-right	journalist	wrote	that	the	food	was	
likened	to	“lamb	head,	dog	meat”	because	it	looked	colorful	and	beautiful	when	set,	
but	looked	strange	and	squashy	when	mixed	up	to	eat.	He	thus	showed	skepticism	
	 215 
about	the	global	success	of	the	food	(H.-s.	Kim,	2009).	The	four-character	Chinese	
idiom,	“lamb	head,	dog	meat”	(yangduguyuk,	read	in	Korean),	is	used	for	the	case	of	
exaggerated	packaging	and	even	hypocrisy,	a	similar	expression	to	“crying	out	wine	
and	selling	vinegar.”		When	his	column	was	reported	in	the	Korean	news	media,	
many	Koreans	took	his	remark	as	disregarding	Korean	food	and	insulting	Korean	
identity.	His	former	remarks	were	freshly	recalled	which	referred	to	Tokto	as	
“symbol	of	patriotism”	and	Japanese	comfort	women	as	“chose	[to	be	one]	out	of	
poverty”	("Chuhan	il	ŏllonin	hansik	hŭmjimnaegi	[Japanese	journalist	resident	in	
Korea	Scratching	Korean	food],"	2009).	Kim	T’ae-ho,	program	director	of	the	
Muhandojŏn	show	stung	back	at	him,	blaming	his	“ignorance”	(No,	2009a).	The	
controversy	escalated	as	Kuroda	claimed	in	his	next	column	that	he	had	received	a	
call	to	threaten	to	kill	him	(T.-g.	Song,	2010).		
The	non-governmental	campaign	for	the	Korea	publicity	helped	and	was	
helped	by	this	rising	nationalist	sentiment	in	the	context	of	East	Asian	geopolitics	
(Takahara,	2007).	The	governments	occasionally	attempted	to	utilize	the	nationalist	
sentiment	among	publics,	but	they	were	usually	cautious	and	even	reluctant	to	
resort	to	popular	nationalism	in	the	matter	of	formal	diplomacy.	The	nationalist	
public	often	regarded	the	official	line	of	diplomacy,	the	so-called	“quiet	diplomacy”51	
	
51	“Quiet	diplomacy”	in	South	Korean	context	refers	to	the	diplomatic	policy	
line	in	which	keeping	a	low	profile	and	exerting	back	channels	and	personal	
contacts	is	regarded	as	the	best	method	of	the	management	and	the	resolution	of	
international	conflicts.	It	especially	refers	to	the	official	diplomatic	line	concerning	
the	Tokto	issue.	As	South	Korea	maintains	the	“substantial	ownership	and	effective	
control”	of	the	islets,	it	argues,	it	is	South	Korea’s	best	interest	not	to	respond	to	the	
provocations	by	Japan.	However,	quiet	diplomacy	was	often	caught	up	in	
controversies.	For	instance,	in	2006,	when	Japan	attempted	to	conduct	maritime	
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by	the	government,	as	passive	and	half-hearted.	Instead,	the	public	praised	the	non-
governmental	efforts	for	the	Korea	publicity	by	the	VANK	and	Mr.	Seo	and	
contrasted	them	with	the	official	quiet	diplomacy.		
On	the	other	hand,	the	changing	media	environment	provided	a	fertile	soil	
for	“net	nationalism”	in	East	Asia	(Takahara,	2007).	Since	the	early	2000s,	news	
articles	have	been	consumed	more	on	the	online	platform	than	on	paper.	Moreover,	
online	news	service	was	monopolized	by	Naver,	a	monopoly	operator	for	online	
search	engine	and	portal	service.52	As	most	news	providers	(newspapers,	
broadcasters,	and	internet	news)	depended	on	the	Naver	News	service	by	Naver	for	
web	traffic	and	online	revenue,	they	competed	to	draw	attention	with	soft	and	
“tabloid”	news	items	which	could	induce	more	“clicks”	(C.-g.	Yi,	2007).	The	
subordination	of	news	to	Naver	and	the	“ghettoization	of	journalism”	exacerbated	
around	2010	(W.-g.	Kim	et	al.,	2013).		
The	news	featuring	the	Korea	publicity	were	suitable	news	items	for	the	
news	providers	to	exploit	in	this	media	environment	as	their	appeal	to	nationalist	
sentiment	and	their	potential	for	light	consumption.	Many	news	articles	of	the	Korea	
	
surveys	around	Tokto	waters,	the	liberal	Roh	government	seriously	reexamined	the	
diplomatic	line	(Ch’a,	2006).	A	public	opinion	survey	revealed	that	93	percent	of	the	
respondents	agreed	to	quit	the	quiet	diplomacy	line	(S.-g.	Im,	2006).	The	
government	was	not	consistent	with	the	Tokto	issue	and	caused	a	stir	when	Lee	
Myung-bak	visited	the	islets	in	2012	for	the	first	time	as	South	Korean	president	
(M.-k.	Kim,	2012).		
52	Naver	has	enjoyed	an	absolute	market	monopoly	position	since	the	early	
2000s.	By	2012,	Naver	had	a	share	of	72	percent	in	the	search	engine	market.	South	
Korean	internet	users	used	45	pages	on	Naver	when	they	did	55	pages	elsewhere.	
South	Koreans	spent	36	percent	of	internet	time	on	Naver	(C.-h.	Yi,	2012).	Most	
news	consumption	on	the	web	has	been	on	and	through	Naver.	Naver	News	service	
explained	40	percent	of	online	news	circulation	by	2007	(S.-m.	Yi,	2007).		
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publicity	were	exploited	by	the	news	media.	Numerous	online	news	services	
reproduced	and	duplicated	news,	and	the	legacy	news	media	(newspapers)	even	
produced	news	solely	for	consumption	on	the	web,	not	meant	for	print	publication.		
The	non-governmental	activities	for	the	Korean	publicity,	especially	by	Mr.	
Seo,	took	advantage	of	this	changing	media	environment.	At	first	glance,	their	
activities	proclaiming	“civilian	diplomacy”	seemed	to	target	international	audiences,	
but	in	fact	centered	on	the	domestic	news	media	and	audiences	at	least	in	equal	
measure.	His	press	kit	included	the	original	ad	materials	accompanied	by	other	
materials	such	as	actual	photos	of	the	newspapers	and	scenes	(see	figures	12	and	
13).	His	story	was	well	circulated	on	the	web,	not	necessarily	in	print,	first	by	the	
news	wires	(such	as	Yŏnhap	News	and	Newsis)	which	were	supplied	the	press	kit	by	
Mr.	Seo,	then	by	numerous	news	media	which	duplicated	and	reproduced	the	
original	stories	by	the	news	wires,	and	then	by	numerous	bloggers	and	online	
forums.		
Controversies	over	the	Korea	publicity		
While	the	promotion	of	Korea	by	the	non-state	actors	drew	positive	
responses	from	the	news	media	and	publics	in	general,	it	also	caused	controversies	
and	sparked	criticism,	cynicism	and	ridicule.	The	VANK’s	internet	activism	was	
rarely	put	to	criticism	by	the	news	media	and	publics	perhaps	because	it	was	mostly	
perceived	as	pure	and	just	activism	by	righteous	youth.	On	the	contrary,	Mr.	Seo’s	ad	
campaign	was	frequently	put	under	fire:	especially	a	series	of	Tokto	ads	(Figures	8	
and	9),	and	a	series	of	Korean	food	ads	(Figures	10-13).		
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In	this	section,	I	examine	how	publics	criticized	Mr.	Seo’s	ad	campaign	for	the	
Korea	publicity.	I	identify	two	different	modes	of	criticism:	the	one	is	the	criticism	of	
his	excessive	nationalism	and	the	other	of	his	lack	of	professionalism	in	public	
diplomacy,	advertising	and	public	relations.		
For	the	examination	of	the	former,	the	criticism	of	excessive	nationalism,	I	
looked	into	the	remarks	generated	and	circulated	in	two	of	the	largest	online	
subculture	communities,	DC	Inside	and	Ilbe.	They	generated	satirical	and	cynical	
remarks	which	ridiculed	and	criticized	Mr.	Seo’s	excessive	nationalism.	Moreover,	
subcultural	criticism	often	went	beyond	the	online	subculture	communities	and	
spread	widely	across	the	news	media	and	among	publics.	Their	neologism,	witty	
remarks,	and	sharp	satire	were	widely	shared	and	circulated,	reflecting	subcultural	
responses	to	the	contemporary	social	issues	in	South	Korea		
For	the	examination	of	the	latter,	the	criticism	of	the	lack	of	professionalism	
in	public	diplomacy,	advertising	and	public	relations,	I	focused	on	the	op-ed	
columns	by	news	reporters	and	experts	for	the	mainstream	news	media.	Focusing	
on	expert	opinions	in	this	matter	does	not	mean	that	they	did	not	criticize	excessive	
and	emotional	nationalism.	Rather,	the	criticism	of	excessive	nationalism	underlies	
the	critical	remarks	by	journalists	and	experts	on	Mr.	Seo’s	“unprofessional”	
practices	of	public	relations	and	public	diplomacy.		
These	two	aspects	are	closely	related	and	cannot	be	separated	in	a	clear-cut	
way.	The	distinction	between	the	two	aspects	of	criticism	has	an	analytic	purpose.	
They	are	followed	by	a	more	comprehensive	discussion.	Put	together,	the	
examination	of	the	criticisms	enables	to	locate	Mr.	Seo	and	the	controversies	around	
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his	campaign	in	a	wider	context	of	the	discourses	and	imaginations	of	the	state	and	
the	nation	in	South	Korea.	
Criticism	of	excessive	nationalism		
In	the	subcultural	game	of	playfulness,	Mr.	Seo	and	his	campaign	for	the	
promotion	of	Korea	was	not	just	put	into	criticism	but	became	an	object	of	ridicule	
and	mockery	and	provided	rich	materials	for	internet	memes,	jokes	and	buzzwords.		
His	ad	campaign	was	mentioned	for	the	first	time	in	2008	when	the	“Do	You	
Know”	Tokto	ad	(Figure	8,	left)	was	published	in	the	NYT.	At	the	time,	a	DC	Inside	
user,	Misuda,	posted	a	clipping	of	a	news	report	on	his	campaign	on	the	sub-
community	imageboard	without	any	specific	criticism	or	mockery.53	Consecutive	
Tokto-related	ads,	including	the	“Visit	Dokdo”	ad	in	2010	(Figure	9,	left),	drew	
mixed	responses	with	some	advocating	and	others	being	suspicious	of	the	effect	and	
hidden	intention.	On	the	one	hand,	for	instance,	a	DC	Inside	user	identified	!!!!!	
commented	on	a	television	talk	show	featuring	Mr.	Seo	positively	as	“a	meaningful	
program	as	the	National	Liberation	day	is	approaching.”54	Another	user,	identified	
as	Tokto,	gave	respect	to	Mr.	Seo	for	his	effort	to	advertise	the	Tokto	issue	by	
contrasting	it	with	the	neglect	of	the	issue	by	the	National	Assembly.55	On	the	other	
hand,	citing	an	expert	opinion	critical	of	Mr.	Seo’s	campaign	on	the	Tokto	issue,	a	DC	
	
53	Misuda	(2008,	July	10).	Kim	Chang-hun,	nyuyokt'aimjŭe	'toktonŭn	
han'gukttang'	chŏnmyŏn	kwanggo	sirŏ	[Kim	Chang-hun	carries	a	full-page	
advertisement	in	the	New	York	Times,	“Tokto	is	Korean	terrority”].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=suda&no=507329	
54	!!!!!	(2008,	August	10).	Murŭp'p'aktosa	miribogi	[Previewing	a	knee-
jerkdosa].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=kanghodong&no=21502	
55	Tokto	(2008,	August	12).	Sŏgyŏngdŏgiran	min'ganinŭn	[A	civilian	Sŏ].	
Retrieved	from	https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=stock&no=4626328	
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Inside	user	Tchoyŏjunŭnhyŏna	ridiculed	him	of	misrepresenting	Tokto	for	a	tourist	
destination.	The	user	continued	to	denounce	Mr.	Seo	as	“an	exemplar	of	stupid	
patriotism.”56	Other	postings	in	2011	blamed	Mr.	Seo	for	his	commercial	intention	
behind	the	Tokto	ads,57	and	called	his	activities	as	a	“selling	patriotism.”58		
Meanwhile,	“Bibimbap”	ads	produced	by	the	Muhandojŏn	team	in	
collaboration	with	Mr.	Seo	in	2010	(Figures	11	and	12)	have	generally	been	
acclaimed	within	online	subculture	communities,	not	quite	different	from	the	
responses	from	the	blogosphere.	One	DC	Inside	posting,	written	by	the	user	Ann,	
titled	“Yes,	that’s	the	way	to	promote	Korea,”	praised	the	team	and	Mr.	Seo	for	
exerting	efforts	to	promote	Korean	culture.59	Another	DC	Inside	user	Ttugimcyu	
showed	an	expectation	about	the	ad	and	a	wish	to	see	the	ad	in	Times	Square	in	
person.60	Yet	another	posting	by	Kŭraesŏ	praised	the	ad	for	its	colorfulness	and	
quality.61		
	
56	Tchoyŏjunŭnhyŏna	(2010,	August	11).	Toktogwanggo,	punjaengjiyŏgŭro	
pich'ige	hanŭn	yŏkhyogwaman	[Tokto	advertisement,	only	adverse	effect	that	
makes	it	appear	as	conflict	zone].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=etc_program&no=1465984	
57	Rhrh	(2011,	April	17).	Kim	Chang-hunŭl	kkoktugaksiro	iyonghanŭn	Sŏ	
Kyŏngdŏk	[Seo	Kyung-duk,	who	uses	Kim	Jang-hoon	as	a	puppet].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=499966	
58	Balkiri	(2011,	August	12).	Toktoga	kukchejaep'ansoe	kal	kyŏnguŭi	
kaep'ibonŭn	saram	[When	Tokto	goes	on	to	the	International	Court].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=542096	
59	Ann	(2010,	December	8).	Kŭrae,	irŏn'gŏl	haeya	chintcha	taehanmin'gugŭl	
allinŭn'gŏji	[Yes,	that’s	the	way	to	promote	Korea].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=news_new&no=55070	
60	Ttugimcyu	(2010,	November	2).	Mudo	hansikhongbo	kwanggo	
tchingnŭndago	ham	[Mudo	Korean	Food	Promotion	Advertisement].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=yjs&no=64896	
61	Kŭraesŏ	(2010,	November	26).	Urinara	pibimpap	kwanggo	[Korean	
pibimpap	advertisement].	Retrieved	from	
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=Gdragon&no=121421	
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Then,	it	was	the	“Bulgogi”	ad	featuring	Shin-soo	Choo	in	2014	(Figure	7)	that	
led	to	an	explosion	of	criticism	of	excessive	nationalism	and	patriotism	in	the	online	
subcultures,	especially	in	Ilbe	community.	An	Ilbe	posting	by	P'ŭroyagup'aeninde	
cited	the	blog	posting	by	the	NPR	reporter,	mentioned	in	the	introduction	of	the	
chapter,	and	asked,	“Is	it	exposing	the	bottom?	I’ve	seen	it	since	the	pibimpap	ad	
came	out,”	and	commented,	“It	is	embarrassing	that	it	seems	to	expose	[our	
psychological]	complex.”62	A	comment	to	this	posting	lashed,	“Stop	kukppong	
marketing!”6364	A	user	Hyeryŏng’i	showed	a	feeling	of	hatred	toward	Mr.	Seo	and	
ridiculed,	“[He]	thinks	he	is	such	a	great	patriot.”65	An	agreeing	comment	
mentioned,	“Now,	it	is	funny	just	to	see	another	“Do	you	know,”	hahaha,”66	and	
another	comment	ridiculed	by	simply	asking,	“Pulgogi?	Kimchi?	Pibimpap?	Do	you	
know?”67	A	user	Paprdoxx	commented,	guessing	the	hidden	intention,	“I	don’t	think	
the	ad	was	made	for	Americans	to	see.”68	
	
62	P'ŭroyagup'aeninde	(2014,	March	18).	Sŏgyŏngdŏk	kyosu	tŭdiŏ	padak	
tŭrŏnanŭn'gŏnya?	ch'amna	pibimbap	kwanggohal	ttaebut'ŏ	arabwatta.	[Is	it	
revealing	the	bottom?	I’ve	seen	it	since	the	pibimpap	ad	came	out].	Retrieved	from	
http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506	
63	Kukhoeŭiwŏnhuboja	(2014,	March	18).	[Comment	to	the	posting].	
Retrieved	from	http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506	
64	Kukppoing	marketing	designates	a	hidden	marketing	plot	which	aims	to	
appeal	to	excessive	and	emotional	nationalism	and	patriotism.	More	discussions	of	
kukppoing	follow. 
65	Hyeryŏng’i	(2014,	March	24).	Kkolbogi	sirŭn	saekkiryugap.jpg	[A	fella	
whose	face	I	don’t	want	to	see].	Retrieved	from	
http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405	
66	Kanadaramabababa	(2014,	March	25).	[Comment	to	the	posting].	
Retrieved	from	http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405	
67	Praengkŭraempadŭ	(2014,	March	26).	[Comment	to	the	posting].	
Retreived	from	http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405	
68	Papardoxx	(2014,	June	15).	Sasilsang	Ch’ushinsu	anti	[Practically	
dismissing	Ch’u].	Retrieved	from	http://www.ilbe.com/view/6007957435	
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To	make	sense	of	the	seemingly	sudden	rise	of	criticism	of	Mr.	Seo’s	ad	
campaign,	it	is	necessary	to	put	it	in	the	context	of	a	wider	rhetorical	terrain	in	the	
online	subcultures.	The	ridicule	and	mockery	of	excessive	nationalism	had	become	
one	of	the	popular	plays	widespread	among	subcultures	since	the	early	2010s.	It	
was	partly	a	reaction	to	thriving	nationalism	on	the	internet,	which	greatly	helped	to	
boost	Mr.	Seo’	s	campaign.	The	online	subcultures	ridiculed	and	mocked	excessive	
nationalism	as	well	as	its	commercial	exploitation	by	the	news	media	and	
corporations.	These	online	subculture	communities	coined	playful,	tongue-in-cheek,	
and	to-the-point	neologisms	such	as	“kukppong	국뽕,”	“du	yu	no	두	유	노	do	you	
know,”	and	“haeoebanŭng	해외반응	overseas	reactions,”	and	widely	circulated	as	
internet	memes	beyond	the	subcultures.		
The	buzzword	kukppong	is	known	to	be	a	combined	word	of	kuk	(which	
means	the	nation)	and	ppong	(short	for	“hiroppoing,”	Japanese/Korean	slang	for	
methamphetamine).	Thus,	kukppong	designates	the	behaviors	intoxicated	with	
excessive	emotional	nationalism	and	patriotism.	The	term	became	a	widely	
circulating	buzzword	since	the	early	2010s,69	mocking	excessive	nationalism	and	
narcissistic	celebration	of	the	grandeur	and	greatness	of	the	nation	of	Korea.	The	
criticism	of	kukppong	culminated	in	January	2014	with	the	commercial,	which	E1,	
LPG	energy	company,	launched	ahead	of	the	2014	Sochi	Winter	Olympics.	The	
television	commercial	for	the	subsidiary	company	of	the	SK	conglomerate	featured	
	
69	It	is	not	easy	to	pin	down	exactly	when	the	term	kukppoing	was	first	used	
among	subcultures,	but	the	item	for	kukppong	appeared	in	Namuwiki	as	early	as	
2008	("Kukppong	(r1	edition),"	2008).		
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Yuna	Kim,	the	world	champion	of	figure	skating	from	South	Korea.	The	punchline	of	
the	commercial,	“You	are	not	Kim	Yuna,	you	are	the	Great	Nation	of	Korea,”	became	
controversial.	The	commercial	was	blamed	as	“kukppoing	marketing”	for	resorting	
to	“forced	patriotism”	with	commercial	intention	behind	(S.-y.	Pak,	2014).	Criticism	
around	this	commercial	reflected	the	changing	attitude	of	publics,	appreciating	
individual	achievement	and	distancing	from	excessive	nationalism.	Amidst	
torrential	criticism,	the	company	had	to	shut	down	the	commercial.		
The	term	began	to	be	in	great	circulation	in	2012	when	it	was	used	to	mock	
the	behaviors	of	news	reporters	who	excessively	and	obsessively	attached	to	South	
Korean	singer	Psy	of	globally	viral	hit	song	“Gangnam	Style”	(H.-p.	y.	Kim,	2014).	
The	term	was	used	in	combination	with	other	related	cynical	neologisms	and	
internet	memes	such	as	“du	yu	no”	and	“haeoebanŭng.”		
The	phrase	“du	yu	no”70	became	a	famous	internet	meme	for	sarcastically	
mocking	the	obsessive	pursuit	of	recognition	from	foreigners,	especially	from	the	
advanced	Western	countries.	It	became	widespread	when	a	video	clip	went	viral	
around	2013,	which	featured	an	exchange	between	a	South	Korean	reporter	and	the	
spokesperson	of	the	US	State	Department.	During	the	US	State	Department	briefing	
on	North	Korea’s	missile	tests	in	October	2012,	a	South	Korean	news	reporter	from	
Yŏnhap	News	asked	the	spokesperson,	“I’m	wondering	if	you	know	a	Korean	singer	
	
70	When	in	use	for	internet	meme,	the	phrase	“두	유	노”	(read	as	“du	yu	no”),	
a	Korean	transliteration,	was	usually	used	rather	than	the	corresponding	English	
phrase	“do	you	know.”	The	Korean	transliteration	might	reveal	that	this	phrase	was	
uttered	by	Koreans	in	a	didactic	and	awkward	way	and	carry	the	implication	of	
mockery	("Du	yu	no	[Do	You	know],"	n.d.).		
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Psy	and	his	song	“Gangnam	Style.”	Do	you	Know?”	[emphasis	added].	While	other	
reports	were	laughing	in	a	grin,	she	answered,	“No,	but	I	bet	you	my	daughter	does.	
She	loves	Korean	pop”71	(H.-p.	y.	Kim,	2014).	Korean	journalists	continued	to	ask	the	
same	question	“Do	you	know	Gangnam	Style?”	to	Hollywood	actor	Matt	Damon	and	
producer	Quincy	Jones	and	so	on	when	they	visited	South	Korea	in	2013.	The	
journalists’	behavior	of	unilaterally	demanding	recognition	of	Korea	were	
enormously	blamed	among	and	beyond	the	subculture	communities.	Since	then,	the	
phrase	“du	yu	no”	generated	a	number	of	internet	memes,	flexibly	combined	with	a	
series	of	South	Korean	celebrities	and	cultures	(such	as	Psy,	Yuna	Kim,	baseball	
players	Hyunjin	Ryu	and	Shinsoo	Choo,	Samsung	Galaxy	smartphones,	Korean	food	
such	as	kimchi,	pibimbap,	and	pulgogi,	K-pop	girl	group	Girls’	Generation,	and	so	on).		
It	is	hard	to	miss	that	Mr.	Seo	is	one	of	the	firsts	who	began	to	use	the	phrase	
“Do	You	Know”	in	his	ad	for	publicizing	the	South	Korean	ownership	of	Tokto	islets	
on	the	full-page	of	the	New	York	Times	as	early	as	2008	(Figure	8,	left).	The	ad	was	
rediscovered	and	retroactively	ridiculed.		
“Haeoebanŭng	해외반응”	literally	means	the	reactions	from	overseas	on	
Korea-related	issues	and	events	("Haeoebanŭng	[Overseas	reactions],"	n.d.).	This	
term	came	into	currency	at	the	time	of	the	launching	of	the	websites	which	
dedicated	to	providing	the	translation	of	overseas	reactions.	These	websites	
translated	news	and	magazine	articles,	but,	more	importantly,	community	boards	
and	social	media	comments	concerning	Korea-related	issues	and	events.	These	
	
71	The	video	clip	is	available	on	YouTube:	https://youtu.be/3qNx3nGySzg,	
last	accessed	October	13,	2018.		
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websites	such	as	gasengi.com	(2010	to	present)	and	gesomoon.com	(2007	to	2017)	
thrived	especially	when	there	were	international	sports	events	such	as	the	World	
Cup,	the	Olympics,	and	the	WBC	(World	Baseball	Classic)	by	providing	immediate	
translation	of	the	comments	from	communities	and	social	media	from	China,	Japan,	
the	US	and	so	on.72		
The	phrase	haeoebanŭng	is	plain	and	simple	and	does	not	imply	criticism	or	
derision	in	itself,	but	significant	is	the	fact	that	it	was	clearly	recognized	as	a	
“problem”	and	shared	as	a	buzzword	within	online	subculture	communities.	The	
phrases	haeoebanŭng	and	du	yu	no	illustrate	how	subcultures	and	increasingly	
publics	realized	the	overly	consciousness	of	others’	gaze	as	problems	and	became	
critical	of	obsessive	demands	for	overseas	recognition.		
Put	together,	these	neologisms	such	as	kukppong,	du	yu	no,	and	haeoebanŭng	
suggest	how	the	promotion	of	Korea	by	the	government,	the	news	media,	and	non-
state	actors	drew	positive	attention	and	support	as	well	as	increasingly	negative	
attention	and	criticism.	The	criticism	of	Mr.	Seo’s	excessive	nationalism	in	his	
campaign	for	the	Korea	publicity	can	be	well	understood	in	the	context	of	
subcultural	rhetorics	such	as	kukppong,	du	yu	no,	and	haeoebanŭng.	The	“Bulgogi”	
ad	featuring	Mr.	Choo	happened	to	come	out	in	March	2014	at	the	peak	of	such	
criticism.	Within	the	subculture	communities,	Mr.	Seo	became	the	name	
representing	kukppong.	He	was	recognized	as	a	person	who	forced	the	recognition	
of	Korea	in	a	way	that	could	not	be	easily	understood	and	accepted	by	the	presumed	
	
72	These	websites	got	less	popular	and	defunct	as	real-time	translations	
became	available	on	such	social	media	platforms	as	the	YouTube,	Twitter,	Facebook	
and	so	on.		
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audience.	It	was	the	news	media	and	experts	here	that	more	strictly	criticized	Mr.	
Seo’s	promotion	of	Korea	for	being	incomprehensible	and	unacceptable	to	the	
professional	level	and	global	standards.	
The	lack	of	professionalism		
The	second	aspect	of	the	criticism	of	Mr.	Seo’s	Korea	publicity	campaign	is	
that	of	the	lack	of	professionalism	in	public	relations	and	advertising	
communications	and	public	diplomacy.	Mr.	Seo	did	not	have	any	educational	and	
professional	background	and	experience	in	advertising	and	public	relations	before	
he	launched	the	advertisement	campaign.	However,	he	was	recognized	as	an	
“expert”	for	his	public	service	ad	campaign	in	the	promotion	of	Korea	and	was	able	
to	serve	as	a	member	of	the	advisory	board	at	the	PCNB.		
The	mainstream	news	media	did	not	lend	much	space	to	the	criticism	of	Mr.	
Seo’s	ad	campaign.	As	discussed	above,	the	mainstream	media	often	resorted	to	
nationalist	sentiment	for	inducing	more	clicks	and	views	on	the	internet	in	order	to	
generate	online	revenue	for	profit	and	for	survival.	Mr.	Seo’s	campaign	for	the	Korea	
publicity	had	continuously	provided	news	items	with	nationalist	flavor	as	well	as	
gossip	quality	to	draw	light	but	wide	public	attention,	which	fit	in	with	this	media	
environment.		
Serious	criticism	and	public	discussion	of	Mr.	Seo’s	publicity	campaign	were	
rare	and	limited;	they	were	raised	occasionally	by	some	journalists,	professors,	and	
experts.	The	mainstream	news	media	responded	only	when	the	campaign	caused	
controversy	and	consequently	became	a	sensational	news	item	itself.		
	 227 
The	criticism	of	the	lack	of	professionalism	can	be	summarized	in	two	points.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	criticism	directed	against	the	lack	of	a	basic	understanding	of	
the	communications	of	advertising	and	public	relations.	As	early	as	2008,	Sŏ	Hwa-
suk,	journalist	of	Han’guk	Ilbo	raised	a	rare	criticism	of	the	Tokto	ad	(“Do	You	
Know”	ad	of	2008,	Figure	8,	left):		
The	full-page	advertisement	in	the	New	York	Times	may	be	a	topic	in	Korea,	
but	it	does	little	to	encourage	public	opinion	in	America.	Sometimes	it	can	
make	a	bad	impression	on	the	matter.	Because	the	advertisement	is	what	an	
absurd	opinion	chooses	when	it	cannot	be	reported	on	the	newspaper	(H.-s.	
Sŏ,	2008).		
	
First	of	all,	advertising	and	public	relations	should	have	a	proper	
understanding	of	the	target	audience.	However,	although	the	Tokto	ad	seemed	to	
address	international,	American	audiences,	in	fact,	it	might	have	aimed	at	domestic	
audiences	as	target.	The	similar	criticism	and	suspicion	have	been	raised	against	Mr.	
Seo	by	the	subculture	communities,	the	suspicion	that	he	aimed	to	appeal	to	Korean	
audiences	so	that	he	sustained	his	“kukppoing	marketing”	(S.-y.	Pak,	2014).	
Moreover,	she	pointed	out	that	the	medium	of	advertising	might	not	be	able	to	elicit	
trust,	but	it	could	lead	to	mistrust	and	suspicion	among	readers.	She	argued	that	the	
obvious	historical	and	real-world	fact	of	Tokto	belong	to	South	Korea	did	not	need	a	
buying	of	advertisement	space	from	the	authoritative	newspaper.	Instead,	she	asked	
for	more	proper	ways	of	informing	the	reader	and	the	citizen	of	the	world	and	
gaining	international	public	trust.	Directly	writing	to	the	newspaper	could	be	more	
trustworthy	and	effective	method;	supporting	the	Korean	studies	and	researches	
related	to	Korea	could	work	better	from	a	long-term	perspective.	Implicitly	
criticizing	the	clumsiness	of	the	ad	campaign,	she	argued	for	a	proper,	systemic,	and	
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professional	way	for	the	promotion	of	Korea.	Rather	than	directly	bashing	the	
excessive	nationalist	sentiment	of	the	ad,	she	implicitly	criticized	the	amateurism	of	
Mr.	Seo’s	campaign	which	lacked	the	basic	understanding	of	the	modes	of	
communications	of	ads	and	public	relations.	
Similarly,	Ch’oe	Chin-bong,	professor	in	Journalism	at	the	Texas	State	
University,	criticized	the	“Bibimbap”	print	ad	in	2009	(Figure	10),	when	it	became	a	
hot	topic.	He	suggested	that	for	enhancing	the	nation	brand	and	national	image,	
buying	an	ad	space	was	not	as	effective	as	organizing	systematic	public	relations	by	
experts.	He	suggested,	for	instance,	that	the	government	should	support	Korean	
professors	and	experts	residing	in	the	US	and	other	countries	to	develop	their	own	
localized	public	relations	(C.-b.	Ch’oe,	2009).		
These	views	mainly	raised	the	question	about	the	effectiveness	and	validity	
of	the	ad	campaign	from	the	standpoint	of	expertise	in	journalism,	advertising,	and	
public	relations.	From	this	position,	Mr.	Seo	made	mistakes	which	went	against	the	
basics	of	advertising	and	public	relations.	As	an	amateur	lacking	professional	
knowledge,	he	was	seen	as	gaining	fame	and	profit	by	relying	on	nationalist	
sentiment,	according	to	the	suspicion	raised	from	the	subculture	communities.	
These	critiques	warned	against	excessive	nationalism	carried	out	at	the	expense	of	
expertise.	
On	the	other	hand,	while	trying	to	acknowledge	the	good	intention	and	
efforts	by	Mr.	Seo	and	other	non-state	actors,	the	writers	worried	that	amateurism	
had	adverse	and	negative	effects	on	the	official	diplomacy	by	the	government	and	
ultimately	national	interest.		
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The	official	diplomatic	policy	by	the	government	was	“quiet	diplomacy”	with	
regards	to	the	issues	such	as	Tokto,	Koguryŏ,	and	North	Korean	defectors.	South	
Korea	has	exerted	a	substantive	ownership	and	effective	control	over	Tokto	with	
sufficient	historical	evidence	supporting	the	Korean	sovereignty	of	the	islets.	Thus,	
concerning	the	Tokto	issue,	the	government’s	official	policy	was	not	to	respond	to	
the	provocation	by	the	Japanese	counterpart,	who	aimed	to	make	the	islets	look	like	
a	disputed	territory	and	be	recognized	as	such	in	the	international	governing	bodies.		
Kim	Tong-sŏk,	president	of	the	Korean	American	Civic	Empowerment,	a	US-
based	non-profit,	grassroots	political	organization	for	the	Korean	American	
community,	pointed	out	that	the	ad	could	generate	adverse	effects	by	giving	an	
impression	that	Tokto	might	be	a	disputed	territory.	He	argued	that	the	Tokto	issue	
was	a	matter	between	the	concerned	parties,	that	is	Japan	and	Korea,	not	a	universal	
issue	with	a	humankind	appeal,	like	the	human	right	issue	such	as	“comfort	
women.”	Thus,	he	suggested	that	the	public	diplomatic	efforts	by	civil	society	for	the	
Tokto	issue	should	be	in	line	with	the	overall	governmental	policy	for	national	
interest	(T.	g.-s.	Kim,	2010).		
In	fact,	this	issue	was	not	limited	to	the	non-state	actors	because	the	
government	as	well	as	the	mainstream	news	media	were	sensitive	to	the	popular	
nationalist	sentiment	and	inconsistent	with	their	positions	with	regard	to	“quiet	
diplomacy.”		
The	mainstream	news	media	has	been	raising	a	nationalist	voice	and	
criticizing	“quiet	diplomacy”	for	not	attending	to	public	opinion	since	the	mid	2000s.	
They	criticized	the	government	when	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	
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(MOFAT)	allegedly	pressured	to	stop	the	ad	campaign	run	by	Mr.	Seo	and	sponsored	
by	Mr.	Kim	(M.-k.	Kim,	2010;	k.	Yi,	2013).	Moreover,	the	President	Lee	Myung-bak	
visited	Tokto	on	August	10,	2012	for	the	first	time	as	the	incumbent	president	of	
South	Korea.	The	news	media	criticized	this	move	for	not	just	jeopardizing	the	
Korea-Japan	relations	but	also	ending	the	principle	of	“quiet	diplomacy”	and	
publicizing	Tokto	as	a	disputed	territory	to	the	world,	in	order	to	raise	the	
approving	rate	of	the	lame	duck	president	by	appealing	to	nationalist	sentiment	(K.-
m.	Yu,	2012).		
The	point	of	the	criticism	of	the	advertisement	was	that	the	ad	was	not	
convincing	to	the	readers	and	citizens	outside	Korea	and	could	not	produce	
intended	effects.	For	example,	the	Tokto	ad	of	2010	(Figure	9,	left)	was	criticized	for	
presenting	Tokto	as	a	tourist	destination.	However,	it	was	apparently	misleading	to	
advertise	the	rocky	islets,	uninhabited	with	no	regular	traffic	back	and	forth,	as	a	
tourist	destination.	The	ad	for	blaring	Tokto	for	tourism	was	not	just	disrupting	the	
principle	of	quiet	diplomacy,	but	also	it	was	not	supported	by	any	official	
governmental	policy	for	tourism.		
Moreover,	the	Tokto	ad	of	2012	(Figure	9,	right)	was	also	criticized	for	being	
ignorant,	self-centered,	and	insensitive	to	their	post-colonial	history	because	it	was	
a	relatively	recent	and	violent	history	when	Bali,	Sicily	and	Hawaii	were	
incorporated	to	Indonesia,	Italy	and	the	US	respectively.	This	attitude	of	
insensitivity	and	ignorance	was	blamed	for	giving	a	bad	impression,	rather	than	
enhancing	the	national	image	of	South	Korea.	
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The	criticism	of	the	lack	of	professionalism	by	a	few	journalists	and	experts	
was	limited	and	isolated	and	did	not	resonate	widely.	However,	the	situation	
dramatically	changed	with	the	“Bulgogi”	ad	of	2014,	introduced	earlier	in	the	
chapter.	Just	as	the	subculture	communities	poured	out	criticism	and	ridicule	of	the	
excessive	nationalism	and	the	ad,	the	mainstream	media	joined	by	publishing	op-ed	
columns	by	journalists	and	experts	as	well	as	by	contributing	to	the	circulation	of	
the	subcultural	criticism	to	wider	audiences.		
The	explosion	of	criticism		
In	the	criticisms	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	a	couple	of	observations	
are	striking.	One	is	concerning	“when”:	the	criticism	exploded	both	in	the	subculture	
and	in	the	mainstream	media	when	the	“Bulgogi”	ad	came	out	in	March	2004.	The	
other	is	concerning	“who”	and	“whose	voice”:	it	was	the	Western	journalists	who	
initiated	to	raise	critical	voices	against	the	“Bulgogi”	ad,	and	then	it	was	Korean	
journalists	and	experts	with	global	life	experiences	who	added	their	voices.	Despite	
some	criticisms	in	the	mainstream	media	and	harsh	derision	within	the	subculture	
communities,	Mr.	Seo’s	ad	campaign	was	not	put	into	criticism	and	under	scrutiny	
until	some	Western	journalists	and	a	Western	expatriate	residing	in	Korea	raised	
questions	about	the	“Bulgogi”	ad.	The	timeline	of	the	events	in	context	clearly	shows	
how	the	criticism	of	the	“Bulgogi”	ad	spread	and	how	the	Western	journalists,	
among	different	actors,	provided	a	crucial	tipping	point.		
The	“Bulgogi”	ad	was	published	in	the	New	York	Times	on	March	12,	2014.	It	
was	right	after	the	closing	of	the	2014	Sochi	Winter	Olympics,	during	which	sports	
nationalism	as	well	as	the	criticism	of	its	“kukppong”	culminated.		
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The	next	day	(considering	the	time	difference	between	South	Korea	and	the	
US,	it	was	half	a	day	later),	the	Korean	newswires	Yŏnhap	News	(K.-h.	Wang,	
2014)and	Newsis	(No,	2014)	favorably	reported	the	ad	featuring	the	interview	with	
Mr.	Seo.	The	news	reports	were	supplied	to	most	news	media	outlets,	including	the	
largest	news	aggregate	platform	Naver	News.	These	news	reports	circulated	to	draw	
some	favorable	comments	in	the	blogosphere	and	the	subculture	communities	in	
general.		
On	the	day	the	ad	appeared	on	the	NYT,	Jon	Tayler	from	the	SI	posted	a	short	
comment	on	his	blog	and	expressed	his	curiosity	and	confusion	(Tayler,	2014).	On	
March	13,	a	South	Korean	internet	news	site,	CBS	Nocut	News	reported	Tayler’s	
posting	as	well	as	Mr.	Seo’s	ad	(C.-r.	Im,	2014).	The	report	was	simple	and	straight	
and	not	necessarily	critical	of	the	“Bulgogi”	ad.	The	news	report	did	not	circulate	
widely	either.	At	this	point,	there	seemed	little	or	no	criticism	of	the	ad.		
The	situation	sharply	changed	with	the	blog	posting	by	Luis	Clemens	of	the	
NPR	on	March	14	(March	15	in	Korea	Standard	Time),	two	days	after	the	original	
NYT	ad	(Clemens,	2014).	Then,	on	March	16,	Clemens’s	critical	remarks	were	
reported	in	detail	in	the	English	language	newspaper,	Korea	Herald.	This	news	
article	was	published	in	Korean	as	well	as	in	English	(H.-n.	Park,	2014b).	The	news	
article	was	also	published	at	the	same	time	in	Naver	News	(H.-n.	Park,	2014a).	It	
began	to	circulate	in	the	online	communities	such	as	blogs	and	subcultural	online	
forums.	The	blogosphere	was	relatively	less	critical	of	Mr.	Seo’s	“Bulgogi”	ad.	Some	
blog	postings	advocated	the	ad	and	retorted	to	Clemens’s	article	as	“American-
centric”	and	“arrogant”	(Alivehs,	2014).	The	subculture	communities	began	to	
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respond	to	the	ad	and	the	news	report	by	Korean	Herald.	They	were	mostly	critical	
of	the	ad,	blaming	for	the	messy	communications	and	showing	their	embarrassment	
with	excessive	nationalism.		
Then,	on	March	18,	Kuki	News	reported	the	Clements’s	remark	as	well	as	the	
reaction	to	it	in	the	online	communities	(T.-p.	i.	Kim,	2014).	Kuki	News	is	the	online	
unit	of	the	national	newspaper	Kungmin	Ilbo,	dedicated	to	the	production	of	online	
news	content	for	Naver	News	and	other	news	service	platforms.	This	article	was	
published	in	Naver	News	and	drew	more	than	one	thousand	comments,	most	of	
which	were	critical	of	the	“Bulgogi”	ad.	In	turn,	the	article	widely	circulated	in	the	
subculture	communities,	blogs,	and	online	forums,	drawing	a	lot	of	attention	and	
criticism.	In	the	next	week,	small	and	big	news	media	rushed	to	publish	news	
reports	and	opinion	pieces	by	journalists	and	experts,	reacting	to	the	blog	postings	
by	Clemens	and	Tayler	as	well	as	an	article	at	Adweek	(Gianatasio,	2014).		
The	titles	of	the	pieces	below	suggest	the	extent	to	which	the	mainstream	
news	media	was	critical	of	Mr.	Seo’s	Korea	publicity	(J.	Han,	2014;	M.-h.	Kang,	2014;	
P.	Kang,	2014;	McPherson,	2014;	C.-y.	Pak,	2014;	S.-d.	Sin,	2014):			
Han,	Jane.	(2014,	March	19).	'Bulgogi'	ad	makes	Choo	laughingstock.	Korea	
Times.		
McPherson,	Joe.	(2014,	March	23).	The	ad	that	ruins	the	image	of	Korean	
food.	Joins.		
Sin,	Sŏng-dae.	(2014,	March	23).	Choo	Sin-soo's	pulgogi	ad	is	a	shame,	not	a	
publicity	for	Korea.	Deilian	[Dailian].		
Kang,	Pyŏngjin.	(2014,	March	23).	Why	is	Choo	Sin-soo's	pulgogi	ad	blamed?.	
Huffpost	Korea.		
Pak,	Chŏng-yŏn.	(2014,	March	25).	Choo	Sin-soo’s	pulgogi	ad…	frankly	
terrible.	Omainjusŭ	[Ohmynews].		
Kang,	Mi-hye.	(2014,	March	25).	If	it	had	listened	to	the	PR	expert's	advice	
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The	timeline	of	the	controversy	around	the	“Bulgogi”	ad	illustrates	the	way	in	
which	news	was	produced	and	circulated	in	the	online	environment	in	South	Korea.	
The	“Bulgogi”	ad	was	circulated	and	amplified	in	the	circuit	of	online	news	content	
producers,	online	news	platforms,	and	online	publics	in	a	circular,	self-referring	
fashion.	Mr.	Seo	provided	a	news	item	which	could	appeal	to	nationalist	sentiment	
and	get	attention	online.	The	news	media	effortlessly	produced	an	online	news	
article	based	on	the	press	release	provided	by	Mr.	Seo	and	distributed	it	on	the	
online	news	aggregators	such	as	Naver	News.	The	online	publics	excitedly	
responded	with	excessive	nationalism.	Usually,	this	would	have	completed	a	cycle.		
What	is	striking	in	the	timeline	is	that	it	was	the	blog	postings	by	the	
Western	journalists	that	triggered	the	deluge	of	criticism	of	the	ad	campaign.	In	the	
“Bulgogi”	ad	case,	a	new	cycle	was	opened	up	as	Western	journalists	reacted	to	the	
ad.	In	fact,	“overseas	reactions”	by	the	Western	media	were	themselves	news	items	
suitable	for	generating	exited	attentions	and	heated	responses.	This	time,	the	news	
report	elicited	cynical	criticism,	which	also	generated	a	lot	of	comments	and	
discussions	within	the	subculture	communities	and	the	blogospheres.	In	turn,	the	
online	public	responses	themselves	became	news	items	by	the	online	news	media.	
In	this	amplified	circulation,	the	news	media	followed	and	published	many	columns	
and	opinions	on	the	ad.		
The	observation	of	the	unfolding	of	the	controversies	around	the	Korea	
publicity	reveals	how	the	desire	for	international	recognition,	especially	by	the	
West,	has	driven	the	formation	of	public	discourses	in	South	Korea.	The	non-state	
actors	focused	their	activities	on	providing	and	disseminating	what	they	deemed	
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was	correct	information	about	Korean	history	and	territory.	They	also	devoted	their	
efforts	to	promoting	what	they	deemed	was	excellent	and	proud	Korean	culture	
such	as	food	culture.	The	campaign	was	widely	supported	by	South	Korean	publics	
because	their	campaign	resorted	to	nationalist	sentiment	and	the	public	desire	for	
international	recognition.	However,	the	responses	by	the	Western	journalists	
confirmed	that	the	ad	campaign	looked	weird	and	unidirectional	to	the	Western	
eyes	and	did	not	seem	to	follow	the	norms	and	standards.	Thus,	they	seemed	to	
reveal	that	the	Korea	publicity	could	not	achieve	the	said	purpose	of	winning	
international	recognition	and	enhancing	the	nation	brand.		
The	criticism	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	also	took	international	
recognition	seriously.	The	online	subculture	communities	not	only	criticized	the	ad	
but	also	felt	embarrassed	about	and	ashamed	of	the	obsessive	desire	of	excessive	
nationalism.	The	“overseas	reactions”	from	the	Western	journalists	confirmed	the	
subcultural	criticism.	In	addition,	the	feelings	of	embarrassment	and	shame	
illustrate	how	the	subcultures	were	conscious	about	the	significance	of	international	
recognition	and	the	potential	harm	of	the	misplaced	campaign	on	it.		
The	experts	and	journalists	who	participated	in	the	criticism	of	the	ad	
campaign	also	confirmed	the	significance	of	winning	international	recognition	and	
enhancing	the	nation	brand	and	national	image	from	the	West.	They	seem	to	suggest	
a	better	and	proper	way	of	earning	it.	They	suggested	that	the	international	
recognition	of	Korea	and	Korean	culture	could	not	be	achieved	by	advertisements	
but	by	proper	practices	of	advertising	and	public	relations.	They	implied	that	the	
professionalism	in	advertising,	public	relations	and	public	diplomacy	should	begin	
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by	understanding	the	target	audience,	in	this	case,	the	Western	audience,	and	by	
meeting	the	global	business	norms	and	standards.	
International	recognition	and	the	imaginaries	of	an	advanced	nation		
It	seems	that	one	of	the	most	important	keywords	in	understanding	the	
Korea	publicity	campaign	and	its	criticism	is	the	term	“international	recognition.”	
What	did	“international	recognition”	mean	to	the	campaign	and	its	criticism?	How	
was	“international	recognition”	conceived	and	constructed	in	different	ways	by	
different	actors?	The	varied	constructions	of	international	recognition	suggest	how	
national	imaginaries	were	rebuilt	in	different	ways	by	different	actors	in	the	
changing	conditions	of	globalization	and	infinite	competition	among	nations.	The	
varied	rebuilding	of	national	imaginaries	was	predicated	on	the	varied	sense	of	how	
South	Korea	was	like	and	a	certain	public	desire	for	what	South	Korea	should	be	
like,	conceived	through	the	construction	of	the	external	gaze.	The	Korea	publicity	
campaign	and	the	controversy	around	it	illustrate	how	the	formation	of	national	
imaginaries	was	predicated	on	the	external,	Western	gaze,	or	international	
recognition,	presumed	in	different	ways	by	different	actors.		
In	this	section,	I	will	discuss	different	ways	in	which	the	campaign	and	its	
criticism	conceived	of	international	recognition	and	reimagined	the	nation,	
especially	as	an	advanced	nation.	I	will	sum	up	and	discuss	how	the	three	different	
perspectives	—	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	the	subculture	communities,	and	the	
group	of	journalists	and	experts	—	conceived	of	international	recognition	and	how	
they	imagined	and	re-imagined	the	nation.	Especially,	I	will	examine	how	contested	
were	the	national	imaginaries	of	South	Korea	as	an	advanced	nation.			
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The	Korea	publicity	campaign	gained	wide	public	support	by	resorting	to	
rising	nationalist	sentiment	since	the	early	2000s.	Undergirding	the	popular	support	
for	the	campaign	was	the	sense	of	national	pride	of	the	economic	achievement,	the	
rise	of	corporate	national	brands,	and	the	expanding	popularity	of	popular	culture.	
The	Korea	publicity	campaign	led	by	Mr.	Seo	among	others	was	regarded	as	helping	
enhance	national	prestige	and	win	international	recognition.		
In	the	campaign,	international	recognition	was	constructed	from	a	self-
fulfilling	way.	It	was	assumed	that	winning	national	prestige	was	equated	with	
winning	international	recognition	and	the	latter	was	simply	equated	with	attracting	
a	high	level	of	attention	from	the	international	media	and	the	public.	Moreover,	it	
was	simply	assumed	that	appearing	in	the	high-profile	media,	even	if	by	buying	
highly	visible	ad	spaces,	might	guarantee	high	exposure	and	high	attention	from	the	
Western	media	and	the	Western	public.	This	assumption	was	based	on	the	self-
righteous,	nationalist	conviction	of	the	self-evidence	of	legitimacy	and	excellence,	
which	was	shared	by	the	non-state	actors	for	the	Korea	publicity	and	the	supporting	
public.	It	was	assumed	that	the	self-evidence	of	legitimacy	and	excellence	was	not	
well	recognized	due	to	misunderstanding,	obstruction	and	distortion,	and	the	
advertisement	and	public	diplomacy	of	the	Korea	publicity	would	help	to	wipe	out	
them.	Thus,	in	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	international	recognition	was	
constructed	in	an	imaginary	way	on	a	self-fulfilling	nationalist	desire.		
The	nationalist	construction	of	international	recognition,	as	a	particular	
reaction	to	the	geopolitical	situation	of	globalization	and	infinite	competition,	
reflected	a	certain	public	desire	for	what	kind	of	country	South	Korea	was	and	
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should	be.	Implicit	in	this	desire	was	the	re-imagination	of	the	nation	as	recognized	
for	its	legitimate,	excellent	and	advanced	status	in	terms	of	political,	economic,	
technological,	cultural,	as	well	as	historical	aspect.		
The	Korea	publicity	campaign	quickly	came	under	fire	and	criticized	as	
kukppong	once	its	arbitrary	and	self-fulfilling	construction	of	international	
recognition	and	self-contained	reimagination	of	the	nation	were	exposed	by	actual	
Western	journalists	who	did	not	have	a	stake	in	South	Korea.	
In	their	criticism	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	both	the	subculture	
communities	and	the	media	and	expert	group	shared	the	criticism	that	the	campaign	
was	based	on	a	naive	nationalist	sentiment	and	focused	on	self-satisfying	publicity	
and	advertising.		
The	subculture	communities	widely	used	the	expressions	such	as	du	yu	no,	
haeoebanŭng,	and	kukppong	to	critically	satirize	the	obsessive	seeking	of	
international	recognition	of	what	were	deemed	as	the	achievements	of	South	Korea	
especially	from	the	Western	media.	However,	the	cynical	reactions	did	not	indicate	
that	the	subculture	communities	did	not	care	about	international	recognition	or	
haeoebanŭng.	Rather,	they	had	been	so	eager	to	pay	attention	to	what	overseas	
online	media	and	communities	had	to	say	about	Korea	that	they	had	been	drawn	to	
the	subcultural	websites	dedicated	to	translating	“overseas	reactions.”	From	the	
perspectives	of	the	subculture	communities,	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	did	not	
make	visible	Korea’s	excellence	and	pride,	but	the	self-centered	nationalist	self-
portrait	of	Koreans	who	could	not	see	themselves	objectively.	In	contrast	to	
nationalist	knee-jerk	reaction,	the	subculture	was	self-conscious	and	self-reflective	
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to	the	extent	that	they	felt	ashamed	of	what	the	self-celebrating	advertisements	
which	did	not	think	through	an	objective	lens	would	look	like.		
It	is	not	clear	what	specific	imaginary	of	the	nation	the	subculture	
communities	shared	with	regard	to	their	criticism	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign.	
However,	we	can	have	a	glimpse	of	it	through	a	new	coinage	“Hell	Chosŏn,”	which	
became	a	buzzword	in	South	Korea	in	the	mid	2010s.	The	buzzword	Hell	Chosŏn	
described	a	state	of	despair	of	South	Korea,	especially	experienced	by	the	younger	
generation,	as	full	of	inequality,	unfairness,	unemployment,	gender	discrimination,	
extreme	competition,	and	everyday	power	abuse	(S.-W.	Koo,	2015).73	The	hellish	
status	of	South	Korea	was	emphasized	as	premodern	and	uncivilized,	especially	
when	it	was	combined	with	another	buzzword	migae	(uncivilized).		
The	subcultural	reactions	were	to	some	extent	predicated	on	the	same	
dichotomy	between	the	advanced	and	the	backward,	the	civilized	and	the	
uncivilized,	and	the	West	and	hellish	Korea.	In	the	subcultural	criticism	of	the	Korea	
publicity	campaign,	in	combination	with	the	imagery	of	Hell	Chosŏn,	the	nation	of	
South	Korea	was	imagined	as	lacking	a	normal	quality	expected	to	any	advanced	
modern	nation	(K.-i.	Pak,	2016;	U.-c.	a.	Yi,	2016).	The	premodern,	uncivilized	
imageries	of	the	nation	conjured	up	by	the	subculture	communities	were	completely	
opposite	to	those	of	advanced	nations,	idealized	in	particular	ways	by	the	nation	
	
73	Chosŏn	is	the	old	name	for	Korea	until	the	early	twentieth	century.	The	
expression	of	Hell	Chosŏn	referred	Korea	(South	Korea)	to	premodern	state	of	
Chosŏn.	The	term	originated	from	the	online	subcultural	disparagement	of	
premodern	Korea	(Chosŏn)	against	the	nationalist	self-aggrandizing	celebration	of	
Korean	history	and	expanded	its	connotation	to	designate	the	contemporary	state	of	
miserable	suffering	experienced	by	South	Koreans,	especially	by	the	younger	
generation.		
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branding	policy,	the	national	prestige	discourse,	and	the	Korea	publicity	campaign.	
To	the	subcultural	perspective,	the	blind	pursuit	of	national	prestige	and	the	
begging	of	international	recognition	by	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	was	the	exact	
shameful	component	of	Hell	Chosŏn.	
Sharing	the	criticism	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	with	the	online	
subculture	communities,	the	group	of	journalists	and	experts	took	international	
recognition	seriously	rather	than	cynically.	The	group	of	journalists	and	experts,	
who	shared	a	certain	understanding	of	global	capitalism	and	cosmopolitan	
perspectives,	criticized	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	run	by	Mr.	Seo	for	lacking	
professionalism.	The	campaign,	from	the	experts’	perspective,	lacked	proper	
understanding	of	advertising,	public	relations	and	public	diplomacy	and	generated	
adversary	effects	on	the	official	governmental	efforts	on	diplomacy	and	nation	
branding.	 
For	the	expert	group,	the	critical	task	for	South	Korea	to	gain	international	
recognition	was	to	obtain	global	citizenship	as	a	legitimate	partner	to	exchange	
dialog	in	the	global	community.	For	this	international	recognition	of	global	
citizenship,	it	was	deemed	crucial	to	embody	universal	rules	and	global	norms,	
universally	acceptable	for	professional	interaction	and	business	transactions	in	
global	capitalism.	Thus,	international	recognition	meant	to	be	accepted	as	a	normal	
partner	in	dialog	by	the	Western	media,	professionals	and	business.	 
By	criticizing	clumsy	communications	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign,	the	
group	of	journalists	and	experts	envisioned	South	Korea	as	a	normal	participant	in	
global	capitalism,	measuring	up	to	global	standards	and	norms,	on	par	with	other	
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advanced	countries.	The	imaginary	of	a	normal,	advanced	nation	came	to	this	group	
seriously	and	at	hand,	not	cynically	as	to	the	subculture	communities,	because	the	
issues	of	global	standards	and	norms	were	not	alien	to	this	group	which	lived	itself	
in	cosmopolitan	sensibility	and	international	business.		
In	this	section,	I	examined	how	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	and	the	two	
critical	perspectives	constructed	international	recognition	differently	and	suggested	
how	they	reimagined	the	nation	and	envisioned	an	advanced	country	through	it.	The	
examination	suggests	how	contested	the	idea	of	international	recognition	as	well	as	
the	imaginaries	of	the	nation	with	regard	to	the	aspiration	for	an	advanced	nation.	
Additionally,	it	suggests	how	South	Koreans	are	sensitive	to	the	external	view	of	
them,	and	especially	obsessive	about	the	Western	view.	The	excessive	
consciousness	of	the	external	view	underscores	the	anxiety	about	an	uncertain	
position	between	a	developing	and	developed	country	within	the	global	capitalist	
order.		
Conclusion		
In	this	chapter,	I	examined	how	publics	were	engaged	with	and	contested	the	
aspect	of	nation	branding	or	public	diplomacy	in	South	Korea.	I	critically	examined	
the	Korea	publicity	campaign	by	the	non-state	actor,	and	its	criticism	raised	by	the	
online	subculture	communities	and	the	group	of	journalists	and	experts.	The	
controversy	around	this	ad	campaign	illustrates	that	the	examination	of	nation	
branding	should	not	be	limited	to	governmental	public	policy	nor	to	the	news	media	
campaign.	It	suggests	how	publics	were	concerned	about	international	recognition	
with	regard	to	the	national	imaginaries	of	an	advanced	nation.		
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Reflecting	the	emerging	sense	of	national	pride	and	self-confidence,	the	
Korea	publicity	campaign	emerged	as	nationalistic	responses	to	the	regional	and	
global	politics.	Asserting	the	legitimacy	and	excellence	of	Korean	history	and	
culture,	the	public	engagement	by	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	articulated	the	
collective	desire	for	the	international	recognition	of	Korea	by	the	West.	It	was	
through	the	construction	of	international	recognition	that	the	national	imaginary	of	
an	advanced	country	was	imagined	and	reimagined.		
The	online	subculture	communities	raised	criticism	about	excessive	
nationalism	and	ridiculed	the	obsession	for	international	recognition	in	South	
Korean	society.	They	did	not	seem	drawn	to	the	national	imaginary	of	an	advanced	
country,	but	to	a	bleak	national	portrait	in	the	middle	of	hellish	competition	and	
hopeless	collapse.	The	subculture	communities	found	the	“overseas	reactions”	to	
the	Korea	publicity	embarrassing	and	exposing	the	hellish	reality	of	South	Korea.		
The	group	of	journalists	and	experts	criticized	the	problems	of	the	campaign	
for	the	lack	of	professionalism	in	public	relations	and	advertising	communications	
and	public	diplomacy.	The	criticism	suggested	that	the	publicity	should	follow	
adequate	universal	cultural	codes	and	professional	protocols	in	line	with	the	global	
standard.	From	this	perspective,	winning	international	recognition	should	be	the	
logical	consequence	of	professional	practices	by	meeting	up	the	global	business	
norms	and	standards.	The	perspective	suggested	the	imaginary	of	an	advanced	
nation	through	earning	normalcy	in	global	capitalism.		
In	this	chapter,	I	examined	the	unfolding	of	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	by	
the	non-state	actor	and	the	controversies	around	it	in	a	wider	context	of	public	
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discourses	in	South	Korea.	The	examination	revealed	how	the	desire	for	
international	recognition,	especially	by	the	West,	has	driven	the	contested	
formation	of	public	discourses	centered	on	the	imaginaries	of	an	advanced	nation	in	
South	Korea.		
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CHAPTER	7 
CONCLUSION		
	
The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	examine	how	the	discourses	and	
institutions	of	nation	branding	and	national	prestige	reshaped	the	social	imaginaries	
of	the	nation	in	South	Korea	since	the	early	2000s	until	the	mid	2010s.	I	followed	
the	trajectory	of	the	nation	branding	discourse	and	traced	how	it	was	converted,	
transformed,	and	articulated	with	other	actors,	discourses,	and	institutions.	In	doing	
this,	I	examined	different	moments	of	the	re-imagining	of	the	nation	of	South	Korea	
(rather	than	Korea)	as	an	advanced	nation	by	different	social	actors.		
Summary:	nation	branding	and	the	social	imaginaries	of	the	advanced	nation	
In	Chapter	4,	I	examined	how	the	news	media	played	a	crucial	mediating	role	
in	importing	and	disseminating	the	discourse	of	nation	branding.	In	the	late	1990s,	
Western	business	consultants	turned	the	techniques	in	marketing	and	business	
management	into	a	globally-circulating	governance	discourse	of	nation	branding.	In	
the	early	and	mid	2000s,	the	South	Korean	news	media	in	collaboration	with	private	
and	public	think	tanks,	embraced	and	localized	the	discourse	of	nation	branding.		
In	the	chapter,	I	showed	how	the	news	media	discourse	connected	the	
marketing-oriented	discourse	of	nation	branding	with	the	self-consciousness	about	
the	international	status	of	the	nation,	that	is,	“national	prestige.”	Through	this	
discursive	conversion,	the	news	media	successfully	promoted	nation	branding	as	a	
discourse	for	neoliberal	national	reform.		
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Mainstream	news	media,	strongly	linked	to	the	conservative	political	party	
and	sharing	interest	with	big	conglomerates,	promoted	nation	branding	as	a	state	
discourse	for	advocating	business	interest	as	well	as	for	accommodating	a	
conservative	government	in	the	presidential	election	in	2007.	They	launched	a	
series	of	massive	public	education	and	enlightenment	campaigns	with	series	
articles,	features,	and	op-ed	columns.	I	analyzed	how	these	news	articles	and	
columns	constructed	a	particular	national	narrative	of	the	past,	the	present	and	the	
future	of	Korea	through	the	lens	of	nation	branding.	The	news	media	narrative	
depicted	South	Korea	as	experiencing	a	unique	historical	process	of	the	double	
achievement	of	industrialization	and	democratization.	From	this	developmentalist	
perspective,	South	Korea	is	standing	in	the	world	at	the	threshold	of	being	in	the	
rank	of	advanced	countries.	Thus,	the	narrative	set	sŏnjinhwa	(being	advanced)	as	
the	national	goal	and	the	global	standards	as	a	way	to	realizing	the	goal.	Nation	
branding	in	practice	worked	toward	prioritizing	business,	controlling	labor	and	
society,	and	disciplining	the	conduct	and	behaviors	of	citizens.	In	this	operation	of	
nation	branding,	the	state	was	repositioned	as	the	neoliberal	manager	to	reorganize	
the	whole	society	for	the	benefit	of	business.		
The	social	imaginary	of	the	nation	provided	by	the	news	media	discourse	of	
nation	branding	geared	toward	a	particular	vision	of	the	advanced	nation	led	by	the	
neoliberal	corporate	state.	Thus,	the	discourse	of	nation	branding	by	the	news	
media	played	a	significant	role	in	the	ongoing	neoliberalization	of	South	Korea.	At	
the	same	time,	the	neoliberal	imaginary	of	the	nation,	depending	on	the	
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developmental	(post-developmental)	ideal	of	sŏnjinhwa,	showed	a	historical	
continuity	in	South	Korean	modernity.		
In	Chapter	5,	I	examined	how	the	conservative	government	instituted	the	
media-promoted	agenda	of	nation	branding	as	a	highly	visible	official	public	policy	
by	setting	up	the	Presidential	Council	for	Nation	Branding	(PCNB)	in	2009.	The	
discourse	of	nation	branding,	promoted	by	the	news	media,	was	elevated	to	the	
status	of	official	state	agenda,	providing	a	general	discursive	framework	for	other	
public	policies.	To	examine	the	official	public	policy	practices	of	nation	branding,	I	
analyzed	official	documents,	meeting	minutes,	advertising	and	promotional	
materials,	and	website	pages	of	the	PCNB	and	other	related	governmental	
departments	and	agencies.	Additionally,	to	get	a	wider	sense	of	the	public	policy	
practices,	I	also	used	interviews,	books,	columns	and	other	writing	written	by	those	
who	were	related	with	the	PCNB.		
Contrary	to	its	ambitious	rhetoric	and	grandiose	appearance,	the	PCNB	has	
not	gone	beyond	its	symbolic	gesture	of	proclaiming	nation	branding	as	a	state	
project.	The	Council’s	roles	were	quite	limited	to	regularly	presiding	over	meetings	
among	working-level	Ministries	and	other	governmental	agencies	in	charge	of	
actual	governmental	affairs,	and	mainly	organizing	communications	and	
promotional	activities	toward	domestic	citizens	rather	than	foreign	audiences.	
Closer	look	at	the	organization	and	activities	by	the	Council	revealed	that	its	focus	
was	on	the	advertising	and	promotion	toward	domestic	citizens	with	quite	a	small	
organizational	size	and	a	limited	budget.	I	especially	focused	on	two	of	the	
communications	and	promotional	activities	by	the	PCNB.	The	one	was	a	series	of	
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public	service	advertisements	which	aimed	to	educate	citizens	on	global	etiquettes.	
One	of	the	ads,	called	“Saranghaeyo	Korea”	was	analyzed	at	length.	Juxtaposing	
Korean	and	Western	art	works,	the	advertisement	evoked	national	cultural	pride,	
symbolizing	the	aspiration	for	the	international	status	of	South	Korea	standing	in	
the	world	on	a	par	with	the	Western	advanced	countries.	The	political	economy	
analysis	revealed	the	corporate-dependent	nature	of	the	nation	branding	campaign	
as	the	ad	was	produced	by	a	particular	conglomerate	(LG)	in	line	with	its	corporate	
brand	identity.	The	other	was	the	mobilization	of	young	citizens	for	online	
campaigns	for	nation	branding.	Utilize	the	trend	of	“digital	participation	marketing,”	
it	illustrated	how	neoliberal	orientation	of	the	state	to	create	a	corporate-oriented	
brand	space	and	to	encourage	brand	citizens	to	serve	the	nation	brand.		
In	Chapter	6,	I	turned	to	the	engagement	by	publics	with	nation	branding,	
whose	discursive	space	was	opened	up	by	the	news	media	and	the	government.	I	
focused	on	the	controversies	and	debates	around	the	“Korea	publicity”	campaign,	a	
form	of	public	diplomacy	led	by	various	non-state	actors.	I	followed	the	trajectories	
of	a	series	of	public	service	ads	which	were	produced	and	run	by	a	non-state	actor	
for	public	diplomacy.	These	ad	images,	featuring	Korea-born	celebrities,	were	put	
up	on	prestigious	newspapers	and	metropolitan	billboards	and	drew	considerable	
attention	as	well	as	generated	controversies.	Data	were	collected	for	the	analysis	of	
the	ads	and	their	criticism	by	online	subculture,	journalists,	and	marketing	experts,	
across	different	platforms	including	news	media	reports,	online	blog	postings,	
subculture	forums,	and	op-ed	columns	by	journalists	and	marketing	experts	at	
home	and	abroad.		
	 248 
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	showed	how	the	desire	for	“international	
recognition”	accorded	by	the	West	has	driven	public	discourses	and	shaped	the	
social	imaginaries	of	South	Korea	as	an	advanced	nation.	The	non-state	actors	for	
the	Korea	publicity	and	their	criticism	constructed	international	recognition	
differently.	The	former,	driven	by	a	nationalist	desire,	attempted	to	win	
international	recognition	by	aggressively	promoting	and	advertising	legitimacy	and	
excellence	of	Korean	history	and	culture.	For	the	latter,	the	self-celebrating	
nationalism	in	the	Korea	publicity	campaign	was	regarded	not	only	as	ineffective	
but	also	detrimental	to	win	international	recognition.	Instead,	it	should	be	won	
through	the	professionalism	in	advertising	and	publicity	and	the	embodiment	of	
universal	rules	and	norms	in	international	business.		
The	different	constructions	of	international	recognition	by	the	West	led	to	
different	reimaginations	of	an	advanced	nation	by	different	social	actors.	In	Chapter	
4	and	5,	I	discussed	how	the	advanced	nation	was	reimagined	as	a	business-friendly	
and	“lawful	and	orderly”	nation	in	the	news	media	discourse,	and	it	was	as	a	
neoliberal	“brand	nation”	in	the	public	policy	discourse.	In	contrast,	the	Korea	
publicity	campaign	articulated	a	self-content	nationalist	imagination	of	an	advanced	
nation	with	legitimate	history	and	excellent	culture.	In	the	online	subculture	
discourse,	reflexively	distanced	from	nationalism,	it	was	imagined	negatively	as	an	
opposite	of	the	current	status	of	Hell	Chosŏn.	In	the	discourse	of	cosmopolitan	
journalists	and	publicity	experts,	it	was	imagined	as	a	culturally	sophisticated,	
globally	accepted	nation,	internalizing	the	global	standards	of	universal	codes	of	
behaviors	and	civility.	The	analysis	suggested	how	different	social	actors	
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reimagined	the	nation	and	envisioned	an	advanced	country	through	different	
measurement	of	international	recognition.		
Critical	media	studies,	neoliberalism,	and	South	Korea’s	modernity		
In	the	analysis	of	the	discursive	circulation	of	global	phenomenon	of	nation	
branding	in	the	local	context	of	South	Korea,	I	made	an	academic	intervention	into	
and	potential	contribution	to	at	least	three	primary	areas	of	debate.		
The	first	area	I	engaged	with	is	the	critical	media	and	cultural	studies	where	
researches	on	nation	branding	and	public	diplomacy	are	expanding.	I	examined	the	
travel	and	localization	of	the	transnational	discourse	of	nation	branding	in	South	
Korea,	informed	by	critical	media	and	cultural	studies,	with	various	operations	of	
the	media	in	critical	focus.	In	the	analysis,	I	addressed	a	few	issues	present	in	this	
research	stream	in	critical	media	and	cultural	studies.		
First,	my	study	highlighted	the	domestic	dynamics	of	the	cultural	politics	of	
nation	branding.	In	Chapter	4,	I	described	how	the	transnational	discourse	and	
technique	of	nation	branding	was	imported	and	localized	by	private	and	public	
think	tanks	and	the	mainstream	news	media.	In	the	process,	I	examined	how	the	
news	media’s	discourse	of	nation	branding	mediated	the	interest	of	large	
conglomerates	as	global	actors	and	facilitated	that	of	the	conservative	political	
party.	In	Chapter	5,	I	looked	into	how	the	government	used	the	rhetoric	of	the	
nation	branding	and	national	prestige	for	its	domestic	political	interest	and	for	the	
interest	of	business.	In	Chapter	6,	I	examined	how	different	social	actors	adopted	
the	languages	of	the	nation	brand,	national	prestige,	and	international	recognition	in	
the	contestation	for	the	envisioning	of	the	direction	of	the	nation.		
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The	focus	on	the	domestic	cultural-political	dynamics	is	contrasted	with	the	
emphasis	by	some	existing	researches	on	the	role	played	by	transnational	
consultants	of	nation	branding	(Aronczyk,	2013;	Bolin	&	Ståhlberg,	2015;	Jansen,	
2008).		The	case	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	exhibited	that	the	“transnational	
promotional	class”	(Aronczyk,	2015)	played	a	limited	role	and	even	was	invoked	at	
the	convenience	of	domestic	actors.	My	study	is	in	line	with	some	other	critical	
studies	of	nation	branding	which	focused	on	what	is	going	on	in	the	domestic	
cultural	politics,	especially	among	elites,	in	the	name	of	nation	branding	and	public	
diplomacy	(Graan,	2013;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011).	I	contributed	to	this	stream	of	
research	by	examining	a	wider	range	of	cultural	politics,	not	limited	to	elite	politics	
but	to	encompass	popular	politics	raised	by	non-state	actors	as	well	as	online	and	
subculture	publics.		
Second,	relatedly,	my	study	also	addressed	the	question	whether	the	
orientation	of	nation	branding	is	internal	or	external.	While	it	sounds	obvious	that	
most	nation	branding	campaigns	look	outward	and	aim	to	project	a	positive	national	
image	toward	foreign	audiences,	it	should	not	be	taken	for	granted	that	it	has	
inherently	outward	orientation.	Many	researches,	including	mine,	attended	to	the	
inward	orientation	of	nation	branding,	seeking	political	legitimacy,	class	control,	
citizen	discipline,	and	nation	building	(Graan,	2013;	Kaneva	&	Popescu,	2011;	
Skilling,	2010;	Valaskivi,	2016;	Volcic	&	Andrejevic,	2011)}.	However,	nation	
branding	was	not	inherently	inward	oriented	either.	It	seems	that	the	
internal/external	orientation	was	contingent	to	domestic	political	and	geopolitical	
conditions	in	which	a	particular	state	and	government	was	hinged	on.	Thus,	the	
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internal/external	orientation	of	a	particular	nation	branding	campaign	should	be	
examined	on	a	case-by-case	basis	rather	than	in	accordance	with	a	predetermined	
pattern.	More	importantly,	the	two	orientations	were	not	exclusive	but	intertwined	
in	the	actual	process:	the	external	projection	of	the	nation	became	an	important	
factor	in	the	domestic	cultural	politics	by	which	ruling	elites	attempted	to	win	
cultural	hegemony	and	the	publics	were	stimulated	to	mobilize	nationalistic	
passions,	populist	discontents,	and	reformist	political	agenda.		
Third,	focusing	on	the	effects	of	the	internal-external	dynamics	on	domestic	
cultural	politics,	I	highlighted	the	multiple	roles	played	by	the	media,	which	were	
relatively	underdeveloped	in	nation	branding	research	in	critical	media	and	cultural	
studies.	In	Chapter	4,	I	focused	on	how	the	news	media	mediated	and	facilitated	the	
localization	of	the	discourse	and	technique	of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	with	
their	institutional	and	discursive	capacities.	In	Chapter	5,	I	critically	examined	the	
public	service	ad	images	in	combination	with	the	political	economy	analysis.	In	
Chapter	6,	I	featured	various	traditional	and	electronic	media	forms,	including	the	
news	media	reports,	ads	on	newspapers,	blogs,	online	forums,	and	advertising	
billboards.	I	focused	on	how	these	media	provided	platforms	on	which	images	and	
talks	with	regard	to	nation	branding	and	public	diplomacy	traveled	across	borders	
quickly.	It	was	in	this	technological	infrastructure	of	the	old	and	new	media	that	the	
nationalist	sentiment	as	well	as	its	criticism	were	escalated	within	the	self-referring	
feedback	loop.	My	study,	focusing	on	the	multiple	roles	played	by	the	media,	
corresponds	to	the	recent	call	and	attention	to	the	media	as	technologies	and	
organization	as	well	as	representation	for	the	implications	for	the	analysis	of	nation	
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branding	campaigns	(Bjola	&	Pamment,	2018;	Bolin	&	Miazhevich,	2018;	Bolin	&	
Ståhlberg,	2015;	Budnitsky	&	Jia,	2018;	Ingenhoff	&	Klein,	2018;	Jacobsen,	2018).	
The	second	area	I	aimed	to	engage	with	is	the	study	of	neoliberalism	with	
regard	to	the	state	and	the	nation.	In	Chapters	4	and	5,	I	examined	how	nation	
branding	facilitated	the	discursive	construction	of	the	nation	as	a	space	for	
international	competitiveness	and	the	state	as	a	“competition	state”	or	a	neoliberal	
manager	for	business	and	capital.	The	news	media’s	discourse	and	narrative	of	
nation	branding	urged	and	“educated”	the	state,	the	nation,	and	citizens	to	
“advance”	toward	global	standards	of	politics,	business,	and	civil	behaviors.	The	
public	policy	of	the	government	for	nation	branding	constructed	a	“brand	state”	
which	continued	favorable	relations	with	business	and	capital	and	mobilized	“brand	
citizens”	which	embodied	the	normative	imperatives	of	international	
competitiveness.		
The	observation	in	these	chapters	confirmed	the	broader	understanding	of	
neoliberalism	as	the	normative	imperatives	to	reorganize	the	whole	society,	
including	the	state	and	nation,	according	to	the	principle	of	market	competitiveness	
(Brown,	2005).	However,	the	other	important	point	I	aimed	to	make	in	the	analysis	
of	neoliberalism	was	not	to	understand	it	as	a	sweeping,	totalizing	logic,	but	as	a	
messy	process	with	many	contradictions	and	loopholes,	and	as	particularly	situated	
practices	(Hoffman,	2006a,	2006b;	K.	Mitchell,	1997;	Ong,	1997,	1999;	Rofel,	2007).	
My	dissertation	illustrated	how	the	public	policy	for	nation	branding	was	poorly	
planned	and	executed	“on	the	fly”	with	little	significant	effects	as	a	result.	I	also	
found	that	the	policy	was	embedded	in	private	interests	and	ambitions	of	
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politicians,	bureaucrats,	and	business.	Thus,	the	neoliberalism	of	nation	branding	
was	not	executed	in	a	clear-cut	way	but	was	entangled	in	a	murky	reality	of	
bureaucratic	incompetence	and	often	conflicting	political	interest.		
The	contingency	of	neoliberalism	in	South	Korea	was	striking	with	regard	to	
the	conceptual	framework	of	social	imaginaries	(Taylor,	2002).	From	the	
perspective	of	social	imaginaries,	nation	branding	needs	to	be	understood	not	as	a	
monolithic	idea/ideology	and	practice	of	the	neoliberal	doctrine,	but	a	set	of	
heterogeneous	ideas	and	practices	which	are	entangled	with	existing	ones	in	society	
(cf.	Ong,	1999).	Avoiding	the	understanding	of	neoliberalism	as	a	sweeping	logic,	I	
focused	on	how	the	neoliberal	logic	of	nation	branding	intersected	with	the	existing	
developmental	logics	in	South	Korea.	In	terms	of	social	imaginaries,	the	deployment	
of	nation	branding	in	South	Korea	illustrated	that	neoliberalism	hinged	on,	rather	
than	excluded,	the	very	ideas	of	the	state	and	the	nation	as	well	as	the	economy.	The	
social	imaginaries	offered	by	nation	branding	were	obviously	leaning	toward	
neoliberalism	in	which	market	competitiveness	was	prioritized,	but	they	were	not	
completely	alien	to	the	developmental	social	imaginary	where	the	ideas	of	the	state,	
the	economy	and	the	nation	were	central.	For	instance,	the	discourse	of	nation	
branding	oscillated	between	developmental	“aggressiveness”	and	neoliberal	
“attractiveness.”	Moreover,	neoliberal	competitiveness	centered	on	the	“competition	
state”	(Cerny,	1997,	p.	251)	and	depended	on	the	developmental	imaginary	of	the	
hierarchical	international	order.	The	rupture	and	the	continuity	with	developmental	
imaginary	is	central	to	the	understanding	of	modernity	in	South	Korea,	which	is	the	
next	discussion	topic.		
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The	third	area	of	engagement	is	the	study	of	modernity	in	South	Korea.	
Focusing	on	the	centrality	of	the	notions	of	the	state	and	the	economy	in	South	
Korean	modernity,	I	found	that,	in	line	with	nation	branding,	the	ideas	of	national	
prestige,	international	recognition	and	the	advanced	nation	not	just	revealed	the	
continued	Western-oriented	nature	of	modernity	in	South	Korea	but	also	became	
the	crucial	discursive	sites	for	the	contestation	of	the	social	imaginaries	of	the	
nation’s	modernity.		
The	prospect	of	South	Korea’s	modernity	is	ambivalent.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
emphasis	on	the	aspects	of	culture	and	civility	in	modernity	indicated	a	degree	of	
reflexivity	of	the	economy-centered	development	and	modernization.	On	the	other,	
the	reflexivity	of	developmental	modernity	seemed	quite	insufficient	and	superficial	
in	that	culture	and	civility	were	within	the	Western-oriented	hierarchy	and	even	
mobilized	for	economic	growth	and	development.	In	that	sense,	South	Korea’s	
developmental	modernity	is	not	seriously	challenged,	if	often	questioned,	which	is	
evidenced	by	the	general	silence	and	indifference	in	South	Korea	to	climate	change	
and	environmental	issues	beyond	lip	service.		
Limitations	and	suggestions		
There	are	several	limitations	to	this	study.		
First,	my	analysis	was	mostly	limited	to	representations,	narratives,	and	
discourses	related	to	nation	branding	(Chapters	4	&	5).	The	analysis	primarily	
aimed	to	follow	the	trajectory	of	fast-moving,	quick-transforming	discourse	of	
nation	branding.	For	this	purpose,	my	data	were	limited	to	quickly	surveying	the	
“surface”	of	the	discursive	circulation.	In	that	sense,	it	was	inevitable	to	some	extent,	
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but	it	would	have	unfolded	a	more	complete	picture	of	the	discursive	arrangement	
with	an	in-depth	research	of	those	who	were	actually	involved	in	each	discursive	
and	institutional	process	(in	the	bureaucracy	and	the	business	world).		
Secondly,	the	research	of	the	reaction	to	the	Korea	publicity	on	the	internet	
and	within	the	online	subculture	(Chapter	6)	was	selective	in	terms	of	data	
collection,	sampling	and	analysis.	Although	the	study	did	not	intend	to	conduct	a	
full-fledged	online	ethnographic	research,	a	more	detailed	strategy	could	have	been	
learned	from	online	audience	studies	for	a	fuller	picture	of	the	online	activities:	for	
instance,	basic	questions	were	not	answered	but	speculated	due	to	the	lack	of	
ethnographic	research,	such	as	“who	they	are,”	“what	they	do	online	and	in	real	life,”	
“what	they	think	about	social	issues	in	general,”	and	so	on.		
Thirdly,	the	key	ideas	of	a	“culturally”	advanced	nation	and	cultural	
modernity	were	underdeveloped.	While	the	idea	of	an	“advanced	nation”	was	
predicated	on	the	developmental	imaginary,	the	ambivalent	aspects	of	a	“culturally”	
advanced	nation	were	not	fully	investigated	with	regard	to	the	direction	of	South	
Korea’s	modernity.	This	might	be	related	to	the	limited	examination	of	the	idea	of	
“culture”	and	the	cultural	aspects	in	relation	to	nation	branding.		
The	first	future	research	suggestion	is	related	to	this	last	point	of	limitation.	
The	rise	of	Korean	popular	culture,	spearheaded	by	K-pop,	would	be	a	fertile	ground	
to	investigate	the	deployment	of	nation	branding	and	public	diplomacy	and	the	
unfolding	of	the	ideas	such	as	national	prestige	and	the	“culturally”	advanced	nation.		
Secondly,	based	on	the	insights	learned	from	the	examination	of	the	case	of	
South	Korea,	the	research	can	be	expanded	to	include	the	international	politics	of	
	 256 
nation	branding,	public	diplomacy,	and	soft	power	in	East	Asia	and	Southeast	Asia.	
One	possible	direction	is	the	changing	national	image	and	the	increasing	soft	power	
of	South	Korea	(cf.	Chua,	2012).	Another	direction	is	relevant	to	examine	the	shift	
and	turmoil	in	regional	geopolitics	due	to	the	rise	of	China	as	superpower,	the	
remilitarization	of	Japan,	the	nuclear	armament	of	North	Korea,	and	the	increasing	
strategic	significance	of	Southeast	Asia.		
The	third	suggestion	is	historical	research.	The	notion	of	nation	branding	
itself	was	short-lived	and	tied	to	neoliberalism,	but	the	notion	can	be	connected	to	
the	history	of	international	relations	and	contribute	to	the	study	of	propaganda	and	
cultural	diplomacy	during	the	Cold	War	era	and	beyond.		
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